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Abstract 
 
Aid information management systems (AIMS) have been implemented in aid-
receiving countries with the hope that they will enable donors and recipient 
governments to share aid information, enhance data governance and aid 
coordination among stakeholders. Despite the global popularity of data-driven 
development initiatives and heavy investment in AIMS, many systems have not 
fulfilled the expected outcomes. This research seeks to explain this failure from an 
information systems perspective.  
 
Building on a historical overview of AIMS implementation, I first develop an 
understanding of how such systems evolved and how the visions of aid 
effectiveness norms that AIMS inscribed have changed over time alongside the 
shifting global aid governance. This overview clearly shows that, in many cases, 
AIMS did not attain the result anticipated, and often failed to reach sustainability.  
 
I then investigate this sustainability failure, through an interpretive case study of 
Indonesian AIMS. I trace the change of international and domestic aid governance 
that shaped the unique context of AIMS in the emerging economy. Investigating 
the role of state actor, I argue that understanding the failure of AIMS requires a shift 
of attention from the process of aid management within a country to the global level. 
It needs to be seen as a result of macro-level events occurring in the global field of 
aid. In the dynamics of global power relations, the role of technology is 
multifaceted—a mixture of managerial and rationalizing, as well as symbolic and 
political roles.  
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
1.1. Research Area and Objective of Research 
 
This research investigates the role of information systems in recipient countries. 
The question of aid effectiveness has been raised in the international aid arena and 
has generated intense academic debate over the past decades (Moyo 2008; Easterly 
2006; Sachs 2005; Burnside & Dollar 2004). A lack of transparency and aid 
coordination among stakeholders has been widely discussed as the main 
impediment to aid effectiveness. The story of a girl who had received the measles 
vaccination three times by different donor organizations after the Tsunami in 
Indonesia, is a clear example of aid management failure (El Pais, 2005)1. The 
general consensus arising from the debate is that sharing basic aid information on 
‘who is doing what and where’ is a prerequisite for better effectiveness.  
 
Based on the plethora of research and international calls for effective aid, the donor 
countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) built significant momentum and reached a major milestone – the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD) in 2005 (OECD 2005). This has been the 
most authoritative principle and practical road-map for improving aid quality, 
imposing commitments to share aid information on stakeholders and spreading aid 
effectiveness norms in the global field of aid.  
 
Against this background, a number of information and communication technology 
(ICT) applications, commonly referred to by the generic term of aid information 
management systems (AIMS), have been implemented in many aid-receiving 
countries with the hopes of bringing donors and recipient governments together in 
order to open and share geo-coded aid data, and to enhance the process of 
information rationalization for better aid. Over the last two decades, the use of 
                                                 
1 El Pais, Demasiado Dinero en Banda Aceh, April 13, 2005. quoted in Djankov, Montalvo, and 
Reynal-Querol (2009) "Aid with multiple personalities", Journal of Comparative Economics 37(2), 
217-229.  
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information systems in aid management has been informed by the idea that new 
technologies (computerization, web-based, open data) not only contribute to 
managerial effectiveness, but also change the nature of aid governance towards 
open development (Smith & Reilly 2014). Despite the global popularity of AIMS 
and the rapid diffusion with considerable investment accelerated by the Paris 
Declaration, the vision and rhetoric inscribed by AIMS have not been translated 
into reality in many cases.  
 
In spite of the abundance of ‘good practice’ studies mainly published by 
multinational development agencies (MDAs), little critical research has been 
conducted on the role of information systems in aid management. Within existing 
research, many studies adopt a managerial and technically rational perspective to 
offer normative suggestions to finding an optimal process of AIMS implementation 
in developing countries. This instrumental view has often been favoured by 
powerful donors and MDAs, who play an important role as norm entrepreneurs. 
However, information systems scholars have criticized a-contextual and 
universalistic views of ICT in developing countries, as well as their prioritization 
of developers (innovators) over adopters (imitators) in general. Addressing this gap 
in the literature, this study conceptualizes AIMS as a socio-technical system 
embedded in the global field of aid, and seeks to provide an institutional account of 
their diffusion and failure.   
 
1.2. Motivation and Problem Area 
 
Before introducing my research project, I will briefly explain my motivation for 
this study and elaborate on the knowledge that I would like to contribute to the 
broader debate. The original insight for the research question was conceived during 
my previous work as a computer teacher at Arusha Technical College in Tanzania 
from 2004 to 2007. Working closely with the local people, I realized that the most 
significant problem of development projects is the lack of transparency and 
coordination. I often observed duplicate projects being carried out by a number of 
donors in the small town where I lived.  
14 
I conveyed these concerns to the Innovation Labs at the World Bank, where I was 
involved in the ‘Open Aid Partnership’. This initiative shares aid data with other 
donors under a common mapping platform based on the Bank’s open data initiative, 
visualizing all the Bank-financed projects. The opportunity to be involved in the 
Partnership, as well as to work closely with local government officials gave me a 
unique vantage point to witness the global popularity of ICT initiatives in the hope 
of improving aid transparency, coordination and citizens’ participation in the 
development process: the idea commonly referred to as open development (Smith 
& Reilly 2014; Linders 2013). 
 
However, it was not long until I realized that what was carried out in the field was 
far from what was originally expected. Information sharing based on open data 
initiatives became a norm that recipient governments were forced to follow. Similar 
to when the ‘good governance’ agenda was added to aid conditionality for 
developing countries in the 1990s (Santiso 2001; Nanda 2006), the new norm of 
data-driven development initiative put big burdens on the recipient government to 
report information by deadlines, and to match aid data with the donors’ data set 
despite the country’s limited statistical and financial capacity. More importantly, 
donors were not very active in sharing their aid data in many cases. This greatly 
undermined the sustainability of systems, which could potentially result in 
inefficient aid targeting and a lack of coordination.  
 
Furthermore, the evaluation of donor-driven ICT initiatives from different 
stakeholders yielded contradictory results. Around 2012, the Kenya Open Data 
Initiative, in which I was involved, had been considered a successful model by the 
World Bank (World Bank 2012; World Bank 2014b). However, what I witnessed 
from the field was very different. In spite of the excitement when the ribbon was 
cut at the luxurious launching ceremony in Nairobi in 2011, it quickly lost its 
position as a symbolic leader in ICT innovation (Brown 2013; Oriko 2013). The 
Electronic Project Monitoring Information Systems (eProMIS), the AIMS 
implemented in Kenya, initially designed to be compatible with the Kenya Open 
Data Portal, had not been updated in many months. This enabled me to observe 
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different interpretations constructed by each stakeholder, and to question the hidden 
dynamics surrounding technology-based development projects embedded in 
complex donor-recipient relationships. The assumptions and technological feature 
of most other AIMS were similar to the one employed in Kenya. Thus, I became 
worried that these initiatives might follow suit and fade away, as yet another fad. 
 
This was a déjà vu – a flashback to my days in East Africa. There were several 
‘pump’ projects with considerable investment across the continent. One of the most 
popular donor-driven projects was ‘Play Pump’, in which children could play 
‘merry-go-round’ and simultaneously have water pumped. The idea was simple, 
intuitive, and thus powerful. Many people were easily excited by the idea and 
acquiesced. People believed that implementation of this simple logic could be a 
cure-all for multiple problems—a  lack of clean water (sanitation), a lack of 
electricity to run an electric pump (sustainability), women working hard to get water 
(gender equality), and girls not being able to attend schools because they help their 
mothers (education).   
 
In spite of the promises, most pumps became problematic and the excitement faded 
over time. I revisited the region after four years. The pumps were replaced by yet 
another fancier technology, the ‘solar-thermodynamic pump 2  with solar panels 
across East African countries. I observed how the same patterns repeatedly emerged 
overtime: excitement over new technologies with universal ideas in development, 
explosive initial attention, and huge investments followed by quick diffusion across 
different contexts and states. Something would go wrong, create a negative cycle, 
and fail. However, there was no reflection either. The problems witnessed above 
are neither purely technological nor solely politico-economic. It is against this 
background that I decided to focus my thesis on the role information systems in the 
aid sector and to prevent yet another déja-vu experience from occurring.  
                                                 
2 http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/water/brief/solar-pumping 
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1.3. Research Project 
 
1.3.1. Theoretical Concepts 
 
My study broadly addresses the research area of ICT and development (ICTD), a 
multidisciplinary field that integrates information systems (IS), development 
studies, and other relevant fields (Walsham & Sahay 2006; Avgerou 2010; Heeks 
2006). More narrowly, this thesis investigates the role of AIMS in recipient 
countries. The study at hand conceptualizes AIMS as a socio-technical system, in 
which diverse stakeholders’ interests and different interpretation of technology 
inevitably collide. Building on a practical definition by multilateral development 
agencies (MDAs) (UNDP 2010; OECD & UNDP 2006), for the purpose of this 
study  I define AIMS as: 
 
A national-level, single-window information system implemented in a given 
recipient country, to assist the government to manage aid effectively and bring 
development partners to share aid information and better coordinate.   
 
The three main theoretical concepts developed in this thesis are development, aid, 
and technology, which I identify as being closely linked to each other. Highlighting 
the plurality of competing concepts of development, as well as the political nature 
of foreign aid, this study sheds light on the insufficient attention paid to the macro 
dynamics of aid in ICTD research. Special attention is paid to global aid 
governance, particularly the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD) signed in 
2005, as an account of locally situated meanings and behaviours of information 
systems in the aid sector would only be partially-explained without investigating 
the influence of the global aid structure. While most of the previous empirical 
research has been conducted on IS adoption in the public sector of a single state, 
commonly referred to as e-government, there have been insufficient discussions on 
the role of IS in the context of international aid.  
 
To address these gaps, this study “adopt[s] a transdisciplinary perspective, seeing 
their contribution as potentially important but respecting and engaging with the 
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perspectives from other disciplinary fields” (Walsham 2017). The conceptual 
framework is informed by two broad theories: a theory of institutions, and a theory 
of technology. Reflecting on the intellectual interplay between sociological 
institutionalism and international relations (IR), I employ the constructivist IR view 
of norm dynamics as the conceptual framework for this thesis. Three analytical foci 
are elaborated upon: field (global field of aid), norms (aid effectiveness) and the 
role of state (recipient country) to understand the apparent sustainability failure of 
information systems (Richard Heeks 2002a). Building on this basis, my thesis aims 
at extending the use of socio-technical theories towards understanding information 
systems (IS) to the global aid sector, while simultaneously investigating IS failure 
in developing countries.  
 
In this thesis, I narrowly focus on the sustainability failure of IS and conceptualize 
it as:   
 
A permanent shutdown of IS, which were once implemented, used, but abandoned 
after a relatively short period (such as three years after the launch), without any 
transformation, considerable left-over innovation or thoughtful reflection, e.g. 
evaluation study, report for future innovation.  
 
Existing research often conceptualizes IS failure in developing countries as a micro-
situated struggle, thereby paying insufficient attention to the role of global aid 
institutions. This study argues that understanding the sustainability failure of IS in 
developing countries requires a shift in focus from the project’s local context, to the 
overarching macro-level dynamic in the global field of aid. The role of technology 
in the power dynamics of global aid relations is identified as being multi-faceted: a 
mixture of functional and managerial, as well as political and symbolic dimensions. 
Thus, the thesis contributes to the broader understanding of technology as offering 
socially constructed meanings and reality.  
 
I identify two specific contexts related to this study: firstly, the context of recipient 
countries in which the use of information systems are socially embedded (Avgerou 
2001); secondly, the context of global aid, where stakeholders’ vision and politico-
economic interests unavoidably coincide beyond the state level. This study argues 
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that any explanation of locally situated actions and interpretations of AIMS in 
recipient countries would be insufficient without taking the macro level power 
dynamics in the global field of aid into consideration. Elaborating on the 
institutional change in aid governance at both the local and global level, the thesis 
highlights the role of the state as an agency in the changing landscape of global aid.  
 
A summary of the key objects of study that I bring together in the research questions 
is presented in Table 1-1.  
 
Object of 
study 
Analytical focus  Theoretical link  
Information 
systems  
 
 
Role: What are the roles of IS 
in aid sector?  
Socio-technical perspective: 
social shaping of technology 
(MacKenzie & Wajcman 1999), 
embeddedness   
Failure: How can 
sustainability failure of IS be 
defined?   
Sustainability failure (R Heeks 
2002), social shaping of IS failure 
(Wilson & Howcroft 2002) 
Norm  Norm dynamics: How have 
norms emerged and been 
institutionalized in the global 
field?  
Sociological institutionalism: 
institutional isomorphism 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983), 
norm dynamics (Finnemore & 
Sikkink 1998) 
State State’s action: What is the role 
of the states in resisting, 
localizing global norms; in 
implementing, using and 
abandoning IS?   
IR Constructivist view: norm 
localization and subsidiarity 
(Acharya 2004; Acharya 2011) 
 
Table 1-1. Objects of Study 
 
1.3.2. Research Questions 
 
My doctoral research was conducted to answer the following two key questions, 
which are theoretically informed by theories of institutions and theories of 
technology:  
 
 how the global diffusion of aid information management systems (AIMS) 
can be understood?   
 
19 
 why do AIMS often fail in sustainability?  
 
As summarized in Table 1-1, the following sub-questions arise:  
 
 How has a particular norm (aid effectiveness), envisioned by a particular 
theoretical assumption (rational-choice) emerged, reached a tipping point 
(Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005) and become 
institutionalized in the global field (field of aid)?  
 
 In this process, whose norms matter? Who has the power to drive the norms 
(norm entrepreneurs) and rules (global aid principles)? 
 
 How has a particular technology (AIMS) been promoted and diffused to 
reproduce a set of norms, rules and symbolic meanings?  
  
 In this process, what roles can the state (recipient country) play in norm 
resistance, localization, and subsidiarity?   
 
 How is technology resisted, implemented, used, and abandoned by the state 
actors?  
 
 In this process, how do we understand the multifaceted roles of technology?  
 
 What implications and empirical transferability can be drawn from the case 
of Indonesia.    
 
1.3.3. Research Design 
 
In developing a research design with which to answer these questions, I have chosen 
a two-stage methodology to answer each question at hand. Developing 
methodological rigour has been an iterative process, involving continuous revisiting 
of the theories and data collected.   
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A Study of the Global Diffusion of AIMS  
 
The first stage investigates the global adoption of AIMS over the last two decades 
(Section 4.3). Understanding how AIMS is adopted and locally enacted in 
developing countries would not be possible without taking into account the origin 
of AIMS, and global influences surrounding it. Thus, the thesis first seeks to 
understand the global diffusion of AIMS. Building on a historical overview of 
AIMS, it explores how norms of aid effectiveness and AIMS emerge and evolve in 
the global field of aid.  
 
Following the category of the List of the OECD Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) Recipient (OECD, 2016), this study identified 80 AIMS cases implemented 
in 71 developing countries over the last two decades. Tracing the history of aid 
effectiveness norms and the global adoption of AIMS, the analysis offers an 
understanding of the evolution and the main rhetoric inscribed in AIMS, and how 
it has changed over time. The findings highlight the complexity of problems 
surrounding AIMS, and particularly show that in many cases, AIMS have not 
achieved the result expected, have often failed to reach sustainability and have 
consequently shut down (36 cases, 45%). This leads to the second key question: 
Why do AIMS fail in sustainability in recipient countries?   
 
Introducing the Case Study  
 
In the second stage, I conducted an interpretive single case study to answer the 
arising question. This thesis adopts an interpretive case study of an AIMS in 
Indonesia – the national-level aid management system, which was implemented in 
2010, used, and finally abandoned in 2013. It was financially supported by the 
German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ) and managed by the Indonesian 
Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas). The Indonesian AIMS 
was implemented under the tenure of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(SBY)’s administration (2004-2014), when domestic aid governance experienced a 
series of changes under the focus on ‘ownership’, (i.e. 2006 Government Regulation 
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No.2/2006 on the Procedures for Receiving and Forwarding Foreign Loans/Grant 
(PP No. 2/2006) and the dissolution in 2007 of the Consultative Group of Indonesia 
(CGI) in 2007, which had served as the donor coordination committee for 16 years). 
However, the government initiated the localization of the global norm of aid 
effectiveness by adopting the Jakarta Commitment in 2009. Under this 
Commitment, the AIMS was implemented as a tool for aid management and better 
coordination.  
 
Highlighting the significance of the political and historical dimension of foreign aid 
that has influenced the transformation of national development policy, the case 
study investigates the sustainability failure of the AIMS involving multiple 
stakeholders at local and macro level, and their relationships in the broad global 
field of aid. By tracing the global aid institutions and the power dynamics of AIMS, 
this thesis identifies that unlike other recipient countries, Indonesia, as a state actor, 
has actively shaped its strategic position in the field of aid while being influenced 
by global aid governance, as well as effectively justifies the implementation and 
abandonment of the AIMS.  
 
There are three reasons that ensure the empirical significance of the study of AIMS 
in Indonesia. First, while many ‘good practice’ studies by MDAs exist, there are 
very few in-depth studies of information systems in aid management from a socio-
technical perspective. In particular, sufficient attention must be paid to the role of 
the state in adopting, localizing and abandoning information systems. Second, 
emerging economies have increasingly played an important role in the global field 
of aid, particularly since the 2007 financial crisis (Addison et al. 2004; Manning 
2006). Indonesia has been the most important actor in the Non-Aligned Movement 
and has expanded its role in South-South Cooperation. Investigating the case of 
Indonesia thereby gives meaningful insights into understanding the role of the state 
as an emerging economy in the global power dynamics of aid. Third, Indonesia has 
implemented an AIMS twice in the recent past: the Recovery Aceh Nias Database 
(RAND) in 2005 for Tsunami recovery, and the Aid Information Management 
Systems (AIMS) in 2010, the latter being the technological object of my case study. 
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This setting also provides the opportunity to investigate how legacy technology 
influences the shaping process of the latter. 
 
The analytical focus is three-fold. First, I have identified the major lacuna of 
‘missing aid’ in ICTD research in Chapter 2 and 3. Thus, reflecting the importance 
of the political nature of aid, the analytical focus is on the global-level dynamics. 
Second, reflecting the lack of understanding on the role of the state in information 
systems failure, specific attention is paid to the role of the state as an agency and 
the historical context of embedded information systems in Chapter 7 and 8. Third, 
from the socio-technical perspective, I focus on the role of technology in the process 
of AIMS implementation and abandonment.  
 
1.4. Thesis Outline 
 
The thesis is organized into ten chapters: Introduction, Literature Review, 
Theoretical Framework, Methodology, two empirical chapters (Chapter 5 and 7 for 
the first main research question), Analysis (Chapter 6 and 8 for the second main 
research question), Discussion, and Conclusion, with several sub-chapters in each 
chapter. 
 
In this Chapter 1, I present the motivation that inspired my work, and highlight the 
problem area that I have identified. Also the chapter provides a brief introduction 
to research questions, theoretical framework, and research design.  
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Figure 1-1. Thesis Outline 
 
Chapter 2 positions my study in the research domain of ICTD and provides the 
literature review, which will constitutes the theoretical background for the research 
inquiry. Three main concepts - development, aid and technology, as well as their 
theoretical linkages, are discussed. The first section briefly outlines some of the key 
theoretical underpinnings of the ICTD research, linking these to existing critiques 
of development and discussing the role of technology in development. The second 
part starts by introducing three major views of aid in International Relations (IR) 
and highlighting the constructivist approach which frames the study. Building on 
the review of the aid effectiveness debate, it identifies the new institutional 
economics approach on aid coordination as a dominant extant theory. The third 
section develops a focused literature review on the role of information and ICT in 
aid sector that can be found in ICTD research, and reviews the theoretical 
perspectives and underlying assumptions. Through this literature review, a research 
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gap is identified. The chapter concludes with a critique of insufficient attention paid 
to the global dynamic of aid in ICTD research, as well as the dominant technical-
rational approach embedded in the development idea and international aid arena.   
 
Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework used in this thesis, which is informed 
by a theory of institutions on adopting technology in developing countries, and a 
theory of technology on its role in aid management in the broad context of global 
aid governance. The chapter first develops an extension of the concept of 
organizational field to the global-level. Identifying the theoretical connection 
between sociological institutionalism and the IR constructivist view, it highlights 
the significant focus on ‘norm dynamics’, and how norms diffuse and influence the 
behaviour of states, between norm localization and subsidiarity. The theory of 
technology grounded in Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Information 
Systems (IS), aims at deepening the understanding of the role of technology in the 
institutional account. Theorizing AIMS as socio-technical systems embedded in the 
global field of aid, where various actors’ vision and politico-economic interests 
inevitably collide, conceptual attention is paid to the role of technology as a 
theatrical construction in which interests act symbolically, thereby constructing 
political meaning. Combining the theoretical discussions in two domains, the 
chapter revisits the broad problem area of the study discussed in the previous 
chapter, and converts it into two main research questions.  
 
Chapter 4 elaborates the research design in this thesis and the methodology utilized 
in the studies. It begins with a discussion on the constructivist epistemology which 
is embodied in the structure of my research, and explores the interpretivism in 
information systems research, applied at the level of research methods. 
Methodological underpinnings are described in two steps: firstly, the explanatory 
study of the AIMS implementations by recipient governments, second, an 
interpretive single case study of Indonesia’s AIMS. In both sections, the methods 
of data collection and analysis, as well as their limitations are discussed. Based on 
an interpretivist approach, combined with a constructivist epistemology, the 
iterative process of the research through the entire period of study is explained.  
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Chapter 5 presents a summary of the findings on the implementations of AIMS 
over the last two decades, empirically showing their global diffusion. In preparation 
for the analysis in the chapters that follow, it provides a snapshot of the proliferation 
of AIMS across a range of recipient countries with varying economic, regional, and 
political contexts. The countries are categorized according to their i) economic 
status, ii) region, and iii) chronology. Based on the findings, the high degree of 
similarity among AIMS is investigated, and the commonalities discussed in relation 
to i) rationale and norms; ii) functionalities, and iii) target users. The findings 
indicate that the shared visions and norms inscribed in AIMS often result in a 
homogeneity in the design, technological functionality and target users across the 
systems. The findings also reveal the existence of two dominant service providers, 
and their possible influence on the homogeneity of systems and the competition in 
implementation is discussed.  
 
Chapter 6 situates AIMS in the global field of aid and analyses the findings with 
reference to the question of their diffusion. Grounded in the institutional account of 
their widespread adoption, this chapter highlights the complexity and failure of 
many AIMS to achieve sustainability by exploring 80 cases of AIMS 
implementation in 71 developing countries. Using Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) 
‘norm dynamic’ framework, the emergence and institutionalisation of aid 
effectiveness norms are traced and analysed, with a discussion on the process 
through which AIMS were globally diffused, and norms, rules, and institutional 
structures of the global aid governance were reproduced. Framed by the concept of 
institutional isomorphism, the emerging global aid governance architecture and 
resultant changes in the inscribed vision of AIMS are examined in three stages of 
technological advancement: PC-based, web-based, and open data based. Also, a 
standardized implementation process, which most cases of AIMS followed, is 
identified. Undoubtedly, AIMS achieved global popularity and significant 
investments were made, however, the research demonstrates that in many instances 
the expected level of use and aid management, were not achieved. Based on the 
findings, 36 cases (46%) failed to achieve sustainability and subsequently ceased to 
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operate. Expanding the concept of ‘sustainability failure’ (Heeks & Kenny, 2002), 
attention is drawn to the need for an in-depth interpretive single case study.  
 
In Chapter 7, the Indonesian case study is presented, and the geopolitical and 
economic context reviewed with specific focus on the significance of historical and 
political nature of foreign aid, which has been instrumental in transforming national 
development policy. Having provided a historical narrative of foreign aid in 
Indonesia, as well as an overview of Indonesia’s aid management mechanism, 
particularly during the tenure of President SBY (2004-2014), this chapter focuses 
on the technological object of empirical field work. The interpretive single case 
study centres on the Aid Information Management System in Indonesia – its 
national-level aid management system, which was implemented in 2010, used, and 
later abandoned in 2013. The chronological narrative of the implementation is 
constructed based on data collection and a general process of AIMS implementation 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
Chapter 8 presents the data analysis of the case study. This chapter, also based on 
the previous three chapters, further integrates the framing of analysis and discusses 
it to answer the research questions. By tracing the global norm dynamics of aid 
effectiveness and the process of AIMS implementation, AIMS are conceptualised 
as a norm-supporting device. I argue that both the adoption and abandonment of 
AIMS can be justified by tracing the norms and power dynamics of global aid and 
by the ways in which Indonesia as a state, not only as a norm taker but also as an 
agency, strategically seeks legitimacy in this institutional change. In the dynamics 
of global power relations, the role of technology is multifaceted – a mixture of 
managerial and rationalizing, as well as symbolic and political roles. The main 
conclusion drawn from this analysis is that the failure of AIMS to achieve 
sustainability in Indonesia must be understood from a macro-level perspective with 
a clear appreciation of the dynamics of institutional changes in the global field of 
aid and the state’s strategic responses.   
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Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter. The chapter presents further discussion from 
the review of AIMS and the case study. It discusses the implications of the findings 
and analysis, as well as the empirical transferability that can be drawn from the case 
of Indonesia. It emphasizes that examining the failure of information systems 
requires a shift of attention from a micro-situated standpoint to the global level, as 
well as what roles an emerging power can play in internalizing, resisting and co-
shaping norms and the aid agenda which future ICT innovations unfold. This also 
contributes to an extension of the existing concept of sustainability failure in the 
field of information systems. This chapter presents contributions that relate to ICTD 
research, methodology and policy, limitations incurred as well as suggestions for 
further study. 
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Chapter 2.  Research Domain and Critical Literature Review 
 
My research lies in the field of information and communication technology (ICT) 
and development (ICTD), a multidisciplinary area that integrates Information 
Systems (IS), Communication Studies and Development Studies (Avgerou 2008; 
Walsham & Sahay 2006; Heeks 2006; Walsham 2017). My thesis broadly addresses 
the role of ICT in foreign aid3 and aims to provide an understanding of the IS failure 
in the global field of aid. This chapter reviews the literature that has informed my 
thesis. The three main concepts developed in this chapter are development, aid, and 
technology, as discussed and interwoven in the four sections below:  
 
 First, this chapter offers a brief overview of ICTD research and positions 
my study in the research domain.  
 
 Second, I provide an overview of the evolution of development theory and 
the role of technology as according to various theoretical perspectives of 
development. It highlights the plurality of visions related to development 
and theories in ICTD. The section concludes with the recognition of the 
insufficient attention to the macro context, particularly concerning the role 
of global aid governance in ICTD research.  
 
 Third, Section 2.3 starts by defining key terms of aid. It reviews theories of 
aid based on theoretical insights from International Relations (IR) with an 
emphasis on the importance of the political characteristics of aid.  It then 
narrows the focus to the concept of ‘aid effectiveness’, and examines how 
                                                 
3  I acknowledge there is on-going debate over an appropriateness of the terms 'foreign aid', 
‘development assistance’, ‘development cooperation’. The term ‘foreign aid’ has been criticized of 
its 'donor-centric' connotation as well as unclear distinction between development purpose and 
others such as military and security purpose (Breuning 2002). Recently, in particular, having the 
transformation of Aid Effectiveness Forum into a new international aid governance 'Global 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC)'in early 2010s, the term ‘development 
cooperation’ is increasingly being used by development practitioners in the field of global aid. Aid 
scholars, however, still mainly use 'foreign aid'. I also found the term most appropriate in this study 
to explain a broad phenomenon around aid mechanism. See the Section 2.3.1 for more discussion. 
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the relationship between aid and development has been studied, and what 
the dominant extant theories in the domain are.   
 
 Fourth, the last section discusses the role of aid information and ICT in the 
aid effectiveness debate. It reviews the existing studies and addresses the 
lacunae in the dominant technical rational perspective to be further 
discussed by theories of technology grounded in Information Systems (IS) 
and Science and Technology Studies (STS) in Chapter 3.   
 
2.1. Information and Communication Technology and Development (ICTD) 
 
As an established independent research domain, ICTD is concerned with the role 
of ICT in achieving development in general. Of course, scholars in various 
disciplines have discussed the potential effect of ICT in society, explaining it 
through such diverse angles and terms as ‘post-industrial society’ (Bell 1974), 
‘information economy’ (Porat 1977) ‘the third wave’ (Toffler 1984), ‘network 
society’ (Castells 1996), and ‘knowledge-based economy’ (OECD 1996b), as well 
as the recent debate on an era of ‘data revolution’ (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier 
2013; Kitchin 2014) and the fourth industrial revolution  (Schwab 2016).  
 
Although such arguments emanate from theoretical backgrounds and perspectives, 
scholars identify enough shared features to consider ICT as one of the most 
influential factors shaping our current society. Most of the arguments, however, are 
criticized on two bases: first, their techno-optimism which often exaggerates the 
deterministic power of technology to bring about revolutionary social 
transformation and a paradigmatic shift in our society, and second, their Western-
centric focus, which mainly draw on technological advancement in developed 
countries while failing to consider the contexts of developing countries. Webster’s 
analysis is one of the indispensable critiques of the existing social theories of an 
‘information society’. He differentiates between theories which argue that there has 
been a departure from a previous ‘modern’ society towards a completely different 
world, such as Bell and Castells, and those who emphasize continuity of the 
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previous economic, social and institutional arrangements in the present era. He is 
critical of the former for its technological determinism, but relates to the latter, 
agreeing with Schiller (1995), who views ‘informatization’ as a consequence of the 
existing capitalist structure and focuses on politico-economic factors such as 
stratification hierarchy, market mechanism and power relationships.  
 
Likewise, the role of ICT in international development has been widely discussed 
in the broad field of ICTD, which closely relates to Information Systems (IS), 
Human Computer Interaction (HCI), Development Studies, as well as the 
Engineering field. Although the terminological origin of ICTD is unclear, the 
Maitland Report, ‘The Missing Link: Report of the Independent Commission for 
World Wide Telecommunications Development’, published by International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), is one of the very early discussions of ICTD (ITU 
1984). Since then, such research has been referred to in slightly different terms, 
such as ICT4D, ICTD, information systems in developing countries (ISDC), 
development informatics, and most recently, digital development.  
 
Although I use the term ICTD to refer to the academic discipline in this study, the 
most common term seems to be ICT4D which has been used globally4. Indeed, 
ICT4D, as an academic discipline, encompasses diverse approaches including the 
socio-technical perspective, which is further discussed in Chapter 3. However, the 
term itself has arguably been criticized for its technologically deterministic notion 
both in academia and in practice. Some scholars and practitioners, for example, in 
the biannual ICTD5 conference, deliberately removed ‘for’ in favour of ‘and’ which 
has a ‘neutral’ meaning of interaction (Merritt 2012). Also, ‘ICT4D’ does not 
appear in the 2016 World Development Report ‘Digital Dividends’, one of the 
seminal annual works in international development, and has been replaced by the 
concept of ‘digital development’ in other works (Heeks 2016; UNCSTD 2015).  
 
                                                 
4  For example, the World Summit on Information Societies (WSIS) and the United Nations 
Information and Communication Technologies Task Force (UN ICT TF) established in 2001.  
5 The first conference ICTD2006 was held in UC Berkeley in USA. ICTD 2017 will be held in 
Pakistan in November 2017.  
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Apart from the terminological debate, ICTD has been a core issue in both academia 
and practice. In particular, such reductions in the cost of technological advancement 
that occurred over the last two decades have led to the global diffusion of ICTs in 
developing countries. One of the most remarkable changes is the phenomenal 
growth in the usage of mobile phones and broadband connectivity in developing 
countries, which reflects ICT’s rapid globalization. Mobile phone subscriptions 
have increased dramatically in Sub-Saharan Africa, skyrocketing from below 10% 
in 2004 to the forecasted 73% in 20146. Governments in developing countries are 
also increasingly connected to the Web, and are considered even more digitalised 
than the private sector.7 It is clear that ICT is now widely used in most organizations 
around the world.  
 
In spite of the proliferation of ICTs and popular ‘best practice’ types of ICTD 
studies, which mainly driven by international organizations such as the World 
Bank, UNDP and ITU, there is still a major lacuna in theorizing concrete the link 
between ICT and development (Avgerou 2010; Heeks 2006; Walsham & Sahay 
2006; Qureshi 2015). Critics focus primarily on two main concepts, namely 
technology and development. Building on Orlikowski and Iacono’s compelling 
argument that insufficient focus on theorizing IT artefacts had been placed 
particularly in the field of IS, scholars have attempted to conceptualize the IT 
artefacts themselves in their implementation and usage (Orlikowski & Iacono 
2002).  
 
Yet another stream of critics focuses on the link between ICT and development, 
which is complex and multifaceted with various socio-economic and institutional 
factors. The gaps mainly originate from the different theoretical assumptions and 
foundations on development, like in what way and according to which terms 
                                                 
6 World Development Report (2016)  
7 World Development Report (2016, p.6) “By 2014, all 193 member states of the United Nations 
(UN) had national websites: 101 enabled citizens to create personal online accounts, 73 to file 
income taxes, and 60 to register a business. For the most common core government administrative 
systems, 190 member states had automated financial management, 179 used such systems for 
customs processing, and 159 for tax management. And 148 of them had some form of digital 
identification, and 20 had multipurpose digital identification platforms”. 
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development should be viewed. As Walsham and Sahay (2006) observe, a precise 
notion of what development implies and how ICTs can contribute to development 
is underemphasized in much of the existing ICTD literature. Avgerou (2010) argues 
that most ICTD research avoids engaging with controversies on development and 
calls for an active discussion on the ‘D’ in ICTD studies.  
 
In addition to these arguments brought forward, I argue that insufficient attention 
has been paid to ‘aid’ in ICTD research. Foreign aid is commonly considered to be 
the most direct means of achieving arguably its ultimate goal, ‘development’, in 
developing countries. Furthermore, donors’ aid policies and international aid 
governance have undergone a series of institutional changes over time and based 
on different philosophical assumptions about development. Thus, there is an 
inextricable link between development and aid. Again, this research broadly 
addresses the role of information systems in the field of foreign aid. Accordingly, 
development, aid, and technology are closely linked to each other and discussed in 
this chapter.  
 
 
Figure 2-1.Missing ‘Aid’ in ICTD Research-Structure of the Sector’s View of ICT 
and Development8 
                                                 
8 Single arrow between ‘technology’ and ‘aid’ as well as ‘technology’ and ‘development’ is an 
emphasis of a dominant technological determinism in the fields. Conversely, the double arrow 
between ‘aid’ and ‘development’ reflects relatively balanced view between the two concepts. 
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Having reviewed the existing literature, the following three sections discuss the 
relationship between technology and development (2.2); aid and development 
(2.3); and technology and aid (effectiveness) (2.4) as illustrated in Figure 2-1. The 
Figure highlights ‘missing aid’, the current lacuna of ICTD research. The single 
arrow between ‘technology’ and ‘aid’ as well as ‘technology’ and ‘development’ is 
an emphasis of a dominant technological determinism in the fields. Conversely, the 
double arrow between ‘aid’ and ‘development’ reflects the relatively balanced view 
between the two concepts. 
 
2.2. Technology and Development 
 
2.2.1. Meaning of Development and the Role of ICT 
 
The importance of ‘development’ in ICTD research has been acknowledged by a 
variety of scholars. Avgerou (2010) points out that every ICTD research makes 
specific theoretical assumptions about the ‘nature of the process of development’. 
Prakash and De’ (2007) emphasize the importance of the ‘development context’ in 
practice as well, as it influences the design of ICTD projects and determines the 
purpose they serve. However, the meaning and context of ‘development’ has been 
a major debate and remains a moving target. The global-historical context for 
development and international aid governance has been changing over time (Desai 
& Potter 2014). Therefore, before looking at ICTD, we need to ask the fundamental 
question: what is meant by ‘development’ in the first place? Building on an 
understanding of the various theoretical notions of development and how it has 
evolved over time, this section discusses how scholars view the role of ICT in 
different developmental frameworks.  
 
Most development studies regard modernization theory, which flourished during 
and after World War II, as the earliest theoretical approach to development (Pieterse 
2010; Leys 1996).In fact, very early discourses on development centred primarily 
on domestic economic growth at the national level. Although Classical Economics 
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discussed economic growth, the term ‘development’ was not used (Arndt 1981). 
Adam Smith, for example, spoke not of economic development, but of the 
‘progress’ towards ‘opulence’ and ‘improvement’. After World War II, when the 
post-war aid programs began, the term ‘economic development’, defined as ‘growth 
in per capita income’, featured prominently in debates. The economist, Rostow 
(1960), in his influential book The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto, introduces the concept of ‘stages of growth’ and describes development 
as a displacement of traditional society and as a linear and universal trajectory that 
developing countries have to follow for their economic prosperity.  
 
Although the concept of modernization originates with ‘stratification’ and 
‘functionalism’ in early sociological works, the theory has mainly been discussed 
in the field of Economics (Schrank 2015; Kang 2014). In this view, the study of 
economics was thought to be, at least normatively, separate from politics. Looking 
at the early structure of the UN, economics is an issue for the UN Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) while political and security issues, on the other hand, 
are only insulated to a degree from the politics of the Cold War and dealt with within 
the Security Council and General Assembly. The situation relating to the twin 
organizations of Bretton Woods, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank, was similar. The Bank’s grant and loan activities remained 
financial, and economic matters did not take any political impact into account. 
These structural divides contributed to the idea that development is an apolitical 
matter. As the World Bank President Jim Yong Kim recently asserted “we are 
forbidden from engaging in politics, it is our unique stance.”9 This legacy still 
seems to resonate. Yet, the real story of national government is a little different. 
Even Rostow himself, in his influential role as a National Security Advisor and 
Counsellor of the US State Department during the Vietnam War, engaged with 
international political issues and applied the theoretical assumption of 
modernization in development policy. Development, therefore, was not only 
concerned with hope for economic prosperity in developing countries, but also for 
                                                 
9  At his speech, where I attended, ‘Rethinking Development Finance’ at London School of 
Economics (LSE) on 11 April, 2017 
35 
developed countries, for which development was viewed as a means of promoting 
security and achieving political gains.  
 
Critiques of modernization also came from dependency theory which thrived in the 
Latin American and African context in the 1970s. Dependence theory sheds light 
on the alternative perspective that economic growth in a given developing country 
(periphery) depends on its position within the hierarchy and power relations of 
exploitative international capitalism, which is arguably driven by rich Western 
countries (core). Dependency theory had its shortcomings and failed to sustain its 
influential position; however, a couple of its insights and contributions still remain 
valid. First, it rejects a linear and universal progression of development, and instead 
perceives ‘underdeveloped’ to be a constitutive element of development (Kapoor & 
Kapoor 2002). Second, it influenced the conceptualization of the unity of the ‘world 
system’ (Wallerstein 1974), which emphasizes the structural and  historical 
approach to development.  
 
There are two main ideas that both modernization theory and dependency theory 
share. Firstly, their perspective on development is still ‘state-led’. Secondly, they 
share the view that technology contributes to national economic growth by 
promoting productivity, industrialization, and mass production. Early study of the 
role of technology in development also focused on its contribution to economic 
growth. Building on the notion of modernization, the early neo-classical economic 
framework formulated by Solow (1956) argued that technology can boost labour 
productivity and competitiveness within a market regime. The role of ICT known 
then as telecommunication technology in economic development was widely 
studied in the 1980s (Hardy 1980; Cronin et al. 1993). In particular, scholars 
highlighted inconsistencies between measures of investment in ICT and measures 
of output, popularly known as the ‘productivity paradox’ (Brynjolfsson 1993; 
David 2000). Despite the neoclassical orthodoxy that office automation (OA) can 
boost labour productivity, macroeconomic research on the relationship between 
computerization and productivity used empirical evidence to demonstrate that as 
ICT became ubiquitous, there was a massive slow-down in growth. One explanation 
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emphasizes the complexity in designing, implementing and maintaining IT 
artefacts, and argues that productivity can be particularly lower in the public sector 
where services are priced at cost without value added (Brown 2015; Pilat 2005).   
 
The introduction of the ‘basic needs’ approach in the 1970s was the first big shift 
in viewing development from a macro-economic progress to focus on poverty 
reduction. Over time, macro-economic growth oriented perspectives on 
development were often challenged. The first oil shock in 1973, followed by the 
food crisis and recession in African and developing countries, led the move away 
from national infrastructure projects towards poverty reduction projects in rural 
areas such as water, health, and agriculture (Moyo 2008). This constitutes a clear 
departure from modernization’s ‘trickle-down’ approach. Building on this focus on 
micro-level poverty at the individual level, the shift led to redefining goals of 
development projects in international organizations, contributing to an emphasis on 
non-economic aspects. The famous phrase ‘small is beautiful’, also the title of 
Schumacher’s book demonstrates this shift in thinking. The concept of appropriate 
technology emerged as a small-scale, energy efficient and contextual technological 
solution (Schumacher 1973; Kaplinsky 2011). With the rise of the appropriate 
technology movement, the focus on local context and design based on indigenous 
knowledge were gradually adopted. Indeed, having a very unstable economic 
situation as a result of two oil shocks in the 1970s, the international development 
field experienced an explosion of visions on development including ‘basic needs’, 
‘appropriate technology’, ‘sustainable development’, ‘gender and development’ 
and so on.  
 
In the 1980s, the neoliberal framework, also known as the Washington Consensus, 
became dominant in the development debate. The ‘free market-led’ vision 
emphasizes economic liberalization, which supposedly promotes greater 
engagement by the private sector through deregulation, privatization and a minimal 
role for state actors. The World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Reform (SAP) forced 
developing countries to dramatically curtail government control over the domestic 
economy while reducing regulation of the private sector and opening up their 
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markets to multinational enterprises. ICTD projects were often part of the wider 
SAP and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Practically and theoretically, 
ICTs were perceived to be a good tool for market efficiency and ‘good governance’, 
the vision intertwined with the rise of the neoliberal view and globalization. There 
is an underlying assumption that ICT can eliminate the cost of communication for 
globalization, promoting market efficiency for macroeconomic growth. This 
assumption, however, has been criticized within both Economics and ICTD studies. 
Economists criticize the lack of evidence of the effect of ICT on macro-economics; 
for example, Dewan and Kraemer (2000) say that “returns to capital IT investment 
are not significant while returns to non-IT capital investment are significant”. In 
addition, ICTD scholar criticizes ‘tool-and effect’ relations and highlights a 
particular social and organizational context in developing countries (Avgerou 2003; 
Walsham & Sahay 2006; Avgerou & Walsham 2000).  
 
In spite of their alleged differences, ‘state-led’ modernization and ‘market-led’ 
neoliberal approaches share a common conception of development as ‘catch-up’ 
and ‘leapfrogging,’ which hypothesizes that developing countries can avoid an 
inferior, less-efficient stage of development and ‘catch-up’ with a faster economic 
growth rate by ‘leapfrogging’ through technological innovation (Rogers, 1962). In 
this view, a lot of attention is given to efficiency gains and socio-economic 
improvements resulting from ICT-based practice classified by Avgerou as “transfer 
and diffusion with progressive transformation” (Avgerou 2010). This shared 
conception has also been criticized due to its lack of attention to local contexts and 
technological determinism, an “uncritical stance towards capitalist relations of 
wage-labour and competition” (Burkett 2003).  
 
Similarly, the post-developmentalist school, also influenced by dependency theory, 
argues that the universal concept of development can be closely linked to the 
emergence of neoliberalism. For example, the popular notion of ‘knowledge for 
development 10 mirrors the neoliberal view that information and knowledge in 
development can be transferred from the Western to the poor, and often has been 
                                                 
10
 Also it is the title of World Development Report in 1998.  
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used to justify the search for new markets for developed economies 
(Narayanaswamy 2013). Escobar (2011:279) criticizes an exclusive reliance on 
“one knowledge systems, namely the modern Western one” in international 
development and calls for the supply of information and knowledge in development 
by the global South. Similarly, scholars call into question the Western-Northern 
hegemony on ICT throughout the rest of the world. Wade (2002) argues that ICTs 
and their international standards could lead to a ‘new form of dependency.’ ICTD 
scholars often criticize ‘technology transfer’ and the rationalist notion of knowledge 
and information for being measurable and universal as opposed to ‘situated’ 
(Avgerou 2003; Madon et al. 2009).  
 
Perhaps the most influential alternative approach that challenges the neoliberal 
vision may be Amartya Sen’s (1999)’s ‘capabilities approach’. Sen argues that 
economic development is only one of many means of achieving human 
development. As opposed to the utilitarian perspective, which views development 
as an increase in the total sum of people’s happiness, Sen’s notion of ‘development 
as freedom’ combines Rawls’ concept of ‘primary social goods’ and ‘utility 
equality’, and defines poverty as deprivation of capability. Capability in this context 
refers to the ability of a person to do what he/she does and envisions according to 
their expectations of what constitutes a valuable life. Sen’s work has been reflected 
in many contemporary development agendas including the launch of the Human 
Development Report (HDR) that is published annually by UNDP since 1990, 
emphasizing the ‘functionings’ suggested by Sen, including health, education and 
income, and the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) followed by the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These goals have become internationally 
accepted as a normative framework of development (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme 2011). 
This reflects important shifts in how the concept of poverty is defined, how each 
aid project is designed, and what the role of international community to achieve 
development can be. The constructivist school of thought in IR, rooted in 
sociological institutionalism, to be discussed in greater detail in Section 2.3.2 and 
3.1, often seeks to explain the power dynamics in this change and how the new 
norm emerges and is institutionalized in the arena of international politics.  
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Sen’s capability approach and human development perspective contributes three 
significant insights which allow for a reconceptualization of poverty and 
development. First, it calls for a multi-dimensional approach to development. 
Second, it argues that development is a “process of expanding the real freedoms 
people enjoy,” and gives insight that views development as a process rather than as 
an activity. Third, Sen argues that even the income-based poverty line must differ, 
because contexts change across countries. However, the capability approach has 
been criticized for both theoretical and practical reasons, including its 
individualistic position and measurement challenges. To remedy its individualistic 
position, scholars (Evans 2002; Alkire 2002) later proposed ‘collective capability’ 
as a concept, and tried to integrate a social level of development by adopting the 
social capital approach (Putnam 2000). In addition, much effort has been directed 
towards elaborating multidimensional poverty measurement (Alkire 2002; Alkire 
& Foster 2008).  
 
One of the contributions of capability approach is the shift of focus from the ICT 
infrastructure to its impact on socio-economic development. As previously 
discussed, a common underlying assumption of early ICTD research was that 
developing countries have a disadvantage in ICT access and suffer from a ‘digital 
divide’, which lead to a new form of inequality. The early studies conceptualised 
the digital divide as a narrow concept of access to information and technology, and 
view technology as an instrument to addressing the gap. Later, the theoretical 
concept of digital divide extends beyond information access to ‘digital inequality’ 
(DiMaggio & Hargittai 2001) as well as  embraced the broader aspects of human 
development, applying ICT for social well-being, education, health, women’s 
rights, social exclusion, and participation in democracy and social inequality 
(Hamel 2010; Madon et al. 2009). An example of includes Madon's (2004) work, 
which offers a thoughtful example of the theoretical application of the capability 
approach11 in ICT and governance.  
 
                                                 
11 To be more discussed in the following section.  
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In this study, I do not adopt any particular theoretical assumption of development 
as a single conceptual framework to conduct research. The most important lessons 
that I would like to take from this short historical review of development as well as 
the discussion on foreign aid in the following sections, are the recognition of the 
plurality in development and the importance of political characteristics of 
development. Development is not as simple, apolitical, and innocent as it may 
sometimes seem to be from such slogans as ‘world free of poverty’ by the World 
Bank, or ‘building a better world’ by UN Global Compact. Dominant positivist 
approaches toward development aim for the generalizable and a-contextual account 
of social phenomena that is commonly discussed with economic models. However, 
these attempts are often oversimplifications of social realities and ignore the 
political and historical contexts that continuously structure the international 
development arena. Thus, we need to understand that development, which is still 
popularly recognized as economic growth, is a politically entrenched effort and 
historically constructed issue. Political contexts and power relationships in the 
global arena are inextricable from the various perspectives of development vision, 
policy, activities and outcomes.   
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 Perspective 
Meaning of 
Development 
Historical Context Aid Role of Technology & ICT  Macro 
Micro 
individual level 
 
‘Transitive’ 
‘a set of activities’ 
‘Intransitive’ 
‘a set of processes’ 
 Classical 
Economics 
Marxist view  
    
1850 Colonial 
Economics 
 
 
Resource management, 
trusteeship 
  Exploration of new territories 
1950 Modernization  
(Harrod-
Domar,)(Rostow 
1960) 
  
Economic growth, 
industrialization, linear 
trajectory to development   
Post-war, the establishment 
of Bretton Woods (1944), 
competence in the Cold War 
Birth of Aid 
Marshall Plan (1948):  
Mass production 
Increased productivity 
1960 
 
Dependency 
Theory 
Neo-Marxism 
 
National auto-centric 
growth & capital 
accumulation  
Rise of Third World 
nationalism and 
decolonization  
Institutionalization of 
Aid OECD DAC; ODA 
definition 
Creation of domestic product, 
Increased productivity and 
innovation in a state 
1970  World System 
(Wallerstein 
1974) 
Basic Needs, 
Alternative(Susta
inability etc) 
Poverty reduction, rural 
development  
Oil Shock (1973, 1979)  
Détente  
 
Poverty reduction Alternative technology for 
poverty reduction, enhancing of 
local capacity  
1980 
Neo-liberal 
 
 
Economic growth: 
deregulation, privatization, 
liberalization, open to 
global market  
Washington Consensus,  
Globalization 
Lost Decade of Aid  
WB’s SAP, PRSP 
Enhancing market efficiency, 
global competiveness 
1990 Good governance 
New-institutional 
Econ.(Williamson, 
1985; North, 1990) 
 
 Institutional, social 
development 
End of communism & 
demand on democracy  
Emphasis on local context 
Aid Fatigue 
 
ICT for new public 
management (NPM), 
transparency, government’s 
efficiency, delivery of services 
 
 
Post-
developmental 
(Escobar,1985) 
 
 Reflection on neoliberal 
orthodoxy 
 ICT as a means of 
strengthening international 
capitalism 
 
  
Human 
Development 
(Sen,1999) 
Human capabilities, 
‘development as freedom’   
  Development human 
capabilities (education, health, 
participation, gender)  
2000 Aid Effectiveness 
(Paris Declaration, 
2005) 
 
Millennium 
Development 
Goals (2000) 
 Rise of  BRICS, MINT,  Civil 
Society Organizations,  
Proliferation of Aid ICT for aid effectiveness, aid 
management (AIMS) 
2010 Global Partnership for Development Effectiveness and 
Cooperation (GPDEC) (2014) 
Sustainable Development Goals (2015) 
Inclusive development   Diversity in Aid 
Emerging power; South-
South cooperation  
Open Development  
Data for Development  Digital 
development  
 
 
Table 2-1. The Evolution of Development Theories and the Role of Technology – Developed on Pieterse (2010) and Thapa and Sabo (2014) 
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2.2.2. Theories in ICTD Research 
 
Over the past few decades the multidisciplinary literature has increasingly articulated 
the contribution of ICT in development (Avgerou 2008; Walsham 2012; Walsham & 
Robey 2007; Heeks 2010). Due to the multi-disciplinary nature of ICTD, much research 
has been conducted based on diverse theoretical frameworks. This section provides an 
overview of major theories applied to ICTD research in order to map the current field 
and status of research, as well as situates my theoretical view within a broader stream of 
institutional theory. 
 
Diffusion and Acceptance theory: In the broad field of ICTD, and also in related 
disciplines as Development Economics, Human Computer Interaction (HCI) and 
Communication Studies, positivism tends to be the dominant paradigm. This is not only 
the case in relation to ICTD, but is also the dominantly established situation in the broad 
field of information systems (IS) (Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991; Kaplan & Duchon 1988). 
Over the past few decades, diffusion theorists have tried to identify determinants of ICT 
in developing countries, based on formal econometric modelling with typical disparate 
variables in development economics such as income, education, health, political rights 
and so on (Baliamoune-Lutz 2003). The most cited theoretical approaches in this stream 
also include Davis’ (1985) technology acceptance model (TAM). TAM and its extended 
version (Wixom & Todd 2005) have been widely used for proposing hypotheses for 
multivariate statistical analysis in ICTD research, including studies of the effect of social 
and organizational factors on ICT transfer in the Arab region (Al-Gahtani 2003), user 
adoption of a digital library in developing countries (Park et al. 2009), and citizen 
acceptance of e-government in Gambia (Lin et al. 2011). Rogers (1995) provides a 
conceptual generalization of the significant factors, with special consideration given to 
social and organizational contexts. His diffusion model, centred on the context of 
developed countries, has been developed to overcome the shortcomings of its 
applications in developing countries (Roman 2004). However, TAM research may 
underestimate continuously changing ICT environments in developing countries, as well 
as the socio-technical nature of technology, and has been widely criticized for its linear 
technical rationality and a-contextual characteristics. A significant amount of alternative 
interpretive ICTD research has derived from foundational works conducted via the IFIP 
43 
9.4 Working Group: Social Implications of Computers in Developing Countries, ICTD 
Conference and the Association for Information Systems (AIS) Special Interest Group 
on ICT and Global Development.  
 
Institutional theory: One of the most influential theoretical contributions in 
development studies is new institutional economics, which emphasizes the role of rules, 
regulations and social and legal institutions in economic development (North 1990; 
Acemoglu & Robinson 2012; Williamson 1985). As opposed to economic new-
institutionalism, which is based on rational-choice, sociological institutional theory 
focuses more on informal institutions – norms, value, and culture – and views the 
institution as ‘multifaceted, durable social structures, made up of symbolic elements, 
social activities, and material resources’ (Scott, 2001: 49). Technology is not a core 
emphasis in institutional theory. Much of the ICTD research, however, has ascribed to 
institutional theory an understanding of the issue of institutional change/reform, 
isomorphic mechanisms of ICT adoption, (de)institutionalization, institutional logic, 
and the context of developing countries (Avgerou 2002a; Alghatam & Cornford 2012; 
Avgerou 2004; Nicholson & Sahay 2009; Madon et al. 2009; McGrath & Maiye 2010; 
Avgerou & Walsham 2000). The institutional approach to be used as conceptual 
framework in this thesis will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
 
Capability Approach: Although Sen himself discusses very little about the role of 
technology, his capability approach and the multidimensional concept of development 
have been considerably discussed in ICTD. It has been applied to theorize the effect of 
ICT on development (Kleine 2011; Kleine 2010; Zheng 2009), to examine the role of 
ICT in enhancing citizen participation and empowerment (Dasuki et al. 2014), the micro 
dynamics of e-government implementation (Madon 2004), disabilities (Toboso 2011), 
social exclusion (Zheng & Walsham 2008) and poverty reduction and livelihoods 
(Duncombe 2007; Gigler 2015). The multidimensional capability approach has been 
widely used as an evaluation framework of development such as the UN Human 
Development Report. Sen argues that institutions are the most fundamental mechanism 
for removing obstacles to freedom and attaining development. With such emphasis on 
institutions, Sen’s approach can be linked to the new-institutional approach (Alkire 
2002; North 1990), and challenges the neoliberal orthodoxy in development (Acemoglu 
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& Robinson 2012; Rodrik 2007).While the utilitarian explanation used by institutional 
economics focused on formal institutions such as regulations, rules and markets, Madon 
(2004) shifts the focus away from evaluating ICT projects only on functional criteria 
related to access and infrastructure, placing the focus instead on nonmaterial aspects, 
such as social, organizational and political aspects.   
 
Critical approach: Critical studies, often referred to as ‘critical social information 
systems research (CSISR)’ (Klein 2009),aim to expose hidden problems and ‘critique 
the status quo’ of existing structural contradictions and existing domination (Orlikowski 
& Baroudi 1991; Stahl 2011). It focuses on ‘what is wrong with the world rather than 
what is right’ (Geoff Walsham, 2005:112). Avgerou (2005:103) further argues that 
critical studies should keep “suspicion to instrumental reasoning”, and yield knowledge 
on “an alternative agenda of substantive social issues by the interplay of theory and 
empirical evidence”. Likewise, Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) pointed out early that 
“critical researchers depart from their interpretive colleagues, in that they believe 
interpretation of the social world is not enough”. In addition to promoting 
‘emancipation’, critical studies provide insight into the adoption of information systems 
and organizational change in a global context (Walsham 2001; Avgerou 2002a). 
Criticizing the assumption that ICT-driven globalization promotes equitable socio-
economic transformation, Avgerou (2002a) sheds light on the restrictive conditions of 
the global socio-political order and argues that ICT innovation is embedded in a 
particular context and thereby shaped by a multitude of different level of institutions 
with conflicting incentives, structure, and histories. Attention to the macro socio-
political context can be similarly found in critical ICTD research, which adopts aspects 
of postcolonial theory. Such research provides postcolonial critiques of ‘development’ 
and modernity as well as seeks the theoretical link between macro structure and the local 
organizational context of ICTD projects (Lin et al. 2015; Njihia 2008). Some studies 
belonging to the Political Economy or Development Studies domains also criticize 
existing power structures in international development as constituting ‘new form[s] of 
dependency’ (Wade 2002), with ICT being ‘the privileged technology of neoliberalism’ 
(Harvey 2005).  
 
45 
Mixed: There has been much discussion of different epistemologies - positivism and 
interpretivism, as well as both quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches 
in the IS field. In particular, there has been intense debate about whether two different 
perspectives can be combined in multi-methodological approaches (Mingers 2001; 
Venkatesh & Brown 2013). In ICTD literature, however, due to the multidisciplinary 
nature of the field, the adoption of mixed-methods and diverse theoretical concepts from 
such contributing fields as Sociology, Anthropology, Computer Science, 
Communication Studies and Development Studies has been encouraged (Walsham 
2017). Indeed, Bass et al. (2013) suggest a combined analytical framework informed by 
sociological institutional theory and Sen’s capability approach. Zheng and Stahl (2011) 
draw insights from critical theory to strengthen the theoretical link between ICT and 
Sen’s conceptualization of human development. In addition, there have been multiple 
attempts to pursue mixed methods, an approach that combines quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. Building on Sen’s capability approach, Musa (2006) proposes a 
modified version of TAM, and suggests ways to make ICT adoption more sustainable 
and beneficial in enhancing human capabilities in the Sub-Saharan Africa ICT diffusion. 
Jamison et al. (2013) evaluate the impact of information sharing via mobile phone on 
sexual health in Uganda by using randomized control trial (RCT) augmented by 
qualitative interviews.  
 
Theory  Studies and ICT artefact (selected) Level of analysis 
Diffusion and 
TAM 
Roman, 2004 (telecenter); Park et al., 2009 
(Digital library); Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003 
(ICT in general)  
Cross-national, national   
Institutional 
theory 
(sociological)  
Avgerou, 2002; Madon et al., 2009 
(telecenter); Alghatam and Cornford, 
2012(e-government)   
Individual/community, 
national  
Capability 
approach  
Madon, 2004 (e-government); Masiero, 
2014 (Food Security System); Klein 2010; 
Zheng, 2009; Zheng and Walsham, 2008 
(framework) 
Individual/community 
 
Critical research Avgerou, 2002; Lin et al., 2015; Njihia, 2008 
(e-government); Wade, 2002; Walsham, 
2001 
Global/macro-historical  
Actor-network 
theory 
Andrade and Urquhart, 2010 (telecenter); 
Walsham and Sahay, 1999 (GIS) 
Individual/community  
Combined/mixed Bass et al., 2013; Jamison et al., 2013; Musa, 
2006 (m-health)  
 
 
Table 2-2. Selected Studies in ICTD Research 
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This section has provided snapshots of theoretical frameworks in ICTD and highlighted 
the plurality of ideas related to development and theories. A summary of major 
theoretical frameworks in ICTD research is presented in Table 2-2 above. This review 
confirms the use of a wide range of theories and angles of analysis in ICTD research. 
There is, however, an insufficient understanding of the role of global aid governance in 
ICTD initiatives. In particular, there seems to be a theoretical missing link between the 
success and failure of ICTD initiatives and the role of nation state actor in the global 
field of aid. This is crucially important as most ICTD initiatives have followed common 
goals and norms such as MDGs, SDGs, and aid effectiveness agendas, which will be 
introduced briefly in Section 2.3 as well as investigated in detail in Section 6.1, which 
often constrain and regulate ICTD projects. However, there are not so many studies 
looking at the ICTD initiatives from this macro perspective. Rather, in understanding 
ICTD initiatives, scholars have mostly focused on the micro-situational actions of 
individual and organizational actors and their unfolding relations with technological 
artefacts. This lacuna is similarly identified in the studies of IS failure in developing 
countries, and will be primarily discussed in Chapter 3.    
 
2.3. Unpacking Aid: Development, Politics, and Structure 
 
We should stop pretending aid is apolitical. (Maggie Black)12 
 
In addition to the overview of the literature on ICTD in Section 2.1, this section aims to 
unpack the meaning of aid. This is vital as aid is commonly perceived as the most direct 
and conventional means to achieve development. However, the debate on the nature, 
motivation, role and global governance of aid is not adequately addressed in ICTD. 
Three main questions will be discussed in this section: What is aid? Who gives aid and 
why is it given? What is the role of ICT in aid effectiveness? To answer these questions, 
I will review the interdisciplinary research literature on aid with a view to ascertaining 
– i) the nature and motivation behind aid, ii) the effectiveness and legitimacy of aid, and 
iii) the role of ICT in aid. In this way, this section will demonstrate that research on aid 
has predominantly been conducted from an economics and political economy 
perspective, and to a lesser extent, over the last few decades, from an anthropology 
                                                 
12 The Guardian, on 25 September 2015. 
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perspective. Thus, there are significant research opportunities in the study of ICT and 
aid in the IS discipline, especially from a socio-technical perspective.  
 
In the first part, I provide a short history of foreign aid governance and highlight the 
political nature of aid. In the second part, I review the literature on the motive for aid as 
seen through the lens of International Relations (IR), in which several competing 
theories coexist based on various theoretical assumptions on the behaviour of state 
actors. I do not rely heavily on the IR approaches; instead I try to make a theoretical 
connection between the constructivism of IR and the sociological new-institutionalism 
to explain the global field of aid, institutions and governance in aid mechanism in 
Section 2.3.2 and further in Chapter 3. Following this, I move to literature on the 
emerging norms of ‘aid effectiveness’ and discuss the role of ICT therein. I do not seek 
to find which type and condition of aid can be more effective, nor do I propose another 
theory on how to make aid work better in ICTD projects. Rather, I identify a common 
underlying assumption of aid information - considered to be a prerequisite in aid 
coordination - as a key feature of aid effectiveness. I contend that the role of ICT has 
been positioned at the core of aid effectiveness debate in the existing literature and aid 
practice and, through this review, identify current lacunae in ICTD studies.  
 
2.3.1. Defining Aid - What is Aid? 
 
Foreign aid matters in ICTD as it has a considerable effect, either positive, negative or 
neutral, on the development agenda in recipient countries. What, then, does aid mean 
exactly? At its broadest, aid encompasses of all resources, including capital, physical 
goods, skills and technical know-how, which are transferred by donors to recipient 
countries. However, such a definition leaves many crucial questions unanswered. Who 
are donors and recipients? Are donors always rich and recipients poor? Is it possible for 
a state to be a donor and a recipient country at the same time? Is the provision of aid a 
voluntary or normative action? Is aid based on conditionality or coercion? What is meant 
by concessional aid commonly referred to as a grant, or non-concessional aid, commonly 
referred to as a loan? Who decides on the rules governing aid? Should states follow 
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them? Must we consider military assistance as aid? 13 More narrow and restrictive 
definitions of foreign aid have been discussed and shaped by those who have a major 
role in international development, such as the OECD countries and Multilateral 
Development Agencies (MDAs).  
 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been the most influential and widely 
accepted definition of foreign aid. The most substantial efforts made to develop a set of 
conceptual and operational definitions of what consists of aid, and what rules aid 
activities should follow, has been led by the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC)14, established in 1960. The definition of ODA suggested by DAC in 1969 and 
revised in 1972, never set out to define foreign aid and development finance in 
general(OECD 2008a). Rather, it sought only to define a particular flow of aid provided 
by states to states, what is referred to as, donor and recipient governments. The OECD 
DAC defines ODA as “those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA 
Recipients15 and to multilateral institutions16 which are:  
 
1) provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their 
executive agencies; and  
2) each transaction of which 
a. is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare 
of developing countries as its main objective, and  
b. is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent 
(calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).”17 
 
                                                 
13 For more discussion on the origins of aid and definition, see Riddell (2007). The chapter 2, in particular, 
led me to the motivating questions above. 
14 The DAC is the association of leading donor countries in OECD. As DAC members, countries commit 
to enact DAC guidelines and the Recommendations adopted by the DAC in formulating national aid 
policies. They also provide the annual submission of required official development assistance (ODA) 
statistics on their aid efforts and policies to be included in the Development Cooperation Report. As of 
2016, the DAC has 30 members including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, European Union 
(http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm).  
15 Source: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm 
16 Source: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/annex2-procedure.htm 
17 Source: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm 
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The OECD defines that “the boundary of ODA has been carefully delineated in many 
fields, including: 
 
 Military aid - No military equipment or services are reportable as ODA.  Anti-terrorism 
activities are also excluded. However, the cost of using donors’ armed forces to deliver 
humanitarian aid is eligible. 
 Peacekeeping: Most peacekeeping expenditures are excluded in line with the exclusion 
of military costs.  However, some closely-defined developmentally relevant activities 
within peacekeeping operations are included. 
 Nuclear energy: Reportable as ODA, provided it is for civilian purposes. 
 Cultural programmes: Eligible as ODA if they build the cultural capacities of recipient 
countries, but one-off tours by donor country artists or sportsmen, as well as activities 
to promote the donors’ image and ‘soft power’, are excluded.” 18  (OECD ODA: 
definition and coverage) 
 
Humanitarian assistance includes funds for disaster relief and reconstruction; for 
example, the emergency aid response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was not a part 
of ODA either. Barnett (2011) demonstrates that humanitarian aid and development aid 
have historically drawn from different financing streams and timelines, and been 
managed in different organizational structures in a given country. He argues that this 
may be because humanitarian aid was used for emergency situations, such as natural 
disasters, whereas development aid was born out of colonialism.  
 
In addition to this, the conceptual validity of ODA itself has been challenged due to the 
fast-changing landscape of international aid. Severino and Ray (2009) highlight ‘triple 
revolution’ the recent diversification of goals of aid, increased number of aid players, 
and mushrooming tools (policy), and thereby call for moving from the conventional 
measurement of ODA to its redefinition with an inclusive concept. Similarly, aid 
scholars point out the proliferation of new donors (Acharya et al. 2006; Burcky 2011; 
Knack & Smets 2012) and increased aid heterogeneity in type and modality (Mavrotas 
2005). Furthermore, the emergence of new non-OECD DAC donors, such as China, 
Indonesia, India, Russia, and Brazil, as well as the South-South Cooperation (SSC)19, 
which now provides significant amounts and various types of aid across the world, are 
crucial challenges in the concept of ODA. In response to these criticisms, the OECD 
                                                 
18 Source: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm 
19 This will be discussed in details from the perspective of Indonesia in Chapter 7 
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DAC has “continuously refined the ODA reporting rules to ensure fidelity to the 
definition and the greatest possible consistency among donors”20 over the past decade.21 
 
Against this backdrop, in this thesis, I take the term ODA as a key concept of aid. The 
main purpose of Indonesian AIMS, the case of this study, was managing aid data on 
ODA which was given by the official OCED DAC donor governments. However, the 
terms ‘(foreign/development) aid’ are used interchangeably to generally describe aid 
from all sources and types, such as foreign aid from emerging countries like China and 
India; direct financial support from private sector as their corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) strategy; and volunteer activities from charity organizations. 
 
Similarly, finding the most relevant term for the country classification according to the 
degree of development, as well as finding the same for the aid-receiving countries, are 
both no easy task. The terms ‘the third world’, ‘the global south’, ‘developing countries’, 
‘least developed countries (LDCs)’ and ‘recipient countries’ should be carefully read, as 
they have different conceptual origins and different underlying assumptions. Given the 
complex history of evolving concepts and contexts, there are definitional limitations and 
ambiguity in the use of these terms. Yet, they have been used interchangeably in many 
academic research and policy documents. Therefore, at this point, it is necessary to 
clarify the meaning of terms, to reflect upon the definitions of the terminologies, and to 
explain the justification of use and disuse terms in this study.  
 
Developing countries: Among the terms stated above, the dichotomy of developed and 
developing countries has been predominantly used and accepted in both academic 
research and in the public. Although different organizations have often used different 
categories for ‘developing countries’, the term, generally refers to low and middle-
income countries assessed by the World Bank in reference to countries’ Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita. However, the World Bank announced their decision to stop 
using the term ‘developing countries’ in its 2016 World Development Indicators, using 
geographical categorizations instead. Arguments against using the term ‘developing 
                                                 
20 Source: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm 
21 For the discussion of redefining ODA, please see(Martens 2001; OECD 2013) 
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county’ include its methodological challenge, limitations of categorization, and 
increased dissimilarity between developing countries. 22  They differ greatly in their 
economy size, political institution, and historical and cultural background. More 
importantly, the dichotomy of developing and developed countries has implicitly been 
based on the outdated philosophical concept of modernization, and has contributed to 
the reproduction of modernization ideals.  
 
Least developed countries (LDCs): Some scholars and practitioners seem to prefer using 
‘least-developed’ because ‘developing’ arguably implies ‘not yet developed’. One of the 
interviewees of this study, who has been in development practice for a long time, 
expressed reluctance to use the term as it often implicitly means ‘still far from 
developed’. The term LDCs originates from the UN General Assembly in 1970, and its 
criteria have been reviewed regularly by UN ECOSOC in terms of poverty line, human 
development, and economic vulnerability. However, the scope of LDCs doesn’t fully 
cover all aid-receiving countries such as middle-income recipient countries, which is the 
main reason that I am not going to use the term in this study.  
 
The Third World: this term has also been widely used. With the aftermath of the Korean 
War (1950-1953), a new geopolitical dynamic began to emerge as the ideological, 
military, and politico-economic tension between the United States and the USSR 
commonly referred to as the Cold War. The etymology of the term can be traced to the 
French demographer Alfred Sauvy’s article Three worlds, one planet (Sauvy 1952). He 
made an analogy between underdeveloped post-colonial states with ‘the third estate’ 
during the French Revolution, which were opposed to the clergy and aristocracy. The 
Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 was an important moment for 
the historical significance of the term, and for the emergence of the ‘power of the Third 
World’. Although the term is still widely used in media and practice, its academic usage 
has dramatically declined in recent decades (Tomlinson 2003). The main critique is that 
the collapse of ‘the second world’, along with emerging globalization, have made the 
term largely irrelevant (Berger 2004; Tomlinson 2003). Similarly, World Bank President 
Robert Zoellick, announced the end of usage of the term ‘Third World’, while still using 
                                                 
22 Source: https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/should-we-continue-use-term-developing-world 
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the terms ‘developing countries’ and ‘global South’ in his 2010 speech Modernizing 
Multilateralism for a Multipolar World23: 
 
If 1989 saw the end of the ‘Second World’ with Communism’s demise, then 2009 saw 
the end of what was known as the ‘Third World’: We are now in a new, fast-evolving 
multipolar world economy – in which some developing countries are emerging as 
economic powers; others are moving towards becoming additional poles of growth; and 
some are struggling to attain their potential within this new system – where North and 
South, East and West, are now points on a compass, not economic destinies. 
 
Recipient country: Overall, I found the term ‘recipient country’ most relevant to this 
study. Some government officials expressed their reluctance to the use of ‘recipient’ and 
‘donor’, while preferring ‘development partners’ during my interviews; I will explain 
this in further detail in Chapter 8. Their argument is that development can only be 
achieved in a horizontal, non-hierarchical structure, in a manner that is mutually 
accountable for all stakeholders. In this sense, they argue that the dichotomy of recipient 
and donor would not be appropriate because aid mechanisms should not be “just giving 
aid and receiving aid as a one side game” (Senior Officer in Bappenas). 
 
However, I still found the term ‘recipient country’ justifiable in this study. This thesis 
does not directly question whether ICT can have a positive/negative impact on 
‘development’, nor how ICT can enhance development. Instead, it focuses on the 
dynamics of the aid mechanism (aid-providing and receiving), and its influence on 
information systems failure. As discussed in greater detail in Section 2.2, the 
fundamental characteristic of aid is the flow of funds from the supply side of aid (donors) 
to the demand side of aid (recipient). This view often appears in the research that drew 
upon the concept of ‘aid market’ (Barder 2009; Djankov et al. 2009). The ‘market 
metaphor’, which argues that the major source of the aid problem is an imperfect market, 
is not always appropriate. However, it is quite “useful to recast the aid relationship as 
the interplay of demand and supply” in particular in a country which has a complex aid 
mechanism with diverse stakeholders (Abegaz 2005:437).  
 
Furthermore, while avoiding confusion with the term ‘developing country’, using 
‘recipient country’ can be more compatible with the categorization of economies. There 
                                                 
23 Source: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2010/04/14/end-third-world 
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are countries which, arguably, are considered to be a developing country but not aid-
receiving country like Croatia, Romania or Russia. A country can simultaneously be a 
recipient country of aid, and a high income country, such as Chile and Uruguay. Others 
can have a ‘dual identity’ as both a recipient and an aid donor country while still being 
a lower-middle-income country, such as Indonesia and India. Also, there are some 
emerging economies that are categorized as upper-middle-income countries by the 
World Bank, which are still receiving aid such as Brazil, China, Mexico, and Turkey. 
Thus, in this study, the term ‘recipient country’ is used to describe all aid receiving 
countries, regardless of the size of their economies, as well as their simultaneous dual 
identities as both donor and recipient. In order to define ‘recipient country’, I follow the 
OECD DAC list of ODA recipients24, which will be explained in detail in Section 4.3.2, 
and Section 5.1 when the data collection and findings of AIMS implementation in 
recipient governments are elaborated on. In addition to this, the term ‘developing 
country’ is also used in a limited sense to refer to broader context in general discussion 
of the issue of ICTD.  
 
2.3.2. Theory of Aid –Why Do Governments Provide Aid? 
 
Why do governments provide foreign aid? Foreign aid, in recent years often referred to 
as ‘development cooperation’, has been recognized as an international norm today. 
However, it did not exist prior to 1947 when the Marshall Plan, commonly considered 
to be the origin of foreign assistance, was created. This modern phenomenon, a peculiar 
behaviour of state actors to provide aid to other countries, has been a topic of intense 
debate in terms of its motivation, outcome and effectiveness. This section reviews why 
state actors provide foreign aid, and how we understand their inclination based on the 
three competing philosophical perspectives in the field of IR: Realism, Liberalism, and 
Constructivism.  
 
There is a longstanding debate in social theory about whether ‘agent’ constructs 
‘structure’ or whether ‘structure’ shapes ‘agent’. A solely agent/individual-centric 
                                                 
24 The OECD DAC list of ODA recipients is available on: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DAC%20List%20of%20ODA%20Recipients%202014
%20final.pdf 
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perspective would argue that society is an aggregation of individuals involved in diverse 
interaction; social structures, therefore, are not real. This view has early intellectual roots 
and was highlighted in Thomas Hobbes’ seminal work Leviathan (1651). On the other 
hand, a structure-centric view would hold that agencies are situated within the social 
structure, which determines the actions of individuals. This perspective is well 
represented in the work of Emile Durkheim. This structure and agency debate still 
relevant and remains much discussed in the field of IR. In short, realism assumes the 
international political system is in the Hobbesian ‘state of anarchy’, and puts emphasis 
on states as central actors in international politics, while liberalism highlights the 
‘interdependence’ of states and emphasizes on international regime and cooperation. 
Constructivism criticizes the static view of the dominant IR theories, realism and 
liberalism, and argues that international reality is constructed by the interplay between 
agency and structure. These perspectives have been influenced by each other and been 
amended and extended to revised versions that have a shift in focus and level of analysis 
from their original roots. Nonetheless, it is meaningful to understand the core underlying 
assumptions of each approach, assessing what can be learned to form a theoretical lens 
to investigate states’ behaviour of giving and receiving aid.  
 
Realism: Although realist theories in IR cover a fairly wide range of perspectives, from 
Morgenthau’s classical realism (Morgenthau 1960) to Waltz’ structural realism (Waltz 
2000), the basic insights of the view are well explained in Morgenthau’s seminal book, 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1960). He defines three 
underlying assumptions of the realist view in IR. First, states are the most important and 
unitary actors in international relations. Second, there is a clear distinction between 
domestic and international politics. Third, international politics is “the struggle for 
power and peace”(Morgenthau, 1960). In this view, aid has always been a matter of 
politics. Morgenthau famously notes: 
 
The problem of foreign aid is insoluble if it is considered as a self-sufficient technical 
enterprise of a primarily economic nature. It is soluble only if it is considered an integral 
part of the political policies of the giving country - which must be devised in view of 
the political conditions, and for its effects upon the political situation in the receiving 
country. In this respect, a policy of foreign aid is no different from diplomatic or 
military policy or propaganda. They are all weapons in the political armory of the nation 
(Morgenthau, 1962:309). 
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Realists are sceptical that international institutions such as international organizations 
and regimes can govern world politics, because in realist perspective, the states follow 
realpolitik. In the Cold War era, major Western donor countries established aid agencies 
as a ministerial level. Realism provides a useful framework to understand the 
competitive behaviour of the USSR and the US, which both invested large sums of 
money into geo-politically important countries to establish military alliances. It, 
however, cannot fully explain a new reality of aid in the post-Cold War world (Waltz 
2000). From the perspective of realism, after the collapse of communism in the late 
1980s, the tradition of giving aid should have faded away. However, reality shows that 
the amount of aid has increased and the international cooperation in development grown 
with a more ‘pro-poor’ aid agenda. 
 
However, the realist perspective still provides insight into aid studies, which believes 
that foreign aid is a projection of the commercial, political and security interests of 
donors into the international relations domain (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Bermeo 2011; 
Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009). Although 
Dunning (2004) exceptionally argues that the end of the Cold War marks a turning point 
in donor intent in the politics, empirical studies have shown donor’s political 
preferences. For example, Alesina and Dollar (2000) empirically show that donors’ aid 
allocations are made by diplomatic and strategic considerations including colonial 
histories and geo-political alliances much more than by the recipients’ economic needs.  
 
Liberalism: Although the intellectual tradition of the liberal argument can be traced back 
to John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (1690) and Adam Smith’s The Wealth of 
Nations (1776), liberalism in international relations theory gained prominence in the 
time of Détente25 in the 1970s, more significantly after the end of the Cold War. Both 
realism and liberalism consider states as rational actors, as well as the most dominant 
actors in the international arena. Liberalism, however, criticizes the realist over-
emphasis on power and the assumption that all states have the same goals, and exhibit 
similar behaviours to achieve these goals. Liberalism has contributed to aid studies in 
the two following perspectives.  
                                                 
25 A French word literally meaning ‘relaxation’. It is often used in explaining a period of easing tension 
in the middle of Cold War in early 1970s.  
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First, it emphasizes the possibility of international cooperation, as well as the role of 
non-state actors such as international organizations, non-government organizations 
(NGOs), and civil societies. In this view, the ‘interdependence’ of states, which enables 
them to cooperate through negotiations and institutional arrangements, is crucial, and a 
fast growing aid relationship and its governance are understood in this perspective 
(Keohane & Nye 2001). According to Keohane and Nye (2001), the ‘interdependence’ 
perspective considers foreign aid to be an ‘age-long fact of human activity, which is 
obvious in the increasingly globalizing and interdependent world. Democratic peace 
theory, which claims that democratic countries rarely or never cross swords with 
democratic states, also originated from liberalism (Owen 1994). The liberalist 
perspective argues that development cooperation is an instrument of foreign policy used 
by liberal states generate cooperation, greater democracy abroad and, therefore, greater 
security for themselves.  
 
Second, liberalism emphasizes unique characteristics and individual behaviours of states 
in terms of their international relations, thus, providing a useful lens with which to focus 
on the political and commercial dimensions of aid in each country. Liberalism takes into 
account ‘domestic institutional configuration’, such as the political institution, public 
opinion, and the preference of the diverse actors within the state as important 
determinants of aid policy .Noël and Thérien highlight the role of political ideology in 
aid allocation (Noël & Thérien 1995; Thérien & Noel 2000). Similarly, Tingley (2010) 
investigates how a donor's domestic political and economic environment affect aid 
behaviours, and empirically shows that conservative governments are likely to commit 
fewer funds to aid than progressive governments. These can be broadly linked to 
previous studies which show that conservative administrations are more likely to provide 
larger amounts of aid to trading partners or geo-politically important countries, while 
liberal governments provide more need-based aid  (Fleck & Kilby 2006).  
 
Realism and liberalism as two dominant rationalist IR theories with positivist 
epistemology have been challenged from a wide range of perspectives. Critical 
perspectives, broadly influenced by the neo-Marxist view perceive foreign aid merely 
as the manifestations of a discourse of dominant power, arguably imperialism and 
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colonialism, that reproduce capitalist relations between global North and South 
(Ferguson 1994; Escobar 1994; Hayter 1971; Wallerstein 1974).  
 
Constructivism: Among the alternative views, constructivism26 may be the most cited 
view in recent aid studies. As I will discuss in Section 4.1, some may argue that 
constructivism is not a particular theory, but an epistemology (Crotty 1998). The term 
originates with the epistemological stance that the observer can never be completely 
separated from the observed, and that observations are constructed out of one’s own 
situation, experience and bias. As an ontological approach, constructivism is concerned 
with understanding how shared ideas become reality (Wendt 1995). Although 
constructivism, in the context of IR, has been regarded as a new approach which began 
with Nicholas Onuf in the late 1980s, its intellectual origin  can be traced to previous 
sociological efforts (Berger & Luckmann 1966; Hacking 1999; Sismondo 1993). 
Constructivism criticizes the static assumptions of traditional IR theory and emphasizes 
that the concept of international relations is a social construction. The concept of 
structuration, as developed by Giddens (1979: 5) plays a central role with regard to how 
agents and structures are interrelated and conditioned by each other. Thus, agents are 
neither completely independent from the environment within which they have been 
socialized, nor entirely determined by it. The corollary is that the mutual relationship 
between agents and structures is an ongoing process rather than a rigid one.  
 
According to Wendt (1995:71), the constructivist view in IR provides a two-part 
definition of social construction. First, it reflects that ‘the fundamental structures of 
international politics are social rather than strictly material’ (1995: 71). Second, it 
conveys that structures do not only shape behaviour, but also fundamentally define 
states’ identities and interests (1995: 71-2). These state’s interests, as well as threats to 
those interests, do not exist as objective facts, but are instead socially constructed 
through processes of meaning-making and identity-formation. These meanings and 
identities are typically summarised as ‘norms’, or more specifically, ‘constitutive 
norms’, which comprise a set of shared ideas, including ideologies and beliefs. 
Constitutive norms in international development, such as poverty reduction, aid 
                                                 
26 It relies on the sociological concept of ‘social construction’ and commonly referred to constructionism 
as well, but it will be referred to throughout this thesis as simply constructivism 
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effectiveness and sustainable development make a state what it is (Finnemore & Sikkink 
1998). Constitutive state norms and international norms are thus the accepted standards 
of behaviour and ways of doing and thinking that are taken for granted (Finnemore 1996; 
Acharya 2004). There can also be ‘behavioural norms’, such as giving foreign aid in a 
particular ‘appropriate’ way, that express the state’s identity. These are coherent 
patterned behaviours that make sense precisely because of who the state is. In this sense, 
the constructivist view is the non-materialist stance of realism (Acharya 2004; Acharya 
2011). That is, states are considered unitary actors in international relations but a state’s 
interests are not purely material.  
 
Similar to most constructivist research in other disciplines, both the main characteristic 
and the primary limitation of the constructivist view is a heavy dependence on 
descriptive single case studies. This results from the stance of constructivist 
epistemology towards a non-positivist qualitative methodological approach, which most 
often focuses on a particular context, but thereby restrains researchers from predicting 
other cases.  
 
This section has provided an overview of existing theories of aid as well as the various 
theories dominating the IR discourse. The literature review highlights the politico-
economic nature of aid and its complexity in governance. Some scholars also emphasize 
that foreign aid cannot be explained without motives such as moral vision and “humane 
internationalism”, particularly in the case of humanitarian assistance and altruistic 
behaviours of Scandinavian countries and some mega-philanthropists (Lumsdaine 1993; 
Stokke 1989). However, it can be also understood as a way of achieving legitimacy and 
soft power. Indeed, foreign aid has been carried out in diverse ways, in pursuit of a 
number of purposes and for many different motives which have historically influenced 
donor decisions to allocate aid and exercise policy. Furthermore, in a changing and 
globalizing world in which global aid institutions and power dynamics are shifting, aid 
is a political object, which involves hidden geo-political and commercial motives no 
matter as which stakeholder – not only as traditional powerful donor countries and 
MDAs, but also as recipient governments.  
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2.3.3. Aid and Development – How Effective is Aid? 
 
This following section reviews the literature on aid effectiveness, which includes several 
competing theories, all based on the previously discussed different development theories 
and assumptions. However, this section does not discuss how aid contributes to 
development. Similarly, it does not seek to find which type and condition of aid can be 
more effective, nor does it suggest another theoretical framework on how aid works 
more effectively in achieving development. Rather, it demonstrates that rational choice 
institutionalism has been a dominant assumption which is inscribed into the 
technological object of my research, namely AIMS. It also shows that aid information 
is positioned at the core of the aid effectiveness debate. Finally, it finds a common 
underlying assumption that aid coordination is considered to be a core component in the 
effectiveness of aid, and aid information is considered to be a prerequisite in aid 
coordination as well as in aid effectiveness.  
 
Foreign aid has been the most direct action and the largest financial source geared toward 
socio-economic development and poverty alleviation in developing countries since the 
Marshall Plan in the era of post-World War II reconstruction. The overall international 
development cooperation has undergone a series of trial and error in practice and has 
become more sophisticated through the theoretical debates on development. In spite of 
over $4.6 trillion in ODA to developing countries between 1960 and 2008, there is lack 
of empirical evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of foreign aid in reducing poverty 
and promoting economic growth (Easterly & Williamson 2011; Burnside & Dollar 
2004). On the contrary, most developing countries, Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, 
seem to have been caught in a ‘poverty trap’.  
 
Intense debate on whether aid contributes to development goes back decades. In 
particular, the end of Cold War results in a growing recognition that aid relationships 
between donors and recipients as well as the conventional way of aid programs, 
commonly known as neoliberal ‘structural adjustment programme’ (SAP) by the World 
Bank. The study on the relationship between aid and development is massive, but Jeffrey 
Sachs’ End of Poverty, Easterly’s White Man’s Burden and Dambisa Moyo’s Dead Aid 
are some of the best-known contributions to this debate. The main arguments are as 
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follows: Firstly, aid supporters, including Sachs (2005), who was heavily involved in 
designing the UN MDGs, argue that insufficient foreign aid is the main reason aid does 
not work properly, based on the neoclassical model of capital accumulation. Supporters 
argue that more funding is needed for developing countries to escape poverty traps. 
MDAs and major OECD donor countries have supported this notion, and have led ‘top-
down’ or ‘donor-driven’ agendas, such as MDGs (2000), the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (2005), and SDGs (2015) (Sachs 2005; OECD 2005). Conversely, aid 
critics argue that aid has not contributed to growth in developing countries because it 
has been implemented in the ‘wrong way’ (Easterly & Pfutze 2008; Bauer 1984). In this 
regard, scholars emphasize grassroots level implementation with accountability and 
careful consideration of local contexts (Easterly 2006), the complex nature of aid 
(Ramalingam 2013), and a broken feedback loop (Nielson & Barder 2009; Wittemyer et 
al. 2014). Thirdly, aid sceptics, including Moyo (2008), add another layer to the critique, 
arguing that the problem is neither the non fulfilment of donors’ commitment to foreign 
aid nor the manner of implementation. Rather, it is the aid structure itself, where 
downward accountability is hard to achieve.  
 
Although the aid debate has been the subject of significant research and controversy, 
most aid scholars and practitioners focus on investigating which conditions make aid 
more effective, rather than questioning the fundamental existential reasons for foreign 
aid to be needed in the first place. Approaches to aid effectiveness in the literature have 
been varied and derive from diverse theoretical backgrounds including anthropology, 
and sociological institutionalism; however, the debate on aid effectiveness has been 
predominantly driven by economists. The following section reviews the dominant new-
institutional economics view on aid effectiveness, which is the main rationale behind the 
use of information systems in aid management.  
 
New-institutional economics as a dominant perspective: While I will not take the new-
institutional framework to analyse the case brought forward in this thesis, it is important 
to review its key arguments in order to understand the common underlying assumptions 
about aid effectiveness. In fact, neo-institutional economics is the dominant rationale 
underpinning the global adoption of AIMS. New-institutional economics framework 
mainly relies on ‘rational choice’ theories of the firm to support the claim aid activities 
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are integral to the multiple ‘principal-agent problems’ involved in diverse stakeholders 
in the field of international development (Martens 2005; Knack & Rahman 2007). 
According to proponents of this perspective, principals either donor countries or 
taxpayers in rich countries have contracts with agents to pursue goals they cannot 
directly work by themselves. Donor development agencies play a role as a principal to 
local or international contractors whom they hire, as well as an agent for their citizens, 
as shown in Figure 2-2 below. In this chain of principle and agent, donors and 
governments are expected to make a rational decision in maximize their benefits, while 
simultaneously minimizing costs (Martens 2005). 
 
The most commonly discussed challenge in this perspective is the increased transaction 
costs caused by multiple principle-agent problem at different levels of stakeholder 
relationships as discussed above (Acharya et al. 2006; Nunnenkamp et al. 2013). 
According to Acharya et al. (2006:6), “there are very strong reasons to believe that, all 
other considerations aside, aid often underperforms because it flows through too many 
institutional channels. This generates high transactions costs within each recipient 
countries, and so reduces the effectiveness of aid.” Scholars often discuss this increased 
transaction costs between stakeholders may harm the effectiveness of ODA in the 
following perspectives: i) deteriorating aid coordination, by overlapping similar aid 
activities in recipient governments and duplicating aid reporting procedures, as well as, 
misaligning the long term national goals of government (Crola & Saulière 2011; Bigsten 
& Tengstam 2015), ii) letting development partners to misallocate aid activities in ways 
that do not align the national development priorities of recipient governments and harm 
the institutional capacity of governments (Dollar 2000; Collier & Dollar 2002; Svensson 
2006).   
 
Therefore, minimizing the transaction costs increased by aid fragmentation (Knack & 
Rahman 2007) has been a major motivation behind the establishment of the aid 
effectiveness agenda to be discussed in the following section. The adoption of AIMS 
can be understood as one of the efforts of the international aid community towards this 
end.  
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Figure 2-2. The Global Field of Aid and Stakeholders27 
 
Aid effectiveness studies: Building on the theoretical underpinnings of new-institutional 
economics and economic rationality, scholars have discussed the effectiveness of aid, 
especially with respect to the conditions in which aid effectiveness can be achieved in 
the following four different areas: i) donors’ politico-economic factors, such as a 
proliferation in the number of donors and aid modalities including  bilateral vs. 
multilateral and OECD DAC donors vs. new donors (Dreher et al. 2011), a lack of donor 
coordination, political motivation of aid, and an unwillingness to coordinate and align 
aid activities to the recipient government’s strategy (Woods 2011), ii) economic 
condition of the donor’s aid policies and recipient government, such as the composition 
of public expenditure (Mosley et al. 2004); social expenditure (Verschoor & Kalwij 
2006); structural impediments of national industrialization (Fischer 2009); and the 
domestic macroeconomic policy (Burnside & Dollar 2004; Collier & Dollar 2002), iii) 
social and institutional factors of recipient countries, such as transparency and 
corruption (Ghosh & Kharas 2011; Burnside & Dollar 2004); ownership; aid 
accountability to citizens (Wenar 2011); social capital and institutions (Acemoglu & 
                                                 
27 As explained in the List of Abbreviation in the beginning of thesis, DAC stands for Development 
Assistance Committee; CSOs stands for civil society organizations.  
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Robinson 2012); intra-governmental coordination failure (McCormick et al. 2007), and 
political instability. Among these, Burnside and Dollar’s (1997) work may be the most 
cited study in aid studies, which argues that aid is effective to economic growth when 
governance is good. It argues that aid has a positive effect on economic development 
only in countries with sufficiently reformed policies and good institutions (Burnside & 
Dollar 2004). In sum, the mainstream of aid effectiveness studies dominantly framed by 
institutional economics and favoured by the MDAs including the World Bank, and the 
IMF have argued that ‘good governance’ in recipient governments are crucial to whether 
aid contributes to development and alleviates poverty.  
 
Lack of coordination as an impediment to aid effectiveness: In addition to the focus on 
the recipient’s side, there is a growing consensus that aid coordination, has to be 
improved for aid to be more effective. Lack of aid coordination is considered to be the 
main impediment to aid effectiveness (Woods 2011; Steinwand 2014; Lawson 2013). 
Aid coordination mechanisms occur at three different levels. McCormick, Mitullah, and 
Manga (2007) classified three levels of coordination: i) donor coordination, sometimes 
referred to aid harmonization; ii) donor-recipient coordination, commonly referred to as 
aid alignment; and 3) intra-governmental coordination.  
 
Aid studies empirically show that a lack of coordination may undermine aid 
effectiveness. First, a lack of donor coordination results in a duplication of donor 
activities in a country (Rahman and Sawada 2012; Woods 2011). Spatial disparities may 
occur in aid flows, with some recipient locations being supported by multiple aid 
operations, while others are neglected  (Woods 2011). Second, a lack of donor-recipient 
coordination leads to contradictory guidance at a particular  project site and thereby; 
undermines the alignment of aid programs with the recipient country’s long term 
national development plan (Halonen-Akatwijuka 2007; Lawson 2013). In addition, 
coordination failure increases the administrative burden and delivery cost to both donors 
and recipient government (Lawson 2013; Bigsten & Tengstam 2015), as well as 
constitutes a the negative long-term impact on state capacity (McCormick et al. 2007). 
Third, a lack of intra-government coordination may harm aid efficacy (Djankov et al. 
2009)  and erode institutions in recipient governments (Knack & Rahman 2007).   
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Based on this, what are the impediments to aid coordination? Firstly, scholars identify 
potential impediments to donor coordination such as donors’ politico-economic interests 
in a certain aid type. For example, donors would favour the ‘project approach’ through 
which they can demonstrate visible results to taxpayers rather than ‘budget support’, 
which would contrastingly give the recipient government decision-making power 
(Halonen-Akatwijuka 2007); the desire for sustaining their autonomy (Uvin 1999); turf-
protection and competition among donors (Kanbur et al. 1999); insufficient economic 
incentives and the overly expensive cost of coordination (Balogun 2005); the politicized 
purpose of NGOs (Barnett 2005); unbalanced power between donors and recipients 
(Robb 2004); and also intra-governmental politics within a recipient country 
(McCormick et al. 2007).   
 
More importantly, aid scholars identify impediments to coordination by looking at 
changes in the landscape of international aid. The proliferation of donors (Acharya et al. 
2006; Burcky 2011) are considered the most fundamental sources of impediments. 
Donor proliferation is commonly defined as “the increase in the number of donors giving 
aid to any one recipient country” (Burcky 2011). Yet another challenge is increasing aid 
heterogeneity, the multiplication in types of modality (i.e. project aid, program aid, 
budget support, technical assistance, and food aid) and in goals which may also originate 
from donor proliferation and a multiplication of development vision and conflicting 
goals (Mavrotas 2005). Empirical studies show that donor proliferation and aid 
heterogeneity increase complexity in development operations, making it increasingly 
difficult to monitor aid flows and to share aid information (Acharya et al. 2006; Knack 
& Smets 2012). This would increase difficulties in aid coordination and undermine the 
effectiveness of aid.  
 
In summary, it is difficult to identify the concrete causes of aid ineffectiveness. 
Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007:316) investigate the causality between aid flows and 
development, asserting that “many of the questions that policy makers and economists 
would like to squeeze data into answering simply cannot be answered due to the 
complexity and ‘noise’ along links in the chain”. Kenni (2008) points out lack of holistic 
approach and criticizes that aid effectiveness studies tend to find little significance 
between aid and development in general. It is hardly surprising that “questions of 
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whether, what kinds, and under what conditions aid might be said to work still remain 
highly contested” (Sumner and Mallett 2013:4). In spite of the dispute on aid 
effectiveness, there are still a couple of stances on which most aid scholars and 
practitioners would probably agree: i) aid information is a prerequisite for enhancing the 
effectiveness of aid, and ii) ICT can arguably contribute to better information 
management.  
 
2.4. ICT and Aid Effectiveness 
 
Many scholars have empirically studied ICT-enabled public sector reforms, commonly 
called e-government, and drawn attention to the differences between developed and 
developing countries in the approach to the ICT initiatives. Studies with a variety of 
cross-national data  mainly in the Public Administration discipline provide insights on 
diverse contributing factors on e-government and the diffusion of ICT-enabled services 
(Rorissa & Demissie 2010; Relly & Sabharwal 2009; Gibbs et al. 2003). Although there 
is still a dominance of the technology transfer perspective, more contextualized research 
has been provided by ICTD scholars (Ciborra 2005; Madon 2009; Madon et al. 2009; 
Avgerou & Walsham 2000). Compared to e-government research in the context of 
developing countries, however, little research exists on the use of information systems 
in the international aid sector. In this section, I will review existing studies on the role 
of information and ICT in managing aid and enhancing aid effectiveness, in order to 
identify research gaps.   
 
2.4.1. The Role of Aid Information 
 
A common underlying assumption on the role of aid information is that of  Moon and 
Williamson (2010:2), namely that “the comprehensive availability and accessibility of 
aid flow information in a timely, systematic and comparable manner” would increase 
transparency and allow stakeholders to coordinate better. This would support more 
effective delivery of aid and enable development activities to produce better results 
(McGee & Gaventa 2010; Ghosh & Kharas 2011). 
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As discussed in Figure 2-2, international aid mechanism involves key stake holders who 
play diverse roles in the process of aid flow at different levels :i) tax payers of donor 
countries, ii) donor governments, iii) intermediaries such as international development 
agencies, iv) recipient governments, and v) citizens of the recipient who are the 
beneficiaries of foreign aid. Sharing aid information on the three ‘Ws’ of aid flow: ‘Who 
is doing what, where’ would enable taxpayers to be informed on how their money is 
being used, thus encouraging taxpayers to become more supportive of foreign aid policy 
(Ghosh & Kharas 2011); and enable citizens to better understand aid activities and 
further participate in the feedback mechanism of development process (World Bank 
2014b; Wenar 2011). More importantly, opening and sharing basic aid information is 
often considered a prerequisite for better coordination. The process of this information 
rationalization enables countries to more effectively manage their aid activities and 
avoid overlaps with other donors (Ghosh &Kharas 2011; Bigsten & Tengstam 2015), 
and enhances donor-recipient coordination by helping recipient governments to plan and 
predict their budgets better. Recipient governments thus take more ownership of the aid 
coordination mechanism and achieve better development outcomes, particularly in 
countries with higher aid dependency, and where foreign aid forms a large part of their 
budget. 
 
However, there are still knowledge gaps in both theory and practice since transparency 
by itself has limitations and achieves very little or nothing (McGee & Gaventa 2010). 
Transparency can only offer a basis and means for effective action, and is not a sufficient 
condition for coordination (Sturges 2004; Fox 2007). Kaufmann & Bellver (2005) argue 
that it is still poorly understood how transparency and information accessibility can 
affect coordination and improve the quality of aid governance. In addition, in spite of 
widespread of transparency and information sharing initiatives, progress has been slow 
(Nunnenkamp & Thiele 2010).  
 
One area of focus in the theoretical debate is the conceptualization of information itself. 
In much of the aid and ICTD literature, the concept of information and knowledge is 
inadequately problematized (Mason, 2008; Kleine & Unwin, 2009). The direction 
towards information sharing and transparency is a positive progress in theory. However, 
three main issues remain unanswered: Who produces aid information and knowledge? 
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For whom? For what purpose? Does information sharing aim to support beneficiary 
feedback or to report to the donors and attract more funding? Scholars further criticize 
the dominance of knowledge production in the field of aid. Narayanaswamy (2013) 
points out that information is treated as an isolated entity in knowledge in the 
development agenda, and argues that there is significant coercion in the transfer of 
information from developed countries, as the knowledge producer to developing 
countries, who arguably suffer a paucity of knowledge. The developed countries often 
set the criteria for what matters as ‘valuable knowledge’ and what does not (Escobar, 
1995). However, in the current ICTD research, there is insufficient attention to and 
interest in who produces and consumes aid information for what; and what the 
surrounding power dynamics are.  
 
The dominant theoretical explanation from economic institutionalism is that the 
publication of aid data represents a classic collective action problem among stakeholders 
where the costs of information sharing are seen as prohibitively high in comparison to 
the potential benefits (Acharya et al., 2006; Knack & Smets, 2012). Aid transparency 
initiatives, which have received a global attention over the last decades, mainly highlight 
the potential benefit of information sharing in the aid sector (World Bank 1998; OECD 
2012a). With this backdrop, the use of information systems in the aid sector has been 
widely discussed as an innovative tool for this type of process of information 
rationalization. 
 
2.4.2. Information Systems in Aid Management 
 
Although there are plenty of practical reports mainly published by MDAs, there is a 
lacuna in studies on the role of ICT in aid management. There are two gaps identified in 
the academic studies in this arena. First, similar to the gaps in e-government literature 
(Al-Gahtani 2003; Lin et al. 2011; Rogers 1995), there is a dominance of technical-
rational assumption in which the nature of the ICT adoption is seen as intrinsically 
beneficial action. Second, regarding the modality of aid, most studies examine 
emergency recovery and humanitarian assistance as the research case, while there is a 
lack of understanding in the role of information systems in managing ODA such as 
AIMS.   
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As envisioned by the New Public Management (NPM) and the notion of ‘good 
governance’, ICT adoptions in the public sector in developing countries has been widely 
discussed as a means to achieve government efficiency (Kettani & Moulin 2014), 
transparency (Bertot et al. 2010; Sturges 2004), improve service quality (Jaeger & 
Thopmson 2003; Brown 2015) and citizen participation (Avila et al. 2010; Medagila 
2012). In the field of aid, the notion of good governance, has promoted the use of ICT 
in aid management in aid-receiving countries. Although the concept of ‘good 
governance’ and NPM has been increasingly challenged theoretically, the practices 
based on the concepts are globally institutionalized and might continue in practice 
(Dunleavy 2005).  
 
Researchers have often investigated ‘good practices’ in aid management and highlighted 
the adoption and transfer of the technology by analysing socio-organizational factors 
and impediments to successful implementation. Agustina and Fahmi (2010) introduce 
five AIMS and compare advantages and disadvantages. Kharas (2011) compares the 
Pakistan Development Assistance Database and the OECD Creditor Reporting Systems 
(CRS). Illustrating the case of using GeoCommons in the Haiti Earthquake, he further 
argues that the use of information systems and geo-referencing tools at the national level 
greatly help government tackle the gaps in aid transparency and effectiveness.  A lot of 
operational guidance and practical reports published by MDAs adopt an instrumental 
view toward the use of ICT in aid management (UNDP 2010; OECD Publishing 2015; 
Wittemyer et al. 2014; OECD & UNDP 2006).  
 
These studies are mainly based on the assumption that improvement in aid management 
can be achieved by facilitating the process of collecting, sharing, and managing aid 
information by using information systems (Wittemyer et al. 2014; Linders 2013; 
Agustina & Fahmi 2010). Linders (2013) further highlights the role of information in 
aid, and discusses how development agencies leverage an emerging concept of open data 
to improve aid effectiveness. With the backdrop of emergence of open data, which 
becomes powerful as part of socio-technical assemblage (Kitchin 2014), the common 
underlying assumption that open data contributes to better aid governance has given rise 
to popularity of the concept of open development (Smith et al. 2011; Smith & Reilly 
2014). The recent reports A World That Counts: Mobilising the Data Revolution for 
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Sustainable Development, published by UN(2014), and Big Data in Action for 
Development by the World Bank (2014) continue spreading the concept. Some 
pioneering ICTD scholars investigate the potential and challenge of open data in a 
particular field of health (Sahay 2016), education (Schalkwyk et al. 2015), big data for 
development (Hilbert 2016). In the field of aid effectiveness, however, there are still 
missing links between open data, information sharing and better coordination and 
effective aid. Furthermore, the concept of open development itself has been 
characterized by strong ambiguity and vagueness, criticized for inadequacy as a solid 
framework for theorizing the complexity of development process.  
 
There is a plethora of development economics research on aid effectiveness, using 
quantitative data from the existing aid database and information systems such as 
AidData28, World Bank Data Portal29, the OECD Creditor Reporting Systems (CRS)30 
(Tierney et al. 2011; Findley et al. 2011; Powell & Michael 2011; Kilama 2016). 
However, these are not information systems implemented in recipient countries and 
managed by local governments. Also the technological object of such studies is not the 
information systems. Rather, they conduct empirical analysis based on data from the 
systems. There are very few in-depth studies on AIMS. UNDP (2010) presents multiple-
case study of AIMS in three post-conflict and fragile countries. The World Bank report 
(Weaver et al. 2014)31 on the Malawi Open Aid Map is one of few examples of single 
case studies on AIMS. It investigates the main goals of the AIMS and discusses the 
challenges as well. However, such research is a type of ‘lessons learned’ study and 
focuses on highlighting the potential of aid mapping and AIMS as a powerful tool for 
decision-making in aid governance.  
 
The second gap in literature on ICT in aid sector is that most studies explore the specific 
context of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in a short term period, rather 
than ODA management in a long term and regular base32. Altay and Labonte (2014) 
                                                 
28 Source: http://aiddata.org 
29 Source: https://data.worldbank.org 
30 Source: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1 
31 In a collaboration with University of Texas at Austin’s Climate Change and African Political Stability 
team, in collaboration with AidData, Development Gateway, the Government of Malawi 
32 Discussion on the difference was summarized in Section 2.3.1.  
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discuss the potential and challenges of ICT in managing humanitarian aid in the 2010 
Haiti earthquake. Tapia et al. (2012) conducted four cases studies of ICT enabled 
coordination of humanitarian action organizations, and discusses cross-organizations, 
cross-technology, cross-hierarchy collaboration. Saab et al. (2012) argue that 
coordination at the headquarters level is insufficient, and highlight the field level 
coordination among ICT workers. Studies mainly discuss the potential and challenge of 
ICT in cross-organizational (multi-agencies) and cross level (national, regional and 
local) coordination in humanitarian assistance.  
 
This research stream often benefits from the scholarly works from traditional 
organization studies (Crowston 1997; Adler 1995). Coordination issues arise at various 
levels of aid management (McCormick et al. 2007). A previously discussed in Section 
2.3.3, a widely accepted concept of ‘aid coordination’ in development studies mainly 
takes the donor-recipient dichotomy and defines three levels of coordination between 
stakeholders: donor coordination, intra-governmental coordination, and donor-recipient 
coordination. However, research in ICT in humanitarian assistance more frequently cites 
Malone and Crowston (1990)’s conceptualisation of coordination as “the act of 
managing dependencies between entities and the joint effort of entities working together 
towards mutually defined goals”, and perceives coordination issue from a collective 
view, or at hierarchical levels: macro (agency), local (community), and micro 
(individual) level. This perhaps reflects the nature of a high degree of urgency and 
contingency in humanitarian assistance.   
 
In addition, the studies of ICT in humanitarian assistance and disaster management 
covers what has been discussed in traditional IS research, regarding inter-organizational 
alliances through ICT: a market coordination structure versus a hierarchical 
coordination structure (Malone 1987); maintain inter-organizational coordination 
through a set of practices within ‘trading zones’ (Kellogg et al. 2006); as well as 
interoperability and governance based on standardized ICT based platforms (Markus & 
Bui 2012). The main challenges discussed in the research are associated with 
information problems as well. Ngamassi et al. (2011) address inter-organizational 
coordination problems between humanitarian NGOs in using ICT, and pay more 
attention to conflicting mandates and organizational issues. Researchers have also 
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identified impediments including the criticality of data quality in disaster management 
and timeliness of information (Fisher & Kingma 2001); unwillingness to share 
information (Ngamassi et al. 2011); as well as trust and misinterpretation of information 
(Saab et al. 2012). Bui et al. (2000) further propose a framework to minimize these 
challenges and develop a global information network in humanitarian assistance and 
disaster management operations, by utilizing ICT.  
 
2.4.3. Problem Area 
 
There are two main research gaps of studies in ICT in aid management. First, alongside 
the proliferation of AIMS initiatives and ‘good practice’ reports published by MDAs, 
most academic research is grounded in a technical-rational approach and tends toward 
favourable evaluation on the technology. Some ICTD scholars add socio-technical 
dimension to the discussion. Tusiime and Byrne (2011) explore the process of 
implementation and institutionalisation of the Commodity Movement Processing and 
Analysis System (COMPAS) developed by the World Food Program (WFP) in Chad, 
and emphasises a context-based approach. However, there is a lack of in-depth research 
considering the nature of foreign aid, which is embedded in both local context, as well 
macro-dynamic of global context. IS implementation in recipient countries is contingent 
upon multiple socio-technical and institutional factors that vary across countries. 
Second, most research has been conducted on the inter-organizational level coordination 
between NGOs in the context of humanitarian assistance, not the context of ODA. There 
is a lack of studies of the regular-based, national-level information systems for the 
purpose of ODA management. A comprehensive review of AIMS implemented in 
recipient countries is non-existent. 
 
2.5. Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have provided a theoretical overview of the research domain of ICTD. 
This chapter aimed to unpack the relationship between the concepts of development, aid 
and ICT. Two broad research gaps were identified in this literature review. First, framed 
by a dominant instrumental view on the role of information systems in aid management, 
the literature identifies a relative lack of socio-technical perspective of information 
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systems in the aid sector. Significant emphasis can be placed on the political nature of 
aid, as well as a socio-technical view of the role of IS in aid. The second is concerned 
with limited ICTD research focusing the macro structure of global aid governance. ICTD 
initiatives and practices in developing countries are shaped by a specific ideology, norms 
and visions of development. The review, and in particular the constructivist perspective 
in IR, suggests that the role of information systems in aid should be understood with a 
comprehensive, holistic view and broad institutional force constituting shared visions, 
rationales and expectations of ICT.  
 
So far, the literature review allowed me to position my study in the narrow domain of 
ICTD, information systems in aid management in developing countries. Based on the 
gaps identified in the domain of my study in this chapter, I provide a broad research 
question for this study that synthesizes the research interests discussed in this chapter: 
 
 How is technology adopted, implemented and used by government for aid 
management (ODA at state-level)? 
 
I will further synthesize the problem area through the next chapter, which will focus on 
institution, technology, and global field of aid for framework of the study, and will 
specifically convert them into the specific questions guiding my thesis. 
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Chapter 3.  Conceptual Framework 
 
Building on the literature review on development, aid and technology, and the research 
gaps identified in Chapter 2, this chapter explains the conceptual framework used for 
this study. The framework is informed by two broad theories: a theory of institutions, 
and a theory of technology.  
 
A theory of institutions, informed by sociological institutionalism, discusses the way in 
which norms, rules and schemes produce meaning for actors’ social behaviour and 
interact within an organizational field. Building on the discussion of the central concepts 
of institutional theories, the discussion is expanded to the global field of aid. A 
conceptual link is established between sociological institutionalism and International 
Relations (IR) constructivist approach with a specific focus on norms diffusion 
dynamics, as well as the state’s response to global norms as norm localization and 
subsidiarity.  
 
A theory of technology, grounded in Science and Technology Studies (STS) and 
Information Systems (IS), aims at an understanding of the role of technology in the 
institutional account. This thesis conceptualizes information systems as a socio-
technical system and discusses different interpretations of technology according to 
diverse stakeholders. Through the lens of social shaping of technology, special attention 
is paid to information systems failure in developing countries with a particular focus on 
the political and symbolic roles of technology.  
 
Combining the theoretical discussions in two domains, Section 3.3 revisits a broad 
problem area of the study, and converts it into two main research questions. These 
questions will be examined through the research framework, which will guide the 
analysis and interpretation of empirical findings on the review of AIMS presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6, as well as the Indonesian AIMS detailed in Chapters 7 and 8 
respectively.  
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3.1. Theory of Institutions 
 
Institutional theory is very prominent in literature and is considered through a range of 
diverse disciplines, including the economic tradition of rational choice institutionalism 
(Williamson 1985; North 1990) and historical sociology focusing on path dependency 
(Mahoney 2000; Stinchcombe & Skocpol 1985). In this study, institutional theory is 
referred to as a body of theorizing efforts, which generally take a contrasting position to 
the rationalist or functionalist approach to organizations, and emphasizes a social, 
institutional and historical context (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Scott 2001; Thornton & 
Ocasio 1999; Fligstein & McAdam 2012). Building on the discussion of key concepts 
of institutional theory, this section identifies the theoretical link between sociological 
institutionalism and the constructivist approach in IR discussed in Section 2.3.2, and 
extends the discussion of institutional theory to the field of global aid.  
 
3.1.1. Conceptualizing Global Filed of Aid 
 
In this section, I first conceptualize the global field based on the core concept of the 
organizational field in institutional theory. The concept of organizational field has been 
a primary unit in institutional theory. DiMaggio and Powell (1983:148) define fields as 
“those organizations which, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional 
life: key suppliers, resources and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other 
organizations that produce similar services or products”. The concept of organizational 
field is now fairly established and drawn upon in institutional theory (Currie 2011). 
However, there are constant attempts to improve its conceptualization, boundaries, and 
operationalization in institutional analysis through the suggestion of alternative 
perspectives.  
 
Meyer and Scott (1991:117) offer the concept of societal sectors as “a collection of 
organizations operating in the same domain, as identified by the similarity of their 
services, products or functions, together with those organizations that critically influence 
the performance of focal organizations: for example, major suppliers and customers, 
owners and regulators, funding sources and competitors”. Scott (2004:9) emphasizes “a 
functionally specific arena” in an attempt to broaden the range of organizational 
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relationships horizontally and vertically, by defining boundaries functionally rather than 
geographically.   
 
The concept of ‘strategic action field’ was developed in Economic Sociology, although 
it was not explicitly discussed in the field (Fligstein & McAdam 2011). The strategic 
action field approach argues that actors in a field always share a common understanding 
of ‘what is at stake’, and develop tactics and strategies to form a coalition in an attempt 
to attain dominant positions through both competition and cooperation. To strive for 
dominance, actors need to possess social skills that enable them to read others’ 
perceptions, promote cooperation among actors, create, contest and reproduce rules and 
norms in favour of theirs advantages. (Fligstein & McAdam 2011).  
 
The conceptual value of the field is that it provides an alternative perspective, compared 
to the earlier passive notion of organizational environment. The concept of the field 
highlights that it is not just “random collections of resources and schemas, nor are they 
constructs defined by disembodied dimensions, such as complexity and munificence; 
rather, they are themselves organized” (Scott 2001:136). While environments are 
passively given, field are constructed. This constructivist view of organizational field 
has also been applied beyond organizational studies. By offering a comprehensive 
literature review on organizational field over the past three decades, Wooten and 
Hoffman (2016:13) encourage researchers to continue to develop the concept of a field 
as an analytical tool and to investigate “how it is developed, which field members 
contribute to its development and maintenance, how it is transmitted to other actors, and 
how it changes over time.” One example in IR is the work by Dingwerth and Pattberg 
(2009), which investigates how the field of transnational rule-making organizations 
emerged and is institutionalized in environmental politics.  
 
There have been efforts, however, to further conceptualize fields beyond the nation-state 
and extend the analytical focus from an organizational or national scale to a global level, 
particularly in the field of international political sociology33 (Brenner 1999; Buchholz 
2016; Sassen 2007). Connell (2007) particularly points out the limitations in simply 
                                                 
33 It is also sometimes referred to international sociology, global sociology and sociology of globalization.  
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scaling up existing concepts such as field, power and governance, which are rooted in 
Western societies. Other scholarly efforts to find the missing theoretical link between 
national and global fields includes ‘glocalization’ (Robertson 1995), ‘norm localization’ 
and ‘norm subsidiarity’ (Acharya 2004; Acharya 2011), which will be introduced and 
further discussed in Section 3.1.3. Buchholz (2016) has insightfully summarized these 
scholarly efforts and suggested ‘relative vertical autonomy’ between macro and meso-
level properties and relations of global field structure. This analytical framework may 
be useful to understand the mechanisms of aid delivery involving diverse stakeholders 
at different levels, which Figure 2-2 illustrates.  
 
It may be difficult to theorize the nature of a global field and to suggest a completely 
new conceptualization in the framework of this thesis. However, the significance of 
understanding the relationship between the national and global levels is highlighted in a 
way that can reflect the interdependence between them, as well as can avoid simple 
dualisms between the two levels. In this regard, the IR constructivist view discussed in 
Section 2.3.2 provides valuable insights as it opposes the static assumption of the 
structure-agent relationship, and conceptualizes the structures of the global field as 
social, rather than strictly material.   
 
Keeping in mind that organizational fields are arenas within which there are similar 
actors, this study conceptualizes the field of aid as a highly established field, where the 
relationships between diverse stakeholders including states and multi development 
agencies (MDAs) are subject to historically evolved aid norms, governance, tensions 
and cultural dispositions, which jointly define a distinctive organizational field 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983).  
 
As further developed in Figure 2-2 and illustrated in Figure 3-1, the global field of aid 
has all the key characteristics of a ‘recognized area of institutional life’ with a 
constellation of stakeholders performing similar functions, but with differentiated roles 
and levels of practice. It includes key suppliers (typically donors), resources (financial, 
technical, in-kind aid, and knowledge), product consumers (recipients), regulatory 
agencies (typically MDAs, rule-making organizations), and other organizations (CSOs, 
media, professional communities) that produce similar services, products or functions 
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related to aid (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Scott 1991). These actors share 
norms and a ‘common meaning system’, perceive each other as peers, and frequently 
interact with each other. Similar to Scott’s (2001:136) views of fields “as a collection of 
contextual factors or conditions affecting organization structures or processes”, the 
behaviours of actors are influenced by both the domestic and global contexts in which 
they are embedded. Also, the global aid institutions are shaped by these key 
stakeholders, as well as the power relationships between them. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1. The Global Field of Aid and Stakeholders 
(Developed on Figure 2-2) 
 
3.1.2. Institutional Perspective: Isomorphism and Institutional Change 
 
Institutional Isomorphism: Scholars tend to agree that the field shapes the behaviour of 
its members, once the organizational field is established. In the seminal work by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), the authors seek to account for why organizations in the 
same field often experience significant similarities and become ‘isomorphic’. The three-
fold concept of institutional isomorphism they propose –coercive, normative, and 
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mimetic – has been widely applied in investigating the diffusion of a particular policy 
and a practice. These mechanisms could influence organizations in their similarities with 
peers and in gaining institutional legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell 1983).  
 
Coercive isomorphism implies that an organization adopts a particular structure and 
practice due to formal and informal external pressures from other influential 
organizations on which they are dependent. Such pressures could be perceived as 
persuasion, force, or invitation to dominant collusion. For instance, inter-governmental 
mandate, regulation, or trade and finance dependence are sources of coercive pressures. 
In the field of aid, recipient governments that have either entered into an agreement or 
endorsed an international aid agenda could be more cooperative with the rules. Those 
countries that are more reliant on aid might follow the aid standards and goals set by the 
international aid community more than other governments. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
diverse ‘good governance’ initiatives directly or indirectly involve NPM principles as a 
prerequisite, which act as aid conditionality (Ciborra & Navarra 2005; Santiso 2001).  
 
Normative pressure primarily stems from the norms of a professional community. It 
influences organizations by advising and disseminating knowledge. Academics, 
technical experts, and the media are often in the position to influence recipient 
governments to endorse widely accepted norms of aid agendas. For example, developing 
countries receiving consultancy and technical assistance from leading aid experts or 
agencies are more likely to follow ready-made solutions and to adopt structures and 
practices suggested by these professionals. In the field of aid, as previously discussed, 
MDAs are often considered to be a source of normative pressure across recipient 
countries and helped to spread global norms (Finnemore 1993).  
 
Mimetic isomorphism is encouraged and tends to take place when there is a high degree 
of competition or uncertainty in the field. Organizations tend to copy structures and 
practices that are considered legitimate, regardless of their functional and managerial 
efficiency. In Scott's (2001) explanation, the cognitive pillar of institutionalization is a 
process of imitating similar organizations in the same field that are regarded as more 
successful. The rapid diffusion of AIMS after the international endorsement of aid 
transparency initiatives such as the Paris Declaration and current trends favouring 
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openness among developing countries, can be understood as the result of mimetic 
isomorphism. In addition, regional competition between aid-receiving countries could 
be a source of mimetic pressure.  
 
The seminal works by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
became one of the most cited studies in sociology and has greatly influenced subsequent 
research in the related disciplines.  These early works on institutional theory, however, 
has been criticized for paying heavy attention to stability, homogeneity, and 
isomorphism while ignoring institutional change and organizational heterogeneity 
(Oliver 1991; Thornton & Ocasio 2005). 
 
Institutional Change: Institutional accounts of organizations’ behaviour, such as 
through the lens of the various isomorphic forms, provide a basis for understanding that 
taken-for-granted norms, regulation, and uncertainty might force organizations to adopt 
similar practices, and hinder them from pursuing rational strategic choice (Dimaggio & 
Powell 1991). However, such accounts pay less attention to the significant role of power 
and organizations’ interests in the process of institutionalization. Rather, they emphasize 
institutionalization as an outcome rather than a process.  
 
To overcome these limitations, institutional theorists have been addressing issues 
pertaining to the organizations’ resistance to institutional pressure and institutional 
change. Conceptualizing institutional logics, Thornton and Ocasio (1999) explain that 
organizational forms and practices are legitimated by the “socially constructed, 
historical patterns of material practices, assumptions and values, beliefs, and rules by 
which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and 
space, and provide meaning to their social reality." If two or more institutional logics 
are adapted to the same forms or practices, then the institutional logics conflict with each 
other, and this may lead to institutional change. The notion of institutional logic 
emphasizes that organizations are not passive enough to adopt taken-for-granted 
institutional structures, rather perform strategically with their diverse interpretations of 
rationality embedded in a given context (Thornton & Ocasio 2005; Townley 1997). This 
notion of institutional logic has similarity to a couple of other concepts, such as Weber’s 
rationality (Kalberg 1980), Kuhn’s paradigm, conceptions of control (Fligstein & 
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McAdam 2012), and cognitive prior (Acharya 2010). Among these, through the IR 
constructivist lens, Acharya (2010:21) suggests ‘cognitive prior’ to explain “an existing 
set of ideas, belief systems, and norms, which determine and condition an individual or 
social group’s receptivity to new norms.”  
 
Contingency views in institutional change aim to address the situations where 
established institutional structures become unstable and the possibility of a de-
institutionalisation process is real (Deroy & Clegg 2015; Lawrence et al. 2010). 
Institutional structures are reproduced by the actors who accept the set of norms, rules, 
and cultural understandings as the dominant logic of institutions in the field while 
collectively changing the structures through active actions (Scott 2008; Giddens 1987; 
Greenwood & Hinings 2010). In this view, institutional change occurs in situations in 
which certain events take place and cannot be interpreted and categorized by applying 
the existing dominant logic of institutional structures. The incapability of codifying 
these events by the dominant institutions usually leads to two divergent consequences: 
either the actors improvise a new set of codes that become recognized and accepted as 
the legitimate means of understanding and enacting, or the actors find alternative 
codification schemes that potentially destabilize the dominant institutional logic. Events 
are defined as scenarios that are ‘not known, unexpected, and unwelcomed by the 
dominant institutions (Bartley & Schneiberg 2002; Greenwood et al. 2011). When 
events take place and become knowable by actors in the field of practice, the flexibility 
of interpreting the meanings of events and the following rhetorical, discursive 
movements to establish the one legitimate means of understanding among other 
alternatives, becomes the source of institutional change.  
 
Once the corresponding relationship between the dominant institutional logic and the 
emerging practical scenarios is, what Meyer and Rowan referred to as decoupled, the 
alternative possibility of codification becomes open and accessible to actors’ practical 
knowledge, which means the dynamics of competing for legitimacy of reasoning 
(institutional logic) is established (Meyer & Rowan 1977a). The legitimacy of 
institutional logic is challenged, as actors gain alternative, competing means of 
interpretation to justify and prescribe a different logic of actions and relationship-
building.  
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3.1.3. Insights from the Institutional Approach in International Relations 
 
Before I illustrate the analytical framework, which is informed by the IR constructivist 
view, I identify the intellectual resonance between the sociological institutionalism and 
IR constructivist theories. Scholarly works in the field of IR, inspired by sociological 
institutionalism are discussed. In particular, I revisit the aid effectiveness debate in 
Section 2.3.3, where the dominant rational-choice theory was identified, and introduce 
the institutional approach to aid effectiveness.  
 
World Society Perspective: The sociological institutional perspective often appears in 
IR literature. Finnemore's (1996) work provides a comprehensive overview of 
sociological institutionalism and its implications for the study of international political 
economy. He criticizes the ‘disciplinary isolation’ in the field of IR and calls for 
attention to the sociological institutionalist view, which he describes as “a powerful set 
of arguments about the role of norms and culture in international life that pose direct 
challenges to realist and liberal theories in political science” (Finnemore, 1996: p.2).  
 
Institutional theory emphasizes the importance of informal institutions such as norms, 
values and cultural aspects of organizational fields in determining the structure and 
activity/behaviour of organizations. Fields exert both material and resource constraints 
related to competitive efficiency on individual organizations, in rational choice 
institutionalist terms, as well as societal expectations of conformity with external 
normative and cultural standards. The intellectual resonance between organizational 
sociology and IR was initiated by sociologist John Meyer in the late 1970s. 
 
Meyer conceptualized the World Society34 perspective, which combines a sociological 
perspective for the analysis of norm and culture in the global community theory (Meyer 
et al. 1997; Meyer 1980), and the classical view on state identity as being constructed, 
as propagated by constructivists in IR (Wendt 1995; Katzenstein 1997). The concept of 
world society is a critique of the realist IR theories, which consider the state as an 
                                                 
34 Initially, he suggested the concept of world polity. Reflecting the limitations of its heavy attention to 
isomorphism, and embracing the issue of globalization, the World Polity School further developed the 
concept of world society. The scholarly group is also known as the Stanford School(Buhari-Gulmez 2010).  
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egoistic actor in a controllable international environment. However, the state, which is 
both internally and externally sovereign, as well as its constructed roles is still at the 
core of this concept as well as its analysis (Meyer et al. 1997). This is also closely linked 
to the constructivist IR view. This institutional perspective raised questions that the 
realist IR scholars then dominating the debate could not fully explain: why do states 
globally adopt very similar institutions and policies in spite of significant differences in 
socio-political and economic conditions as well as cultural and historical diversities?  
 
The main critique of the realist view was the paradoxical behaviour of states. World 
Society scholars argue that it may be explained by the concept of world society/polity, 
which is ontologically prior to states (Buhari-Gulmez 2010). Their works, in particular 
those on the emergence of NGOs and international social movements, are greatly 
influenced by the institutional understanding of the embeddedness of the organizations 
in a wider cultural environment, as well as the constructed nature of agency and the ritual 
character of action (Meyer & Rowan 1977b).   
 
Conceptualizing Aid Effectiveness through the Institutional Lens: As stated at the 
beginning of this chapter, throughout this thesis I refer to institutional theory as a 
sociological new institutionalism, which stands in opposition to rational choice 
institutionalism. In Section 2.3.3, the new-institutional economic analysis was identified 
as the extant dominant theory of aid effectiveness. However, there have been efforts to 
investigate the issue of aid effectiveness and complex dynamics of aid mechanisms from 
institutional perspectives. The institutional approach highlights the ambiguous mandates 
and the different interpretations from stakeholders in a given field, which are the 
outcomes of contradictory pressures (Thornton & Ocasio 2005; Babb 2003). As 
discussed in Chapter 2, particularly in the complex field of aid with a proliferation of 
actors, as well as fragmented aid activities, organizational legitimacy can be obtained 
from diverse sources.  
 
The concept of legitimacy has been essential to sociological organizational studies. 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that organizations pursue legitimating external 
institutions on which they rely, rather than simply achieving organizational 
effectiveness. Scott (2008) identifies three central elements of institutions within an 
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organizational field: regulative, normative, and cognitive social systems, and explains 
legitimacy within three dimensions. While organizations try to sustain different types of 
legitimacy, they can acquire membership, approval, and resources. This leads them to 
continue to exist and to hold power in the field. Suchman (1995:574) further develops 
the notion that “legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of 
an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of norms, beliefs and definitions”. This provides the assumption that organizational 
legitimacy is a socially constructed reality, which can be redefined in accordance with 
changing norms, rules, and other informal and formal institutions in the field. For 
example, the behaviour of state actors, including recipient government and donor 
agencies, is shaped by this need for legitimacy in the field of aid. Pressure to endorse 
global norms like poverty reduction, and to participate in the internationally agreed 
development agenda often structures the behaviour of actors in the field. In this process, 
ambiguous mandates between the symbolically adopted agenda, which satisfies other 
stakeholders, and action ‘on the ground’ are often found in organizations (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977).  
 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) described this decoupling process as an organizational 
situation of inevitable discrepancy, in which compliance with social expectations can be 
symbolic rather than substantive, leaving the original practices largely unchanged. 
Decoupling occurs because of what organizations actually do and what organizations 
ought to do in formal structures, which only serve as symbols (Scott, 1987, p. 507). State 
policy change is often a direct response to an international mandate, which cannot be 
simply understood as cognitively rational or functional. In this situation, international 
agreements, domestic commitment to them, and policy action documents of globally 
accepted norms such as aid effectiveness, are often interpretable in diverse and 
sometimes even contradictory ways. Gulrajani (2014) explains:  
 
The contradictions between development-policy goals like poverty reduction, neo- 
liberal economic policies and neo-conservative foreign policy might also contribute to 
significant slippage (Cooke, 2003; Murphy, 2008). Donor nations have naturally 
glossed over such inconsistencies with the use of diplomatic buzzwords, unrealistic 
policies and a proliferation of new strategies and solutions, all in their bid to maintain 
support and legitimacy from multiple quarters (Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Quarles van 
Ufford, 1988). 
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This is reminiscent of the previously discussed constructivist approach in IR. The 
constructivist view takes an account of state actors’ behaviour deriving from a 
diversified perspective about aid, development and national interests. Scholars study the 
manner in which international norms and dynamics strongly influence state actors’ 
behaviour. Both donor agencies and recipient governments are embedded within the 
multiple levels of environments including global, regional, and domestic field, where 
diverse stakeholders contest, negotiate and collaborate each other.  Global aid 
institutions, including aid norms and rules, define the behaviours of states embedded in 
their domestic governance due to the states’ pursuit of legitimacy in the global field. In 
spite of its suffering from the 2007 financial crisis, for example, South Korea joined the 
OECD DAC, a rich donor’s club, becoming a donor of global aid community, which 
serves as a visible symbol of national strength. Likewise, the commitment of a recipient 
government to be a part of global efforts on poverty reduction as an emerging donor, for 
example, Indonesia’s efforts in the South-South Cooperation (SSC) are a powerful 
symbol of a legitimate member, same as a ‘good government’ of aid receiving countries.  
 
Constructivist view in IR: The constructivist approach in IR theory has been inspired 
by sociological institutionalism (Finnemore 1996). As discussed in Section 2.3.3, it 
contends with the realist and liberalist views, and criticizes them as being too rigid. The 
constructivist lens has been regarded as an approach based on two assumptions: i) 
agents/states are situated in a setting that is material and social, with relatively more 
emphasis on the latter characteristic, and ii) this setting influences how agents or states 
perceive their own interests (Checkel 1998). Essentially, constructivists tend to place 
significance on the interaction between agents and structures, which is likely dictated by 
norms (Wendt 1999). In general, norms have been defined as “a standard of appropriate 
behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). Norms provide 
rules and guidance to determine behaviours and they are generated as actors pursue their 
respective interests and disseminate ideas in networks and organizational settings 
(Collins 2013).  
 
Constructivists perceive that agents/states and structures/international norms interact, 
and interpret norms as “collective understandings that make behavioural claims on 
actors” (Checkel, 1998: 327-328). Rather than considering norms as mere rules that 
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regulate behaviour, constructivists tend to perceive norms as defining elements in actors’ 
identities (Checkel, 1998). With a significant focus on norms during the last two 
decades, there has been growing interest in examining how norms diffuse and influence 
the behaviour of states at the international level (Landolt, 2004; Park, 2006).  
 
3.1.4. Norms Dynamics and Global Politics 
 
Building on the discussion on the theoretical link between sociological institutionalism 
and IR theories in the previous section, the constructivist framework is hereby proposed 
to investigate the questions that have come up in this thesis:  
 
 How do global norms emerge, how are they diffused and institutionalized in the 
global field? (Norm diffusion)  
 
 How do the states vary in adopting the norms? (Norm localization)  
 
 How do the states challenge the global norms and contribute to institutional 
change in the global field? (Norm subsidiarity)  
 
In the previous section, I discussed how sociological institutionalism has influenced the 
field of IR, in particular, the constructivist IR view. The following section highlights 
what the constructivist approach can offer when it comes to institutional thinking. It 
provides useful analytical frameworks in four ways:  
 
 capturing the trans-national dynamics of stakeholders in the global field 
(Buchholz 2016). 
 
 emphasizing the role of global norms and its social construction – how norms 
emerge, are diffused and institutionalized (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Acharya 
2004). 
 
 focusing on the role of state as a unit of analysis and the heterogeneity of the 
state’s behaviour – how states adopt norms differently. 
 
 investigating institutional change in the global field – how states challenge the 
global norms and contribute to institutional change.  
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Norm Dynamics: How and why particular global norms were being adopted by an 
increasing number of state actors and finally diffused across the globe has been one 
of main research areas in the field of IR (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 
1999; Checkel 2002). Norms are in general perceived as standards of behaviour of 
actors based on intersubjective validity (Finnemore 1996). Scholarly efforts on norm 
diffusion process have provided useful frameworks to understand a process of social 
construction of norms, and ways in which state actors socialize in international 
community.  
 
In organizational sociology, scholars have offered a critique of conventional 
institutional theory. Hasselbladh & Kallinikos (2000:700) point out:  
 
neo-institutionalism bypass the central issue of the social construction of 
rationalization, which it treats in terms of structural isomorphism, i.e. diffusion of the 
same or similar structural patterns across populations of organizations. (…) 
 
The constructive nature of norms, ideas, technology and rationalization cannot be 
ignored as Kallinikos & Hasselbladh (2000) argue:  
 
Questions such as how some ideas or techniques achieve a remarkable visibility while 
others fail to do so, or why some administrative patterns or objects diffuse relatively 
unchanged while others are renegotiated and reinterpreted to a degree that makes them 
hardly recognizable (profit centres in public organizations) cannot be answered by 
standard versions of neo-institutionalism.  
 
It is crucial to investigate how norms are constructed, emerge and are institutionalized, 
and why a particular norm is diffused, while other norms fail in the international arena. 
Answering these questions can be achieved by adopting constructivist lens from IR. 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), building on the constructivist view, provide the most 
influential and frequently cited analytical framework to investigate norm dynamics and 
political change in the international field. While their study focuses on the “norm’s life 
cycle” and rules related to women’s rights and the laws of war, the framework has been 
applied to diverse area including studies on international politics in Southeast Asian 
countries (Acharya 2004; Poole 2013; Stubbs 2008). 
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Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), in their seminal paper ‘Norm dynamics and political 
change’, present a three-stage model of the norm diffusion process:  
 
 i) Norm emergence: Norm leaders arise and frame their issue to reach a broader 
audience by using existing international institutions. The new norm begins to 
attain domestic and international attention that culminates in a tipping point at 
which there is a critical mass of state actors embracing the norm.   
 
 ii) Norm cascade stage is “characterized more by a dynamic of imitation as the 
norm leaders attempt to socialize other states to become norm followers” (Ibid: 
895), and in which the norm diffused through the international field. Although 
there is no significant domestic coalition advocating for the adoption of an 
international norm, states adopt it in response to the combination of international 
pressure “for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the 
desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem” (Ibid:895).  
 
 iii) Norm internalization: when the norm becomes taken-for-granted and 
influences behaviours of the state change at the end of norm cascade, norm 
internalization occurs in the state. In this final stage, the norm is “no longer a 
matter of broad public debate (Ibid: 895).”  
 
Stage 1. Norm emergence 2. Norm cascade  3. Norm internalization  
Actors  Norm entrepreneurs 
with organizational 
platforms 
States, international 
organizations, 
networks 
Law, professions, 
bureaucracy 
Motives Altruism, empathy, 
ideational 
commitment 
Legitimacy, 
reputation, esteem 
Conformity 
Dominant 
mechanisms 
Persuasion Socialization, 
institutionalization, 
demonstration 
Habit, institutionalization 
 
Table 3-1. Stages of Norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) 
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Norm entrepreneurs35 are the most important actors who persuade other actors to adopt 
norms particularly during the first and second stage. However, norm entrepreneurs, their 
motivation and means of influence may vary at each stage, as shown in Table 3-1. 
Completion of the ‘norm’s life cycle’ is not an inevitable process. Scholars in other 
disciplines have developed a number of concepts that seem rather compatible with 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s notion of norm entrepreneurs, including ‘meaning manager or 
meaning architect’ (Lessig 1995), ‘idea brokers’ (Smith 1993), ‘policy entrepreneurs’ 
(Kingdon 1084), ‘transfer entrepreneurs’ (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996), ‘institutional 
entrepreneurs’ (Beckert 1999), which all share the emphasis on institutional change.    
 
However, compared to the aforementioned terms, the concept of norm entrepreneurs 
focuses more on trans-national issues. In the global field of aid, MDAs play a significant 
role in the spread of norms. Finnemore (1993), using a famous metaphor, describes 
“international organization[s] as teachers of norms”. Acharya (2010) further argues that 
international organizations act as ‘rule-makers and innovators’, beyond ‘teachers of 
norms’: 
 
They initiate the demand for new norms and provide an initial crucial setting within 
which norm entrepreneurs persuade others to accept them (…) International institutions 
are also the arena for judging the success and failure of norm diffusion, which can be 
ascertained from changes to their own institutional design and apparatus (…) (Acharya, 
2010:24)  
 
In summary, Finnemore and Sikkink’s conceptual framework highlights the dynamic 
mechanism of how a certain norm is diffused and provides an understanding that exceeds 
a linear view. In this thesis, the framework helps to investigate the following questions: 
 
 How has the aid effectiveness norm, envisioned by a particular rational-choice 
institutional economics model, acquired international visibility and been 
institutionalized in the global field aid?  
 
 How has a particular technology, AIMS, been promoted and diffused to 
reproduce the norm of aid effectiveness? 
 
                                                 
35 The term, norm leader is also used interchangeably in their studies.  
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 In this process, whose norms matter? Who has power to drive the norms?  
 
However, the Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm diffusion model have been criticized due 
to its structure-centric view as well as its inability to understand micro-level diffusion 
within a particular state actor. IR Constructivist scholars have further offered a refined 
explanation of the norm diffusion in various contexts as well as put more attention to the 
role of state in resisting, adopting and internalizing international norms (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; Acharya 2004; 2011; 2013; Zimmerman 2016).     
 
In the process of norm diffusion, it is important to address what roles states play, and 
how states respond differently? One limitation of institutional analysis addressed in 
previous sections is a general view of organizations operating in the same field as being 
homogenous and singular actors. Institutions are often expected to persist over time, but 
are subject to change as well (Beckert 1999; Thornton & Ocasio 1999). The 
constructivist IR view addresses this concern. Finnemore (1996) argues that “common 
global norms may create similar structures and push both people and states toward 
similar behaviour at given times. However, if the body of international norms is not 
completely congruent, then those isomorphisms will not be stable”. Finnemore 
(1996:342) further asserts that “isomorphism is not homogeneity; it does not create 
identical behaviour outcomes”. The norm dynamics discussed in the previous section, 
however, largely focus on transnational agents, particularly powerful actors in the global 
field. The focus is also on the processes that shape norm diffusion at the international 
system level, rather than the role of norm-takers, which are in general states (Acharya 
2004).  
 
Norm localization and subsidiarity: The constructivist approach further helps to 
understand institutional change taking place in the international arena, and provides an 
analytical lens to investigate the role of the state in the process (Wendt 1995; Finnemore 
2008; Buhari-Gulmez 2010). Acharya suggests the concept of norm localization 
(Acharya, 2004, 2011, 2013), defined as “the active construction of foreign ideas by 
local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local 
beliefs and practices” (Acharya, 2004: 245). For transnational or international norms to 
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be localized, they should be compatible with cognitive prior36 in a region or state. Norm 
localization requires local or regional stakeholders to actively borrow and reconstruct 
international, outside norms (Capie 2012). Paying attention to localization offers a shift 
away from the focus on global norm entrepreneurs – often external to the norm targets 
– to local or regional agents and norm-takers, typically those in the Global South (Capie 
2008; Capie 2012). Examples of studies that adopted notions of norm localization 
include studies in the context of Southeast Asian countries (Capie, 2008, 2012; Collins, 
2013; Kraft, 2012; Rüland, 2009). 
 
As opposed to norm localization, Acharya (Acharya 2011) further suggests the concept 
of norm subsidiarity, which he defines as “a process whereby local actors create rules 
with a view to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by 
more powerful central actors” (Acharya, 2011:95). The concept originates from the 
common notion of subsidiarity referring “a principle of locating governance at the lowest 
possible level – that closest to the individuals and groups affected by the rules and 
decisions adopted and enforced” (Slaughter 2004:34). Subsidiarity “encourages and 
authorizes (local) autonomy” (Acharya, 2011:97). 
 
Although local actors are ‘imported norm’-takers in localization, Acharya argues that 
localization is also the “active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and 
cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the latter developing 
significant congruence with local beliefs and practices” (Acharya 2004:245). By 
contrast, in subsidiarity, local actors can perform as norm-rejecters and may export 
locally created norms. Both concepts highlight the role of local agencies including state 
actors.  
  
                                                 
36 In Section 3.1.2, I found conceptual similarity of cognitive prior with other notions of institutional logic, 
rationality, conceptions of control. 
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 Norm localization Norm subsidiarity  
Vector Inward-looking Outward-looking:  
Role of 
State 
Always norm-takers Norm rejecters and/or norm-
takers 
Norms 
focus 
Global norms are imported 
for local use (Acharya 2004) 
Local agents may reject global 
norms, and export or 
universalize locally constructed 
norms (Acharya 2011) 
Analytical 
focus 
The process of reshaping 
existing beliefs, practices and 
foreign norms in the local 
context; making foreign 
norms consistent with a local 
cognitive prior (Acharya, 
2011:98) 
Relations between local actors 
and external powers (Acharya 
2011)  
Related 
research 
(Southeast 
Asian 
context)  
Capie, 2008, 2012; Collins, 
2013; Kraft, 2012; Rüland, 
2009 
 
Democracy (Tomsa 2017), 
security (Katsumata 2011; Capie 
2008), humanitarianism 
(Bellamy & Beeson 2010; Capie 
2012), human rights (Katsumata 
2009), health, HIV/AIDS 
(Collins 2013) 
 
Table 3-2. Summarizing Key Concepts of Norm Localization and Norm Subsidiarity 
 
However, the concept of norm subsidiarity does not pay sufficient attention to 
investigate how the subsidiary norm constructed by local agents can challenge the 
existing dominant transnational norm, and lead to the possibility of institutional change 
in the global field, which will be investigated further in this study. The concept of 
institutional entrepreneurs, from organizational sociology, provides a useful lens to 
bridge this gap (Garud et al. 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby 2006; Beckert 1999), as it 
responds to the question of how it is possible that organizations can change from 
“isomorphized regimes” within a field (Clegg 2010). By conceptualizing local actors 
which construct subsidiary norms as institutional entrepreneurs, further investigation 
can be conducted on, how the local actors can actively engage in shaping the global-
level institution, and restructure global organizational field by negotiating, challenging 
the existing norms, and creating subsidiary norms.   
 
Building on the synthesizing of analytical concepts informed by the constructivist view 
in IR, and institutional theories from sociology, the conceptual framework of this thesis 
is constructed in order to answer the following questions:  
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 How has the transnational norm (aid effectiveness) been internalized, sometime 
ignored or resisted, and negotiated by states?  
 
 Whether the norm is localized or resisted, and replaced by states? 
 
 What role do subsidiary norms play in the global field; and what role can states 
play as institutional entrepreneur?  
 
 In this process, how has norm-supporting technology been resisted, adopted, and 
abandoned by the states?  
 
The conceptual framework will be further synthesized and illustrated in Section 3.3, as 
well as focused on addressing the main thesis questions.  
 
3.2. Theory of Technology 
 
So far, I have detailed the theory of institutions, and identified the theoretical link with 
the constructivist IR framework. It conceptualizes the global field of aid, and explains 
the process of global norms diffusion and the varied responses of states to the norms and 
technology that inscribes the norms. This thesis explores the role of AIMS by 
investigating their global diffusion, as well as their sustainability failure in the context 
of recipient countries. Now I move on to the theory of technology, which conceptualizes 
information systems as socio-technical systems embedded in a domestic and global 
context.  
 
3.2.1. Socio-Technical Perspective 
 
Bearing in mind the research gaps identified in Chapter 2, I positioned my study in the 
domain of ICTD, with the sub-focus of the use of information systems in the aid sector. 
Although the research directly investigating AIMS is limited, I extend the literature 
review to a wide range of research of ICT in aid management including the context of 
humanitarian assistance, e-governance, and non-academic research mainly conducted 
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by MDAs. I highlighted the technical rational, a-contextual perspective, which focuses 
ICT as tools for achieving aid effectiveness within the new institutional economics 
approach as the dominant research trend.  
 
Technological Determinism in the Aid Field: Before I discuss the socio-technical 
perspective in information systems research, I would like to highlight the pervasive 
technological determinism in the aid sector. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, there has been 
continuous scholarly debate on the view of development and the role of technology in 
achieving a varied understanding and concept of development. I did not adopt any 
particular theory of development, nor did I support any assumption on how technology 
could better lead development. However, it should be highlighted that the view of 
technology as an innovative ‘tool’ for accelerating development has been dominant in 
development theories and practice, in spite of the plurality in development and the 
political nature of aid. Although modernization theory and dependency theory contend 
with each other, they share the linear assumption that technology transfer would greatly 
help state-led development. The technological deterministic view as a theoretical 
approach has become outdated in the field of STS, information systems and science of 
knowledge (Smith & Merritt Roe 1998; Bijker 2010). However, this does not necessarily 
imply that such a perspective does not exist in current development discourses and 
practices (Cherlet 2014).  
 
Former American President John F. Kennedy referenced the Marshall Plan, which is 
commonly considered as the origin of foreign aid, in his Special Message to the 
Congress on Foreign Aid, on 22 March 1961:  
 
This [Marshall Plan] was followed by Point 4-an effort to make scientific and 
technological advances available to the people of developing nations. These new 
nations need aid in loans and technical assistance just as we in the northern half of the 
world drew successively on one another's capital and know-how as we moved into 
industrialization and regular growth.  
(J.F. Kennedy, US President, 1961) 
 
Even after fifty years, an almost identical view of technology can be identified in one of 
the most influential reports in the aid field, the World Development Report published by 
the World Bank:  
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Knowledge is like light. Weightless and intangible, it can easily travel the world, 
enlightening the lives of people everywhere. Yet billions of people still live in the 
darkness of poverty (…) Poor countries and poor people differ from industrial ones not 
only because they have less capital but because they have less knowledge (…) 
Communicating knowledge involves taking advantage of new information and 
communications technology.  
(World Bank, Knowledge for Development, 1998) 
 
As briefly introduced in the beginning of this thesis, the optimism and the unconditional 
belief in the ‘magic’ of technology developed by the global North is a view that 
continues to exist in the discussion on AIMS. The former World Bank President, Robert 
Zoellick expresses his excitement therein:   
 
Imagine this: A parent in a village, with a laptop or mobile device, can access aid 
information in real time through geo-mapping platform. She can see which schools 
have feeding programs and which go without (…)  She can see how funds are spent, 
and learn about the purpose, cost and results of each (...) She can upload her own data 
and mobilize the community to demand more targeted donor programs.  
(Robert Zoellick, World Bank, 2012)  
 
In the global arena, technology is often considered as a ‘good and simple tool’ that can 
transfer development knowledge from the global North to the South. As discussed in 
Section 2.2.1, the post-developmentalism school considers the entire knowledge system 
in international development as a dependency on Western hegemony (Narayanaswamy, 
2013; Kleine & Unwin, 2009). As argued by Cherlet (2014:15) the “technological 
deterministic view ignores the intense co-evolution of technology and society, whereas 
the epistemic determinism ideology ignores that all knowledge is situated and embedded 
in its particular social context.” Although the debate on epistemic determinism in the 
global field of aid is not a core question of this thesis, I take on their concern about the 
dominance of the deterministic view and top-down approach in the aid field, as well as 
the proposed notion that knowledge is ‘situated’ or ‘socially embedded’.  
 
Such dominance of deterministic views in the development discourse and aid practices 
has influenced the research seeking cases of ‘good practice’ in the transfer and adopting 
of technology (Al-Gahtani 2003; Lin et al. 2011; Rogers 1995). This calls for an 
alternative approach reflecting what STS scholars have brought to the theoretical lens of 
technology, which unpacks the socio-political and cultural forces in which technology 
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interacts. Building on this, I adopt sociological institutionalism as a broad theoretical 
umbrella in investigating the aid effectiveness norm and the AIMS diffusion in the 
global field of aid. This needs a more inclusive approach taking into consideration the 
social, political nature of technology, rather than only focusing on technical and 
economic rationality.  
 
Framing AIMS as Socio-technical Systems: Although the abovementioned 
deterministic view of technology is often favoured by MDAs, there exists a more 
nuanced approach which conceives an ICT innovation as being locally and socially 
constructed. This thesis follows the socio-technical tradition of information systems and 
therein develops the conceptual framework (Avgerou 2002b; Walsham 1993; 
Hirschheim et al. 1996). As discussed in the introductory chapter, it would be a mistake 
to approach the complexity of the challenges that surround information systems in 
developing countries only from a technology acceptance perspective, or solely from a 
social deterministic view (Walsham & Sahay 2006; Avgerou 2010). Particularly the 
global field of aid, in which different stakeholders’ politico-economic interests exist at 
diverse levels, is subject to socially constructed and historically evolved norms, rules, 
and culture. Therefore AIMS are inextricably linked to the relationships with global aid 
norms, rules of use, as well as participation by different levels of human stakeholders.  
 
This study conceptualizes AIMS as a socio-technical system in which different factors 
and interests collide, ranging from social, cultural, and political to economic. The socio-
technical premise on information systems includes the mutual constitution of people and 
technology (Leonardi & Barley 2010), and the contextual embeddedness and 
situatedness of technology (Orlikowski 1991; Avgerou 2001). Based on these common 
premises, socio-technical approaches in IS research differ from the dominant ‘technical-
rational’, ‘instrumental’ or ‘tool’ view in several ways. Primarily, the technical-rational 
view places excessive emphasis on the technological aspects where contrastingly, in 
socio-technical approaches more attention is paid to social and political roles and 
structures. Secondly, while dominant views seeks generalization and best practices, 
socio-technical approaches focus on context – oftentimes, as context can be viewed as 
matrices of people, technology, history, and geo-political location, this is not simple to 
investigate (Avgerou 2001). Thirdly, the linear and simplified rationale is denied by the 
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socio-technical perspective – rather, such approaches seek to reveal the complexity and 
hidden dynamics involved in designing, implementing and using technology, as well as 
the unexpected outcomes of information systems.   
 
Increasingly, institutional analysis has been informed by this socio-technical 
perspective, and has been applied to the study of IS (Walsham 1993; Orlikowski 1992; 
Avgerou 2002a; Mignerat & Rivard 2009). By conceptualising ICT initiatives as 
socially embedded actions, based  epistemologically on the social constructionist view, 
an important research stream has been formed which deviates from the dominating a-
contextual and a-political view (Avgerou 2001). Building on this, Orlikowski & Iacono, 
(2002) further develop and conceptualize technology as an embedded system which is 
shaped by a particular context, and also influences its dynamics and trajectories. This 
ensemble view of technology comes from the limitations identified in three dominant 
views; i) the ‘tool’ view: technology is seen an object for achieving certain goals; ii) the 
proxy view: technology is not a focus but is discussed for some other economic and 
social criteria, and iii) the nominal view: technology is simply under the name of some 
other objects. 
 
This new and comprehensive perspective of technology as an embedded system has been 
widely adopted, particularly in the field of ICTD. In ICTD studies, the institutional 
perspective is discussed within the broad perspective of the social embeddedness 
approach, which argues the role of ICT has to be considered in the local context of a 
developing country. The social embeddedness perspective challenges the underlying 
assumptions of one of the dominant ‘transfer and diffusion’ perspectives, as being 
misleading and oversimplifying (Avgerou 2008; Avgerou 2001). In fact, Avgerou 
(2003) argues that the tool-and-effect association of ICT and development can be 
misleading and emphasizes a context-embedded process that is entangled with 
institutions in a developing country. More nuanced research, based on case studies in 
the context of developing countries, which reflect global changes, have been studied in 
depth (Qureshi 2013; Walsham 2001; Avgerou 2002a). For example Avgerou (2001) 
argues that technology is not necessarily transferred or diffused to a developing country; 
rather, the country conceives technological innovation according to locally determined 
features and their own perspectives.  
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ICTD research based on the social embeddedness approach builds on social theories 
such as the  sociological perspective, which also includes institutional theory (Bass et 
al. 2013; Avgerou 2002a), economic sociology (Li 2014), structuration theory, as well 
as the STS perspective through actor network theory (Puri & Sahay 2003; Walsham & 
Sahay 1999). It tends to broaden the research arena to address “conceptual relationships 
such as technology/society, agency/structure and technical reasoning/institutional” 
(Avgerou 2010:4).  
 
As discussed in Section 2.3, there is a continuing mainstream of deterministic treatments 
of information systems, prioritising the study of ICT effects as a shortcut to achieving 
NPM principles including government efficiency, and improving aid transparency and 
effectiveness (Linders 2013; Tierney et al. 2011; Synergy International Systems 2014; 
Weaver et al. 2014). Studies with a variety of cross-national data, mainly conducted in 
the discipline of Public Administration, provide insights on diverse contributing factors 
on e-government and the diffusion of ICT-enabled services (Rorissa & Demissie 2010; 
Relly & Sabharwal 2009; Gibbs et al. 2003). Despite this, public sector reforms 
following NPM are the dominant perspective, which tend to oversimplify the inherent 
complexities of ICT adoption in aid mechanisms, and overlook its broader 
consequences.  
 
3.2.2. Social Shaping Nature of Information Systems 
 
The social shaping of technology (SST) has been widely accepted and utilized in IS 
research. It embraces an extensive scope of research that intertwines technological  
evolvement with socio-politico agenda (MacKenzie & Wajcman 1999). Within SST, 
technology can be interpreted and reshaped ‘in situ’ by users (Orlikowski 1992; 
MacKenzie & Wajcman 1999). Jørgensen et al. (2009:80) argue that SST is promising 
in the areas of “technology where visions are manifold, societal interests conflicting, and 
applications and markets are non-existing or still under construction” such as the area of 
emerging high technologies and the field where the interests of diverse actors collide. 
The open data initiatives and the popularity of the ‘open development’ concept (Linders 
2013; Smith & Reilly 2013), as well as the global popularity of AIMS in the global field 
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of aid, are arenas in which the complexities of diverse stakeholders’ interests inevitably 
collide. Thereby, SST becomes a useful lens for further analysis. 
 
The intellectual origin of the SST is a critique of technological determinism in the STS 
discipline. STS scholars criticize the deterministic perspective that framed the 
conceptualization of technology, which took it for granted and assumed that; i) the nature 
of technology and the directionality of change are pre-determined and unproblematic; 
and ii) technology has a necessary and determinate ‘impact’ on society (Williams & 
Edge, 1996). More concretely, this perspective implies that there is a relationship of 
causality between technological change as an independent variable, and social and 
organizational change as dependent variables. However, this view frequently overlooks 
difficulties in implementing technologies and their failures to deliver predicted 
outcomes. STS scholars, contrasting this, pursue a broad range of theoretical views to 
focus on the interplay between technology and society. They argue that technology does 
not evolve following an inner logic, but it is a social product, so that the ‘black-box’ of 
technology must be opened (Winner 1993). Two of the most prominent theoretical 
approaches of STS are first, the social construction of technology (SCOT), which 
focuses on the social interactions during the design and development of technology and 
relevant social groups (Pinch & Bijker 1984; Bijker et al. 1987); and second, the SST 
which draws on concepts of configuration and trajectories in response to the question on 
the notion of ‘closure’ in SCOT (MacKenzie & Wajcman 1999).  
 
SCOT scholars, in general, conceive technology as not determining human action, but 
as being socially constructed by humans. The enabling and constraining effects of 
technological artefacts are viewed as interpretive practices in a particular context. The 
stages in which this happens include ‘interpretive flexibility’, ‘stabilization’, when 
relevant social groups engage, and ‘closure’ when the technological contents of the 
artefact, are linked to the social by assigning certain meanings to the technological 
artefact (Pinch & Bijker 1984). However, when it comes to closure, SCOT has been 
criticized due to its privileging of the ‘design stage’ over the ‘use stage’. The possibilities 
of interpretive flexibility may be recurrent and endless (MacKenzie & Wajcman 1999; 
Jørgensen et al. 2009). Despite this, it is important to not ignore the potential that lies 
within reinterpreting technology at a different time, and a different stage, as well as in 
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reference to a different group of users. Through this process of reinterpretation, it can be 
found that the role of technology may in fact be different from the one initially assigned 
to it.  
 
Social shaping of technology (SST) researchers re-theorize the concept of design and 
development of technology by using concepts of ‘configuration’. This means that 
technology developers can only preconfigure the technological artefact that continues to 
be re-configured beyond its initial design stage in the local site of use. SST 
conceptualizes users as agents of technological change (MacKenzie & Wajcman 1999) 
and emphasises its political aspects in the process of ‘configuration’. Within the 
perspective of SST, the concept of interpretative flexibility remains valid. Each 
interpretation is produced by developers, designers, funders, users and non-users. The 
interpretation is influenced not only by the situated context within which it occurs, but 
also by the content, logic and roles of the artefact itself. These constitute particular 
underlying meanings, including meaning about success, failure, and to whom this 
applies. Thus, to understand how technology is embedded, shaped and utilized in 
society, it is crucial to understand how different groups view and interpret technological 
artefacts.  
 
A further contribution of the SST approach is, in the perspective of SST,  “technology 
also shapes outcomes by shaping later technologies” (Dutton, 2014:183).  A ‘legacy 
technology’ enables or constrains people at different stages of design, implementation, 
use and diffusion by shaping later technologies.  
 
[O]nce a technology is in place, it will influence future developments by making it 
easier to carry on in a similar path or direction. This is not only a technical path, but 
also one that has been adapted to institutions and users in ways that make technical 
change all the more difficult since change requires an alternation of the practices of 
institutions and users, which involves social as well as technical innovation.  
 
Having established the different ways in which technology can be contextually viewed 
and having introduced the predominant theories which underline the complexity of 
technological constructivism, it makes sense to move from theoretical approaches to the 
symbolic role of technology. Sociological institutionalists have challenged the validity 
of rational choice in decision-making (Hirscheheim & Newman 1991; Wagner et al. 
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2002; Hirschman 1982; Eoyang 1983). It has been argued that policy and technology 
are often adopted as a rationalized myth and symbol in managerial decision-making. 
Organizations may symbolically adopt technology and policy practices in order to 
comply with external environments and to achieve social legitimacy. Often, formal 
structures and visible symbols of compliance are intentionally created in an effort to re-
interpret compliance, showing the impact of symbolic meaning of technology.  
 
Considering the methodological benefits of SST as providing a comprehensive, systems 
embedded approach to understanding technology, the SST approach appears particularly 
useful for the purpose of this thesis. From the perspective of SST, understanding norms, 
rules, and aid governance in the global field of aid are significant in the justification and 
de-construction of how a particular technology has developed, who drives its diffusion, 
and who benefits from usage. Framing technology through an SST perspective is useful 
as a multiplicity of interpretations about AIMS can be approached, thereby avoiding the 
linear, straightforward answers oftentimes found by the dominant approaches. Also, the 
symbolic meanings of technology and its interpreted roles can vary depending on 
different stakeholders, and can be taken into account.  
 
3.2.3. Information Systems Failure in Developing Countries 
 
The socio-technical perspective is also of use when it comes to interpreting information 
systems failure in the context of developing countries. Persistent efforts have been made 
to understand information systems failure in the academic field of Information Systems 
(Hitt & Brynjolfsson 1996; Lyytinen & Hirschheim 1987; Markus 1983; Wilson & 
Howcroft 2002). Particular attention has been paid to a high rate of failure i) in the public 
sector (Berman & Tettey 2001; Heeks 2004), and ii) in the context of developing 
countries (Richard Heeks 2002b; Sahay & Avgerou 2002).  
 
Avgerou and Walsham (2000:1)’s statement “successful examples of computerisation 
can be found, but frustrating stories of systems which failed to fulfil their initial promise 
are more frequent” in the context of developing countries, remains valid. The evaluation 
conducted by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank indicates that 
more than 70% of its ICT projects supporting public sector governance have experienced 
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substantial delay and cancellation (Independent Evaluation Group 2011). Similarly, 
Heeks' (2003) estimates that 35% of e-government projects in developing countries can 
be considered total failures, while 50% are partial failures, and only 15% are successes.  
 
With this in mind, a lot of ICTD research has been conducted into explaining the 
epidemic failure of ICT in developing countries (Baark & Heeks 1999; Braa & Hedberg 
2001; Masiero 2016b; Richard Heeks 2002b; Braa et al. 2004). However, there exist two 
main concerns that must be further addressed in the existing literature conceptualizing 
IS failure, namely: i) the social shaping nature of failure, ii) a lack of attention to the 
‘macro’ dynamics. Again, the socio-technical perspective shows merit in its 
consideration of socially constructed phenomena, and complexity.  
 
3.2.3.1. Social Shaping Nature of IS Failure 
 
Ascription of failure or success is socially constructed, thus there is no distinctive 
boundary in defining it as an evaluation process; further its criteria rely on individual 
perspectives and subjectivity  (Wilson & Howcroft 2002; Bartis & Mitev 2008). The 
notion of social shaping is still valid to understanding the nature of conceptualizing 
failure and success. Wilson and Howcroft (2002) study various perceptions of failure 
from the project, system, and user perspectives to discuss that in the existing literature.  
Based on the premise of the social shaping of technology, they argue that it is important, 
in understanding information systems failure, to conceive it as a process in a particular 
context. Since failure and success are related to interpretive flexibility and relevant 
social groups, there is no distinctive boundary in the definitions; also, any ascription 
should be understood as a complex social process rather than as a linear outcome of 
technology. Power dynamics among relevant social groups may contribute to the 
legitimization of particular views in this process as well. Thus, attention has to be paid 
to who has the power to decide failure, and from whose perspective.  
 
In the context of developing countries, the concern about IS failure can be intensified 
due to additional pressures for success, over-optimistic hope for the role of technology, 
and the high opportunity costs of ICT investment (Avgerou, 2008). Furthermore, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, paradigms of development policy are subject to 
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frequent revision, particularly in the ICTD initiatives where new visions and fads 
continuously emerge and disappear (Kleine & Unwin 2009). Given such frequent policy 
revisions, as well as the complexity of context, in which diverse local and international 
stakeholders are vested with differing interests, performance and the way it is evaluated 
is likely to be socially constructed. Thereby, norms and established rules determine the 
‘rights and wrongs’ of performance and conduct.  
 
Measurement, Indicators and Rankings in Global Governance: In the global field of 
aid, monitoring and evaluation with the use of indicators and indexes for assessing 
success and failure has been increasing rapidly (Davis et al. 2012). Measuring the 
performance of public organizations and use of indicators in measurement have become 
widely accepted features. Monitoring and evaluation frameworks and indicators for 
measurement are often developed by rule-making organizations such as MDAs, 
powerful NGOs and think tanks. These phenomena have two important characteristics. 
First, such measurement has been globally diffused beyond the borders of state, and has 
become internationally standardized. Thus, it reflects the power dynamics of global 
governance. Second, quantification by using diverse indicators has been pertinent. There 
has been growing preference for quantification and statistical analysis over qualitative 
and subjective analysis. In the global field of aid, monitoring and evaluation systems on 
government performance,  particularly on transparency (Williams 2015), development 
outcomes (Michener 2015), and governance (K. E. Davis et al. 2012)  have expanded 
rapidly. Considering this, attention needs to be paid to: What is the nature of 
measurement and indicators? Who creates, drives, and promote such measurement? 
What is the effect of participating in measurements and using indicators, or alternatively 
not participating? Is it better performance or better legitimacy that is being achieved in 
the field? These questions can be answered by investigating the nature of the 
measurements and indicators in question.  
 
Many scholarly efforts have been made to theorize measurements and indicators as 
social processes. The relevance of a social object as constructed by quantification, as 
well as theories of the nature of statistical practice, categorization, and standardization, 
have been widely examined from the perspective of STS (Espeland & Sauder 2007; 
Porter 1995; Bowker & Star 1999). For example Hacking (1990) investigates the birth 
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of statistical analysis. Additionally, Espeland & Sauder (2007:1) suggest the concept of 
reactivity, noting that “people change their behaviour in reaction to being evaluated, 
observed, or measured”. This is reminiscent of Bentham’s panopticon. The constructive 
nature and social consequence of indicators and rankings should be highlighted. Tracing 
the processes of measuring, indexing, raking, categorizing and kind-making offers 
insight into understanding power dynamics in particular forms of knowledge, norms and 
rules produced in the global field. A diffusion of measurements and indicators and their 
institutionalization require states to be monitored, which may push political leaders 
toward accepting the norms behind the indicators (Davis et al., 2012). ‘Naming and 
shaming’ is often used as a popular strategy to enforce international norms and rules 
(Hafner-Burton 2008). Thus, it is also fundamental in the global field of aid, to consider 
which measurements and indicators, driven by whom, are more powerful than others, 
and why this may be the case; further, the question arises in which circumstances and to 
which state ‘naming and shaming’ would ultimately lead or not lead to an advocacy 
result. The constructivist lens borrowed from IR helps in conceptualizing how 
measurements and indicators are created and promoted, and how they influence the 
behaviour of states.  
 
3.2.3.2. Missing ‘Macro Dynamics of Aid’ in IS Failure in Developing Countries 
 
Similar to the constructivist approach, ICTD scholars often take into consideration the 
socio-cultural realities of local context. This is associated with the theorizing efforts to 
understand the local context of ICT innovations and how they are socially embedded in 
context (Avgerou & Walsham, 2000; Avgerou, 2001), constituting a growing body of 
knowledge to address the gap between system design and local contingency (Avgerou, 
2002a; Bada, 2002; Benbasat & Weber, 1996; Braa, Monteiro, & Sahay, 2004). As 
discussed above, many studies have been conducted to explain IS failure in the context 
of developing countries. One of the main challenges, according to Heeks (2002), can be 
described as the problem of the “design-reality” gap. Scholars  argue that the origin of 
the problem of failure lies in the gap between the professional knowledge of IS 
development and the actual settings of organizational practice (Richard Heeks 2002a; 
Masiero 2016b; Avgerou 2008). These arguments still apply with greater cogency to 
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Lyytinen and Hirschheim (1987)’s analysis of IS failure and their categorization of types 
of failure, namely process, interaction and expectation failure. 
 
Consequently, IS failure in the field of ICTD has predominantly been framed as a micro-
situated struggle to bring together multiple stakeholders and to generate a contingent fit 
between local use and the dominant logic of international aid institutions (R Heeks 2002; 
Nicholson et al. 2000; Krishna et al. 2006; Braa & Hedberg 2001). Such explanatory 
accounts mostly focus on the project-level or domestic context of a developing country, 
in which the state coordinates multiple local interpretations and objectives. State actors, 
in this context, are widely seen as the indispensable intermediary translating and 
coordinating the expectations and actions of diverse local actors at the government, 
municipal, community, and individual levels within the recipient country (Evans 1992; 
Al-Jaghoub & Westrup 2003; Braa et al. 2004). 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, there is insufficient attention to the macro-level 
dynamics in the global field of aid in ICTD research. Indeed, foreign aid is an established 
field dominated by states, where the relationship between donor and recipient countries 
is subject to the historically-evolved rules, governance, tensions, and cultural 
dispositions, which jointly define a distinctive organizational field of state actors and 
MDAs. The successes or failures of information systems have rarely been explained by 
examining the role of the state embedded in the global field of aid.   
 
In addition, only very little literature seems to exist on how ICTD initiatives influence 
aid policy and international aid regimes, which furthermore shows a significant gap in 
ICTD studies. Foreign aid has arguably been most instrumental when it comes to socio-
economic development. Therefore, the inextricable connection between aid and 
development cannot be denied. Nonetheless, most ICTD initiatives follow the goals, 
norms and rules set out by the international aid regime, which constrain and regulates 
participant behaviour. The identification of this very research gap is crucial in studying 
AIMS, which are designed to manage aid and institute global aid principles signed by 
member states and MDAs. Building on the literature review in Chapter 2 and the 
recognition of the fact that there is insufficient attention to global context of aid and the 
role of state in ICTD, the conceptualization of AIMS failure will be presented in the 
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following section. The framework is based on insights drawn from the concept of 
sustainability failure in order to provide further guidance in answering the main research 
questions.  
 
3.3. Analytical Framework 
 
This thesis seeks to answer the following two key questions: 
 
 How can we understand the global diffusion of AIMS?  
 
 Why do AIMS fail in sustainability?  
 
As discussed in this chapter, the conceptual framework consists of two theories: the 
theory of institutions, and the theory of technology, which are synthesized to frame my 
research. Before presenting the analytical framework, this section conceptualizes the key 
concepts of the study.   
 
Conceptualizing AIMS: Before conceptualizing AIMS failure, it is necessary to review 
a common definition of AIMS again, and to redefine it in a more systematic way for 
application to the analysis in this thesis. As briefly introduced in Chapter 1, based on a 
plethora of research on aid effectiveness premised on the new-institutional economic 
approach, a number of ICT applications commonly referred to as AIMS have been 
developed and implemented. 
 
AIMS is a generic term. Although there are a few defining concepts suggested by MDAs, 
there is no clear definition of AIMS. Studies on information systems in aid management, 
as I discussed in Section 2.4.2, have not yet reached a general consensus on 
conceptualizing AIMS. In the literature, ‘AIMS’, ‘aid management platform’ 37 , 
‘development assistance database’38 and more recently ‘open aid platform’ co-exist and 
are concurrently used in a confusing manner. This perhaps results from the lack of 
                                                 
37 This is also a brand name of a particular AIMS by an AIMS provider, named Development Gateway, 
which I will further discuss in Section 5.3. 
38 This is also a brand name of a particular AIMS by an AIMS provider, named Synergy International, 
which I will further discuss in Section 5.3.   
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academic research on AIMS, as well as from the practical focus of AIMS driven by 
MDAs. AIMS research is often viewed as an applied field with significant focus on the 
practice practice and application of information systems rather than on the philosophical 
foundation and theory building behind it. Thus, the research may be subjected to vague 
concepts. However, a-theoretical approaches can easily fail even to provide important 
practical recommendations. The conceptualization of AIMS thus needs to be explicitly 
articulated to explain how AIMS can be academically differentiated from other systems.  
 
I will begin with a commonly accepted practical definition of AIMS by the OECD. The 
report ‘Role of Aid Information Management Systems in Implementing the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness at the Country Level’ by the OECD DAC Working 
Party on Aid Effectiveness provides the most often cited definition of AIMS. It defines 
AIMS as “IT applications, usually databases, which record and process information 
about development initiatives and related aid flows in a given country” (OECD & UNDP 
2006).  
 
UNDP (2010:1) provides a more articulated definition:  
 
AIMS are software applications that record and process information about development 
activities and related aid flows in a given country, in order to assist the recipient country 
in managing the aid it receives. (…) AIMS thus fulfil two purposes at the same time:  
o AIMS strengthen a government’s capacity to plan, implement, monitor and 
evaluate the use of public resources; and  
o AIMS enable aid coordination, information-sharing, and domestic and mutual 
accountability.  
 
This explanation has proliferated and has appeared on project documents and AIMS 
websites in many cases of AIMS implementation (Synergy International Systems, 2009; 
Techno Vista, 2015). 
 
Although the expectations and technological functionalities of AIMS might slightly 
vary, the common characteristics of AIMS can be identified. Through this study, I define 
AIMS as:  
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A national-level, single-window information system implemented in a given recipient 
country, to assist the government to manage aid effectively and bring development 
partners to share aid information and better coordinate.   
 
To avoid confusion, I note that many donor countries and international development 
agencies have recently developed aid tracking platforms in order to increase 
transparency of their aid activities. However, information systems which have been 
developed and implemented in donor countries and MDAs are not categorized as 
AIMS 39 . One of the main objectives of donor’s information systems is ‘upward 
accountability’ to their tax payers and donors, contrary to AIMS implemented in 
recipient countries.  
 
Conceptualizing Sustainability Failure: As discussed above and keeping in mind the 
present theoretical lens of ‘design-reality gaps’, scholars have found that well-
implemented information systems often fail to meet stakeholders’ expectations in 
developing countries (Richard Heeks 2002a; Heeks 2003) . Masiero (2016) further 
develops the notion with the recognition of complex causal chains encompassing 
institutional, historical, cultural and organizational gaps. The outcome of these gaps is 
often associated with what Heeks (2002) referred to as “sustainability failure.”  
 
Heeks points out the lack of studies focusing on the long term sustainability of ICT 
initiatives in developing countries, and suggests sustainability failure as part of the 
concept of “partial failure” in which main goals are not achieved, or produce 
significantly undesirable outcomes (Heeks 2002; Heeks, Mundy, and Salazar 1999). 
Heeks (2002) referred to sustainability failure as situations where the information system 
initiative “at first succeeds but is then abandoned after a year or so”.  
 
Building on Heeks’ proposition, Kumar & Best (2006:11) propose five principal modes 
of the sustainability failure model:  
 Financial/economic sustainability failure, e.g. a donor supported program loses 
its funding after some fixed period of operation and has to shut down. 
                                                 
39 Active cases of donor’s practice include Development Tracker by UK DFID 
(https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk), Open Aid by Swedish International Development Cooperation (SIDA) 
(http://openaid.se), Open Aid Italia by Italian Development Cooperation (http://openaid.esteri.it). For 
more details, please see Section 6.2.3. and Table 6-2. 
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 Cultural/social sustainability failure, e.g. some social group within the 
community gains a benefit from the intervention but some others are hurt. This 
tension is not tenable over time and results in the subsequent sustainability 
failure. 
 Technological sustainability failure, e.g. the field hardware and software fail to 
track upgrades to the equipment within the central government offices and thus, 
over time, their ability to network degrades and fails. 
 Political/institutional sustainability failure. e.g. the relevant local institutional 
leaders leave the critical organization and without larger institutional structures 
in place the project fails. 
 Environmental sustainability failure, e.g. a project that sources a large number 
of PC’s without plans for their eventual disposal or reuse when they reach the 
end of their effective life. 
 
ICTD scholars investigate the issue of ‘sustainability failure’ in different contexts 
including e-government in India (Kumar & Best 2006), Malaysian public e-services 
(Sutan et al. 2013), and rural telecentres in India (Best & Kumar 2008). Such studies 
make an effort to find critical failure factors including people, cultural, organizational, 
and managerial ones in a particular context.  
 
However, this concept has some limitations including its broadness of scope, which tries 
to include almost every possibility of IS failure (Lyytinen & Hirschheim 1987; Paul 
1999; Bartis & Mitev 2008), and its project-level focus.  State actors in this context, are 
widely seen as the indispensable intermediary only when it comes to translating and 
coordinating multiple stakeholders’ expectations and actions(Evans 1992; Al-Jaghoub 
& Westrup 2003; Braa et al. 2004). Understanding how states function can help to 
explain information systems failure in the global aid context, particularly in cases where 
the main sources of institutional change lie at the global-level, rather than in the domestic 
context (Ramalingam 2013; Moyo 2008).  
 
Much of the disuse of these information systems must be explained by tracing the change 
in power relations, ideologies, and institutional arrangements among the donors and 
international organizations, which are normally beyond the influence of organizational, 
domestic institutional matters dealt with by state actors in developing countries. 
Contingency in the field of international development has rarely been accounted for or 
theorised in the ICTD literature to explain system failure. 
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In addition to this, existing theories of information systems failure do not differentiate 
between the non-use of information systems in combination with online presence and 
possible cooperating agencies, and the cases of AIMS which have been shut down. In 
addition to the aim of understanding the global diffusion and failure of AIMS, this thesis 
further investigates how we theorize sustainability failure of information systems, and 
the role technology can play in the process of failure.  
 
Recognizing that the ascription of failure is socially constructed and diversified, in this 
study, sustainability of AIMS is defined as a narrow concept:  
 
A permanent shutdown of IS, which were once implemented, used, but abandoned after 
a relatively short period (such as three years after the launch), without any 
transformation, considerable left-over innovation or thoughtful reflection, (e.g. 
evaluation study, report for future innovation) 
 
Together with the AIMS definition, sustainability failure can now be used as guidance 
in the creation of a conceptual framework for the further course of research.    
 
Analytical Framework: This section summarizes an analytical framework which is 
applied to the studies at hand and to the two main research questions, which then leads 
to the discussion of the research design in the next chapter. First, based on the discussion 
in the previous two chapters, key concepts utilized in this thesis are re-defined and 
summarized for the purpose of clarification. They will provide the pillars constructing 
the research design. 
 
Based on the clear definition of the key concepts, it is possible to integrate the concepts 
into a broader research design which allows for the in-depth investigation of the issues 
presented. This works by integrating the institutional approach into the global field of 
aid, as shown in Figure 3-2. Through the combination of the view of social shaping of 
technology, a comprehensive approach into analysing the role of AIMS is developed.   
  
110 
Concept Definition by author  Related 
sections 
AIMS Socio-technical information systems implemented in a 
given recipient country, to assist the government to 
manage aid effectively and bring development partners 
together to share aid information and better coordinate. 
3.2.1  
5.1 
5.2    
5.3    
6.2 
Global field 
of aid 
An established field as a recognized inter-national area of 
institutional life with key suppliers (typically donors), 
resources (financial, technical, in-kind aid, and 
knowledge), product consumers (recipients), regulatory 
agencies (typically MDAs, also referred to as rule-making 
organizations), and other organizations (CSOs, media, 
professional communities, and other rule-supporting 
organizations) that produce similar services, products or 
functions related to aid (developed on (DiMaggio & 
Powell 1983; Meyer & Scott 1991)). 
 2.3.3 
 3.1.1 
 6.1 
 
Sustainability 
failure (IS) 
A permanent shutdown of IS, which were once 
implemented, used, but abandoned after a relatively short 
period (such as three years after the launch), without any 
transformation, considerable left-over innovation or 
thoughtful reflection (e.g. evaluation study, report for 
future innovation)  
 3.2.3 
 4.3.3 
 6.3  
Super-norm A grand norm as a superordinate concept, which is a set of 
interrelated norms (for example, ‘aid effectiveness’ is a 
super-norm of ‘aid transparency’, ‘aid coordination’, ‘aid 
alignment’, ‘aid harmonization’, etc). 
 2.4           
 3.1.4 
 6.1  
Global aid 
institution 
Through the thesis, I use the following terms 
interchangeably: global aid institution, structure, 
governance and regime.  
I view the notion of aid agenda, norms, policy, practice, 
and mechanisms as subordinate concepts of aid institution.   
Global/international/foreign aid community and, industry 
are used synonymously with the global field of aid.  
 3.1.1 
 6.1 
 
Table 3-3. Key Concepts Defined in This Study 
 
There are two fields in which the recipient state is embedded, namely the domestic and 
the global field. Changing aid governance has been shown to often take place on a global 
level and in three steps: norm emergence, cascade, and internalisation. Building on 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm dynamics, global norms are expected to diffuse 
following the three stages discussed in Section 3.1.4 – norm emergence, cacade and 
internalization. The diffusion of norms and norm supporting technology takes place 
through the process of three isomorphic mechanisms – coercive, normative and mimetic 
in the global field, discussed in Section 3.1.2. In this process, transnational norm 
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entrepreneurs play an important role in convincing other members to become norm 
followers (norm-takers) in the field of aid.  
 
Entering into the phase of internalization, local agents, typically the states. takes 
different actions characterized by ignorance, resistance, negotiation and compliance. 
Global norms and practice (technology) can be ignored, resisted and negotiated by the 
states. Norm localization or subsidiarity may occur after such a process. Localization is 
the active construction and interpretation of external norms by local agents. In some 
cases, norm subsidiarity occurs where local agents reject accepting the external norms 
and may export locally created norms. The localization and subsidiarity can occur 
subsequently during different time periods. For example, negotiation and collaboration 
between the global structure and local agent may lead to localization and subsequently 
subsidiarity, and vice versa. As discussed in this chapter, the conceptual framework 
which integrates the institutional approach on norms (aid effectiveness) and technology 
(AIMS) in the global field of aid is illustrated in Figure 3-2.  
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Figure 3-2. Conceptual Framework  
(Developed by Author) 
 
3.4. Summary  
 
In this chapter, I have explained the conceptual framework informing the research at 
hand. The conceptual framework is constructed by synthesizing two theoretical 
domains: on the one hand the theory of institutions, which conceptualizes the global aid 
field as an established field, and explains norms dynamics and isomorphic pressure in 
the field. On the other hand, the theory of technology, which conceptualizes AIMS as 
socio-technical systems embedded in a particular domestic and the global field and 
explains information systems failure and the role of technology. 
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Chapter 4.  Methodology 
 
In this chapter I will present the research design and methodological structure I have 
followed to answer my research questions. In my literature review, I problematized my 
research area and positioned it both in the domain of ICTD and, more specifically, in the 
use of information systems in the global field of aid. Building on insight from the 
explorative pilot study on the AIMS in Kenya, I then started my investigation of the 
global diffusion of AIMS. Two questions emerged: 
 
 How can we understand the global diffusion of AIMS?  
 
 Why do AIMS fail to achieve sustainability?  
 
In developing a research design with which to answer these questions, I have chosen a 
two-stage methodology. The first stage involves an explanatory study investigating the 
global adoption of AIMS. In the second stage, I conducted an interpretive single case 
study to examine the sustainability failure of AIMS. Developing methodological rigor 
has been an iterative process, involving continuously revisiting theories and the data I 
collected.  
 
The research design is logically connected to the theoretical perspective I discussed in 
the previous chapter, and is led by an epistemology I will explain in this chapter. Crotty 
(1998) articulates the four fundamental elements of social science research as: i) 
epistemology; ii) theoretical perspective; iii) methodology; and iv) methods. Whether 
epistemological discussion can be clearly differentiated from what Crotty calls 
theoretical perspective may be debatable. However, his articulation of the research 
scheme is useful for explaining the methodological reasoning shown in Figure 4-1, the 
stages of which I will detail in the following sections as follows:  
 
 First, I briefly elaborate the epistemological assumptions, in particular social 
constructivism (Section 4.1), as well as interpretivism (Section 4.2)  
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As discussed in Chapter 3, there are two main research questions in this thesis, each of 
which I presented above. The latter question, which asks why AIMS fails to achieve 
sustainability, cannot be studied without answering the initial question about the origin 
of AIMS and how we should understand its global diffusion. Methodologies and 
methods for investigating each of these questions are discussed in Section 4.3 and 4.4 
respectively: 
 
 Section 4.3 first presents implications of the explorative pilot study. It then 
focuses on the explanatory study of AIMS implementations, and describes data 
collection methods, data sources and analysis strategy.   
 
 Section 4.4 illustrates the overall strategy of the interpretive case study used in 
this thesis. It justifies the case selection and explain the methods for data 
collection. It also explains the data analysis used.  
 
 Finally, in sections 4.5 and 4.6. I discuss research quality criteria and research 
ethics respectively.  
 
Figure 4-1. Structuring Research Procedure - Author’s Development on Crotty’s 
(1998:5) 
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4.1. Epistemology: Social Constructivism 
 
It is crucial to justify why I use a certain methodology, how I collect empirical data, and 
how I have interpreted these data when developing my own conclusion (Crotty 1998). 
ICTD researchers call for methodological rigour and diversity in research on ICT 
interventions in the public sector (Heeks and Bailur 2007; Walsham 2017; Yildiz 2007). 
More importantly, the researcher must clarify the underlying philosophical assumptions 
that have led to the use of a particular research design and methodology. Notably, IS 
research is an applied field of social science that has concentrated more on the practice 
or application of information systems than on its philosophical foundations (Garcia & 
Quek 1997). For this reason, IS researchers have called for an awareness of the 
epistemological and methodological foundation for strong discussion about the 
underlying premise of new challenges in IS research (Orlikowski 1991; Mingers 2001; 
Porra et al. 2014). Due to recent phenomena, such as open data (Kitchin 2014), big data 
(Floridi 2012), social media and digital artefact (Kallinikos et al. 2013), new 
epistemological challenges have also emerged in the ICTD research domain.  
 
Epistemology is an inquiry into the nature of knowledge: how reality can be known. 
There are two main reasons that I lean towards social constructivism. Firstly, as Crotty 
(1998) argues, epistemology should be based on ‘real-life’ experiences and problems, 
as well as on what the researcher seeks to address and answer. As I briefly noted in the 
introduction chapter, my research question originates from issues that arose during my 
previous working experiences. Secondly, the dominance of positivism in the field of IS 
that I identified in the literature review has guided this study to an interpretive approach 
that has its roots in social construction of reality.  
 
My epistemological turn towards social constructivism was instantaneous, but occurred 
over time. It probably started in my college days when I majored in Chemical 
Engineering. As an engineering student, my belief in rational, scientific, and mechanistic 
processes of knowledge acquisition matched the modern science courses I studied. 
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Laplace’s demon40 was still possible to me, for example, as I firmly subscribed to the 
Cartesian idea of the world.   
 
As it turns out, my epistemological turn was triggered by the quantum mechanics class 
I took. According to orthodoxy in quantum mechanics41, observational activities by the 
researcher on the observable would change the reality of the observable. This is 
completely opposite to classical physics, which argues that physical quantities 
represented by mathematical equations are wholly independent of human observations. 
It was quite challenging for me to accept that physical quantities are not determined 
independently of observation, but rather are determined in part by the process of 
measurement itself. Furthermore, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle asserts that 
physical quantities are predicted not by clear-cut laws but only by statistical probabilities 
by which a particular measurement may co-produce the result.   
 
I maybe did not fully understand all the details of quantum mechanics, but I realized that 
it was quite different from how I intuitively thought about the world. Nobel laureate in 
Physics, Niels Bohr, famously mentioned that “for those who are not shocked when they 
first come across quantum theory cannot possibly have understood it”. I probably still 
could not completely understand the theoretical implications of quantum mechanics. 
Nonetheless it caused me to question determinism and objectivism, which makes a strict 
distinction between the observer (subject) and what’s observed (object), and made me 
more interested in both the significance of uncertainty and the inevitable limits of precise 
measurement. The fundamental implication – that the object can never be entirely 
separated from the subject – is the epistemological position of social constructivism in 
social science research. It is a primary assumption of the interpretive perspective, which 
views reality and our knowledge as social products and, therefore, “incapable of being 
understood independent from the social actors that construct and make sense of the 
reality” (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). 
                                                 
40 Laplace's demon is the articulation of scientific determinism by Pierre-Simon Laplace, published in 
1814. It describes a determinism in classical (Newton’s) mechanics, if the ‘Demon’ knows the precise 
values of atom including location and momentum, its past and future values for any given time can be 
calculated.   
41 I refer to the Copenhagen interpretation by Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr, which still remains as 
the most accepted theory in Physics. 
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Constructivist approaches, however, have also raised concerns. For example, scholars 
have criticized an absolute subjectivism that views everything as socially constructed. 
Kallinikos (2004) points out that the constructionist epistemology may lead to extremes. 
According to Hacking (1999), there are various types and degree of constructivism. 
Universal constructivism is based on the belief of pure constructivism and those 
phenomena that are socially constructed. Sismondo (1993) differentiates between 
radical constructivism and mild constructivism, claiming that criticisms made by realists 
are directed only towards the former, which denies physical reality. He ultimately 
defends a more moderate view, which says that knowledge is socially constructed but is 
still mediated through the interpretations of social actors and their relations with the 
world. Picking up on this idea, Crotty (1998:63) similarly argues that social 
constructivism in epistemology is “at once realist and relativist” and can be compatible 
with realism in ontology. 
 
4.2. Theoretical Perspective 
 
As Crotty illustrates, the epistemology is fundamental in devising the theoretical 
perspectives, through which the study is further informed. The interpretivist world view 
is based on the assumption that regardless of whether reality is objective or socially 
constructed, accessing it is possible only through a social construction including 
language, shared meanings and consciousness. In other words, interpretivism seeks to 
understand the human situation through meanings, intentions and actions (Orlikowski & 
Baroudi, 1991; Walsham, 2006). Walsham (2006), for example, argues that the 
interpretive perspective is premised on the assumption that an understanding of social 
processes cannot be acquired by hypothetical deductions, but rather only by directly 
experiencing what generates these social processes. 
 
The literature review in Chapter 2 identified some of the limitations of positivist research 
in information systems in international aid, where different political and economic 
interests and institutional logics of various stakeholders inevitably collide. There cannot 
be simple answers to questions about what has to be measured, how, and from whose 
perspective. Rather than being measured, therefore, the failure of information systems 
in foreign aid is best understood as a complex socio-technical process – one that is 
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enacted by a combination of different stakeholders and technological components. In 
the field of IS, researchers have encountered complex and intertwined social phenomena 
caused by the rapid development of technologies and their diffusion. This has resulted 
in a growing emphasis on interpretivism (Walsham 1995).  
 
Given this complexity, my research needs to be supported by a ‘thick description’ of 
occurrences related to the emergence of AIMS. These involve multiple social actors 
including development partners, recipient governments, and international organizations. 
By thoroughly investigating these diverse social groups, their interpretation on AIMS 
will help us better understand the multifaceted roles of information systems and the 
underlying causes of IS failure. Furthermore, deep examination of the contextual 
realities in a domestic and national-level setting is needed to understand how political, 
historical and ideological factors interplay differently in a recipient country.  
 
In summary, interpretivism, premised on mild constructivism, will shape the 
methodological structure of my research. The questions that guide my thesis, centred on 
interpretation of technology, are inscribed in a social constructionist view in 
epistemology, in which reality is neither observable nor discovered as objective and 
universal truth. The reality is rather constructed by people in their cognition and in a 
particular context and is investigated by researchers based on their conceptualization 
and theorization.  
 
4.3. Methodology Part 1. Review of AIMS 
 
Methodology can only bring us reflective understanding of the means which have 
demonstrated their value in practice by raising them to the level of explicit 
consciousness; it is no more the precondition of fruitful intellectual work than the 
knowledge of anatomy is the precondition for ‘correct’ walking.  
(Weber 1949:115) 
 
Methodology is neither a tool nor is it anatomical knowledge consciously used by a 
researcher. As Weber argues above, discussion on methodology needs to be reflective 
and valuable in practice. To gain insights on the implementation of AIMS in recipient 
countries, I first conducted pilot study before I began with the main case study. The pilot 
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study helped in shaping the research questions and led to the interpretive single case 
study of the Indonesian AIMS.  
 
4.3.1. Explorative Pilot Study 
 
The first step of research was a pilot study. It was an exploratory and formative step 
helping me develop relevant questions and conceptually clarify the research design (Yin 
2009). The pilot study was conducted during my doctoral coursework in November 2013 
and as part of my preparations for an upgrade examination in December 2014. The 
AIMS implemented in Kenya, also known as ‘e-ProMIS’ (Electronic Project Monitoring 
Information System)42, was chosen as a pilot study for the following reasons:  
 
 Yin (2014) argues that ‘convenience, access and geographic proximity’ can be 
regarded as the main criteria for selecting a pilot case. As discussed in the thesis 
introduction, I participated in the Open Aid Map (OAM) project, which 
visualizes the locations of aid activities on a common mapping platform for 
better aid coordination. The project was launched in 2012 in a close collaboration 
with e-ProMIS team. This setting gave me good access to data and potential 
interviewees.  
 
 As Walsham (2006) emphasizes, good social skills and local language fluency 
are important for gaining closer access to the site and carrying out better field 
research. I was quite confident that I would be able to conduct more 
comprehensive research leveraging my Swahili skills.  
 
 As briefly discussed in the introduction chapter, the evaluation of Kenyan AIMS, 
e-ProMIS was significantly divergent.  
 
For pilot study, I conducted three 30-60 minute semi-structured interviews on Skype: 
with a government official who was involved in the e-ProMIS project, and two others 
from the World Bank and a donor agency.  
                                                 
42 http://e-promis.treasury.go.ke/e-promis/ 
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During the pilot study stage, two themes emerged. First, the findings show that there are 
often contradictory perceptions of whether the information system succeeds or fails. 
While the World Bank and other MDAs considered Kenya as a best practice (Kenei 
2012; World Bank 2012), voices in the field evaluate and interpret the AIMS differently:  
 
ICT is oversold. This is not a matter of technology (…) I am quite sceptical with new 
tools like crowd sourcing for citizen’s feedback; you can try a direct communication 
with citizens. But actually we don’t get meaningful feedback from it.  
(Interview with a government officer in Kenya) 
 
The findings do not show sufficient evidence that AIMS and the Kenya Open Data 
initiative have been used for better coordination among stakeholders. It seems very 
unlikely that beneficiaries produce or use such aid data on the system and demand local 
government or donors to improve aid coordination. Thus, the following sub-questions 
arise: does AIMS achieve aid effectiveness in accordance with the inscribed visions? If 
not, why does AIMS fail in achieving the expected outcomes? If it is a failure, in whose 
perspective?  
 
The second theme that arises here is, who drives this technology and this idea of 
information sharing in the aid sector? Is it driven by the recipient countries or by a 
particular technological innovation? As discussed in Chapter 2, the rationales of AIMS 
have been favoured by major donors and MDAs, in particular, the OECD, UNDP and 
the World Bank. Also MDAs often have financially supported the implementation of 
AIMS. This might contribute to isomorphic pressures of adopting AIMS in recipient 
governments.  
 
On the basis of the conceptual framework for unpacking AIMS implementation, the first 
part of this explanatory study will investigate how the global adoption of AIMS can be 
understood.  
 
4.3.2. Study of AIMS Diffusion and Data Collection 
 
This section describes the methodological approach adopted in my explanatory study 
investigating the global diffusion of AIMS. I started data collection on the cases of 
AIMS implementation in recipient countries.  
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The first stage of data collection was conducted, mainly for the period January to April 
2015, by searching for relevant quantitative and qualitative document data on cases of 
AIMS in recipient countries. In these searches, I used keywords on Google and Google 
Scholar. I searched archival data by combining the key words ‘aid information 
management systems’, ‘aid management platform’, ‘open aid’, ‘development assistance 
database’, ‘donor assistance database’ with the names of the countries in the List of the 
OECD ODA Recipient43. As discussed in Section 3.3, although many donor agencies 
and MDAs have recently developed their own information systems that track aid flows 
in order to increase transparency and accountability in their aid activities, the data 
collection for this study excludes such cases. Also, information systems for aid 
management at the regional and sectoral levels were also excluded, as the focus of this 
study is on aid management at the national-level. The data that I collected in this stage 
are mainly secondary sources comprising the following: 
 
 official AIMS project documents, user manuals, administrative guides, 
business process documents, and power point presentations that are normally 
published by recipient governments and service providers;   
 AIMS related reports and documents published by international 
organizations44;  
 media and existing academic literature; and  
 AIMS websites  
 
Blog articles, incomplete documents, and data whose source could not be clearly 
identified were rejected.  
 
The second stage for additional data collection was conducted after May 2015. This 
was facilitated by my previous network from the World Bank, as well as by my 
                                                 
43 OECD DAC list of ODA recipients is available on: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DAC%20List%20of%20ODA%20Recipients%202014
%20final.pdf 
44  In particular, OECD Paris Declaration Country Reports, OECD Survey on Monitoring the Paris 
Declaration Reports, Role of AIMS implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness at the 
Country Level are very resourceful 
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participation in the 3rd International Open Data Conference (IODC), which was hosted 
by the International Development Research Center (IDRC) and the World Bank, and 
held in Ottawa, Canada, in May 201545. The subsequent International Aid Transparency 
Initiative (IATI) Tag Meeting, held in June, was also a good opportunity to meet aid 
experts from international organizations and governments as well as AIMS developers.46 
 
I directly questioned government officials (mainly from the Finance Ministry or Foreign 
Ministry) from 21 recipient countries. To ascertain whether the country currently has or 
previously had an AIMS, their officials were contacted via informal conversation during 
these two events or by email after informal conversation. Primarily during the period 
from August 2015 to February 2016, in order to collect further data on AIMS diffusion, 
I conducted 14 semi-structured interviews with four government officials in recipient 
countries (Philippines, Rwanda, Mozambique, Kyrgyz Republic)47, six aid experts in 
donor agencies (two in donor agencies and four in MDAs excluding one in Indonesia), 
three AIMS providers, and one from a development NGO. Additionally, a limited 
number of speeches by political leaders in recipient governments, as well as senior 
policy makers in donor agencies, were collected for analysis as a primary data source. 
The data collected and data sources are detailed in Appendix 3.  
 
The original data collected in the first and the second stage, particularly from AIMS 
websites, were continuously revisited during the analysis stage to form interpretations 
through an iterative process. This took place mainly from November to December 2016, 
and also in July 2017 for final URL check-up. The data collected are summarized in 
Figure 5-1. Moreover, new data from different sources were added to the existing data 
set during the analysis to cross-check and ensure that statements were properly applied. 
Some URLs are no longer accessible, but the screenshots archived by web.archive.org 
are collected as references. The date when the last screenshot was taken, however, 
should not be mistaken as the last day of the AIMS.  
 
                                                 
45 https://internationalopendataconfer2015.sched.com/list/descriptions/ 
46 http://www.aidtransparency.net/technicaladvisorygroup/tag-meetings/tag-meeting-may-2015 
47 This excludes Indonesia case, which I will discuss mainly in Section 4.4.  
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Figure 4-2. Research Timeline 
 
4.3.3. Data Analysis 
 
Criteria of Selecting Cases: Data collection identified 80 cases of AIMS either currently 
or previously being used in 71 countries during the period from 1996 to 2015. The first 
part of data analysis in this study involved evaluating data from secondary sources. Scott 
(1990) suggests useful guidelines for assessing the quality of social research evidence, 
including documents. Authenticity is concerned with whether the evidence is genuine 
and of unquestionable origin. Credibility asks about its possibility of error and distortion. 
Representativeness questions whether the evidence is typical. Lastly, meaning assesses 
the clarity and comprehensiveness of the evidence. 
 
There are a few more cases of AIMS implemented during this period, but not enlisted 
due to the lack of data quality and therefore not discovered during the research. Building 
on Scott’s criteria, the main consideration for selecting a case that I followed was: 
 
 documentation from the recipient country’s government declaring AIMS 
implementation  
 documentation from funding institution (UNDP, EU, GTZ, etc) 
 documentation from provider or confirmation of implementation  
 URL address, apart from being accessible or not 
 
With the exception of the early AIMS adopted in the late 1990s, most cases identified 
in the data collection stage met these criteria, while few cases did not meet them. These 
include:  
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 AIMS implementation was only mentioned by other data sources published by a 
third party (Egypt and Syria).  
 AIMS related documents such as feasibility studies were found, but the actual 
implementation has not yet occurred (Ghana and Swaziland). 
 A plan to implement AIMS was identified through semi-structured interview, 
but the actual implementation has not yet occurred (Indonesia and Vietnam). 
 There are cases of AIMS implementation that I identified very recently.  
However, as I was in the final stage of analysis, I was not able to include these 
cases (Bulgaria, Colombia and Bosnia Herzegovina). 
 
Qualitative Content Analysis: The documents and websites of identified AIMS cases 
were examined using qualitative content analysis. Krippendorff (1989:18) defines 
content analysis as "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences 
from texts to the contexts of their use”. In general, quantitative content analysis 
dominates in classical content analysis. However, qualitative content analysis has been 
considered a strategy for the analysis of qualitative descriptive studies particularly in 
searching for underlying themes in a large quantity of qualitative data (Mayring 2000; 
Kohlbacher 2006). 
 
All the cases of AIMS were summarized in terms of country, name of the AIMS, URL, 
year of implementation, implementing ministries, funder, service provider, language in 
service, listed donors, budget, as well as the data sources. By assessing the AIMS 
websites regularly, further data was collected, categorized and coded. Based on the 
conceptual framework for institutional account discussed in Chapter 3, all the cases were 
analysed to understand the diffusion of AIMS in the global field of aid. To do this, I 
developed inductive and deductive categories. A deductive approach can also be applied 
to generate initial categories and codes (Mayring 2000). Mayring (2000) argues that an 
advantage of qualitative content analysis is the flexibility of deductive and inductive 
category development or a combination of both approaches in data analysis (Cho & Lee 
2014).   
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The cases were categorized using the existing categories first, namely the OECD’s 
classification by income48 and the World Bank’s regional classification of countries49. 
Moreover, based on the theoretical framework discussed, I constructed a pre-defined set 
of categories, known as deductive categorization, to investigate the specific themes of 
three institutional isomorphic mechanisms as well as five Paris Declaration Principles. 
This procedure provided a broad structure for data analysis of AIMS cases and helped 
me generate codes. Based on this, I searched for similarities and patterned regularities 
in the text and the websites, and made inferences building on these. At this stage, 
important tasks included eliciting evidence of the proliferation of AIMS; seeing whether 
AIMS have a similar role, functionalities, design and governance structure; and 
assessing whether AIMS achieved sustainability, based on the themes related to my 
questions. Furthermore, the coding frame built on the deductive categories I initially 
used were evaluated and modified to expand analysis. By taking a step back, similar 
subcategories were collapsed and revised, and a new emerging theme was added.  
 
The identified themes and findings were supplemented with quantitative methods as an 
ancillary purpose. This stage involved checking word frequency of key concepts. As 
discussed, the key concepts were identified using the themes informed by existing aid 
norms and principles, as well as theories in ICTD such as NPM. In addition, word 
clouds, which provide visual depictions of texts document or a website that lists key 
words with different text font size according to their frequency, were generated. I 
acknowledge the multiplicity of visual representations and their political nature 
(Manovich 2011; Galloway 2011). These analyses, however, offer a useful quantitative 
check, in particular, for investigating the visions and rhetoric that AIMS inscribe in 
different generation (PC-based, Web-based, open data based). 
 
The qualitative content analysis of AIMS documents and websites helped me attain 
insight into the characteristics of the discourse, identify key actors (relevant social 
groups in the notion of SCOT), and discover these actors’ specific interests and 
interpretations of technology, all of which are crucial for mapping the key themes in the 
                                                 
48 
https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DAC%20List%20of%20ODA%20Recipients%202014
%20final.pdf 
49 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country 
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research. The procedure is also iterative between data collection, analysis, and 
constructing narrative.  
 
The initial analysis, conducted from January to March 2015 before the case selection, 
enabled me to identify the key themes and actors, and provided me with a better 
understanding of the field of AIMS. In fact, the participation in the IATI Meeting after 
the IODC, which I mentioned in the data collection section, resulted from the initial 
analysis. This made me aware of the importance of participating in the Meeting. I was 
supposed to present a paper at the Research Seminar at IODC and return to London. 
However, I extended my trip and attended the IATI meeting, where I met many aid 
experts who were directly or indirectly involved in AIMS. In order to achieve further 
understanding, the semi-structured interviews that I conducted were transcribed and 
analysed in addition to the secondary data.  
 
To understand the current status and its sustainability, the categories were constructed 
on the basis of theoretical discussions about the sustainability failure of information 
systems. The cases were classified into the three categories: [A] relatively in active use, 
[B] accessible but rarely in use, [C] implemented once but shut down. The category [A] 
refers to systems which were last updated within the one-year period, July 2016 and July 
2017, when the final screening of URL was conducted. An update could mean new data 
input regarding a new project, a disbursement report, or any data revision, as well as the 
system's software upgrades. However, the criteria do not take into account the frequency 
of data inputs into the system, or the quality of information. The category [B] refers to 
systems which have had no updates within the most recent one year period (July 2016 
and July 2017), although the URL is still accessible. The category [C] refers to systems 
for which data that I collected confirms the implementation of AIMS, but the URL could 
no longer be accessed. In some cases, the URL addresses are not even traceable. For 
triangulation, semi-structured interviews and informal conversations were conducted on 
investigating the use of AIMS. However, the numbers of semi-structure interviews were 
limited, as discussed above.  
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 Time Activities 
Exploratory 
Pilot Study 
2014  Pilot interviews  
 
1st Stage Jan – Apr 2015  Data collection – AIMS documents   
2nd Stage  May 2015 – Feb 
2016 
 Presentation at IODC and IATI meeting  (May, 2015) 
 Data collection – AIMS documents, Semi-structured 
interviews 
 Data triangulation  (continued in 2016-17)  
Sustainability 
Studies 
Nov – Dec 2016 
July 2017 
 Visiting AIMS and checking its sustainability  
 
Table 4-1. Research Timeline (Part 1) 
 
4.3.4. Limitations and Challenge 
 
Regarding the qualitative content analysis, Cho and Lee (2014) point out that “it can be 
a labour-intensive and time-consuming process”. Indeed, it is time-demanding for me to 
process large amounts of data. I mainly rely on the secondary data source, written text. 
I conducted 14 semi-structured interviews, which were helpful for understanding the big 
picture of the global diffusion of AIMS and for strengthening an argument.  However, 
the number of interviews is limited and selection bias may exist. Although I 
acknowledge the semi-structured interviews conducted with government officers who 
are in charge of AIMS could in each case provide a much more nuanced view, it was not 
feasible to establish contact with all AIMS-implementing countries due to the time 
limits.  
 
Except for a limited amount of data, which I directly acquired from interviews, most 
documents were collected online, mainly through search engines. Notably, the use of 
English as a primary language in a search function would omit potential data resources 
written in other languages. Some of the documents collected in French, Spanish, 
Portuguese, and local languages were therefore acquired only after learning about the 
existence of AIMS in a particular country. There are probably documents written in 
Arabic about AIMS, including Egypt’s, that were not identified until the closing of the 
data collection phase, and so were not included in this study. The documents used for 
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analysis were mainly in English, while documents in Indonesian were archived to be 
selectively translated to ensure ‘meaning’ for further analysis according to Scott’s 
criteria.  
 
In using search engines, researchers encounter not only technical challenges but also 
political ones (Lucas D. Introna, Helen Nissenbaum 2000). In particular, search engine 
may be a source of bias, since they often systematically give visibility to, or exclude, 
particular information and sites in favour of others. This is especially important for my 
research, since information systems failure is typically not celebrated or advertised. 
Successful cases may be more prominent on the Web. In spite of these potential pro-
AIMS biases in the existing documents on the Web, however, I would like to note that 
findings of my study present considerable evidence of failure. Therefore, I think the 
methodological validity still remains.   
 
I also acknowledge that cross-national data has its own limitations. I note that economic 
categorization based mainly on GDP per capita, as well as other existing indices such as 
the e-government index, corruption perception index (CPI), and the government 
effectiveness index, give only a partial picture of ‘ICT-enabled governance in 
developing countries (Relly & Sabharwal 2009; Rorissa & Demissie 2010). In particular, 
the rankings not only reflect what happens in a given state but also in every other in 
relation to the state. Thus, rankings are made with a ‘zero-sum technology’ with 
reactivity (Espeland & Sauder 2007). Such indicators and rankings are carefully used 
only for supplementary purposes in this study.  
 
4.4. Methodology Part 2. Interpretive Case Study Research 
 
Through conducting the research on the implementation of AIMS discussed in Section 
4.3, the broad question about AIMS failure became more focused on sustainability 
failure. This section justifies the choice of an interpretive single case study, as well as 
the choice of Indonesian AIMS. Data collection, analysis strategy and limitation will 
also be discussed.  
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4.4.1. Justification of Single Case Study 
 
There are two reasons I employed an interpretive single case study for my research. Yin 
(2009:2) argues that case studies are more appropriate when ‘how’ or ‘why’ are the main 
research questions in a natural setting where the researcher has little or no control over 
behavioural events. The main purpose of this thesis is to explore why AIMS fails to 
achieve sustainability. In addition, as an investigator, I cannot manipulate events and 
outcomes in the field. Thus, the case study is the most suitable choice for my research. 
Secondly, it is a suitable choice for providing an in-depth understanding of the complex 
phenomenon of AIMS and the hidden dynamics of the stakeholders involved. The case 
study methodology has often been used in past decades to give rich narratives in the field 
of IS (Ciborra 2005; Walsham 1993; Walsham 2006). However, Myers (1997) argues 
that ‘the case study research can be positivist (Yin, 2009), interpretive (Walsham1993), 
or critical’. Framed by my constructivist epistemology, I employ an interpretive single 
case study, which enables me to be much closer to the situation, and to interpret the real 
dynamics through the human experience.  
 
4.4.2. Selection of Indonesia’s AIMS as a Case Study 
 
Flyvbjerg (2006) emphasizes that how a case is selected plays a major role in theory 
development and generalizability50. Case selection should be linked to the main purpose 
of research, the theoretical background, and the epistemological perspective of 
researcher. In selecting the case, I used a methodical procedure and followed a “two-
phase approach”, which would be suitable for screening “a large number of eligible 
candidates” (Yin, 2009, pp.95). These two phases involve first collecting relevant data 
about the entire pool from an archival source and then reducing the candidates by 
defining some relevant criteria.  
 
In this thesis, the initial data collection identifying the pool of AIMS in the explanatory 
study (Part 1) represents the first phase. Based on the data collected, the cases of AIMS 
                                                 
50 ‘empirical transferability’ in qualitative research to be further discussed in Section 4.5. Research Quality 
Criteria.  
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were summarized by categories such as service provider, year of implementation and 
region. By accessing their URL, all the AIMS were screened and examined.  
 
Out of 36 cases in the category of sustainability failure, Category [C] as discussed in 
Section 4.3.3, 13 cases are considered to be relatively feasible to study in terms of data 
accessibility and the year of implementation, which is assumed to be less than five 
years.51 Additionally, in order to reduce the number of candidates (Yin, 2009), fragile 
states were eliminated due to the complexity of research and difficulty accessing data 
respectively (Brinkerhoff , 2007). Six cases remained to be investigated further.  
 
While narrowing down the candidates in the first stage of data collection specified in 
Appendix 3, I checked the feasibility of the study with one of my acquaintances who 
works for the Indonesian government. The official, who later became one of my 
important informants, attended my seminar at Seoul National University (SNU) in 
December 2011. The informant studied abroad as a Master student at Graduate School 
of International Studies, SNU. I remembered the informant because of questions on my 
summary from the 4th Busan High Level Forum (HLF) on Aid Effectiveness, where I 
participated as a representative of the World Bank in the same month. On 12 February, 
2015, I contacted the informant concerning an Indonesian experience with AIMS. At 
that time, the AIMS used for Tsunami recovery (implemented in 2005) was identified 
only by my data collection. The mail received on 29 March from the informant, however, 
confirmed the existence of a second experience of AIMS in Indonesia, which was 
implemented in 2010 but permanently shut down. I had a preliminary semi-structured 
interview with the informant on 7 April in order to check whether data in the files were 
accessible. 
 
Accessibility to the sites is one of the major issues of case selection (Yin 2009). At the 
beginning of the study, the biggest consideration was whether there was difficulty in 
data accessibility as the system had been shut down two years earlier. There was also 
the nature of the challenge in studies investigating a case of ‘failure’, including the 
potential reluctance of interview participants. The five core publications related to 
                                                 
51 Please see Section 6.3.1 for the details.  
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Indonesian AIMS received from the informant via the former AIMS Task Force Leader 
on 24 June was the crucial moment. After examining the government publications, 
namely, AIMS On-Line Survey User Guide, User Guide, Administrator Guide, Business 
Process, Technical Reference, my assessment was that there is sufficient feasibility as a 
research project in the case.  
 
Another reason is that, in Indonesia, two AIMS were implemented in 2005 and 2010 
respectively. The one established with the support of UNSDP for Tsunami recovery has 
been considered a success story by international organizations (Masyrafah & Mckeon 
2008); while the other AIMS, which is the technological object of my study, was shut 
down. Thus, it may be considered that Indonesia arguably experienced both success and 
failure in AIMS practice, and therefore evaluation and interpretations from different 
stakeholders may be contradictory. No study was conducted on the Indonesian case.  
 
4.4.3. Data Collection 
 
Based on the interpretivist perspective, the field work was motivated by the need to 
actively engage with the real world in which the research object is embedded. While 
diverse sources were utilized for data collection, semi-structured interviews are used as 
the primary method. Walsham (2006) argues that ‘interviews are the primary data source 
in an interpretive study’ in the field of IS research. Following the interpretivist approach, 
interview methods enabled me to dialogue with the interviewees and collaboratively 
construct a meaningful reality. In particular, semi-structured interviews enable a 
researcher to undertake an in-depth analysis of the process of events. It allows the 
researcher to engage more with interviewees and have flexibility by asking open ended 
questions (Flick, 2009). However, this can serve as a limitation at the same time because 
a lot of uncertainty arises during the interview (Flick, 2009). For this reason, the quality 
of a semi-structure interview often relies on the researcher’s interview skills and 
capacity.  
 
Developing Interview Capacity: The pilot interviews conducted prior to my PhD 
upgrade were my very first experience with semi-structured interviews for academic 
purposes. I faced some challenges, including pausing a few times during conversation 
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and forgetting to ask a previously planned question. A couple of seminar books on 
qualitative research helped me develop skills in preparing and conducting interviews. 
Rapley (2004:18) offers a good overview of preparation, recruitment and interaction in 
interviews, noting that it is important to “work with them and not strictly delimit the talk 
to my predetermined agenda”. InterViews, authored by Kvale, S. & Brinkmann 
(2009:135-6) provides useful guidelines for constructing interview questions, as well as 
follow-up questioning, such as specifying (can you give me an example?), directing 
(how do you think other people view X?), structuring (Thank you for that. I would like 
to move to another topic.) and using silence.  
 
Interview Questions: Regarding interview questions, I have mainly followed Robson’s 
(2011:282) guide. I not only articulated interview questions by avoiding long questions 
and the use of jargon, but to maintain neutrality, I refrained from ‘leading’ and biased 
questions. Prior to conducting interviews, the interview questionnaires were constructed 
in a way that cohered with the research questions and were organized according to 
several themes linked to the theoretical gaps discussed. In a broad ICTD perspective, the 
research questions focused on the role of information systems in aid management, 
interpretations of technology in terms of its role, use, and criteria of success. A topic 
guide was used for dealing with any uncertainty that could originate from open-ended 
questions in the semi-structure interviews (Flick, 2009:192). This is crucial to clarify the 
interview questions and to select interviewees (Bauer & Gaskell 2000). A sample topic 
guide that I utilized for the semi-structured interviews during my second field visit is 
attached in Appendix 6.  
 
Access to Field and Participants: Fieldwork has been conducted during four-time visits 
to Indonesia, of as specified in Table 4-2 as below.  
 
Part 2. Interpretive Single Case Study in Indonesia 
Study 
preparation 
Apr – Jun 2015   Case selection  
 A pilot interview with an expert in Bappenas,  
 Arranging interviews  
Fieldwork 1 Aug 2015   Semi-structure interviews  
 Archival data  
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Fieldwork 2 Dec 2015-Feb 
2016 
 Semi-structure interviews 
 Archival data  
Fieldwork 3 Jun, Jul – Aug 
2016  
 Additional data collection and case analysis  
Fieldwork 4 May 2017   Paper presentation at IFIP 9.4 Conference  
(May 22-24, Yogyakarta)  
 
Table 4-2. Research Timeline (Part 2) 
 
During the field work, 51 semi-structured interviews with 45 informants, each on 
average an hour long, were conducted mainly in Jakarta, Indonesia with some exceptions 
in Depok, Yogyakarta, and Bandung. Skype was also used for conducting interviews 
with the former aid experts of donor agencies in Indonesia, who have now returned back 
to home countries, and with Indonesian participants during my stay in London. I 
recorded audio of the interviews and took field notes. Participants of the semi-structured 
interviews were selected using a ‘snow-balling’ technique (Bryman & Bell, 2007). For 
my study, snow-balling was particularly appropriate, as a personal network is culturally 
very important to approaching individuals and organizations.  
 
Three sources greatly helped in the initial stage of snow-balling. First, the existing 
network enabled me to begin snow-balling, including the informant previously 
mentioned. Also, I was able to build a strategy to contact the potential interviewees by 
expanding the existing network in the organizations where I worked previously, 
including Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and the World Bank. 
Second, the internal documents that I acquired – Technical Meeting for the 2011 Paris 
Declaration Monitoring Survey (held on 20 January 2011) and Workshop on the 
Monitoring Survey for Paris Declaration – Date Review for Country Spreadsheet (held 
on March 16, 2011) were very useful. They each had a full list of the names and 
organizations of the participants in these two important meetings, including 40 people 
from 39 donor agencies and more than 30 government officials. In approaching 
personnel in the list, it was helpful to use Linked-in websites to contact people and 
explain my research to them. Third, networks that I built during the field visits also 
helped me approach potential participants. These include:  
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 Bappenas International Conference on Best Development Practices and Policies, 
Jakarta, on 19-20 August, 2015  
 High-Level Workshop on Indonesia-Korea Cooperation for e-Government, 26 
August, 2015  
 The Annual Meeting organized by the LSE Alumni Association Indonesia, 
Jakarta, on 21 January, 2016 
 12th World Islamic Economic Forum, Jakarta, 2-4 August, 2016  
 
This snow-balling, as illustrated in Appendix 8, continued throughout both the entire 
study period and most of the data collection process. The full list of interviewees is 
summarized in Appendix 7. I also conducted focus group discussion twice, which 
brought together AIMS developers, AIMS users from donor agencies, and government 
officials. Data collected from interviews and focus group meetings were transcribed by 
me and two transcribers who were paid from the research support budget of the 
Department of Management, London School of Economics (LSE).   
 
Secondary Data Sources: secondary data including documents from diverse sources, 
speeches of policy makers, and website content were collected. The most important data 
was the AIMS website, which was archived on 26 September 2011 by another important 
informant, one of the AIMS developers. I was able to receive a temporary URL to access 
the actual AIMS. In addition, government reports, AIMS project documents, user 
manuals, contract documents, publications by donors, and email communications saved 
by AIMS developers were collected for analysis. Finally, field notes and notes from 
informal conversations enriched and complemented the primary data sources. The 
quality of data was assessed based on the Scott’s (1990) criteria discussed in Section 
4.3.  
 
4.4.4. Data Analysis 
 
The core task of analysis is to uncover the institutional foundations of actors in the global 
field of aid that justify their interpretations of technology and their engagement with it. 
Building on the insights of theories of institution and theories of technology, the analysis 
in this thesis is a process of mapping the relational actions toward technology with 
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contextual structures in the different levels of fields – local and global. Such interpretive 
analysis can be done by ‘thick description’.  
 
Social science research, whether quantitative or qualitative, involves the dual goals of 
describing and explaining. Some scholars set out to describe the world; others to 
explain. Each is essential. We cannot construct meaningful causal explanations without 
good description; description, in turn, loses most of its interest unless linked to some 
causal relationships. Description often comes first; it is hard to develop explanations 
before we know something about the world and what needs to be explained on the basis 
of what characteristics  
(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:35) 
 
The ‘thick description’ requires qualitative analytical methods such as thematic 
(Aronson 1994), content (Kohlbacher 2006), and discourse analysis (Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough 1999).  
 
I utilized thematic analysis in this study as the main device to reconstruct the processes 
of AIMS. The choice of thematic analysis, among the diverse methods available for thick 
description in qualitative research, is motivated by the central focus of my study 
represented in research questions. The analytical focus lies particularly in the state actor, 
differentiated interpretations on technology, and global norms which is set of other 
interrelated subordinate logics. In general, thematic analysis follows an inductive 
reasoning, by allowing open coding to derive themes from the data collected. However, 
thematic analysis is methodologically similar to qualitative content analysis discussed 
in Section 4.3.3. Building on the methodological combination of inductive and deductive 
logic, thematic analysis helped me organize and describes the data collected in details 
as well as identifies important themes and patterns.  
 
While doing interviews, I took notes including interviewees’ emphases and my first 
impressions. Afterwards, I read the transcript carefully line-by-line with labelling words, 
terminologies, sentences, and sections with coding and indexing sometimes conducted 
on printed transcripts or sometimes on the MS word file. On occasion, reading 
transcripts while listening to the recorded audio file helped me decide what to code. 
Building on Miles and Huberman (1994), as an interpretive researcher, I used the 
following guidelines to decide which parts of interviews were more relevant: 
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 if it is often repeated in the interview  
 if interviewees explicitly emphasis  
 if I find it very different from existing explanation or if it surprises me  
 if it reminds me of a particular concept or theoretical explanation discussed in 
my literature review and conceptual framework.  
 
Afterwards, I went through all the codes created. They were categorized and integrated 
with several themes. New codes emerged by combining different codes. Some codes 
were discarded before analysis. The central focus lies particularly in the state actor, 
interpretations on technology, the role of stakeholders in using, implementing and 
shutting down information systems. It also focuses on how they were connected to each 
other, as well as explains the relationship and connection between categories.  
 
I also investigate whether there was a hierarchy, chronology or causal relationship 
among the categories, and whether some categories were more important than others. 
Figures were also created if they helped me in analysing the data more efficiently.  Based 
on this data analysis, as well as previous literature review, I created an analytical 
narrative and developed discussion. In addition, following the qualitative data analysis 
method in case study (Yin 2009; Miles & Huberman 1994), the primary data that I 
collected have been triangulated with government documents on the Indonesian AIMS, 
donor reports, press releases, speech, and other statistical data and indices.   
 
4.4.5. Limitations and Challenges 
 
One of the fundamental challenges of social science research is the ‘double hermeneutic’ 
(Giddens 1984). In particular, in an in-depth case study conducted over a certain period 
of time, it is inevitable that the interpretive research will be involved in the situation the 
researcher is observing, and that the researcher will influence some of the responses of 
the participants that the researcher is studying. This study, focusing on system failure, is 
therefore more likely to make interviewees reluctant or influence their interpretations. 
With very few exceptions, those people I managed to contact were willing to accept 
meetings and interviews. However, I realized that previously conducted interviews with 
informants who introduced new participants in the same organization sometimes limited 
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my capacity to further approach and fully attain useful information from the new 
participant. This did not always happen. However, one interviewee seemed to have heard 
the discussion that I conducted with the previous informant, and insisted that ‘a failure’ 
was not ‘their’ failure.    
 
As Walsham (2006) emphasizes, good social skills as well as fluency in the local 
language are instrumental to gaining access to the site and carrying out better field 
research. Overall, given that the majority of the interview participants were fluent in 
English and that most of the interviews were not conducted at the community level, the 
use of Indonesian and tribal local languages is not very crucial in my most of interviews. 
However, I tried to learn Indonesian by taking a short course offered by SOAS in 2015. 
Free Youtube channels were good source of learning as well. I would try to start 
interviews by briefly introducing myself and my research in Indonesian.  
 
However, the language barrier was still one of the challenges I encountered in the field. 
In general, the level of proficiency in English of government officers, academics, and 
local hires within international organizations was high. But there were times when 
interpreters were needed, especially during the interviews with senior government 
officers that involved detailed or deep discussions. The real challenge was cultural, not 
solely linguistic. In the case of senior government officers, it was quite difficult to say 
‘May an interpreter accompany me for the next interview?’ This was because it could 
appear disrespectful to some people who were particularly sensitive to seniority. Once I 
understood the challenge, in a mail prior to the interview I tried to include a sentence 
asking if the interviewee would prefer to have a conversation in Indonesian. However, 
it did not make a big difference because most government officers readily accepted 
English interviews and expressed confidence when making interview appointments. It 
was quite hard to guess in advance the level of their comfort in having the conversation 
in English.  
 
Another challenge involved an interpreter who was a former intern at a Ministry and had 
many college friends and former colleagues in the government. In spite of the 
interpreter’s amicable character and good ability, the interpreter seemed at times to be 
trying to mediate or even tone down the interviewee’s response. Although the interpreter 
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might have been eager to help me with my research, it was risky for the interpreter to 
engage beyond the role as an interpreter. In order to ensure the reliability and credibility 
of the research, I carefully let the interpreter know that interviewees’ response and their 
own views do matter as they are. 
 
Regarding the documents that I analysed, most of the government documents that I 
accessed were also written in English. The main research area is the role of information 
systems in foreign aid, which by its nature is international so most documents related to 
aid mechanism and coordination are written in English. Particular documents related to 
legislation or to the regulation of internal aid management, such as the Presidential 
Decree and Government Regulations, were checked with a bilingual professional who 
majored and worked in the field of international relations.  
 
Google Translate, updated in January 2017, was also a useful supplementary source of 
help. I sometimes used the service when I needed to skim government documents or to 
search relevant media articles by using key words. Recognizing this type of algorithms-
based machine translation often ignore contextual knowledge, once I found a relevant 
document or article, I received help from two local personnel to translate it in its entirety 
for further investigation. 
 
4.5. Research Quality Criteria 
 
Denzin (1989 in Flick 2009) distinguishes four systematologies of triangulation, namely 
data, investigator, theory, and methodological triangulation. It refers to the use of 
different sources of data, observers or interviewers, various theoretical perspectives and 
different methodologies. Unlike quantitative research which has generally accepted 
research quality indicators such as reliability, validity and generalizability, these 
qualities in qualitative research are rather ambiguous and contentious (Maxwell 1992). 
In this thesis, following the ‘functional equivalents’: transparency and reflexivity, 
grounding interpretations and triangulation, transferability and significance (Bauer & 
Gaskell, 2000), I hope to provide a methodological rigor based on the criteria for the in-
depth interpretive case study as below.  
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General criteria Functional 
equivalents 
Efforts to ensure quality 
Reliability Transparency & 
Reflexivity 
Document the study process explicitly, 
Clear demonstration of how data was 
collected and analysed,  
(Internal) 
Validity 
Grounding 
Interpretations & 
Triangulation 
Rich narratives and in-depth description. 
Use multiple sources of data. 
Generalizability 
(External 
Validity) 
Transferability & 
Significance  
Demonstrate the research findings and 
result in a wider set of phenomena. 
Show significance broader than the 
specific sample under examination.  
 
Table 4-3. Strategies for Ensuring Research Quality 
 
First, arguably, qualitative research does not necessarily aim for ‘reliability’ in the sense 
of quantitative research, where an instrument of research would produce the same 
findings with a different researcher at different times. However, by providing enough 
information to critique, I ensure the ‘transparency and reflexivity’ of my thesis. For this, 
I present details in methodologies, and research processes including how data was 
collected and analysed; and how the research design has shaped the data collection and 
analysis. Also, I discussed the issue of reflexivity.  
 
Second, in order to ensure grounding interpretation and triangulation, I provide rich 
descriptions with quotes from interviews and documents. I utilise multiple sources of 
data for triangulation. By investigating converging evidence from findings, data 
triangulation strengthens the research quality. In doing so, I demonstrate the openness 
to alternatives, in which I reflect on differences between research findings from different 
sources.  Use of some limited quantification particularly in Chapter 5, was helpful as 
well.  
 
Third, an interpretive single case study is inevitably limited in how much the research 
findings can be generalized to other populations. Being aware of the methodological 
limitations, I claim to demonstrate transferability and significance of the thesis beyond 
the particular case under investigation. I ensure ‘theoretical transferability’ and 
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‘empirical transferability’ (Miles & Huberman 1994). For this, I associate my research 
findings to the existing literature, and demonstrate practical and theoretical implications 
in other similar cases. This will be further discussed in the thesis conclusion.  
 
4.6. Research Ethics  
 
It is important to consider research ethics when conducting research, particularly when 
this research involves interviewing people. There are a few ethical considerations, 
however, as this study focuses on the relevant stakeholders’ interpretation of technology 
instead of a specific person. Unlawful activities were not observed during the research. 
In order to ensure my research meets strict ethical standards, I reviewed the LSE Ethics 
Policy52 carefully, and briefly read the Framework for Research Ethics published by the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)53. Then, prior to each field visit, I filled 
out the Applications to Undertake Fieldwork. These were then approved by the 
supervisor, Professor Chrisanthi Avgerou, and submitted to the LSE Research Degree 
Unit, via the Department of Management. The application form is compulsory for 
conducting fieldwork away from LSE. In particular, in the case of overseas fieldwork, 
it is necessary to conduct a Risk Assessment54 checklist for a hostile environment. To 
do this, I referred to the Foreign Travel Advice from the UK government55. Regarding 
the location of the field work, Indonesia, the probability of risk, and likelihood of 
adverse events or outcomes arising is relatively low including health and safety issues. 
Thus, the risk of a field visit with potential of being conducted in a hostile environment 
as part of a particular research component, was not high in my case. 
 
When conducting interviews, I explained the anonymity and confidentiality of the 
research. Prior to interviews, both a one-page research brief, which provided background 
information on the study, and an informed consent form were disseminated to interview 
participants. Confidentiality has been widely discussed in qualitative research (Seymour 
                                                 
52 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/intranet/researchAndDevelopment/researchDivision/policyAndEthics/QuickGuide-
Research-Ethics-web.pdf 
53 http://www.esrc.ac.uk/funding/guidance-for-applicants/research-ethics 
54 https://info.lse.ac.uk/staff/Services/Policies-and-procedures/AtoZ 
55https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-business-risk-indonesia/overseas-business-risk-
indonesia; https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/indonesia 
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& Ingleton 2005; Allmark 2009). The most common issues that potentially lead to 
identification, particularly in the research related to health, criminology and conflict 
studies, are the use of quotes which may be identifiable. However, my biggest concern 
about my research is the risk that participants may be identifiable not to the general 
public or the media, but to their colleagues involved in the same project. This is 
especially considerable because the aid field in Indonesia is small. In particular, in 
government, more specifically, Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas), 
individuals are well-known to each other and have worked together since the research 
project was done. Thus, I selected quotes carefully and removed the information about 
participants’ affiliation. Once my interviews were transcribed, they were anonymized 
and stored on my local computer. I assured that no records of the interview were kept 
with personal information, and that participants remained completely anonymous in 
their quotes in the writing up of thesis. As written in LSE’s Style Guide for Ph.D. Theses 
in the Department of Social Policy56,  
 
[G]ender-neutral language should be used whenever possible, but not at the expense of 
clarity or good grammar (…) options for developing a gender-neutral thesis or paper 
include rephrasing the text to facilitate the use of gender-neutral nouns (“an individual”, 
“the subject”, “humankind”  
(LSE’s Style Guide for Ph.D. Theses)  
 
4.7. Summary 
 
This chapter has presented the methodological structure of this thesis. I started with an 
overview of the underlying epistemological assumption, which led to a research focus 
on how information systems failure is constructed, as well as a different social actors’ 
interpretation of the failure. The perspective on the dynamics of actors in the field of 
aid, which is based on the constructivist theory of international relations, and the 
conceptualization of technology, which is underpinned by socio-technical perspective, 
elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3, strongly mirrors the idea of social construction. This 
chapter identified the link between the discussion on epistemology and theoretical 
perspective and the thesis questions, which was demonstrated by the research design. 
Data collection was conducted by using diverse sources, as it is typically recommended 
for interpretive case studies (Yin 2009; Walsham 2006). The following four chapters 
                                                 
56 http://www.lse.ac.uk/socialPolicy/pdf/InformationForCurrentStudents/PhDStyleGuide.pdf 
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will present the findings and analysis from the two parts of research: the global diffusion 
of AIMS (Chapters 5 and 6) and the AIMS failure in Indonesia (Chapters 7 and 8). 
  
143 
Chapter 5.  A Review of AIMS Implementation in the Last Two 
Decades (1996-2015) 
 
In the previous chapters, I positioned my research and explained the theoretical 
framework and the methodology used in conducting my research. This chapter confirms 
the global proliferation of AIMS in recipient countries in the last two decades (1996-
2015) and provides descriptive evidence for the systematic analysis of AIMS 
implementation in the next chapter. In this chapter:  
 
 First, I provide an overview of AIMS diffusion in recipient countries where 
different economic, regional, and political contexts exist. Findings are 
summarized according to i) economic status, ii) region, as well as iii) year of 
implementation. 
 
 Second, based on the findings, I investigate the high degree of similarities 
between AIMS. Commonalities are discussed in three features, i) rationalities 
and norms, ii) functionalities, and iii) target users. The section identifies that the 
shared visions and norms AIMS inscribe often translate into homogenous design 
and functionalities of technologies, as well as targeting users.  
 
 Third, I identify the dominance of two AIMS service providers in the AIMS field, 
and discuss the influence of these major players on the adoption of AIMS in 
recipient governments and their homogeneity. 
 
This study conceptualizes AIMS as a set of socio-technical domains in which the varying 
political and economic interests of stakeholders inevitably collide in the global field of 
aid. In the following two chapters, I investigate the questions how we understand the 
global adoption of AIMS in different contexts. To the best of my knowledge, there is no 
published systematic research of the global adoption of AIMS. 
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5.1. Key Findings: 80 AIMS Cases in 71 Recipient Countries 
 
This section provides an overview of AIMS implementation in recipient countries. I 
review AIMS implementation in terms of economic status of the country, region, and 
time of implementation. Based on the data collected on AIMS adoption in recipient 
countries, this study identified 80 cases of AIMS, either currently being used or 
previously used in 71 countries during the period 1996 to 2015. It is clear that AIMS 
have been widely implemented in recipient countries. The findings provide suggestive 
evidence that AIMS implementations have been driven by the emergence of aid 
effectiveness norms. 
 
The findings are summarized in Table 5-1 by country, year of implementation, name of 
AIMS, implementing government agency, URLs (if they are web-based), language in 
service, and service provider. The full list of AIMS with further information including 
funder, participating development partners, the current status, as well as the sources of 
data, is attached in the Appendix 3.  
 
As previously discussed, in this study, the definition of recipient country follows the 
OECD ODA Recipient List. The cases are classified into six different regions following 
the World Bank’s regional categories, as well as three economy classifications following 
the OECD categories, as below:  
 
 Upper middle-income countries (upper-MIC), Lower middle-income countries 
(lower-MICs), Least developed countries (LDCs) 
 
 Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Middle East & 
North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA), East Asia & Pacific (EAP), Latin 
America & Caribbean (LAC). 
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Table 5-1. AIMS Implementation in Recipient Countries (1996-2015) 
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5.1.1. AIMS by Economic Status 
 
Among the 142 OECD ODA recipients57, 71 countries (50%) have the experience of 
implementing AIMS, as shown in the Table 5-1. However, this percentage increases to 
67% (59 countries among 88) if the upper MICs where the ODA does not contribute to 
a significant portion of the government’s budget are deselected. In upper MICs, AIMS 
are implemented only in 12 countries – Russia (1996), Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
(1990s), South Africa (2004), Botswana, Maldives, Thailand (2005), Lebanon (2006), 
Montenegro (2007), Jordan (2010, 2015), Macedonia (2010), and Iraq (2011). 
Meanwhile, none of the LAC countries with the status of upper-MICs, i.e. emerging 
economies such as Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, as well as Caribbean 
countries, ever installed AIMS. Reasonably, in these countries, aid dependency is low 
and the amount of ODA is relatively small. Likewise, island-countries of the Oceania in 
EAP have never implemented AIMS 58 . Among the 35 OECD ODA recipients 
categorized as lower MICs, 21 countries (60%) have implemented AIMS. As expected, 
the highest percentage (72%) and the majority of AIMS implementation happened in 
LICs with 38 cases in 53 countries. 
 
Nine countries have implemented AIMS twice: Bolivia (2007, 2012), Burundi (2007, 
2012); Georgia (1990s, 2015); Indonesia (2005, 2009); Kyrgyz Republic (1990s, 2012); 
Philippines (2013, 2014); Tajikistan (1990s, 2012); and Ukraine (1990s, 2012).The 
motivations for multiple implementations may vary, but the fact that implementation 
context changes overtime may be one reason, e.g. from PC-based intra-governmental 
purpose to web-based in an Internet era, or for the case of humanitarian aid vs. for the 
management of regular ODA. Also possible disappointments may reflect in the switch 
of providers (e.g., in the case of Bolivia, Burundi, Kyrgyz, Georgia and Indonesia).  
                                                 
57According to the OECD ODA List, 142 countries are listed with these notes. Somaliland, and Palestine 
(West Bank and Gaza) are  not in the List. However, I added them in the low income category according 
to the World Bank. Russia is not currently in the OECD ODA List. However, it was listed as a recipient 
of ‘official aid’, a previous OECD categorisation of aid given to more advanced developing and eastern 
European countries. Six territories registered in the List are not included here, i.e. Cook Islands, 
Montserrat, Niue, Saint Helena, Tokelau, and Wallis and Futuna. Thus, actually there are 146 recipients, 
and 68 among those have AIMS experience 
58 Fiji, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Tonga, Micronesia, Samoa, Kiribati, Vanuatu, and Tuvalu. 
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I found that some AIMS cases have been on and off during the examination period 
between 2015 and 2017. The AIMS, which have been ‘alive’ for a relatively long time, 
include those in Afghanistan, Cambodia (2005), Ethiopia (2005), Indonesia 59 , 
Mozambique (2006), Sri Lanka (2005)60. Of course, the level of use, the actual outcome 
of the systems, and how often, and how many users benefits from the systems, may vary 
in each case. For example, the websites of the Ethiopian Aid Management Platform 
(AMP) is not open to public; Mozambique ODAMoz uses outdated version of bulletin 
board system (BBS). However, the service provider argues, in the interviews, that they 
are still being actively used by government workers. As both AIMS in Ethiopia and 
Mozambique are the early products of the service provider, they may have made 
considerable efforts to these. There may be various reasons for their sustainability. This 
will be discussed in detail in Section 6.3. At the very least it is clear that such systems 
have been able to exist for whatever reasons for more than a decade.  
 
5.1.2. AIMS by Region 
 
Except for the transition economies in the earlier period of AIMS between 1996 and 
1999, the implementation of AIMS occurred in all regions and in countries with differing 
levels of economic development as shown in Table 5-2. AIMS have been evenly diffused 
in all regions. As was expected, the majority of AIMS implementation happened in the 
SSA region.  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA): Findings show that there are 33 AIMS cases in 32 countries, 
which represents 45% of the 71 countries where AIMS have been implemented. The 
majority, 28 out of 33 cases that had AIMS in the SSA region occurred in 27 countries 
that fall under the low-income economy group – Burkina Faso (2008), Burundi (2008, 
2012), Central African Republic (2008), Chad (2014), Comoros (2013), Congo 
Democratic Republic (2008), Ethiopia (2005), Gambia (2015), Guinea Bissau (2011), 
Kenya (2010), Lesotho (2013), Liberia (2007), Madagascar (2009), Malawi (2008), 
Mauritania (2011), Mozambique (2006), Niger (2009), Rwanda (2006), Senegal (2009), 
                                                 
59 The one implemented in 2005 for post-tsunami reconstruction. It has not been being used since the post-
tsunami reconstruction program ended. But, the URL is still accessible.  
 60It was implemented as an AIMS for post-tsunami reconstruction, but later evolved as Integrated 
National Development Information System (INDIS), which manages ODA. 
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Sierra Leone (2008), Somalia (2011), Somaliland (2010), South Sudan (2010), Tanzania 
(2008), Togo (2011), Uganda (2013), and Zambia (2008). The other five countries from 
the SSA region – Botswana (2005), South Africa (2004), Cameroon (2010), Cote 
d’Ivoire (2014), and Nigeria (2010) are from the upper and lower middle-income 
economy groups.  
 
East and Asia Pacific (EAP): With the exception of the island-countries of Oceania, 
which are sovereign states, the majority have used AIMS in the EAP region. Twelve 
cases have been implemented in 10 countries. In particular, seven out of 10 ASEAN 
countries implemented AIMS: Thailand (2005), Indonesia (2005, 2010), Cambodia 
(2005), Vietnam (2005), Laos (2011), Philippines (2013, 2014), and Myanmar (2015), 
while the remaining three are richer countries – Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore.  
 
South Asia (SA): With Bhutan as an exception, all countries have implemented AIMS 
in this region: Afghanistan (2002), Maldives (2005), Sri Lanka (2005), Pakistan (2006), 
India (2007), Bangladesh (2014), and Nepal (2010), all countries have the experience of 
AIMS in this region.  
 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA): The findings show that 12 countries in the region have 
implemented AIMS: Armenia (1990s), Georgia (1990s and 2015), Kazakhstan (1990s), 
Kosovo (2010), Kyrgyz (1990s and 2012), Macedonia (2010), Moldova (2014), 
Montenegro (2007), Russia (1996), Tajikistan (1990s and 2012), Turkmenistan (1990s), 
and Ukraine (1990s and 2012). Following SSA with the largest number of AIMS 
implemented, the ECA region had 16 cases from 12 countries. However, the majority of 
AIMS in these transition economies were implemented in late 1990s.  
 
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC): With only five out of 24 countries implementing 
AIMS in this region, the numeric coverage (21%) looks relatively low. However, this 
may be because the LAC region includes many Caribbean island-countries and emerging 
countries where ODA does not contribute to their government budgets as discussed 
above. Bolivia (2007, 2012), Guatemala (2009), Haiti (2012), Honduras (2013), 
Nicaragua (2008) have implemented AIMS.  
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Middle East and North Africa (MENA): six cases of AIMS have been implemented in 
this region, i.e. Iraq (2011), Jordan (2010 and 2015), Lebanon (2006), Palestine (2010), 
and Yemen (2012).  
 
In transition economies in Eastern Europe and tsunami-affected countries in Southeast 
Asia and South Asia, there was relatively visible mimetic isomorphism in the AIMS 
implementation. I will discuss in more detail in Section 6.2, where I present a historical 
review of AIMS implementation. 
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Table 5-2. AIMS Implementation by Region, Year and Economy 
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5.1.3. AIMS by Time Implemented 
 
I highlight the role of global aid norms, governance, and agenda on AIMS 
implementation. Early AIMS adoption occurred clearly in the transition economies. At 
least eight CIS countries implemented AIMS between 1996 and 2000, as shown in 
Figure 5-1. In the early 2000s, only two countries, Afghanistan in 2002 and South Africa 
in 2004, started using AIMS. As shown in Figure 5-1 below, it is apparent that the 
implementation of many AIMS began after 2005 when the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (PD) was signed by 138 countries and 28 international organizations at 
the second OECD High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF). In 2005 and 2006, 12 
countries implemented such systems. The PD became a tipping point of norm cascade 
as well as diffusion of AIMS, which I will discuss in details in Section 6.2.2.  
 
In fact, another contingency that influenced the spread of AIMS was the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami that happened in December in 2004, which will be investigated in more detail 
in Section 6.2.2. The Tsunami-affected countries, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Indonesia, and 
Thailand implemented AIMS for the purpose of managing humanitarian assistance. It 
is, however, clear that the series of the HLFs on Aid Effectiveness, and the emergence 
of aid effectiveness norms in the global field of aid, served as an important driving force 
to boost the number of countries using AIMS. Right after the Accra Action Plan in 2008, 
there was another peak in diffusion with the establishment of AIMS in 10 countries. 
Another five countries joined in 2009, while 10 countries adopted such systems in 2010. 
 
The comparison between AIMS implementation and the states’ participation in the PD 
and the PD Surveys on three occasions is summarized in Table 5-3. Although the 
purpose of comparison involves conceptual inference rather than statistical 
generalizability, the findings provide implications for further analysis, as indicated in 
the following paragraphs. 
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Figure 5-1. AIMS Implementation and the Timeline of the Global Aid Agenda 
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The findings show that a country that participated in the PD or the Surveys at least once 
is more likely to implement AIMS. Of the 71 recipient countries, 63 participated in the 
PD or the Surveys. In addition, 47 countries that never participated in the PD and the 
three PD Surveys did not have AIMS61. This is evidence of the influence the non-
participatory behaviour in the PD institutions exerted on the non-implementation of 
AIMS.  
 
The countries which implemented AIMS without participating in the Surveys were 
Maldives (2005), Sri Lanka (2005), Thailand (2005), Lebanon (2006), India (2007), 
Montenegro (2007), Macedonia (2010), Somaliland (2010), Iraq (2011), Somalia 
(2011), Myanmar (2015), as well as the early CIS countries. However, the early AIMS 
implementation in the CIS countries happened in the late 1990s, prior to the PD, while 
Maldives, Sri Lanka, Thailand, which will be further discussed on institutional 
isomorphism of AIMS adoption, in the next analysis chapter, are Tsunami-affected 
countries.  
 
The other seven countries, except for India, are post-conflict or fragile countries with 
limited availability and capacity to actively participate in the global aid governance. The 
adoption of AIMS in such countries can be understood as an outcome of a different 
momentum. Thus, except for these countries, it is clear that all 53 countries with AIMS 
participated in the PD and PD surveys at least once.62 
                                                 
61 Thirty countries have not endorsed the PD and never participated in any of the surveys, i.e. Algeria, 
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Belize, Bhutan, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Grenada, Iran, Kiribati, North Korea, Libya, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, 
Nauru, Palau, St. Lucia, Seychelles, Suriname, Tuvalu, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. 
16 countries only joined the PD but never participated in any of the surveys, i.e. Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, 
China, Congo, Djibouti, Guinea, Guyana, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Serbia, Syria, Tunisia, 
and Turkey. Additionally, St. Vincent and the Grenadines only joined the 2011 PD Survey without 
endorsing the PD. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Macedonia, Montenegro, Myanmar, Somalia, 
Somaliland, and Turkmenistan have not even endorsed the PD, but have implemented AIMS. 
62 There are still nine countries, which endorsed the PD and participated in all three PD Surveys but did 
not implement AIMS: Albania, Benin, Cape Verde, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Mongolia, 
and Peru.  
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Table 5-3. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and AIMS Implementation 
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5.2. Similarities between AIMS 
 
Based on the findings from the review of documents including AIMS project documents, 
user manuals, administrative guides, business process documents as well as the AIMS 
websites, apparently, there are a high degree of similarity in the AIMS, in terms of 
technical functionalities, website, user manual, the process of implementation, vision 
and purpose. The commonalities of AIMS are categorized in three features, first the 
vision, rhetoric, and norms that AIMS support; secondly the functionalities of AIMS, 
and thirdly target users. 
 
5.2.1. Vision, Rationality and Norms that AIMS inscribe 
 
As discussed in Section 3.3.3, no clear definition of AIMS exists in academic research. 
Building on a commonly agreed definition of AIMS found in the UNDP (2010:1), in 
Chapter 3, I define AIMS as  
 
Socio-technical systems implemented in a recipient country in order to share and 
process aid information that would enable the government to manage aid effectively as 
well as development partners better coordinate.  
 
The PD may have been the most significant momentum for the global adoption of AIMS. 
Aid effectiveness became the ‘super-norm’, in the notion of Finnemore & Sikkink, 
(1998), which embraces subordinate concepts such as aid transparency, coordination, 
and harmonization. The PD and aid effectiveness are referenced in most AIMS 
documents and AIMS websites published in between 2005 and 2011, when the fourth 
HLF on Aid Effectiveness was held in Busan, Korea. For example, the Cambodian 
AIMS explicitly discusses the PD principles in the section under ‘How does the ODA 
Database support the Aid Effectiveness Agenda?’: 
 
Cambodia: The National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) provides the 
overarching framework for implementing development activities and for programming 
domestic and external resources in Cambodia. In this context, and noting the 
obligations of both Government and development partners to the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Royal Government has developed its own ODA 
Database to promote effective aid management.  
(Cambodia ODA Database http://odacambodia.com,  
accessed on 7 July 2017, emphasis added)   
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Some of the AIMS-related documents published in 2010 also explain the vision of the 
PD:  
 
Mozambique: Based in the Ministry of Planning and Development, the electronic 
database on ODA to Mozambique (ODAmoz) was established in response to the 
Government’s need for data and for greater alignment of partners with national 
priorities in line with the Paris Declaration. ODAmoz enables tracking of development 
partners' projects and programs: location, funding sources, implementing 
partner/agency, covering more than 90 per cent of ODA in Mozambique.  
(United Nations Mozambique Newsletter, Issue 29, May 2010, emphasis added)  
 
Tajikistan: AIMS is fully compliant with the principles of partnership declared in the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and by the Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Co-operation. In summary, AIMS: - is a government tool that promotes 
coordinated efforts aimed at the country's development (Ownership); - allows 
analyzing and reporting on aid in accordance with national policies and priorities 
(Alignment); - ensures provision of information on joint activities, thereby promoting 
harmonized, transparent and efficient development activities (Harmonization);  enables 
obtaining information on the results of development work, thereby promoting effective 
decision making (Results-Based); - promotes increased accountability and transparency 
in the use of resources for development (Mutual Accountability). 
(State Committee on Investments and State Property Management of  
the Republic of Tajikistan, Foreign Aid Report (2014:15)63, emphasis added)  
 
AIMS are often designed to track progress towards national development goals and pre-
existing targets set by the global development agenda such as Millennium Development 
Goals (2000), Aid Effectiveness (2005), and Sustainable Development Goals (2015). In 
order to evaluate aid activities and its effectiveness, it is considered a core component 
that the system enables monitoring of pre-defined progress by using indicators and 
measurements.  
 
It is expected that AIMS track key aid effectiveness indicators deriving from a recipient 
government’s national development agenda as well as the global aid evaluation 
framework, led by rule-making organizations, such as the PD Surveys in the global field 
of aid. This will be discussed in more detail in the following Section 5.2.   
 
                                                 
63 http://amcu.gki.tj/eng/images/FAR-2014/3.aid_information_management_system_en.pdf 
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In addition to efforts in norm localization of aid effectiveness and commitment to the 
PD, references to internalized aid governance appeared in some cases. For example, the 
Indonesian AIMS referred to the Jakarta Commitment, which was established in 2009, 
as the domestic aid governance in its explanatory section, instead of direct quotes from 
the PD: 
 
Indonesia: AIMS is developed to support development partners and Government of 
Indonesia agencies to accelerate management of external assistances in effective and 
efficient way, through the preparation of a single system for implementation and 
monitoring and evaluation of external assistances. The Government and development 
partners will jointly carryout regular reviews on progress in implementing the 
commitments on aid for development effectiveness and improve development 
outcomes through an objective country level mechanism. AIMS is described in the 
Jakarta Commitment as Central information system used by government and 
development partners.  
(AIMS Indonesia website archived on 26 September 2011, emphasis added) 
 
In addition to super-norms of aid effectiveness, the ideas envisioned in the PD are often 
discussed in the official documents of AIMS and their websites. Three main themes that 
emerge from most cases of AIMS include better transparency, enhanced coordination 
among stakeholders for decision making, and the recipient government’s ownership of 
aid management. As demonstrated in the examples below, these rationales and 
expectations frequently appear in a similar way in different cases, while well reflecting 
the PD principles. These themes have normative positions, in which super-norms of aid 
effectiveness structures sets of these inter-related norms. These themes, transparency, 
coordination, and ownership are used for the grand prescriptive goal, aid effectiveness.  
 
Theme 1 -Transparency: Transparency has been considered to be a prerequisite for aid 
effectiveness (Christensen et al. 2011; Publish What You Fund 2016). It is often 
discussed in AIMS implementation:   
 
Botswana: The Botswana Development Assistance Management Information System 
(BODAMIS) is an online database that tracks the funding of all development assistance 
in Botswana since 2005 as well as planned disbursements. It has been developed by the 
Government of Botswana’s Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) 
with funding from the European Union. Its aim is to provide a global overview and 
transparent information on external aid received by Botswana to the public at large. 
(BODAMIS http://bodamis.gov.bw, pages archived on 18 February 2015,  
emphasis added) 
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A similar notion of transparency is discussed in the Official Development Assistance 
section of the Nicaragua Database (ODAnic):  
 
Nicaragua: The main purpose of ODAnic is to provide donors in Nicaragua with the 
tools and training to fulfill their reporting obligations under the Paris Declaration and 
Accra Agenda for Action, following international standards and in the spirit of 
transparency and accountability. At the same time, ODAnic also provides the 
Government, donors, civil society and the public a snapshot of donors’ strategies, 
projects and financial commitments. 
(ODA Nicaragua Database http://nic.odadata.eu, accessed on 17 December 2014, 
emphasis added) 
 
In Myanmar’s Mohinga webpage, their expectations on open access are elaborated in 
Q&A format as follows:  
 
Myanmar: Making aid transparent helps to ensure aid goes where it is most needed. By 
ensuring open access to aid information a wider group of stakeholders are able to 
clearly see who is doing what and where. Access to better quality aid information also 
supports the equitable allocation of resources, both sectorally and geographically, 
ensuring that all Myanmar people can benefit (…) Aid transparency isn't just about 
numbers. Results matter too. Open access to aid information means that the people of 
Myanmar are better able to see the impact that aid activities have in their communities. 
This also helps other countries learn what may work, or not work, in their country.  
(https://mohinga.info/en, accessed on 7 July 2017, emphasis added)  
 
Theme 2 - Coordination for decision making: As discussed in Section 2.3.3, aid 
coordination among stakeholders has been discussed as the fundamental for better aid 
targeting that lead to aid effectiveness (Nunnenkamp et al. 2013; Nunnenkamp & Thiele 
2010). In this thesis, aid coordination is conceptualized at the three different levels: 
donor coordination, donor-government coordination, and intra-governmental 
coordination (McCormick et al. 2007). Among the five PD Principles, the notions of 
‘alignment’ (donor-government coordination), ‘harmonization’ (donor coordination), 
and ‘mutual accountability’ are well represented in the theme of coordination. As the 
examples below show, AIMS are expected to enhance these three levels of coordination 
by sharing aid information and minimizing overlaps among stakeholders, thus finally 
resulting in better aid allocation:   
 
Botswana: BODAMIS will be used by the Botswana Development Partner Forum to 
enable coordination and avoid duplication of development partners’ assistance as well 
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as to enable the Government of Botswana to better plan resource allocation using 
information on the ongoing and planned interventions of its development partners (...).  
(BODAMIS http://bodamis.gov.bw, pages archived on 18 February 2015,  
emphasis added) 
 
Bangladesh: The AIMS is your one-stop-shop for all information related to foreign 
assistance in Bangladesh. AIMS records and processes information provided by donors 
on development activities and related aid flows in the country (…) This strengthen 
accountability, facilitate coordination and allow for more efficient aid management.  
(Bangladesh AIMS http://aims.erd.gov.bd, accessed on 7 July 2017, emphasis added) 
 
Theme 3 - Ownership in aid management: The strengthening of recipient governments’ 
ownership through the use of AIMS is part of the repetitive rhetoric of AIMS 
implementation. As may be seen from the Mozambique case below, ostensibly, systems 
providers also recognized ownership as a key issue:  
 
Mozambique: “In light of the need to guarantee Government of Mozambique 
ownership and to ensure a proper administrative set up of the project, management of 
ODAmoz was handed over to the designated directorate in the Ministry of Planning 
and Development (MPD) in September 2006 and ODAmoz Management Committee 
installed in late 2006, composed of Donor and GoM representatives.”  
(ODAmozhttp://www.odamoz.org.mz, accessed on 7 July, 2017) 
 
As part of the upgraded system, the Government of Mozambique is now managing and 
administering ODAmoz. In March 2011, Development Gateway staff travelled to 
Mozambique to install the system on government servers and train the government’s 
IT focal points. These final steps solidify government ownership of the system, 
ensuring its sustainability.  
(Development Gateway, ‘Aid information management in Mozambique:  
a success story’64, clarification added)  
 
Similarly, another major service provider Synergy International argued that national 
ownership was paramount to the success of AIMS.  
 
Rwanda: We aim to continue working closely with the Government of Rwanda to 
support its DAD Team, promote the participation of other government institutions, and 
improve data collection processes and the quality of information to enhance the 
Government’s decision-making capabilities.  
(Synergy International, Government of Rwanda:  
Expanding the DAD for Better Decision Making, 24 December, 2010)65 
                                                 
64 http://www.developmentgateway.org/blog/aid-information-management-mozambique-success-story 
65 Source: https://www.synisys.com/the-government-of-rwanda-expanding-the-dad-for-better-decision-
making/ 
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5.2.2. Functionalities of AIMS 
 
These shared norms and similarities in vision inscribed in AIMS often translate into the 
homogenous design and functionalities of technologies (Currie 2012). These 
functionalities support various purposes, including, aid effectiveness norms and the 
achievement of legitimacy in the global field of aid.   
 
Based on the commonly discussed technical rationality of AIMS, the following features 
and functionalities are often emphasized when designing an AIMS that is supposed to 
effectively support i) aid transparency, ii) coordination and decision making, and iii) 
government’s aid management. 
 
Openness for Transparency: In principle, the use of a web-based system is strongly 
encouraged, because it is seen as a way to allow all relevant actors to access aid 
information providing for greater transparency. The UNDP (2006) recommends that the 
“system should be web-based and easy to use” and asserts:   
 
It is recommendable to use a system that is web-based, because this allows everybody 
to access the information, provides for greater transparency and accountability and 
therefore fosters the acceptance and sustainability of an AIMS. However, the 
usefulness of a web-enabled system obviously depends on the existing national IT 
infrastructure and capabilities. Ideally, the set-up of an information management 
system should be part of a holistic IT strategy to establish/upgrade the IT infrastructure 
within a certain ministry or the government as a whole.  
(Nadoll, 2006:4, emphasis added)66 
 
A web-based system to improve transparency was also specifically designed for the 
Electronic Project Monitoring Information System (e-ProMIS) in Kenya, as the World 
Bank reported:67 
 
Kenya: (…) the web-enabled system was designed to improve the efficiency and 
transparency of Kenya’s national development planning, as well as improve the 
coordination of reconstruction activities nationally. It is also a powerful tool for 
tracking and analysing aid flows, from donors to the various implementing agencies 
within government. The system serves as the main project database and M&E reporting 
                                                 
66 “Lessons learnt from establishing aid information management systems to support nationally-led aid 
coordination”, authored by Jorg Nadoll at UNDP Regional Centre in Bangkok. 
67World Bank (2016) The State and Impact of Open Aid Initiatives in Kenya: A Case Study, p.4. 
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system for Government of Kenya, donor, and NGO communities as it ensures effective 
public access to development data.  
(e-ProMIS Kenya, http://e-promis.treasury.go.ke) 
 
Based on the findings, most AIMS are web‐based systems. However, the usefulness of 
a web-based AIMS depends upon the ICT infrastructure and information capabilities in 
the country. The guidelines of UNDP (2008) suggested that the ICT infrastructure and 
information capabilities be assessed before developing and implementing a system.  In 
addition, the usefulness of AIMS relies on donors entering data on their development 
activities. Therefore, it is important to ensure institutional mechanisms to enable timely 
and accurate data entry.   
 
Analytical and Evaluation tool for Coordination: UNDP (2006) strongly recommends 
a useful analytical tool and reporting module in AIMS. One of the important rationales 
for collecting information is the capacity for analysis that will enhance policy decision 
making. Information processing and analytical presentation are fundamental 
components in this respect. The system is supposed to “allow cutting and dicing the data 
in the most flexible way” (UNDP 2006:6). 
 
It is further recommended that the system has a reporting tool that allows for flexible 
connection of all datasets and their presentation in user-friendly graphs, charts, and 
tables. As can be seen from the examples below, GIS, open data, visualization tools such 
as graphs and charts, as well as publishing report tools have been featured in AIMS. In 
India, the organized lists, reports, charts, and maps are considered to be the result of 
CDSS as a powerful tool:  
 
India: The CDSS India is a powerful tool to view project data organized into lists, 
reports, charts, and maps, present the project data in the form of list, chart and map 
reports, memorize/save the reports, print them, and export them into various formats. 
(…) The CDSS India is designed to provide quick access to the project and aid data 
remotely via Internet. Once you have accessed the application, you can view the project 
data stored in the database, add new projects, edit existing ones, etc.  
(India's Coordination & Decision Support System (CDSS) –  
Analytics User Manual Version 2.1: p.4) 
 
A reporting tool is often considered, however there is lack of evidence AIMS improves 
accountability, as technology has no innate accountability properties (Fox 2007) 
163 
Mozambique: After four years of existence, it was necessary to upgrade the technical 
basis from the system designated 1.0 to a more sophisticated and user-friendly model 
in order to meet the increasing and more complex needs of the Government and its 
development partners. Its "Design your own report" function makes it easy to search 
for specific information and offers tables and geographic maps for analysis. The new 
ODAmoz 2.0 is currently in a testing phase and will be officially launched next year.  
(United Nations Mozambique Newsletter, Issue 29, May 2010, emphasis added) 
 
In particular, a GIS-based mapping platform is often recommended. All AIMS after 
2000s have a mapping tool to some degree. The underlying assumption of AIMS is that 
mapping facilitates the tracking of the sub-national project level information on aid 
activities, disbursements, and evaluation, as well as results and progress towards the 
achievement of goals by geographical location. When designing an AIMS, the GIS are 
considered to be an indispensable tool for enhanced coordination and better aid 
targeting: 
 
Nepal: Using geocoded AMP data on-budget projects, users can easily analyze trends 
like DP division of labor and regional allocation. Maps can be overlaid with 
socioeconomic indicators such as poverty and all data can be filtered by AMP data 
fields. Users can conduct sector-specific analysis to determine where future activities 
should be targeted to address gaps in current funding. Local geocoded data can also 
help government and donors to track project progress and to engage citizens and others 
to monitor program results.  
(Nepal Aid Management Platform - Data Management Guidance Note, 2015, p.26) 
 
Compatibility for Ownership: It is recommended that AIMS provide an overview of 
grants and loans, preferably, are linked to the government’s system used to manage the 
national budget (UNDP 2006). Ideally, the set-up of AIMS should be part of a holistic 
ICT strategy to strengthen the capacity of the recipient government as a whole. In the 
longer run in a country which has a domestic IS in the public sector, the systems such as 
public expenditure systems and resource management systems, should be developed to 
allow tracking aid activities and analysis of financial data, including planned budget, 
commitments, and disbursements:  
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Tanzania: The Aid Management Platform (AMP) is a web based application tool 
designed to enable better management and coordination of development assistance in 
Tanzania. It is a web-based database that can be used by both the Government and 
Development Partners (DPs) in managing external resources, including planning, 
tracking and reporting of development assistance flows. The AMP is a central 
instrument in managing development assistance according to national priorities and 
offers a platform for measuring results in line with the MKUKUTA/MKUZA II 68 
including MDG performance. As such, the AMP is customized Tanzania’s 
development priorities while also tracking progress towards international aid and 
development effectiveness principles.  
(Tanzanian Ministry of Finance, Aid Management Platform System Disbursement 
Flash Report, 2012, p.2, emphasis added) 
 
In the assumption that AIMS implementation is purely driven by the quest for 
managerial efficiency, it is a key motivation that most recipient governments have 
difficulties maintaining detailed aid information on disbursements and budget 
allocations. A common way of managing aid flow without AIMS is by using Excel 
Spreadsheets. However, even after AIMS implementation, Excel spreadsheets are still 
used in many cases as an initial step of managing aid information. OECD (2006) has 
found that those governments who build capacity and ownership in aid data reporting in 
Excel are also those which more effectively use AIMS. On the contrary, those which 
never experienced the use of Excel for aid data reporting are more likely to face 
challenges in taking ownership of AIMS. Thus, the recipient government’s ownership 
and capacity are often discussed in AIMS implementation. More importantly, it is 
recommended that the government plans workflow, report process in Excel, and then 
migrate the information to AIMS. 
 
5.2.3. Target Users 
 
UNDP (2010:1) describes target users as follows:  
 
The primary users of AIMS are government staff in central ministries who are 
responsible for coordinating and reporting aid, and for planning aid in relation to the 
national budget and national planes. The secondary users are those responsible for 
reporting the data required, including development partners.  
 
                                                 
68 Kiswahili acronym MKUKUTA for the five-year term National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of 
Poverty. MKUZA is the Poverty Reduction Strategy for Zanzibar. 
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In most cases, however, both government staffs and aid reporting experts in development 
partners are equally important primary target users. First, key government staffs are 
responsible for aid management and planning national budgets or national development 
plans. The AIMS implementing ministry plays a key role in managing AIMS, while 
other line ministries normally use the AIMS for intra-governmental aid coordination. 
Second, aid experts in donor agencies are responsible for the input of aid information 
into the AIMS, as well as reporting data to their countries and the OECD, in the case of 
an OECD DAC country.  
 
Secondary users are expected to be decision-makers and the aid experts of all 
development partners. In many cases, the donor aid agencies and the MDAs appoint a 
donor focal point usually the World Bank or UNDP, who is supposed to facilitate the 
use of AIMS and the coordination for information providing.  
 
Mozambique: (…) focal points from all UN agencies resident in Mozambique and a 
growing number of non-resident agencies provide input to ODAmoz on all their 
projects and programmes. The UN focal point in the Resident Coordinator's Office sits 
in the Management Committee and coordinates development partners.  
(ODAmoz http://www.odamoz.org.mz, accessed on 7 July, 2017, emphasis added) 
 
In theory, all development partners can access detailed aid information undertaken by 
all participating agencies at the sub-national level, as well as sector level, and so achieve 
better coordination to minimize overlaps in aid activities (OECD & UNDP 2006). 
However, the actual outcomes and sustainability of the systems may vary.  
 
Lastly, it is expected that the public users would benefit from AIMS, and in particular 
CSTs, media and academia may have access to the system for conducting research 
(OECD & UNDP 2006; Weaver et al. 2014). This rhetoric of ‘citizen participation’ in 
aid mechanisms via AIMS appears in the post-conflict states of Timor-Leste and 
Somaliland:  
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Timor-Leste: Aid Transparency Portal is a publicly-accessible internet tool which is 
part of the Government of Timor-Leste’s transparency initiative (…) Aid Transparency 
Portal and system behind it has been highly customised to meet the needs of Timor-
Leste and its development partners. The portal is accessible to all members of the 
public, groups and development partners.  
(Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance, Aid Transparency Portal,  
assessed on 1 July, 2017)69 
 
Somaliland: To ensure more flexibility and to provide access to a wider range of users, 
the system is designed in such a way that it allows public users to enter it without 
registration. Public users wishing to view data should click on the Enter button in the 
Enter as a Public User section on the login screen. They will be directed to the List 
module of the application.  
(Synergy International Systems, DAD Somaliland Analytics Quick Reference Guide, 
2012, p.1, emphasis added)70 
 
Timor Leste’s AIMS, named as Aid Transparency Portal, provides the option of the local 
language Tetum, in addition to English. On the other hand, the DAD Somaliland only 
provides service in English based on the screenshots posted in the user manual; 
Somaliland uses three official languages (English, Arabic, and Somali).     
 
Openness to Whom? As discussed, transparency and openness are key concepts of 
AIMS. However, some important questions arise here: What is meant by ‘openness’? 
Openness to whom? Access to information on the web-based platform by the public 
users is often emphasized as a key aspect in AIMS documents. However, only a few 
AIMS are serviced in the local language as shown in Table 5-1. Illiteracy is often 
discussed as an impediment to participating in social activities and human development. 
In developing countries, many of those who can read only know the official language of 
a country. In particular, the dominance of an Americanised version of English on the 
Internet, which has been “compressed to exclude the complexities of political discourse 
and localized expression” has been criticized in ICTD research (Murphy, 2006:1065). 
Although many ICTD researchers have pointed out the dominance of English in web 
content, the lack of local language and training are significant barriers (Urquhart et al. 
2008), and the progress seems very low. Among 80 cases, there were only 23 AIMS that 
                                                 
69 Source: https://www.mof.gov.tl/aid-effectiveness/aid-transparency-portal/?lang=en 
70 Source: http://www.somalilandlaw.com/DAD_SOMALILAND_Analytics_UserManual.pdf 
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clearly offer services in local languages, as summarized in Table 5-1.71 Warschauer 
(2003) suggests a literacy approach to the digital divide with four distinct concepts: 
computer literacy, information literacy, computer-mediated communication literacy and 
multimedia literacy. A lack of English proficiency and ‘computer-mediated 
communication literacy’ prevent users from continuous use of AIMS, though local 
AIMS users might have all other three types of literacy.72 Some countries specifically 
include this criticism in an evaluation report, for example:  
 
Thailand: The Memorandum of Understanding stipulates that the system should be 
bilingual and TICA is to provide an online Thai translation, but this has yet to happen.  
(Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, Impact of the tsunami response on local and national 
capacities: Thailand – Country Report, 2006, pp. 32-3373) 
 
5.3. AIMS Providers 
 
One of the crucial reasons for the significant homogeneities in the design and 
functionality of AIMS is the dominance of two AIMS providers in the global market. 
There are two major IS vendors in recipient countries across all regions: Synergy 
International (Synergy), and Development Gateway (DG). When combined, they have 
serviced 85% of the 80AIMS cases worldwide.74 Only four AIMS had service providers 
that were neither of the two: Botswana (Equinoccio Ltd.), Georgia (Financial Analysis 
Service Ltd.), Myanmar (Catalpa International Ltd.), and Bangladesh (Techno Vista 
Ltd.). In addition, eight cases of the AIMS were developed by local IT contracted by the 
government or donor agencies, i.e. Bolivia (2), Cambodia, Indonesia (2)75, Jordan (1) 
and (2), Palestine, Philippines (2), and South Africa. There has been no overlap of AIMS 
provider identified, i.e. one country simultaneously has more than two AIMS developed 
                                                 
71 Bilingual AIMS cases includes: Afghanistan (EN, PRS); Burkina Faso (EN, FR); Burundi 2 (EN, FR); 
Cameroon (EN, FR); Central African Republic (EN, FR); Cotê d'Ivoire(EN, FR); Georgia 2 (EN, KA); 
Haiti (EN, FR); Honduras (EN, ES); Iraq (EN, AR); Jordan 2 (EN, AR); Kosovo (EN, SQ, HBS); Kyrgyz 
2 (EN, RU); Macedonia (EN, MK); Moldova (EN, RO); Mozambique (EN, PT); Myanmar (EN, MY); 
Nicaragua (EN, ES); Senegal (EN, FR); Tajikistan 2 (EN, RU, TG); Timor-Leste (EN, TET); Ukraine 
(EN, UK); Vietnam (EN, VI). 
72 Meanwhile, these AIMS provide only local language and no English: Bolivia 1, 2 (ES), Chad (FR, 
TET), Guatemala (ES), Madagascar (FR), Mauritania (FR, AR), and Niger (FR).  
73 PDF downloaded from http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/capacities-thailand.pdf, retrieved on 2 June 
2016. 
74 Synergy International Inc. in 39, and Development Gateway in 29 AIMS cases. 
75 The second experience in Indonesia which is the technological object in this study. 
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by different service providers, so that different service providers are working together. 
Because of the nature of AIMS as a national single window information systems for aid 
management, there may be high competition between providers. 
 
Synergy International Systems (Synergy), established in 1997, was the first comer in 
the AIMS market. Its founder, Ashot Hovanesian, worked with the G7, which led to the 
creation of a database for tracking international assistance to Russia(Synergy 
International Systems 2004). This very first AIMS was branded the Donor Assistance 
Database, which in late 1990s was also implemented in several former Soviet Union 
countries. In 2005, the flagship system was re-branded as the Development Assistant 
Database (DAD). Synergy has maintained a relatively close relationship with the UNDP:  
 
In July 2005, Synergy International Systems signed a contract with the UN 
Development Program (UNDP) to make the DAD the ‘official’ tool for donor 
coordination, by establishing that a country office that needs the DAD software need 
not go through a bidding process.  
(Kishinchand, 2007:398) 
 
Following the humanitarian aid flowing to countries affected by the Tsunami that swept 
across the Indian Ocean in late 2004, Synergy provided AIMS for Maldives, Sri Lanka 
Thailand, and Indonesia. This will be further discussed in Section 6.2. Based on the 
findings of AIMS implementation, Synergy has been present in all six regions, servicing 
39 cases in total. The distribution of their service is as follows: SSA – 13 cases, EAP – 
6, SA – 5, LAC – 1, ECA – 11 (including CIS countries), and MENA – 3. 
 
Development Gateway (DG): was established in 1999 “as a vision of World Bank 
President James D. Wolfensohn to promote sustainable growth and poverty reduction 
through the use of ICT” (Independent Evaluation Group, 2007:xi). It was transitioned 
from a Bank-owned initiative to an independent organization in 2002. The first 
standardized aid reporting systems called, Accessible Information on Development 
Activities was developed. Subsequently, the main product, Aid Management Platform 
(AMP), was introduced in the market in 2005, alongside with the Paris Declaration. It 
has provided services to 29 cases in five regions (SSA, EAP, SA, LAC, and ECA), 
except for MENA. Out of the 29 countries, 18 were from the SSA region, 2 from EAP, 
1 from SA, 4 from LAC, and 4 from EAC. In their early years, around 2005, DG actually 
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had another brand ‘ODAdata’ that was used in Mozambique and Nicaragua. However, 
the two systems are not significantly different from AMP. 
 
AIMS  Development Assistance 
Database (DAD) 
Aid Management Platform 
(AMP) 
Provider  Synergy International Systems, 
Ltd.  
Development Gateway 
Major network UNDP  The World Bank Group, Aiddata 
Headquarters Washington DC, Development 
& Global Learning Center in 
Yerevan, Armenia 
Washington DC 
First development Russia (1996)  Ethiopia (2005) 
Countries 
implemented 
 
37 countries including  
8 former Soviet Union central 
Asian countries in 1990s.  
29 countries (no collaboration 
with MENA countries)  
Software, 
operating system, 
and hosting 
environment76 
Synergy IDM Knowledge 
Builder (closed source code) MS 
SQL hosted on MS Server 
Java open source‐based 
application. But source code not 
released. 
 
Table 5-4. Comparison of Two Major AIMS Providers 
 
AIMS developed by other foreign ICT vendors include:  
 
 Botswana Development Assistance Management Information Systems 
(BODAMIS) in Botswana (2005) by Equinoccio (http://www.equinoccio.eu/en), 
 Mohinga – Aid Transparency Portal in Myanmar (2015) by Catalpa International 
(https://catalpa.io) 
 
AIMS developed by local IT vendors or consultants are: 
 
 Aid Information Management Systems in Bangladesh (2014) by Techno Vista, 
ICT company based in Dhaka  (http://www.technovista.com.bd), 
 E-Aid Information Management System (e-AIMS) in Georgia (2015) by 
Financial Analytical System, public enterprise based in Tbilisi, which belongs to 
Ministry of Finance (http://www.fas.ge/en),  
 Local IT consultants in Bolivia (2012), Cambodia (2005), Indonesia (2009), 
Jordan (2010 and 2015), Palestine (2010), Philippines (2013), and South Africa 
(2004).  
                                                 
76 Synergy International Systems (2009) 
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5.4. Summary 
 
This section confirmed the global proliferation of AIMS in recipient countries in the last 
two decades. This has been often understood by rational choice institutionalism, which 
AIMS may be viewed as an innovative tool for solving collective action and multiple 
principal-agent problems in aid management. Managerial rationality is often considered 
to be a key motivation for implementing an AIMS, since a recipient government is given 
considerable amounts of aid from various stakeholders and requires the capacity for 
managing aid in more efficient way. Reports published by MDAs often describe that a 
recipient government identified technical, managerial and functional challenges and 
showed interest in expanding this capacity to better manage aid (OECD & UNDP 2006). 
 
However, considering the findings presented in this section, particularly, the similarity 
between AIMS, and the state’s decision to implement AIMS after the institutionalization 
of international aid governance, may also be interpreted as the result of institutional 
pressure from the global field of aid on local government. Also, as discussed in Chapter 
2, there is a lack of understanding of the role of aid governance in information systems 
adoption. Building on the findings presented in this section, in the subsequent chapter, I 
will trace how aid effectiveness norms emerge in the global field of aid, and explain the 
diffusion and evolution of AIMS. 
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Chapter 6.  The Global Diffusion and the Evolution of AIMS 
 
In the previous Chapter 5, I provide an overview of 80 cases of AIMS in 71 recipient 
countries, which well confirms the proliferation of AIMS and their apparent 
homogeneity. This chapter investigates how we can understand this global diffusion of 
AIMS. 
 
This chapter serves two main purposes. First, it provides a historical overview of AIMS 
in the global field of aid and an institutional account explaining the global adoption of 
AIMS. Second, it highlights the complexity of AIMS and their frequent sustainability 
failure which calls for an in-depth study to understand why AIMS fail. This chapter is 
organized as follows:  
 
 First, as discussed in Chapter 3, the importance of understanding global aid 
institutions in studying AIMS in a recipient country are highlighted. In this 
context, the key actors, norms and governance in the global field of aid is 
considered. In particular, based on Finnemore & Sikkink (1998)’s norm 
dynamic, I trace the emergence and institutionalisation of aid effectiveness 
norms.  
 
 Second, I analyse the process of the global diffusion of AIMS, as well as how 
AIMS evolved to reproduce norms, rules, and institutional structures of the 
global aid governance. Having investigated isomorphism, I examine how their 
inscribed visions have changed over time alongside the emergence of global aid 
architecture by identifying three stages: PC-based AIMS 1.0, web-based AIMS 
2.0, and open data based AIMS 3.0. 
 
 In spite of the global popularity of AIMS and significant investments made in 
such systems, the study empirically shows that, in many instances, the majority 
of AIMS have not achieved the expected outcomes that aid effectiveness norms 
anticipate. Also 36 cases did not achieve sustainability and have shut down 
(45%). Expanding on the concept of ‘sustainability failure’ (Heeks & Kenny, 
2002), the fourth section 6.4 Summary emphasizes the complexity of 
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understanding AIMS and calls for an in-depth study to understand the hidden 
dynamics in AIMS failure to unpack the puzzle of Why do AIMS fail in 
sustainability.  
 
6.1. Global Field of Aid: Institutional Power and Norm Dynamics 
 
AIMS, as well as its inscribed vision, cannot be adequately studied without taking into 
account the complex structure of global aid governance and the historical evolution of 
aid effectiveness norms. Since the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1948, the field of aid 
has been gradually established with “key suppliers, regulatory agencies, and other 
organizations that produce similar services and products” (Di Maggio & Powell 1991). 
Conceptualizing AIMS as a set of socio-technical domains in the global field of aid, this 
section begins with brief accounts of key actors, aid governance and its institutional 
power in the field. Then, it traces how ‘aid effectiveness’ norms have emerged and 
matured to support a particular way of achieving development through institutional 
reform in aid management. Before discussing how AIMS have emerged in the global 
sphere, this section investigates how aid regimes such as the Paris Declaration and Accra 
Agenda for Action reproduce the norms of aid effectiveness and provide rules and 
institutional structure, in the field of aid.  
 
6.1.1. Institutionalization of the Field and Key Actors 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, foreign aid has been the most direct action and the largest 
financial source aimed at socio-economic development and poverty alleviation in 
recipient countries. The structures of foreign aid, which actually began with European 
colonialism, have become tied to changing economic, military, and political interests, as 
well as a growing humanitarian concern. The Marshall Plan, introduced during the post-
World War II reconstruction, is arguably considered an origin of modern foreign aid. 
Schmelzer (2016:23) describes it as follows:  
 
The Marshall Plan did not only become the intellectual master narrative for the global 
development enterprise, which copied many of its institutional arrangements and 
guidelines, but the same organization, which was founded for the self-monitoring of 
the European Recovery Program (ERP) aid, was in 1961 transformed into the world’s 
preeminent ‘donors’ club.’ However, while the Organisation for European Economic 
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Co-operation (OEEC) received loans and grants on a highly concessional basis and the 
recipients of aid themselves monitored its distribution and use, these principles were 
not reproduced in the OECD.  
Schmelzer (2016:23) 
 
Since the Bretton Woods Agreements, a debate on development has continued for 
decades on whether foreign aid should be mainly utilized for the facilitation of national 
economic growth, or for poverty alleviation that directly focuses on ‘basic needs’. 
Scholars have investigated the politics and the competing incentives behind foreign aid, 
and how emerging global institutional powers change the contour line of the landscape 
in the aid field  (Sachs 2005; Chang 2002; Escobar 1994). 
 
The organizational field of international aid was gradually established as a ‘functionally 
specific arena’ of members that partake in a common meaning system and interact with 
each other (Scott, 2001:207). It has all the key characteristics of a “recognized area of 
institutional life” with three traditional key actors: donor countries, recipient countries, 
and MDAs, all performing similar functions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983:148). Above 
all, MDAs such as the World Bank, UNDP and OECD have played the most influential 
role as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ and ‘rule-making’ entities within this organizational field. 
The MDAs led the aid agenda from ‘modernization’ in the early 1960s to the neoliberal 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and ‘good governance’ in the 1990s, and to ‘aid 
effectiveness’ in the 2000s, as well as the setting up of common development goals such 
as the MDGs in 2000, and most recently, to the launch of the SDGs in 2015, as discussed 
in Table 2-1. Recipient countries are generally expected to accept the institutionalized 
norms and rules in the asymmetrical power relations among donors.  
 
As I discussed in Chapter 2, since the end of the Cold War, the field has gone through 
some major changes, due to the proliferation of the new actors (Acharya et al. 2006; 
Manning 2006), aid heterogeneity (Mavrotas 2005) and the extensive philosophical 
debate on development (Sen 1999; Bourguignon & Sundberg 2007). There is general 
consensus in aid literature that these changes resulted in the institutionalizing of the 
global aid regime, which emerged in the 2000s. The proliferation of actors is the key 
characteristic of the global field of aid (Nadoll & Hussain 2008; Acharya et al. 2006). 
Non-DAC emerging donors, diverse rule-supporting institutions such as mega-
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philanthropists and policy institutes, as well as professional communities emerged as 
important actors in the 2000s and helped to further institutionalize the field (Boisjolie 
2015; Manning 2006). However, the major aid governance order and a set of core norms 
and rules are still shaped by traditional powerful actors in the sphere of global aid. 
Among the DAC countries, the early Western DAC members such as the US, the UK, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium77, in addition to Japan,  have been 
the most influential in global aid governance (OECD 2006). The Western rich donor 
group, the OECD DAC established in 1961, has played the most important role by:  
 
 defining ODA;  
 providing a set of rules and guiding principles such as Resolution on the Terms 
and Conditions of Aid (1963), ODA definition (1969), ‘Disciplines for Tied Aid 
(1991)’, ‘Untying ODA to the LDCs’ and ‘Guidelines on Poverty Reduction’ 
(2001), PD Survey (2006, 2008, 2011), and the Countries Peer Reviews; 
 leading the Peer Review of DAC members78 and monitoring and evaluating aid, 
which began with the Principle for Evaluation of Development Assistance’ 
(1991)79; and 
 providing aid reporting classifications, commonly called, Creditor Reporting 
Systems (CRS).  
 
The financial crisis in 2008, originating in the US, and the economic recession that 
followed, resulted in a reduction in the ODA budgets of the global North. As discussed 
in Section 2, if aid was not effective in the LDCs’ development, the downturn in ODA 
may not have been of much concern from the perspective of aid critics. However, the 
recent change in the global economy has negatively impacted existing ODA targets and 
development goals, such as the MDGs, and highlighted the need for change in the power 
dynamics in the global field of aid (OECD 2012b; Addison et al. 2010). The expanding 
membership of the OECD DAC has reflected this concern; growing from 17 member 
                                                 
77 Countries are ordered by their contribution to aid in 1960s 
78 http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/ 
79 https://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/2755284.pdf 
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countries in 1970s, 23 in 2005, to 30 80  in 2016. Also, the OECD DAC members’ 
promotion of ‘burden sharing’ in development finance, especially in the ODA receipts 
for MDAs, is one of the reasons for the increasing role of emerging new donors such as 
China, India, Indonesia, as well as the private sector’s engagement in global funds 
(Addison et al. 2004; Manning 2006). 
 
Category Stakeholder Role 
Donor country Major Western states, 
new DAC member states  
Lending, funding, norm 
entrepreneur, rule-making, aid 
information reporting to the OECD81 
Non-OECD DAC emerging 
donor countries such as 
China, India, and Indonesia 
Lending, funding, leading South-
South cooperation  
Multilateral 
Development 
Agency 
(MDAs) 
OECD DAC, World Bank, 
UNDP, ADB, AfDB, AIIB, 
UNICEF, WFP, etc. 
Lending, managing multi-donor trust 
fund, norm entrepreneur, knowledge 
disseminating, rule-making, agenda 
setting 
Recipient 
country 
 Managing foreign aid, executing 
national development plans 
Non-
governmental 
Organizations 
(NGOs) 
Mega-philanthropists, civil 
society organizations (CSOs) 
Contractor, rule-supporting, 
reproducing international norms 
Research & 
policy institute 
and others 
Mainly institutes in major 
donor countries, summarized 
in Table 6-2. 
Providing consultation, knowledge 
dissemination, rule-supporting, 
reproducing international norms 
Vendor IT company, management 
consulting company, law 
firm, etc. 
Providing technology, IT platform, 
auditing, consulting, financial and 
legal advisory, tax services, etc. 
 
Table 6-1. Stakeholders in the Global Field of Aid 
 
The emergence of diverse rule-supporting actors is an important feature as well. The 
increasing interactions among the stakeholders continuously contribute to establishment 
                                                 
80 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, 
European Union.  
81 For more details see the List of DAC Recommendations and Guiding Principles (OECD 2006) 
176 
and maturation of the field. It appears that rule-supporting organizations such as research 
institutes and NGOs are totally independent from the power dynamics within the area. 
However, by closely evaluating the funding sources and the board members who are 
used to working with MDAs or donor agencies, as well as investigating how close the 
organizations work together with the traditionally powerful actors in the field, it 
becomes quite clear that there is high-level interdependence between rule-supporting 
and rule-making organizations. The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), 
for example, played the role of the ‘aid effectiveness’ rule-supporting organization. 
Based on its close relationship and collaboration with OECD DAC, it became a ‘rule-
making’ organization and provided an emerging standard of aid reporting. Such indices 
including the Aid Transparency Index (ATI) developed by Transparency International 
(TI) and the Quality of ODA (QuODA) created by the Centre for Global Development, 
have supported and reproduced the norms. The indices have been used for evaluating 
the practice of each country and judging the success or failure of aid management 
practices, mostly from a technical-rational view and the donor’s perspective. They also 
help in disseminating knowledge on best practices. 
 
These rule-supporting organizations share changing norms and a common meaning 
system. They frequently perceive other organizations as peers and interact with each 
other. Common legitimate principles and the framework of codes are communicated 
between state actors and MDAs through a series of meetings, agenda-setting, and 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) exercises based on such indices. In this 
institutionalized setting, recipient countries, which are subject to isomorphic pressures, 
generally share and follow norms and practise the rules proposed by the global aid 
governance system. The symbolic status of sharing the same set of sense-making devices 
and being recognized as a responsible actor by the international community is also 
important. The organisational arena has an institutional power of its own. Thus, it is 
difficult to disentangle the activities and functionings of an actor from those of another. 
Norms exist and are generated by the culmination of actors, connection and 
relationships. 
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Organization Headquarter 
Supporting 
norms and 
rules 
Ranking, 
Index 
developed 
Assessment 
Publish What 
You Fund 
(PWYF) 
London, UK; 
Representative 
in Washington 
DC 
Aid 
transparency  
Aid 
transparency 
index (ATI) 
more than 40 donor 
agencies  
Transparency 
International 
(TI) 
Berlin, 
Germany 
Transparency
, corruption 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index (CPI) 
Global TI Report on 
more than 180 
countries   
International 
Aid  
Transparency 
Initiative 
(IATI) 
Secretariat 
(UNDP, Ghana, 
Sweden, 
UNOPS, 
Development 
Initiatives)  
Aid 
transparency, 
coordination, 
effectiveness 
IATI aid 
reporting 
standard 
(rule-making 
role) 
IATI Standard and 
TAG meeting. 27 
partner countries and 
over 500 
organizations follow 
IATI standard 
Centre for 
Global 
Development 
(CGD) 
Washington 
DC, US  
Aid 
effectiveness 
in general  
Commitment 
to 
Development  
Index 
27 donor agencies 
(CDI);  
Overseas 
Development 
Institute 
(ODI) 
London, UK  Aid 
effectiveness 
in general  
Donor 
resilience 
index 
more than 28 donor 
agencies  
Brookings 
Institute  
Washington 
DC, US 
Governance 
in general 
Quality of 
ODA 
(QuODA) 
with CGD82 
35 donor countries 
and more than 100 
aid agencies 
 
Table 6-2. Major Rule-Supporting Organizations in the Global Field of Foreign Aid 
 
6.1.2. Norm Emergence: Aid Effectiveness 
 
In order to analyse how aid effectiveness norms have emerged and have been 
internationalized, this study employs a constructivist conceptual lens based on 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)’s norm dynamic discussed in Chapter 3. As discussed in 
Section 2.3, based on a plethora of research and international calls for more effective 
aid, the desire to improve policy coherence through better transparency and coordination 
in the aid system was given increasingly more prominence in the 1990s (Forster & 
Stokke 1999). Since the beginning of the new millennium, four High Level Forums on 
Aid Effectiveness (HLF) have been organized by the OECD DAC and held in Rome 
                                                 
82 https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-quality-of-official-development-assistance-quoda-third-
edition/ 
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(2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008), and Busan (2011). They have shaped the then new 
emerging framework known as ‘aid effectiveness’. As discussed in Chapter 2, rational-
choice institutionalism is a central theme that emerged in the debate.  
 
The emerging ‘aid effectiveness paradigm’ was explicitly articulated in ‘Shaping the 
21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation’ (OECD 1996a), which 
also proposed detailed targets and commitments that later contributed to the formation 
of the MDGs in 2000. Having been influenced by the institutionalization of the UN-
driven MDGs as the internationally accepted development goals (Fukuda-Parr & Hulme 
2011), there was subsequently growing demand on a specific ‘way of doing’ aid as 
‘means’ to achieve development goals, MDGs. The emergence of aid effectiveness norm 
was not encoded in a single document. Rather, it was the collective result of the 
continuous process of developing momentum, receiving international attention, and 
negotiating with actors in the field.  
 
In this norm emergence process, norm entrepreneurs “convince a critical mass of states 
to embrace new norms” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998 p.330) by using their 
organizational platforms such as international forums and social movements organized 
by norm-supporting CSOs to drive public debates around aid effectiveness. The OECD 
DAC donors and international organizations such as the World Bank and UNDP, 
initiated ‘norm building’ through several meetings with state actors and professional 
communities in the field of aid, for example the American Economic Association (AEA), 
Brookings Institute, Centre for Global Development. In particular, the OECD DAC 
played the most influential role as norm entrepreneur and led the formation of the HLFs. 
The OECD DAC successfully organized the first HLF held in Rome in 2003 and adopted 
the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation signed by 28 recipient governments and more 
than 40 multilateral and bilateral development agencies. The donor’s responsibility in 
ineffective aid was emphasized83: 
 
We in the donor community have been concerned with the growing evidence that, over 
time, the totality and wide variety of donor requirements and processes for preparing, 
delivering, and monitoring development assistance are generating unproductive 
transaction costs for, and drawing down the limited capacity of, partner countries. We 
                                                 
83 http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/31451637.pdf 
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are also aware of partner country concerns that donors’ practices do not always fit well 
with national development priorities and systems, including their budget, programme, 
and project planning cycles and public expenditure and financial management systems. 
We recognise that these issues require urgent, coordinated, and sustained action to 
improve our effectiveness on the ground. 
(Rome Declaration on Harmonisation, 2003, emphasis added)  
 
The most significant difference between aid effectiveness norms and the previous aid 
governance such as ‘good governance’ and neo-liberal ‘structural reform’ is a shift in 
the view of responsibility in aid performance from recipient countries’ to a mutual matter 
between donors and recipients. Within the previous aid frameworks driven by the World 
Bank and IMF in the 1990s, such as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Program (PRSPs), recipient governments were expected to ensure 
‘good institution’ for advancing political and economic governance in implementing the 
donor-driven strategies, while donors only offered financial and technical assistance. 
Likewise, the norms of ‘good governance’ placed commitment for ensuring the 
performance of foreign aid on recipient governments, while criticizing ‘poor governance’ 
and weak aid management of recipient government (World Bank 1989). Although some 
scholars still criticize its vagueness and the donor-driven nature (Hayman 2009; Sjösted 
2013), it is clear that aid effectiveness norms bring to the attention to the donors’ 
responsibility in the field. The Rome Declaration explicitly emphasizes a lack of 
coordination between donors and poor alignment to recipient’s priorities as a challenge 
yet to tackle.  
 
6.1.3. Norm Cascades and Paris Declaration 
 
Having two years for further norm building after the Rome Declaration, the PD produced 
the ‘tipping point’, which provided the idea of aid effectiveness and international 
approval. While MDAs are powerful actors in the global aid community, the 
endorsement of a critical mass of states, particularly recipient governments are crucial 
in culminating this ‘tipping point’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The PD successfully 
attracted a large number of states including LDCs, and was signed by 138 countries and 
28 international organizations in 2005. It is recognized as the most significant milestone 
in the history of foreign aid (Hyden 2008). Although the initiative of the PD was still 
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driven by major donors, it was arguably praised as a paradigmatic shift towards greater 
recipient governments’ control and ownership over the foreign aid.  
 
We, Ministers of developed and developing countries responsible for promoting 
development and Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions, meeting 
in Paris on 2 March 2005, resolve to take far-reaching and monitorable actions to 
reform the ways we deliver and manage aid (…) we recognise that while the volumes 
of aid and other development resources must increase to achieve these goals, aid 
effectiveness must increase significantly as well to support partner country efforts to 
strengthen governance and improve development performance. This will be all the 
more important if existing and new bilateral and multilateral initiatives lead to 
significant further increases in aid.  
(Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005: Article 1)  
 
Following the Rome Declaration, the Paris Declaration added a new momentum to the 
global aid paradigm, namely that donor countries also have to improve their activities 
significantly. This explicitly realized that a lack of coordination amongst donors, weak 
harmonization of procedures and poor alignment to recipient governments’ priorities 
had to be tackled (OECD-DAC, 2003). Hayman (2009:583) argues that “(t)his implied 
a shift from recipient failure towards joint responsibility for aid effectiveness, with 
recipient governments committing themselves to better governance and donors 
committing themselves to better co-ordination”. This tipping point had a strong effect 
on the further distribution of aid effectiveness norms within the global field of aid. 
 
Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness: The PD provides a practical road-map to 
improving aid quality, setting a series of target goals and indicators to be attained, as 
well as, imposing commitments to share aid information for transparency and aid 
coordination throughout the global aid system (OECD 2005). The norm cascade process 
prescribes a set of legitimate principles of governing aid activities, the five ‘Paris 
Principles’, and provides protocols shared by all signatory states and international 
organizations to coordinate aid efforts. 
 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) point out that ‘vaguely specified norms’ are unlikely to 
have a tipping point to ‘cascade’ across countries. The findings clearly show that the aid 
effectiveness norms brought the specificity of ideas and the details in order to achieve 
the suggested principles through a series of preparation meetings and scholarly research. 
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First, based on the institutional economics’ assumption of transaction cost and the 
multiple principal-agent problems (Bourguignon & Sundberg 2007; Svensson 2006) as 
discussed in Section 2.3.3, five principles are outlined (OECD 2005). 
 
1. Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, 
improve their institutions and tackle corruption. 
 
2. Alignment: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems. 
 
3. Harmonisation: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share 
information to avoid duplication.  
 
4. Results: Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and 
results get measured.  
 
5. Mutual accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development 
results. 
(OECD, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005) 
 
Secondly, the PD was also guided by specified indicators, timelines and targets. “The 
concept of ‘aid effectiveness’ thus entered the development discourse as embodying a 
package of specific ideas and measures” (Haymen 2006:583).  
 
We commit to accelerate the pace of change by implementing, in a spirit of mutual 
accountability, the Partnership Commitments presented in Section II and to measure 
progress against 12 specific indicators that we have agreed today and that are set out in 
Section III of this Declaration.  
(Paris Declaration Article 8, emphasis added) 
 
In the norm dynamics of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), the key actors involved in the 
cascade stage for aid effectiveness are the state actors and international organisations 
that endorsed the PD to achieve legitimacy through compliance with global aid norms. 
However, in the process of achieving the global tipping point, the major norm 
entrepreneurs the OECD DAC donor countries and leading MDAs led the international 
discussion and intensive preparation for the declaration. Schmelzer (2016) provides a 
valuable historical analysis of how the OECD has institutionalized norms and 
governance in the field of aid. Schmelzer argues that the genesis of global aid institutions 
is the “result of a very specific ensemble of discourse, economic theory and statistical 
standards that came to dominate policy making in industrialized countries under certain 
social and historical conditions” (Schmelzer, 2016:10).  
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The DAC was an exclusive donors’ club, designed to suspend the voices of aid 
recipients, and its criteria for aid, set by the donors themselves, did not guarantee a flow 
of capital from the North to the South that was comparable in magnitude or 
concessionality to the Marshall Plan. DAC countries thus not only captured the power 
of standardizing the major development-related policy ideas, practices, and data with 
all the relevant definitions and specifications, but they also monopolized the process of 
evaluating donor performance.  
(Ibid, p.237)  
 
 
 
Figure 6-1. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness ‘Pyramid’  
(Source: OECD 2008) 
 
After Paris, the two subsequent HLFs strengthened the norm cascade process and created 
a powerful political momentum to reorganize the way recipient countries and 
development partners cooperate. Once the norm was institutionalized, there was a strong 
expectation of a high degree of compliance and norm internalization in each country: 
 
Progress has been made. But we have to move faster. We don’t need more analysis. We 
know what needs to be done. With the Paris Declaration, we have the blueprint to do 
it (Speech of President of the World Bank President, from  
(OECD, 2008:15)) 
 
The 3rd HLF in Accra in 2008 was organized to evaluate the progress in achieving the 
Paris goals. The first PD Survey that was globally conducted in 2006 was presented84. 
This Survey, for the first time, globally assessed the effectiveness of aid internationally 
in a standardized manner by using 12 suggested criteria, and provides the results of the 
                                                 
84 http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/oecd-journal-on-development/volume-8/issue-
2_journal_dev-v8-2-en 
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Survey of 34 developing countries and 55 donors, as well as, a snapshot of global aid in 
2006. The Survey results explored the degree to which recipient governments and donor 
agencies had achieved the outcomes in their aid management, policy-making, as well as 
better coordination with other development partners which required in the 
internationally agreed targets (Wood et al., 2008). The Surveys that followed were 
conducted in 2008 and 2010, with the intention of assessing the impact of the PD on 
development outcomes, and their findings were shared at the Busan HLF in 2011. 
 
 
Figure 6-2. High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness and its Monitoring Survey  
(Summarized by Author) 
 
The Accra Agenda for Action (AAA)85, endorsed at the Accra HLF, reaffirmed the Paris 
commitments. One difference from the PD, in the process of AAA, international NGO 
networks mainly rule-supporting organizations also played a major role as norm 
entrepreneurs. Building on the PD, the AAA incorporated feedback and challenges from 
practice and suggested a more recipient government focused action plan, and highlighted 
the sharing of aid information as the most fundamental action to be achieved as a 
prerequisite to better transparency, coordination and aid effectiveness.  
 
Based on the analysis of norm dynamics previously discussed, during the norm cascades 
stage, it is identified that aid effectiveness norms became widely accepted by states, 
through the tipping point, the PD. Considering this, why have AIMS been widely 
                                                 
85
 Accra Agenda for Action, 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2-4 September 2008, Accra, 
Ghana 
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adopted by states? How can we understand the global diffusion of AIMS and their 
homogeneity in the states where different socio-economic and political contexts exist be 
understood? Who leads AIMS implementation? Is it driven by recipient government or 
a particular technological innovation? These questions can be answered by tracing the 
forces influencing AIMS implementations and the institutional changes in the global 
field of aid.  
 
Stage 1. Norm emergence 2. Norm cascade  3.Norm internalization  
Actors  Norm entrepreneurs 
(OECD DAC) with 
organizational 
platforms (High Level 
Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness)  
States (other donors, 
recipients), other 
international 
organizations, networks 
Rules, Paris Declaration 
Survey, professions, 
bureaucracy in recipient 
countries  
Motives Altruism, empathy, 
ideational commitment 
Legitimacy, reputation, 
esteem 
Conformity 
Dominant 
mechanisms 
Persuasion Socialization, 
institutionalization, 
demonstration 
Habit, 
institutionalization 
Aid 
effectiveness 
and AIMS 
- 2003 (Rome 
Declaration) 
2003-2005 (HLF Paris 
as a tipping point) 
2005-  
 
Table 6-3. Norm Dynamics of Aid Effectiveness (Developed on Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998) 
 
6.2. Evolution of AIMS and Institutional Power 
 
AIMS and the norms AIMS inscribe have spread around the globe in the last two 
decades. Using the IR constructivist lens, this study interprets ‘aid effectiveness’ as an 
external norm that has been established and diffused among recipient countries 
(Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Acharya 2004). In this view, AIMS is conceptualized as a 
norm supporting system. 
 
Building on the discussion of norm dynamics in the global field of aid, this section offers 
a historical overview of AIMS and institutional account of the process of AIMS 
diffusion in three analytical foci. First, I explain the emergence and evolution of AIMS 
in the global sphere. Second, I examine how their inscribed visions have changed over 
time alongside the shifting global aid governance, and how AIMS reproduce norms, 
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rules, and institutional structures promoted by the global aid governance. Third, drawing 
on institutional isomorphism, I identify coercive, normative and mimetic pressures on 
AIMS adoptions have existed as framed in Figure 6-3. These three mechanisms of 
isomorphism are not always mutually exclusive, often occurred simultaneously. 
However, the analytical boundary helps me to explain the rapid diffusion of AIMS in 
the global field of aid and their homogeneity. This section consists of three sub-sections 
explaining the evolution of AIMS, namely, AIMS 1.0: PC-based, AIMS 2.0 web-based, 
and the emerging open data-based AIMS 3.0.  
 
 
 
Figure 6-3. Institutional Isomorphism in the Organizational Field of International Aid  
(Developed by Author for This Study) 
 
6.2.1. AIMS 1.0: PC-based Systems in Transition Economy 
 
Although it is not one of the information systems implemented in a recipient country, 
the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) could be considered as an origin of 
AIMS86. The CRS was initially established for tracing aid flow reported by the OECD 
DAC in 1973. It was neither a complete nor timely database in the beginning, and it was 
                                                 
86 Data can be accessible at https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1 
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only after the mid-1990s that the information started being widely used by stakeholders 
in international aid community. As of 2017, the thirty members of the DAC and other 
donors87 submit their data on all aid activities to the CRS and this is verified by OECD. 
It has served as the source of official donor statistics on aid information where each 
donor country of the DAC supplies aid, and shows how it is spent in the recipient 
country. It remains the most reliable database for aid information at this time.  
 
The very first AIMS implemented within a recipient country was the Donor Assistance 
Database88 in Russia in 1996. The system was developed by Synergy International, but 
was intended to be operated by the government to facilitate information flow among 
government agencies and donor agencies, while receiving technical support from 
USAID. It was financed by the G7 Support Implementation Group (SIG), also 
headquartered in Moscow, Russia (Synergy International Systems 2004). The G-7 SIG 
was established for the purpose of effective assistance to Russia at the Tokyo Summit, 
in 1993. It was the US driven operations for “promoting information sharing and 
coordination among the G7 countries” and “communication and consultation with 
Russian authorities” (Gilman, 2010:29). Later, this PC-based AIMS was implemented 
in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 89  including Armenia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Tajikistan in close partnership 
with UNDP. These AIMS, named as ‘donor assistance database’ were developed by 
Synergy International Systems (Synergy International Systems 2004).  
 
It is not very clear why the earliest AIMS were implemented in these transition 
economies, which were changing from a centrally planned economy toward a market 
economy. It is, however, generally accepted that the region of transition economies was 
then the priority of main donors and the target of SAPs led by the World Bank and IMF 
                                                 
87 Some of the candidates of the OECD DAC and other countries such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Hungary, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait (KFAED), Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, 
Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Turkey, Timor Leste, United Arab Emirates 
also provide aid information. (https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1)  
88 Later re-branded as Development Assistance Database (DAD) 
89 When the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991, the CIS was established, comprising most of the former 
Soviet republics. The confederation currently has of 9 member states, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Additionally, Turkmenistan and 
Ukraine are listed as associate members. Georgia was also a member of CIS until the withdrawal of its 
membership in 2008. 
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(Roaf et al. 2014; World Bank 1999). The underlying assumption of the World Bank’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and was that public sector reform and a 
higher recipient government engagement in designing development policy would lead 
to better aid management and greater ownership of fiscal policy. The IMF report titled 
25 years of Transition: Post-Communist Europe and the IMF also recalls the priority of 
assistance to these transition economies and the emphasis of NPM reform (Roaf et al. 
2014): 
 
In transition economy, (…) foreign direct investment (FDI)—played a key role in 
developing new sectors that could reabsorb the dismissed employees from the declining 
sectors. By facilitating transfers of technology, managerial skills, and international 
marketing networks, deepening pools of FDI appeared to have opened a self-enforcing 
cycle of fast productivity convergence and job creation. 
(Roaf et al. 2014) 
 
Apart from a debate of how relevant NPM reform was in transition economies and what 
the legacy of NPM is (Manning 2001; Kenisarin & Andrews-Speed 2008), it is clear that 
MDAs driven public sector reforms were the dominant trend in the region in the late 
1990s. The World Bank launched over 500 ‘good governance’ initiatives in 97 countries 
since 1996 (World Bank, 2000:188-217). It promoted the NPM model in transition 
economies:   
 
Understandably, many developing and transitional countries have explored NPM 
models as opportunities to accelerate their development and improve public sector 
performance. While many aspects of NPM are valuable in any setting, moving too fast 
may be risky and open the door to corruption and abuse if basic public institutions are 
not sufficiently developed. 
(World Bank, 2000, p.36) 
 
As discussed, building on the notion of ‘good governance’, ICT implementation was 
arguably considered an innovative tool for increasing managerial efficiency, 
interconnecting ministries and enhancing intra-governmental coordination. In addition, 
it was also based on the assumption that developing countries have a disadvantage in 
ICT and suffer from a ‘digital divide’, meaning a new form of inequality. As ICT 
penetration increased in developing countries, professional community in MDAs and 
donor countries promoted ICT-enabled public sector reform, commonly referred to as e-
government. Most AIMS were separately implemented from e-government initiatives. 
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However, working alongside the popularity of e-government projects created significant 
normative pressure on the adoption of AIMS in the aid field. AIMS were implemented 
in transition economies with the similar vision of NPM and extended hopes of good 
governance and corruption reduction in aid sectors.  
 
In addition to normative pressure, mimetic isomorphism may be the main source of 
institutional pressure on the adoptions, while coercive pressures for a particular AIMS 
seems to be less prevalent, compared to following generations. The mimetic 
isomorphism is encouraged when there is a high level of competition or uncertainty in 
the field. In these transitional economies, countries tended to replicate policy and new 
practices of the first adopter that they perceive to be legitimate and successful. In 
addition, regional competition for attracting more aid between the former CIS countries 
could be a source of mimetic pressure. AIMS may be an attractive tool for aid 
management, during the transition era, in which global ICT-enabled public sector reform 
was increasingly considered as a norm as well. In spite of the limitations of lack of data 
in the late 1990s, normative and mimetic isomorphic pressures are the main drivers of 
the diffusion of AIMS in this region.  
 
Regarding the functionalities of AIMS, most AIMS in this early generation in CIS 
countries were intra-governmental systems or a database of aid activities. They were 
usually not open to the public, but were used internally to support government officers 
to manage aid and to have better communication with several different donors, which 
donors also found it as a main challenge. The PC based AIMS had reporting tools, which 
in general are not web-based and single desktop applications. Such applications can be 
utilized to create charts and graphs, but there exists no evidence that PC based AIMS 
allowed external users except authorized users from donor agencies. There is an 
exceptional observation that some DADs were transitioned to web-based systems: 
 
The first DAD was a PC system developed for Russia in 1996 by the G7 Support 
Implementation Group. It was called the Donor Assistance Database, and tracked 
20,000 projects over the period from 1991-2001. Originally, it was not web-based but 
after they were stood up in the Newly Independent States (NIS), the DAD was further 
developed to be accessible via web portals.  
(Kishinchand, 2007: 398) 
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However, the rhetoric of aid transparency to citizens was not yet significantly discussed, 
compared to the post-PD period. Instead, the rationale of better communication between 
government and donors was more highlighted. It is a donor-centric view, meeting 
donors’ needs for an efficient way of advising, consulting, and supervising aid activities. 
In addition, the rationale of ownership or mutual accountability did not appear in the 
AIMS in this period. This may not be considered a significant problem of the recipient 
government as they seem to have been more interested in having such ICT initiatives 
transferred to the local government.  
 
6.2.2. AIMS 2.0: Web-based Systems 
 
The second generation of AIMS, while still based on the CRS as a main data source, 
were encouraged to be open to the public and were developed as web-based systems 
(OECD & UNDP 2006). The driving forces for the implementation of web-based AIMS 
were considered to be both internal and external. Encouraged by the rapid diffusion of 
the Internet and broadband connectivity, recipient governments may increasingly have 
sought to adopt web-based AIMS and improve management of the aid they received 
(Linders 2013). However, and more importantly, external institutional pressure played 
a critical role in facilitating the isomorphic dynamics and adopting such AIMS in 
recipient countries.  
 
The Rome Declaration on Harmonization in 2003 was the first international consensus 
on a way of achieving better aid effectiveness. Explaining the further steps in the process 
toward the Paris Forum in 2005, the Rome Declaration also explicitly recognizes the 
importance of ICT and alludes to the adoption of such tools for goals:  
 
We acknowledge the potential contribution of modern information and communication 
technologies to promoting and facilitating harmonisation – already demonstrated by the 
use of audio and videoconferencing facilities in the staff work on harmonisation, the 
Development Gateway, the Country Analytic Work Website, and the early work on e-
government, e-procurement, and e-financial management. We commit to further efforts 
to exploit these technologies. 
(Rome Declaration on Harmonisation, 2003, emphasis added)  
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It is quite surprising that, in the official agreement, a particular group was mentioned. 
The Development Gateway (DG), that was launched as a program of the World Bank in 
1999, but which was at the time an independent foundation in 2002, later became one of 
the major AIMS providers. The funding to support DG includes the initial funding of $7 
million during 2000-2001and $46.1 million as cash and in-kind contributions from non-
Bank donors in a close relationship with the World Bank (Independent Evaluation Group 
2008). Although the DG transitioned to be fully independent from the World Bank, the 
DG seems to have built its reputation on its close collaboration with the World Bank, 
which has a global network of development partners and recipient countries. 
 
Initially, when the (Development) Gateway was part of the World Bank and no partners 
were involved, its legitimacy rested entirely on the reputation of the Bank. The 
Gateway's continuing legitimacy depends on the Gateway's ability to mobilize support 
from other partners, and its ability to produce and demonstrate positive results. (…) 
Currently, no Bank employees serve on the Board of Directors, although two Board 
members are former Bank Vice Presidents. It is likely that the Bank will be represented 
in the future by the new Vice President of OPCS, the unit in charge of the Bank’s aid 
effectiveness agenda. In line with the recommendations of the 2005 independent 
evaluation, the governance of the Gateway has moved toward more of a stakeholder 
model. 
(Independent Evaluation Group, 2007: xvi) 
 
Normative Isomorphic Pressure via the Paris Declaration and the Accra Action 
Agenda: In the subsequent PD in 2005 and AAA in 2008, the adoption of AIMS was 
promoted as an innovative tool for achieving aid effectiveness in recipient countries 
(OECD 2008c). As ICT penetration increased, MDAs promoted ICT-enabled public 
sector reform in developing countries. Working alongside the popularity of e-
government projects, a web-based AIMS became promoted in many recipient countries. 
The PD, the norm adopted by a critical mass of relevant state actors and marked as a 
‘tipping point’ of norm cascade, emphasizes that aid information is fundamental in the 
international partnership of donors and partner countries: 
 
“to coordinate the international monitoring of the Indicators of Progress” and “to enable 
consistent aggregation of information across a range of countries to be summed up in a 
periodic report”  
(Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2005, Article 11);  
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Managing for results means managing and implementing aid in a way that focuses on 
the desired results and uses information to improve decision-making.  
(Ibid, Article 43) 
 
In this sense, donors commit to:  
 
provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable 
partner authorities to present comprehensive budget reports to their legislatures and 
citizens.”  
(Ibid, Article 48) 
 
In the PD, the term AIMS does not appear, but the term ‘country systems’ appears 13 
times with ambiguity about whether the term means existing ‘information systems’ of 
recipient governments or whether it rather means a broader sense of governance 
structure and legal systems.  
 
Using a country’s own institutions and systems, where these provide assurance that aid 
will be used for agreed purposes, increases aid effectiveness by strengthening the 
partner country’s sustainable capacity to develop, implement and account for its 
policies to its citizens and parliament. Country systems and procedures typically 
include, but are not restricted to, national arrangements and procedures for public 
financial management, accounting, auditing, procurement, results frameworks and 
monitoring.  
(Ibid, Article 17, emphasis added)  
 
These major AIMS providers were often explicitly recommended for collaboration in 
the field of aid. The OECD DAC Working Party held a series of meetings on sharing aid 
information including its eighth meeting ‘Role of Aid Information Management Systems 
in Implementing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness at the Country Level’ in July 
2006 and promoted the implementation of AIMS in developing countries: 
 
A good example that could be applied to AIMS is the process of data harvesting put in 
place by AiDA90 , where data is automatically transferred from the donor internal 
database to the AiDA reporting system.  
(OECD 2006:8)  
 
                                                 
90 AiDA (Accessible information on Development Activities) was the then Development Gateway’s 
online aid information directory (http://aida.developmentgateway.org/AidaHome.do) AMP builds on the 
AiDA standards some of which in turn come from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System. 
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Finally, in the AAA agreed in 2008, the term ‘information systems’ emerged, and the 
need for AIMS in aid management and coordination is clearly reaffirmed.  
 
“Developing countries will strengthen the quality of policy design, implementation and 
assessment by improving information systems”  
(Accra Action Agenda, 2008, Article 23-a)  
 
“Donors will align their monitoring with country information systems. They will 
support, and invest in strengthening, developing countries’ national statistical capacity 
and information systems, including those for managing aid.” 
(Ibid, Article 23-c)  
 
In addition to the OECD DAC being the most important ‘norm entrepreneur’, MDAs 
and the professional communities exerted normative pressures on recipient countries by 
introducing ‘knowledge’ of aid management and AIMS. The World Bank and the 
UNDP, particularly, promoted the ‘ICT for aid effectiveness’ agenda and the adoption 
of AIMS in recipient countries, and often financially supported and provided technical 
assistance for the implementation of AIMS. Furthermore, the professional community 
and policy institutes have developed aid effectiveness indices, such as the Aid 
Transparency Index (ATI) and the Quality of ODA (QuODA), which implicitly promote 
AIMS and put more weight on the existence of an ICT component in the score. 
Particularly, after the PD in 2005, such powerful NGOs and research institutes including 
Transparency International and Publish What You Fund (PWYF), and International Aid 
Transparency Initiative (IATI)91 have expanded their ‘rule-supporting’ roles in driving 
aid transparency agenda as well as creating normative pressure on AIMS 
implementation in the global field of aid.  
 
In the international aid community, once the norms “achieve a ‘taken for granted’ quality 
that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic”, isomorphic mechanisms 
could influence organizations in having similarity with peers and gaining institutional 
legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). This normative pressure was presented as moral 
and irresistible. There were only two AIMS implemented in recipient countries before 
2004, except the early PC-based AIMS in CIS countries. Four countries adopted AIMS 
                                                 
91 IATI has been acting as a rule-making organization by promoting the emerging aid reporting standard, 
called IATI Standards since 2008. The standard has not been fully institutionalized in the global field of 
aid. Please see (IATI 2013) for further discussion.  
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alongside with the PD endorsement in 2005 (Botswana, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Viet Nam) 
excluding four AIMS implementations in Tsunami-affected countries Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand and Maldives. Eight countries subsequently implemented AIMS 
between the PD and the AAA in 2008 (Lebanon, Pakistan, India, Liberia, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Bolivia, Montenegro). The year of 2008 was the peak of AIMS implementation 
with 10 recipient countries (Burkina Faso, Burundi, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Malawi, Tanzania, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Nicaragua, and 
Papua New Guinea). Another five countries joined in 2009, while 10 countries adopted 
such systems in 2010. 
 
Mimetic Process in Disaster Management: In fact, the series of HLFs on Aid 
Effectiveness were not the only source of driving forces of AIMS diffusion. Ironically, 
the catastrophe of the Indian Ocean Tsunami that occurred happened on 26 December 
in 2004 greatly contributed to AIMS adoption in Tsunami affected countries. In this 
process, the then emerging aid effectiveness norms created normative pressures for 
AIMS adoption to support the management of humanitarian assistance. At the same 
time, the uncertainty and urgency in the period became an important source that 
encouraged imitation of good practice. The “organizational technologies are poorly 
understood, when goals are ambiguous or when the environment creates symbolic 
uncertainty”, and as a result, the mimetic process occurs (Currie 2012). Furthermore, 
and vice versa, the AIMS experiences in these countries produced mimetic isomorphic 
pressures back to other neighbouring countries for their subsequent AIMS 
implementation in ASEAN as well as the countries affected later by similar natural 
disasters such as the 2005 Kashmir Earthquake (AIMS adopted in Pakistan and India), 
and Typhoon Yolanda in 2013  (Philippines). 
 
In the Tsunami recovery programs and the adoption of AIMS, the UNDP played the 
most important role in promoting AIMS. They had the previous experience of AIMS in 
Afghanistan, working together with AIMS provider, Synergy International. The AIMS 
in Afghanistan was often introduced as a good practice in the aid community:  
 
UNDP has a proven track record of providing customised aid management IT-based 
tools. Recent successful implementations of the Development Assistance Database 
(DAD) in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sierra Leone resulted in strong support from UNDP 
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and the Office of Special Envoy to customise the DAD to meet needs of Tsunami 
affected countries and Pakistan after the South-Asia earthquake.  
(DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness Eighth Meeting, p.2)  
 
Due to the extreme uncertainty in the countries, which were experiencing the devastating 
emergency situation in the region, the mimetic isomorphic pressures to adopt AIMS 
were seen (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). At the High Level Coordination Meeting on 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Tsunami-Affected Countries organized by the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), held in Manila on March 2005, ADB and UNDP were 
asked to assist governments in managing and tracking emergency relief funds due to the 
proliferation of assistance in a disorganized manner. Subsequently, the Governments of 
Sri Lanka, Maldives and Thailand officially asked the UNDP to assist the establishment 
of aid tracking systems. Based on the previous collaboration between UNDP and 
Synergy International Systems in Afghanistan and the earlier PC-based AIMS 1.0 in 
transitional economies, they quickly started working together and conducted a round of 
needs assessments in each country. 92  In July 2005, Synergy then announced the 
implementation of DAD 5.0 in Sri Lanka, Maldives, Thailand and Indonesia.93 The 
service provider argued, via interviews, that a significant configuration process was 
necessary in order to customize AIMS to meet each country’s specific requirements. It 
is, however, not clear how much local government actively engaged in the process due 
to the high degree of homogeneity in terms of technological features, implementation 
process, and funding. With the exception of one AIMS in Indonesia to be further 
discussed in Section 7.2, the functionalities and system design of AIMS were identical. 
The implementations in Tsunami-affected countries also provide a source of mimetic 
isomorphism to AIMS implementations including:  
 
 Development Assistance Database in Pakistan 
 Coordination and Decision Support System (CDSS) in India after the 2005 
Kashmir Earthquake, and 
 Electronic Monitoring Platform Accountability and Transparency Hub for 
Yolanda (eMPATHY) after the 2013 Typhoon Yolanda 
                                                 
92 “Synergy deploys DAD systems in support of countries affected by Tsunami disaster” from 
https://www.synisys.com/synergy-deploys-dad-systems-in-support-of-countries-affected-by-tsunami-
disaster/, accessed 10 August 2017 
93 Ibid 
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Those AIMS were also developed by Synergy International.  
A similar process seems to have taken place in the post-conflict countries. Although 
their sustainability is questionable, AIMS have been continuously adopted in the post-
conflict countries94. The experience of AIMS in neighbouring countries or other post-
conflict countries may create mimetic isomorphic pressure on those post-conflict 
countries. In addition, the adoption of AIMS has been constantly promoted by MDAs 
and professional community in the area of fragile and post-conflict states (UNDP, 
2010:1). 
 
AIMS are meant to be sustainably embedded in government institution. In practice, 
however, this often does not occur in post-conflict and fragile situations. There is thus 
a need for better guidance to assist governments so they can better incorporated such 
systems into government institutions. Such efforts would facilitate national planning 
and resource allocation and would positively contribute to national capacity 
development and the process of building, or rebuilding, the state.  
(Comparative Experience: Aid Information Management Systems  
in Post-Conflict and Fragile Situations, 2010, p.2)  
 
Coercive isomorphism is also considerable in the diffusion of web-based AIMS. The 
PD and AAA marks a new milestone in aid governance institutionalization in the global 
field of aid, putting into place a set of rules on aid reporting and PD Surveys, and 
symbolic myths in the global aid field that constitute a paradigmatic scheme of 
rationalizing the concept of aid effectiveness, as well as creates coercive isomorphic 
pressures on AIMS implementation. The Survey assessed the effectiveness of aid by 
using 12 suggested criteria. In the indicators, Indicator 2a and 5a directly ask whether a 
recipient country uses any type of ‘management systems’ for aid management:  
 
Indicator 2a: reliable country public financial management systems 
o What reforms have been implemented or are planned to improve the quality of 
public financial management systems?  
o What efforts are being made to improve financial management at sub-national 
levels? Indicator 2b: reliable country procurement systems  
(2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, OECD, 2010, p.60)  
 
Indicator 5a: Use of country public financial management systems  
                                                 
94 Afghanistan (2002), Ethiopia (2005), Rwanda (2006), Lebanon (2006), Liberia (2007), Burkina Faso 
(2008), Burundi (2008 & 2012) Democratic Republic of the Congo (2008), Central African Republic 
(2008), Sierra Leone (2008), Niger (2009), South Sudan (2010), Somaliland (2010), Palestine (2010), 
Kosovo (2010),  Somalia (2011), Iraq (2011), Timor-Leste (2012), Chad (2014), Cote d’Ivoire (2014) 
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o Are procedures currently in place to use country systems beyond general or 
sector budget support (e.g. project and basket fund modalities)?  
o Have significant efforts been made to increase use of partner countries’ public 
financial management systems by donors in a way that may not be captured 
fully by indicator 5a (for example, through partial use of systems)? 
o To what extent are donors making efforts at the country level to implement 
their AAA commitments to use country systems as a first option, communicate 
clearly reasons for not using country systems where this is the case, and to 
review this regularly? (see AAA 15a-c) 
(Ibid, p.61)  
 
While AIMS was not explicitly mentioned, the adoption of such systems to meet what 
indicators assess was implicitly recommended. In 2006, 34 recipient countries 
conducted the first Survey; 55 in the second in 2008; 78 in the third in 2011. This 
pressure and the formal rules such as timely reporting according to standardized 
questionnaires and the official peer review process by OECD increased coercive 
pressures on the adoption of AIMS.  
 
Likewise, in the AAA, it is strongly recommended to participate in the PD Surveys and 
DAC Peer Reviews by using an AIMS. This role of AIMS as an assessment tool 
contributes to the coercive isomorphic pressure exerted on recipient governments:   
 
We will step up our efforts to ensure that – as agreed in the Paris Declaration – mutual 
assessment reviews are in place by 2010 in all countries that have endorsed the 
Declaration. These reviews will be based on country results reporting and information 
systems complemented with available donor data and credible independent evidence. 
They will draw on emerging good practice with stronger parliamentary scrutiny and 
citizen engagement. With them we will hold each other accountable for mutually 
agreed results in keeping with country development and aid policies. 
(OECD 2008c, AAA, Article 24-b, emphasis added). 
 
The influence of the global aid institutions was apparent in the documents of AIMS as 
well: 
 
Nicaragua: Since the Rome Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2003, Aid Information 
Management Systems have been widely recognized as essential tools for improving 
government accountability, and assessing aid effectiveness. By using the system, the 
Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration can be easily conducted.  
(ODAnic - Official Development Assistance to Nicaragua Database 
http://nic.odadata.eu/, page archived on 27 January 2013) 
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As illustrated in the previous chapter, findings show that most web-based AIMS in this 
period were homogenous in terms of the functionalities focused on the PD Survey, 
implementation process, project documents, and even web design of AIMS. This 
homogeneity may have resulted from the two main service providers and their close 
collaboration with the MDAs. However, this significant homogeneity can also be 
identified in the cases of AIMS developed by local IT consultants or vendors:   
 
Indonesia: When we started discussion, what we did first was bench-marking other 
AIMS. Bappenas was interested in Cambodia AIMS was recommended by Bappenas. 
But we decided to do some studies and tried to find more resources on-line. (…after 
the interviewee found the Excel file titled “National AIMS Sites”…) We conducted a 
short study on each case, and finally we referred to cases of Afghanistan, India, 
Pakistan, and South Africa, and their user manuals were quite helpful.   
(Focus group interview with AIMS developer and coordinator) 
 
6.2.3. AIMS 3.0: Emerging Concept of Open Data 
 
When it comes to the emerging term ‘open development’ and ‘open aid’, Smith and his 
colleagues (2011) point out that openness in general is rather a marketing term than an 
analytic concept. Although Harvey (2014:292) argues that openness may best be 
understood “as a collective process that is continuously under development and review”, 
such elusiveness can be problematic and cause further confusion for not only academic 
research but also decision making in policy arena. 
 
In recent years, new opportunities and challenges in aid management have risen and 
prompted a more technologically sophisticated AIMS including open data, covering and 
processing more detailed and inclusive aid information and advanced geographic 
information systems (GIS). With this backdrop, the concept of “open development” has 
attained popularity as a new model of “engagement and innovation that are more 
participatory, more collaborative, and driven more by the beneficiaries” in aid sector 
(Smith & Reilly 2014; Smith et al. 2011). The common underlying assumption that open 
data can contribute to solving conventional problems of aid ineffectiveness has been 
increasingly discussed in AIMS implementation (Linders 2013; Dietrich 2012). While 
there is an increase in the implementation of emerging AIMS, which are arguably 
referred to as ‘open data –based’, there is still ambiguity concerning how open data 
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contribute to better aid. Although the use, practice, challenges, and regulatory 
framework of each AIMS may vary, I identify the following reasons as key drivers for 
the demand for open data based AIMS.  
 
First, in the 2000s, the global field of aid has changed dramatically and become more 
complex due to the proliferation of new donors (Acharya et al. 2006; Burcky 2011) and 
aid heterogeneity increasing in type and modality (Mavrotas 2005). In particular, the 
2008 global financial crisis has influenced the field and led to a significant slowdown in 
traditional donors’ aid budget (Addison et al. 2010). This subsequently focused attention 
on opening opportunities for engaging new players. Non-DAC emerging economies for 
South-South Cooperation (SSC), private sectors, and new mega philanthropists have 
come to the field and expanded their roles. They are now providing significant amounts 
of aid of various types across the world. The changes brought the complexity to capture 
collective information on aid, and question the validity of the current definition and 
scope of ODA (Severino & Ray 2009). It also calls for a more extensive version of AIMS 
that covers data from new donors and diverse projects which have not been included 
previously on the OECD CRS database.  
 
Second, empirical research shows that most of the poorest of the poor no longer live in 
low income countries (LICs), but rather live in middle income countries (MICs) (Sumner 
2012; Kanbur & Sumner 2011). This phenomenon raises important questions about the 
current model of aid management and how aid should be allocated to the poorest in non-
poor countries. This new geography of global poverty demands subnational aid targeting 
and better management within a country by using sub-national open data, which is often 
referred to the World Development Indicator (WDI) published by the World Bank, as 
well as an advanced geographic information system (GIS) and geospatial analysis. The 
World Bank’s open data initiatives can be marked as milestones that accelerated the 
diffusion of ‘open development’ or ‘data for development’. It embarked on April 20, 
2010, to provide free access to more than 2,000 economic, financial, health, education, 
ICT, and human development indicators that had previously only been available to paid 
subscribers.  
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Third, there has been considerable enthusiasm for an inclusive development process in 
recipient countries, particularly by citizen engagement (World Bank 2014b; Chambers 
1997). Stakeholders emphasize beneficiary feedback in the design, implementation, 
tracking and evaluation of development programs. As previously discussed, however, 
the notion of a digital divide has extended beyond the access to information and 
technology to the broader view of achieving human development of beneficiaries (Sen 
1999) and to apply ICT for fixing the broken feedback mechanism in aid activities 
(Wittemyer et al. 2014). With this backdrop, there is growing interest in how new tools 
including open data, mapping platform and social media can contribute to enhancing 
citizen participation in the aid projects in their own local community, and responding to 
citizens' actual needs and policy preference (Hogge 2010).  
 
The launch of the World Bank’s open data initiatives in 2010 became the ‘tipping point’ 
of spreading the norms of openness in the global field of aid. Several states, cities and 
international organizations across the world have been embracing the idea of ‘openness’, 
establishing ICT platforms, launching open data initiatives with impressive speed, and 
making their information publicly available for re-use and dissemination. More 
importantly, motivated by the national open data initiatives, development agencies in 
donor countries launched their own information systems, often called ‘open aid 
platforms’, as identified in this study in Table 6-4. MDAs have also implemented 
systems based on linked open data including the MDG, WDI dataset, which were also 
greatly recognized in the establishment of a new development aid agenda, the SDGs in 
2015. In this process, traditional rule-supporting organizations including development 
NGOs and research institutes also played an important role as norm entrepreneurs. More 
importantly, new emerging organizations, in particular, the Web Foundation, the Open 
Data Institute based in the UK, and Esri, a GIS specialized American IT company, also 
came into the process.  
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Table 6-4. Donor’s Open Aid Platforms (Summarized from data collected) 
 
The World Bank launched ‘mapping for results’ which has geo-mapped and visually 
summarized all donors’ activities at the project level on the Open Aid Map (OAM) 
platform since 2011. Since then, building on the similar rationales to AIMS, most major 
aid agencies of donor countries and MDAs have developed their own information 
systems to support aid transparency and effectiveness by making aid flow more 
traceable. One of the main objectives of donor’s information systems is, however, 
‘upward accountability’ to their tax payers (donor countries) and member countries 
(MDAs).   
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So far, I have provided a historical overview of AIMS implementation and explained 
their global diffusion in three different periods. Although AIMS are often implemented 
with NPM principles, the inscribed vision and rhetoric of AIMS have changed over time 
alongside shifts in global aid governance, from ‘good governance’, ‘aid effectiveness’ 
and ‘open development’. AIMS are often adopted as norm supporting device, and used 
to reproduce the norms, rules, and institutional structures promoted by the international 
aid governance system. This chapter has identified three different generations in the 
evolution of AIMS. Firstly, PC-based AIMS in transition economies; secondly, web-
based AIMS since the establishment of the Paris Principle in 2005; thirdly, and most 
recently open data AIMS based on the popular notions of ‘open aid’. As AIMS have 
evolved from the initial adoption as an intra-system in recipient governments to more 
transactional and integrated applications as web-based and open data based systems, the 
themes inscribed in AIMS have also evolved. This development illustrates the evolution 
from a ‘managerial’ to a ‘socio-political’ theme and more recently, the addition of 
‘civil’, ‘participatory’ and ‘business’ themes as the evolution of AIMS is summarized in 
Table 6-4 below. In this change, it is clear that the series of HLFs on Aid Effectiveness 
played as the most important driving force to boost the number of countries using AIMS. 
The boundary of target users has been expanded to cover all public users, with the latest 
AIMS focusing in particular on citizens in recipient countries in the latest AIMS. 
However, these diversified target audiences created challenges in usage, and raised 
questions about how to enhance user experiences effectively.  
 
It has been found that institutional isomorphic pressures drove countries to adopt shared 
norms and homogenous practices in aid management. The three isomorphic mechanisms 
are not mutually exclusive and often occurred simultaneously. However, I found the 
analytical categorizations of three isomorphism are useful for explaining the diffusion 
of AIMS as shown in Table 6-7.  
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AIMS 1.0 AIMS 2.0 AIMS 3.0 
PC-based Web-based Open data based 
1996- 2005- 2010- 
Rationality 
(theme)  
Managerial rationality - ‘efficiency, service delivery’ 
 
Socio-political - ‘transparency, accountability, 
coordination as donor’s responsibility, ownership’ 
 
Inclusive – ‘participation, citizen, 
engagement, empowerment’ 
Business – ‘entrepreneurship, job, 
company’ 
Milestones Transitional 
economies 
Paris Declaration 
(2005) 
Proliferation of donors open data 
initiatives (World Bank, 2010); 
Open Government Partnership 
(2011)  
Primary 
target 
users 
Government 
officials 
+ donor agency 
academia, media   
+ public users (citizens),  CSOs, 
private sector, donors’ tax payer 
(donor open aid initiatives)  
Type of 
services 
Database Web-based, GIS, 
analytic tools  
+ Linked open data in machine-
readable and open format for 
reuse, open API  
Aid data 
standard 
CRS CRS++ CRS++, IATI  
Tension &  
challenges 
Paper-based 
and IT enabled 
administration  
Different interests 
and perceptions 
between 
stakeholders  
Aid heterogeneity, too many 
actors, gaps between supply and 
demand, confusion in aid 
standards   
 
Table 6-5. The Evolution of AIMS (Summary from data analysis)  
 
It also seems striking that there are considerable similarities in the implementation 
processes of AIMS. So far, I have discussed the commonalities of technical 
functionalities, user manuals, website, and visions that AIMS inscribe in Chapter 5 and 
6. Based on review of 11 project documents, 9 user manuals and 5 evaluation reports 
from 18 AIMS cases, I identified that there is significant homogeneity in AIMS in terms 
of functionalities and implementation processes. Although generalization may not be 
possible, the common process of AIMS implementation follows seven stages; 1) 
political process, 2) financial process, 3) design/development, 4) data input, 5) 
implementation, 6) usage and evaluation, and 7) policy, as shown in Table 6-6.   
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Stage Key elements Key questions 
1.Political Process  Sharing the needs of AIMS among 
stakeholders 
 Decision-making process 
 Donor’s commitment to data provision  
 External/international pressure 
 Aid data standard: CRS, IATI 
 Who are the stakeholders?  
 Who drives AIMS? 
 Is there relevant legal 
framework / regional or int’l 
aid agreement? 
2.Financial 
Process 
 Financial commitment (bilateral ODA, 
multi-donor trust fund) 
 Hiring IT consultants or vendors and 
staffing  
 Normally, donor provides fund to gov; 
government takes ownership.   
 Who provides funding?  
 Who operates and manages the 
AIMS?  
3. Design & 
Development 
 Government-driven vs ready-made AIMS 
 Meetings with stakeholders  
 Considering the existing data standards 
and classification in data architecture  
 Considering the existing government 
information systems and compatibility   
 Ways of data visualization 
 Beta version test  
 Who are the users?  
 What software, technical 
features? – GIS, linked data, 
API  
 Who provides and enters data, 
what kind of data in what 
format? 
 How to make AIMS 
compatible with existing 
system?  
 
4.Data Input  Donors’ provision of data (sometimes 
with ID/password)  
 Data workshop with donor agencies  
 Feedback mechanism with beta users  
 Data quality control 
 Who is donor focal point?  
 Who does data quality 
control? 
 Normally, donors provide 
data, gov manages, rearranges, 
and does quality control 
5. Implementation  Launch of AIMS, normally with a fancy 
ceremony and vision announcement by 
high-level policy makers  
 Marketing and media coverage 
 Workshop, capacity development 
programs 
 Data management  
 How to advertise AIMS?  
 How are social, political, 
cultural contexts considered?   
6. Usage & 
Evaluation 
 Encouragement of data use, re-use (open 
data)  
 Feedback process 
 Sustainability 
 Data update   
 Research and publication, best practices 
(mainly by donors)  
 How to sustain AIMS?  
 How to update data?  
 How to promote use?  
 How to scale up best practices 
to other contexts? 
 How to promote citizen 
engagement? (most recent 
AIMS) 
7. Policy  Expected outcomes (transparency, 
coordination, accountability)  
 Further legislation and policy dialogue 
 How to enhance actual aid 
coordination and 
accountability? 
 
Table 6-6. Process and Seven Common Stages of AIMS
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Isomorphism Carrier Aid field Stakeholders Episodes Data and Exemplary Quotes Analysis 
Coercive Rules, laws, 
sanctions  
 Aid 
governance 
principle, 
 Aid reporting 
scheme (shift 
from CRS to 
IATI)  
 Major 
donors 
(OECD-
DAC) 
 Int’l org  
 Establishment of High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 
Rome (2002);  
 Paris Declaration (2005);  
 Accra Action Agenda (2008) 
 The OECD Survey on 
Monitoring Paris Declaration 
(2006; 2009; 2011)  
 “We received lots of pressure from 
development partners, why not 
participating the survey, especially 
OECD” [GV4]  
 The survey assessed the effectiveness 
of aid by using 12 criteria.  
 The monitoring survey provided formal rules 
and codes on aid management and reporting.  
 In this process, recipient countries and donor 
agencies were encouraged to use AIMS in 
conducting the survey.  
 The pressure and the formal rules such as 
timely reporting according to standardized 
questionnaires and the official peer review 
process by OECD increased coercion on the 
adopting AIMS. 
Normative Duty, 
obligation 
 Major annual 
development 
report (WDR, 
HDR), 
 knowledge 
dissemination 
 Professional 
community - 
Int’l org, 
Academia 
 Rule-
supporting 
orgs  
 DAC Working party on aid 
effectiveness and AIMS (2006) 
 Series of workshop, report 
provided, in particular, by the 
World Bank and UNDP 
promoted the adoption of 
AIMS in recipient countries 
 Technical assistance for the 
implementation of AIMS.  
 Emergence of open data, Open 
Government Partnership (2009)   
 OECD, WB reports including  
 Lesson learnt from establishing 
AIMS to support nationally-led aid 
coordination (2006)    
 UNDP Success Stories Strengthening 
management for results (2010) 
 Complementary roles for the OECD-
DAC CRS and IATI (2011) 
 “Int’l community became interested 
in how open data can increase 
transparency in the aid sector” [IOi2] 
 “The Open Aid Partnership is a multi-
stakeholder initiative that helps 
promote open development and 
improve aid coordination and 
effectiveness” [IOi0]  
 Two major systems on the market have 
become the Development Assistance 
Database (DAD) developed by Synergy 
International Systems (since 1996), and the 
Aid Management Platform (AMP) by 
Development Gateway (since 2005) 
 MDAs and rule-supporting research 
institutions helped to further institutionalize 
the field. These professional communities 
created normative pressures on recipient 
countries by disseminating cases of ‘best 
practice’ of AIMS and developing indices 
such ATI and the Quality of ODA (QOODA). 
 The emerging new international norm – 
‘openness’ in development has created 
normative pressure on recipient government 
to open-data based AIMS, and follow a new 
aid reporting standard - IATI  
Mimetic Leaning, 
Uncertainty,  
Competition 
 South-South 
cooperation 
 Regional 
development 
agenda 
 Peers in 
regional 
economic  
community 
(ASEAN, 
EAC, CIS, 
LAC); 
market 
 
 Regional – within the transition 
economy countries 
 The uncertainty of the period 
was a crucial force that 
encouraged imitation right after 
the Paris Declaration (2005) 
and before the Busan (2011).  
 Findings show that most web-based 
AIMS after the Paris (2005) were 
homogenous in terms of user 
manuals, project documents, 
functionalities, and even web design 
of AIMS. 
 This may have resulted from the two 
main service providers and 
collaborations with MDAs. 
 When there is ambiguity in interpretations of 
agreed goals or symbolic uncertainty, mimetic 
process is more likely to occurs.  
 By the Accra Action Plan in Ghana in 2008, 
the goals of the Paris Principles and the role 
of AIMS to achieve them were poorly 
understood, both in policy terms and as a 
practical road-map in aid management. 
However, the web-based AIMS were mostly 
implemented in this period (2005-2008). 
 
Table 6-7. Isomorphic Pressure on AIMS in the Global Field of Aid (Selected analysis) 
205 
6.3. Empirical Puzzle: Why do AIMS Fail? 
 
So far, I have discussed the global diffusion based on the findings on 80 AIMS cases 
and traced their implementation over the last two decades. This section discusses how 
AIMS is used in actual practice and investigates their sustainability. As explained in 
Section 4.3.3, the analysed 80 cases of AIMS were classified into three categories: [A] 
in relatively active use, [B] accessible URL but rarely being used, and [C] implemented 
once but shut down. In summary, this study empirically shows that many AIMS diffused 
in recipient countries have not achieved the expected outcomes and even sustainability, 
in spite of the considerable investments made. This is often associated with what Heeks 
(2002) referred to as the “sustainability failure”, in which information system initiatives 
were initially successful in developing countries but then abandoned after a short period 
of time. However, Heeks’ definition does not clearly differentiate between [B] and [C]. 
Based on this analysis, I argue that there is significant difference in the role of 
technology between [B] and [C]. Highlighting the symbolic role of technology, I extend 
the concept of ‘sustainability failure’ of information systems.  
 
6.3.1. Sustainability Failure of AIMS in Recipient Countries. 
 
As discussed in the Methodology Section 4.3, the AIMS identified have been carefully 
traced by visiting the websites and conducting additional interviews with three main 
periods of 2015, 2016 and 2017 respectively. The final modification process was done 
in July 2017 with the result presented in Table 6-8 below.  
 
Among 80 cases, only 16 cases are identified as belonging to Category [A]. Although 
the criteria for distinction between category [A] and [B] are not clear-cut; as well as 
actual practices of AIMS vary in each case, at least these 16 cases have been updated 
and been in use recently (July 2015 – July 2017). Bangladesh, Cambodia, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Georgia(2), Honduras, Jordan(2), Kenya, Malawi, Moldova, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Timor-Leste, and Ukraine(2) are listed as Category [A]. However, 
‘last update’ could mean merely upgrading websites or uploading data without any 
strategic purpose. Thus, the actual number of ‘good practices’ that are actively being 
used may be lower. Data was also triangulated by semi-structured interviews with 
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service providers. Service providers tended to argue that their practices are active. 
However, on the demand side in general, there is lack of evidence when it comes to 
usage by the originally targeted users, particularly citizens in recipient countries. In order 
to further assess the use and impact of AIMS, closer empirical scrutiny of each system 
is needed. 
 
There are 28 cases of AIMS with accessible URLs, however without any recent data 
provision or evidence of usage. These cases use different kinds of platforms and are 
spread across all regions. A particular pattern could not be established, for example, 
AIMS maybe more likely to be successful or less successful in a particular region, or in 
economic status, depending on various factors.   
 
The category [C] is the main interest of research of sustainability failure. Compared to 
the year of implementation, it is not easy to pinpoint when exactly the system is not 
online anymore or the system is shutdown. An ‘abandonment’ is not to be celebrated or 
something to be proud of in many cases. Thus, most cases may just slowly have faded 
away without any note or, evaluation. There are a total of 36 cases of AIMS being shut 
down. This number represents 45% of the total cases researched. Results empirically 
show the majority of AIMS were identified in categories B and C (64 out of 80 or 80%). 
It happened to cases within all different regions, with different service providers. 
Surprisingly there is a lack of critical studies based on the assessment of AIMS, 
compared to plethora reports published by MDAs with hopes of improving aid 
effectiveness. It seems many of them had been shut down without any thoughtful 
reflection and investigation into why they failed to achieve expected coordination goals 
or remain in operation. 
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Table 6-8. Sustainability of AIMS 
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Unstable Sustainability: After the initial data collection in the period of January to 
April in 2015, the AIMS URLs were accessed for further data collection mainly in 
two different time periods from November 2016 to July 2017 respectively. 
However, cases have been frequently accessed while conducting analysis and 
writing results. I found some AIMS were on and off in this period, and identified 
significant instability in those cases: 
 
‘Dying AIMS’: The URLs for the AIMS in Somaliland, Yemen, Papua New Guinea, 
Pakistan, Tajikistan(2), Philippines, and South Africa were accessible at two 
different checking points in 2015 and December 2016. Furthermore, Congo and 
Madagascar even had particularly active AIMS during the initial period of this 
research in 2015. However during the final checking in July 2017, those 9 cases of 
AIMS had to be put in [C] because the URLs became no longer accessible. 
 
‘Back to life’: Several AIMS came back from the status of inaccessibility [C] to [B] 
or [A]. Some AIMS, whose URLs were initially inaccessible, came back online 
during the second phase or the final phase checking. Gambia, Mozambique, Liberia, 
South Sudan, Iraq, and Sri Lanka were moved from [C] to [B], while Senegal and 
Kenya turned out to have a relatively active AIMS and categorized as [A]. In the 
Laos case, the category switch back and forth from [B] to [C] and back to [B]. There 
was a period during the second phase checking in late 2016, when Laos’ AIMS 
were inaccessible. A typical case of instability access is that of the Central African 
Republic. In the very initial data collection in the period of January and April in 
2015, the URL was accessible. It became inaccessible in late 2015, then again 
accessible at two different phases of URL checks in September and December 2016. 
However, the case finally had to be categorized as [C] because in July 2017 it again 
became inaccessible. 
 
There may be various reasons for these instabilities. An interview with an AIMS 
expert in a service provider reflects these issues:   
 
Accessibility is a bit tricky, of course the most obvious example of an accessible 
AIMS is one with a public URL, which one can access from anywhere. However 
there are a few relatively common cases that may be worth considering: i) AIMS 
with a private URL or IP, which are meant to be accessed only within a 
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government intranet, and ii) AIMS with a public URL, which are temporarily 
inaccessible for any number of reasons, such as: internet outages, power outages, 
or planned downtime.  
(Interview with a senior policy officer at an AIMS provider) 
 
Re-defining Sustainability Failure: As discussed, the ascription of failure may be 
socially constructed and diversified. Accessibility is not the only decisive criterion 
of failure. It may still be possible that an AIMS is actively being used internally, 
but is not open to the public. This can be further investigated by using in-depth case 
studies. However, based on the thorough analysis with diverse sources of data in 
this study, it is quite clear that the cases of category [B] and [C] are experiencing 
difficulties in achieving the originally expected outcomes and their sustainability. 
Another counter argument may be that there can be left-over innovation from the 
experiences of AIMS within implementing government organizations, so that it can 
be argued that [C] is not a case of failure.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there is no single decisive boundary in defining success 
or failure as the evaluation process and its criteria depend on individual perspectives 
(Wilson & Howcroft 2002; Bartis & Mitev 2008). However, it is true that the AIMS 
in category [C] did not achieve sustainability for some reason, which I define as 
‘sustainability failure’ in this study. I define the sustainability failure of information 
systems as a ‘permanent shutdown of the system within a relatively short time 
frame, such as three years after implementation, without any transformation, left-
over innovation or thoughtful reflection (evaluation for future innovation)’.  
 
Following this, in this thesis, I conceptualize [B] not as ‘sustainability failure’, only 
consider [C]. I define ‘sustainability failure’ as ‘a permanent shutdown of the 
information system within a short time (3 years) after implementation, without any 
visible transformation, left-over innovation, or thoughtful reflection and evaluation. 
Existing theoretical frameworks of sustainability failure discussed in Chapter 3 
cannot capture the difference between [B] and [C]. According to Heeks’ definition, 
both [B] and [C] are cases of “sustainability failure” that were initially successfully 
implemented but “abandoned after a year or so”. However, it is important to 
distinguish between B and C because the role of technology in [B] and [C] may be 
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different, which I will more discuss in Chapter 8. A hint about this can be found in 
the comments of an interviewee:  
 
Why do we have to shut it down? Anyway it’s our baby. Many people spent a lot 
of time there. Also we invested a lot of money. It is unfortunate nobody is using 
it. But it was good try for aid management. If we have more assistance, or we 
build up our capacity to run it, maybe then we can re-use it. I hope it’s soon.  
(Interview with a former AIMS team member in a recipient government) 
 
It is not possible for this thesis to determine for all 80 cases whether a particular 
case is a success or failure, not only because of the large number of samples, but 
also due to the constructive nature of such an evaluation. Although several 
frameworks in terms of ICT practice in developing countries, aid transparency 
(Publish What You Fund 2016), open data (World Bank 2013), e-governance (UN 
2014) have often been suggested by MDAs and international NGOs, the purpose of 
this study is not applying a pre-fixed evaluation tool to examine whether each case 
is successful or not. Rather, I focus on sustainability failure as conceptualized in 
Chapter. 3, and highlight the emerging question, why have AIMS failed to be 
sustainable? Reflecting the high rate of sustainability failure, this section 
emphasizes the complexity of problems surrounding AIMS. This calls for a new 
approach, avoiding the technical rational approach often applied to AIMS 
promotion and implementation, as well as more in-depth case study to understand 
the hidden institutional dynamics of sustainability failure. 
 
6.3.2. Do State Actors Matter? – Role of State Actor in AIMS 
 
In this section, I discuss one of the empirical findings, which suggests that AIMS 
failure cannot be understood using the existing framework of e-government 
research. In particular, the frequent shutdown of AIMS in emerging economies 
poses an empirical puzzle as it contradicts extant theory of e-government failure.  
 
In particular, cross-national studies on e-government performance based on 
regression analysis often suggest that e-government is more likely to be successful 
in states, that are wealthy, urbanized, transparent, with higher ICT infrastructure, 
literacy, government efficiency and low-level corruption (Kim 2007; Relly & 
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Sabharwal 2009; Rorissa & Demissie 2010; Ferro et al. 2011; Gil-Garcia & 
Martinez-Moyano 2007). Using the E-government Development Index annually 
published by UN, and other socio-economic indicators, such studies have identified 
the correlations between socio-economic indicators of the states and e-Government 
Development Index (how successful e-government is). In spite of the various 
confounding factors, as well as a-contextual approach in a cross-national analysis, 
findings from such studies almost became an orthodoxy and have been used to often 
justify NPM principles in e-government practice in developing countries.  
 
However, the findings from 80 AIMS cases suggest rather contradictory findings. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the correlation between AIMS 
sustainability/success and factors frequently used for e-government research is 
unclear. More importantly, most emerging economies fall into the case of 
‘abandonment’, as outlined in Category [C]. It may not be simply generalized, 
however, as findings also show that it is more likely to find a great number of LDCs 
in [A], in which groups AIMS are in relatively active use, to emerging economies. 
At the same time, it is more likely to find MICs in [C], rather than [B], which groups 
AIMS that are rarely used. 
 
As shown in Figure 6-4, while there is a strong correlation between e-Government 
and economic statue (GDP per capita) in line with extant research, sustainability 
failure of AIMS often occurred in countries with higher e-Government performance 
and upper middle-income countries.   
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Figure 6-4. Mapping AIMS in the Comparison of e-Government Development 
Index and GDP per Capita (Developed by Author) 
 
Furthermore, AIMS is more likely not sustainable in larger economies with higher 
government effectiveness. This includes emerging economies such as Indonesia 
(GDP: 9323 billion USD), India (GDP: 22,640 billion USD), South Africa, 
Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam.  
 
 
Figure 6-5. Mapping AIMS in the Comparison of Government Effectiveness 
Developed by the World Bank and Total GDP (Developed by Author) 
 
This suggests that there is no simple and linear way to identify the unquestioned 
assumptions made in existent multivariate analyses in e-government research. In 
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order to explain this puzzle, understanding state actors in the global context is the 
key to explaining those particular cases of ‘sustainability failure’ where the major 
sources of changes and contingency are to be found on the donor’s side or in the 
global aid governance, instead of the recipient’s side (Ramalingam 2013; Moyo 
2008). Much of the disuse of information systems needs to be explained by tracing 
the change in relations, ideologies, and institutional arrangements among the donors 
and MDAs, which are normally beyond the influence of the recipient country as a 
state actor. Within this macro dynamic, the role of states in the field of international 
aid has rarely been accounted for and theorised in the ICTD literature to explain IS 
failure. 
 
In light of these gaps, the following chapter aims to understand why a donor-funded 
AIMS designed to institute global aid governance principles, in particular, those 
endorsed by the PD, has been implemented, used, and then abandoned in recipient 
country. Taking a closer look at a particular case in Indonesia is important, as it 
illustrates the ‘sustainability failure’ in a struggle with the change of norms, rules 
and relations in a global context of aid. I raise the question, why does AIMS fail to 
achieve sustainability? By tracing the justifications for AIMS failure from their 
local context to the global context, the following Chapter 7 and 8 illustrate how an 
information system failure in Indonesia needs to be understood as a result of macro 
events occurring in the global field of aid.  
 
Furthermore, there is a lack of understanding of the effect of the macro dynamic 
between states and global aid institutions, which often govern, enable and constrain 
development initiatives, on IS failure in recipient countries. In particular IS failure 
has rarely been explained by examining the role of state actors in the macro context 
of global field of aid. Thus, the following chapters present the case study and further 
investigate how the state of Indonesia as an emerging power has actively shaped 
this global-level contingency, in the field of aid, which used to be dominated by the 
global North.  
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6.4. Summary 
 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no published systematic research of the global 
adoption on AIMS. The review and discussion of the diffusion of AIMS in this 
chapter shows that such systems were spread and evolved technologically, 
however, there are major issue of sustainability and questions about the way they 
are actually used and the purposes they serve within recipient countries. This 
chapter has traced the history of AIMS and explored 80 AIMS cases implemented 
in 71 developing countries over the last two decades in order to provide a historical 
overview of the global diffusion of AIMS in the field of aid. It has explained and 
identified their driving forces for the diffusion and the homogeneity of such 
systems. This chapter also offered an understanding of evolution and the main 
rhetoric inscribed in AIMS and how it has changed over time. The analysis enables 
us to highlight the complexity of problems surrounding AIMS. 
 
In the light of the discussion in this chapter, the following chapters seek to answer 
the emerging question of the sustainability failure of AIMS, through an in depth 
interpretive case study of the AIMS in Indonesia. It traces the changes in 
international and domestic aid governance that influenced the unique context of 
AIMS in this emerging economy. The analysis highlights the role of the state in the 
institutional account of AIMS failure. I argue that understanding the failure of 
AIMS requires a shift in focus from the process of aid management to the global 
level. It needs to be seen as a consequence of macro-level events occurring in the 
global field of aid. 
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Chapter 7.  Case Study: AIMS in Indonesia 
 
This chapter elaborates on the case used for empirical fieldwork. The chapter is 
divided into three sections: 
 
 Section 7.1 provides an overview of the geopolitical and economic context 
in Indonesia with a specific focus on the historical significance of foreign 
aid that has influenced transformation of national development policy.  
 
 Section 7.2 offers an overview of aid management mechanism with a 
specific focus on the period of the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(SBY)’s administration (2004-2014).  
 
 Section 7.3 illustrates the technological object of the case study; the 
Indonesian Aid Information Management Systems (AIMS), the national 
level aid management system, which was implemented in 2010, used and 
abandoned in 2012. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is significant 
dependence of aid on its historical, political and global context. A full 
understanding of the AIMS, including its rationale, role, implementation 
and shutdown, can be achieved through using a historical and political lens, 
as done in this chapter. 
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7.1. ‘Dancing with Aid’ - Indonesia’s Strategic Actions with Donors 
 
7.1.1. Indonesia’s Geopolitical and Economic Context 
 
The Indonesian Archipelago consists of more than 17,500 islands whose ‘Tanah 
Air (land and water)’95 constitutes the territory of Republic of Indonesia. Over 300 
ethnic groups make up the more than 257 million (UN World Population Prospects, 
2015)96 people who constitute a population abundant in diversity of languages, 
culture and community. Under the legacy of the founding principles ‘Pancasila’97, 
Indonesian society has enjoyed a full diversity and religious freedom in spite of the 
fact that Indonesia is the country with the largest Moslem population in the world.98 
The national motto ‘bhinneka tunggal ika (unity in diversity)’, envisioned in the 
national development policy, simultaneously embraces pluralism while still 
maintaining national identity (Vickers 2006).  
 
The country has been recognized for its geo-political location as well as great 
capacity for economic growth. Looking back at the history of Indonesia, especially 
the golden era of Sriwijaya (650-1377) and the Majapahit Empire (1293-1527), 
Indonesia has repeatedly earned wealth and glory from its geo-political position as 
the centre between the Indochinese Peninsula and Oceania. Indonesia’s strategic 
location also enables the state to become the centre of the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) 99 . In addition, the fundamental characteristics of 
                                                 
95  Mentioned in the lyrics of the most popular song in the ‘Lagu Wajib Nasional (National 
compulsory song)’. These are the songs about patriotism and independence which must be learned 
by Indonesian students in elementary and secondary school. After the Suharto’s step down in 1998, 
it became not compulsory any more. But, some songs are still very popular and loved by the people 
of Indonesia.  
96 Source: https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp, accessed 1August 2017. 
97
 Pancasila comprises two Sanskrit words, ‘panca’ meaning five, and ‘sila’ meaning principle. It 
consists of five inseparable and interrelated principles: i) belief in the one and only god, ii) just and 
civilized humanity, iii) the unity of Indonesia as a state, iv) democracy guided by the inner wisdom 
in the unanimity arising out of deliberations among representatives, v) social justice for the people 
of Indonesia.  
98
 In the media, Indonesia is often considered as the largest ‘Islamic country’. However, it is not 
true. Although 88% of its population is Moslem, Indonesia is not an Islamic country, meaning not a 
state based on Islamic law as well as having freedom of religion.    
99 The Secretariat of ASEAN was housed in Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia.  
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Indonesia, including in particular the demographic advantage of increasing labour 
force in productive age (67%, 2015)100, as well as large territory filled with natural 
resource, both offer significant potential for economic development and 
industrialisation.  
 
The state, however, underwent a long economic downturn and an era of political 
instability before the new millennium. There is still on-going scholarly and public 
debate on the era of Suharto (1967-1998), controversially called ‘Father of 
Development (Bapak Pembangunan)’, when Indonesia enjoyed the highest growth 
rate in its history. Three decades of authoritarian leadership under Suharto arguably 
failed to achieve the expected performance in socio-economic progress and 
democracy. Scholarly research on this period often focuses on the corruption of 
Suharto’s New Order regime and the nation’s economic development (Juwono 
2016; King 2000). Authoritarian leadership, corruption, nepotism and clientelism 
are often considered to impede on the motivation and development of the nation’s 
capacity for sustainable progress (Robertson-Snape 1999; Goodpaster 2003). 
Transparency International ranked the former President Mohamed Suharto (1967-
1998) as the most corrupt politician in the world, with an alleged embezzlement of 
$15-35 billion (Transparency International 2004). At the end of his term, when the 
Asian Financial Crisis hit the nation in 1997, the economy remained fragile, 
creating massive economic disparity.  
 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, Indonesia has experienced a transition from 
an authoritarian political regime to political pluralism with a multi-party system and 
a decentralized government, with the recovery of economy. Since President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) took the office in 2004, the average of annual 
economic growth rates in his first (2004-2009) and second term (2009-2014) were 
5.64% and 5.80% respectively101. With moderately strong economic growth in this 
period, Indonesia achieved a structural reform in economy and became the world’s 
sixteenth-largest economy (World Bank 2015). In addition to joining G20 in 1999, 
                                                 
100 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS, accessed 7 July 2017. 
101 It is lower than the previous Suharto’s era. However, it is relatively high compared to other 
emerging economies and other ASEAN countries in 2010s. 
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Indonesia was invited to join the club of the OECD Enhanced Engagement 
Countries in 2008, along with four other countries, Brazil, India, China and South 
Africa (OECD 2007). Within the region, Indonesia also has played a key role in 
regional integration and collaboration, specifically through ASEAN. 
 
 
 
Figure 7-1. Indonesian Economic Growth from 1997-2015 
(Figured by author based on the World Bank Data) 
 
In spite of these remarkable achievements in the beginning of the 21st century, the 
progress in socio-economic development can still be improved upon. According to 
the Central Bureau of Statistics Indonesia (BPS: Badan Pusat Statistik), the number 
of people below the national poverty line has surpassed 28.01 million as of 2016. 
Over 40% of the Indonesian population “remain vulnerable of falling into poverty, 
as their income hover marginally above the national poverty line”102, set at 330,776 
Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) per person per month ($22.60)103. This is higher than the 
average of ASEAN member states both in percentage and number104. In addition to 
                                                 
102 Source: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/overview, accessed 18 June 2017 
103  Set by BPS for the period of March-September 2015 as disclosed in the document 
https://www.bps.go.id/website/brs_ind/brsInd-20160104121812.pdf, accessed 19 June 2017. The 
national poverty line is defined according to each country’s specific economic and social conditions. 
104 The international poverty line ($1.90 per day) set by the World Bank has been periodically 
updated to reflect price data of basic food, clothing, and housing needed around the world. The new 
global poverty line $1.90 was updated in October, 2015, and generally used in comparing poverty 
measures across countries.  
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the poverty reduction in the most impoverished group, the goal to surpass the status 
of middle-income to that of high-income country by 2025, is still the most important 
priority in the national development agenda as well as development cooperation 
with donors. 
 
[B]y 2025 our country will be in phase to set actually move towards a developed 
country. This is our vision for 2025.  
(President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s speech  
commemorating the 64 year of independence, Jakarta on 14 August 2009, p.9)  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the effect of foreign aid on the economic and social 
development of recipient countries has been a controversial issue. Some empirical 
studies of aid advocate the positive impact of foreign aid on economic growth, while 
other studies highlight that it increases recipient government’s aid dependency and 
causes structural distortions of their economy. Whether positive or negative, the 
central role of foreign aid in Indonesian economy and politics, however, cannot be 
ignored. 
 
7.1.2. History of Foreign Aid in Indonesia 
 
7.1.2.1. Colonization and the Politics of Foreign Aid 
 
Whereas freedom is the inalienable right of all nations, colonialism must be 
abolished in this world as it is not in conformity with humanity and justice  
(The first sentence of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia)   
 
Indonesia’s political and historical legacy continues to have an influence on the 
current debate over national development plans and perspectives on foreign aid in 
many ways. In this sense, we need a historical lens to understand the mechanisms 
of foreign aid in Indonesia and its development policy. Foreign aid has been an 
important component of Indonesian domestic politics and economy since the period 
of colonization. At the same time, it has been considered a diplomatic tool for donor 
countries to seek their own military, political and economic advantage since the 
establishment of Indonesia as a nation state (Hindley 1963). Remembering the 
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discussion in Section 2.3, “we need to stop pretending that aid is not a political 
issue”.  
 
Indonesia was a Dutch colony named the Dutch East Indies, Hindia Belanda in 
Bahasa Indonesia, for three and a half centuries, until the Dutch Army surrendered 
to the Japanese military without pre-condition in East Java in 1942 during the 
Second World War105. The Japanese government was first welcomed by Indonesian 
nationalists due to its propaganda ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ 
(GEACPS:大東亜共栄圏 ), which sounded like an antithesis to Western 
imperialism and appeared as a new momentum for Indonesian development. The 
vision was first introduced in a radio speech by Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro in 
1940:  
 
The countries of East Asia and the regions of the South Seas are geographically 
close, historically, racially and economically very closely related to each other. 
They are destined to cooperate and minister to one another’s needs for their 
common well-being and prosperity, and to promote peace and progress in their 
regions. The uniting of all these regions in a single sphere on the basis of common 
existence and assuring thereby the stability of that sphere is, I think, a natural 
conclusion.106 
(Japanese Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro’s speech, 29 June 1940)  
 
Before long, Indonesian nationalist leaders, however, began to realize that the 
Japanese vision of GEACPS was nothing but the constructed rationale for justifying 
the invasion and exploitation of Indonesia. When Indonesia declared its 
independence from the Japanese Military Imperialism on 17 August 1945, two days 
after Japan’s surrender, its independence and national development were not simply 
a domestic matter, but an important issue to major players in the international 
political economy such as for the US, Japan, China, the Netherlands, as well as the 
USSR (Ricklefs 2001).  
 
                                                 
105 Kalijati Agreement, signed on March 8, 1942 
106 29 June, 1940 (from the citation in ‘Sources of East Asian Tradition: The modern period, Vol.2 
edited by Theodore De Bary, 2008, Columbia University Press) 
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The ‘dwitunggal (united duo)’ Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed 
Indonesia’s independence, and were immediately appointed as the first President 
and Vice-President of Indonesia upon its independence. As soon as the Hague 
agreement107 with the Netherlands was signed in 1949, the very first foreign aid of 
$40 millions to Indonesia was scheduled to be delivered via the US Marshall Plan. 
In the following year, the foreign aid from the Western world, including $53 
millions of the Dutch foreign aid as well as $74.9 million from the US, were 
delivered to Indonesia. Foreign aid from Western countries, however, decreased 
during the early period of Sukarno’s regime in 1950s. The hesitancy of Indonesian 
government to admit its planned alignment with the Western world was an 
important reason for this decrease (Friend 2003; Hindley 1963).  
 
7.1.2.2. Sukarno’s Leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement (1945-1967) 
 
As a state led by strategy and bureaucracy, Indonesia arguably profited from the 
Cold War context. Although Sukarno relatively strengthened the ties to the 
Communist bloc, including to the Soviet Union and China in his late presidency108, 
Sukarno’s era is more known for being neutral towards receiving aid from both the 
West and the East, as well as allying the state in the Non-Aligned world. In the 
wake of World War II, the hegemony of imperial powers was diminished by anti-
colonial movements in the Third World, as previously discussed in Chapter 2. In 
spite of rising tensions of bipolarity that emerged between the US and the Soviet 
Union, as well as pressure to align with either capitalist or communist ideology, the 
leaders of the Third World arguably had little interest in taking a particular side 
within this contention (Tomlinson 2003; Berger 2004). The situation of Indonesia 
was not different, as Vice President Mohammad Hatta expressed: 
  
                                                 
107 The Indonesian-Dutch Round Table Conference held in Hague from August to November in 
1949. The conference ended with the Dutch agreeing to transfer sovereignty to the Republic of the 
United States of Indonesia (RUSI). There had been international pressure via the UN on the Dutch 
to officially withdraw their intention to reoccupy Indonesia and grant independence. 
108 Sukarno’s Independence Day speech on 17, August, 1965. He suggested “the Axis of Jakarta-
Phnom Penh-Hanoi- Beijing-Pyeongyang. 
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Have the Indonesian people fighting for their freedom no other course of action 
open to them than to choose between being pro-Russian and pro-American? Is 
there no other position that can be taken in the pursuit of our national ideals? The 
Indonesian government is of the opinion that the position to be taken is that 
Indonesia should not be a passive party in the area of international politics but that 
it should be an active agent entitled to decide its own standpoint. 109 
(Indonesia’s Vice President Mohammad Hatta’s speech on 2 September 1948, 
Translated) 
 
Defending its right to neutrality and pursuing an independent diplomatic policy, 
Indonesia initiated the Non-Aligned Movement, playing an active role in the 
international arena by consolidating the Third World. Indonesia hosted the Asian-
African Conference in Bandung, also known as the Bandung Conference, in 1955. 
The Conference is widely perceived as the first attempt to establish the foundations 
of Third World unity, where 29 newly independent countries shared their 
opposition to colonialism and concerns about Western powers (Asian-African 
Bandung Conference 1955). The Bandung conference promoted the attitudes of 
newly independent countries from colonization towards the Cold War by laying the 
foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement to counter both the influence and power 
of the US and the USSR (Acharya 2016). More importantly, the Conference 
provided the underpinnings for the development cooperation within between the 
Third World, also later commonly referred to as South-South Cooperation (SSC). 
In the Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference of Bandung (24 April 
1955):  
 
The Asian-African Conference recognised the urgency of promoting economic 
development in the Asian-African region. There was general desire for economic 
cooperation among the participating countries on the basis of mutual interest and 
respect for national sovereignty.  
(Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference of Bandung, Article 1) 
 
The participating countries agreed to provide technical assistance to one another, 
to the maximum extent practicable, in the form of: experts, trainees, pilot projects 
and equipment for demonstration purposes; exchange of know-how and 
establishment of national, and where possible, regional training and research 
institutes for imparting technical knowledge and skills in co-operation with the 
existing international agencies. 
 (Ibid, Article 2)  
                                                 
109  In the then Vice President Mohammad Hatta speech made before the Central Indonesian 
Committee (KNIP) on 2 September 1948. 
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This Bandung vision endorsed by the 29 countries succeeded and was 
institutionalized in a larger space toward Non-Aligned Movement. Building on the 
solidarity within the South and the real fear of war after the Korean War, the Non-
Aligned Movement was established in 1961 in order to institutionalize their efforts 
within the field of international development and address the structural challenges 
in development – such as organizing the Group of 77 in the United Nations, and the 
UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to focus on the economic 
disparity between the North and South. Within this, Sukarno portrayed himself as 
the leader and head of the Non-Aligned Movement, which he later described as the 
“newly emerging forces”. The started legacy still permeates to Indonesian politics 
nowadays, as shown in the second Asian-African Conference Summit in 2005, 
chaired by Sukarno’s daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri110, and the third Summit in 
2015, chaired by the current President Joko Widodo (2014-present) 111 , where 
Indonesia actively propagate South-South Cooperation.  
 
This alliance with non-Western countries echoed the notion of ‘Berdikari (standing 
in one’s own feet)’112, the self-reliance doctrine declared by President Sukarno. It 
was officially introduced in his ‘Tahun Vivere Pericoloso (Year of Living 
Dangerously)’, Independence Day speech, delivered on 17 August, 1964, where he 
suggested Trisakti113, i.e. economic self-reliance, political sovereignty, and cultural 
identity. Interestingly, quoting North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung’s speech in June 
1947, Sukarno highlighted:  
 
(…) without the foundation of an independent economy, we can neither attain 
independence, nor found the state, nor subsist. 114 
(Sukarno, Presidential speech at the Independence day, 17 August 1964) 
 
                                                 
110 Indonesia’s first female President (2001-2004), and the current head of Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle (PartaiDemokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) 
111  The theme was ‘Strengthening South-South Cooperation to Promote World Peace and 
Prosperity’. 109 Asian and African countries, 16 observer countries and 25 international 
organizations participated. 
112 Abbreviation of Berdiri di atas Kaki Sendiri, literally meaning ‘standing in one’s own feet’.  
113 ‘three energies’ or ‘three principles’ in Sanskrit. 
114 Wilson Center Digital Archive, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116520, 
accessed 19 April 2017. 
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He proposed that Indonesia should ‘banting stir (turn the wheel)’ from depending 
heavily on multinational firms to ‘exploit’ national resources and labour forces. In 
his well-known Independence Day speech in 1965, also known as, ‘Raihlah 
Bintang-Bintang di Langit: Tahun Berdikari (Reach for the Stars in the Sky: Year 
of Berdikari)’, or shortened as just ‘Takari’,115 he again clarified Berdikari rejects 
the dependency on imperialism, but instead “expands international cooperation, 
especially among all the new independent nations.” 
Without this stance, Indonesia would not have attempted to leave the United 
Nations. When Malaysia was appointed to serve on the UN Security Council, 
Indonesia declared the withdrawal of its membership from the UN as a sign of 
protest. In Sukarno’s view, the existence of Malaysia, a commonwealth nation, was 
the Britain’s way to sustain a colonial influence in the region. Indonesia then 
consistently refused to recognize the existence of Malaysia and pursued a policy of 
aggression towards the new state (Livingstone 1965). This might seem 
contradictory, to oppose the neighbour’s independence from imperial power while 
leading Non-Aligned Movement. Sukarno, however, viewed Malaysia ‘as a puppet 
country of the Commonwealth’, and hoped Indonesia to remain a power in the 
region. Sukarno maintained that real independence can only be achieved by 
‘standing on its own feet’, not by trying to gain legitimacy from international 
powers such as the United Nations. He affirmed that:  
 
[T]he crowning of independence is not the membership of the UN, but the ability 
to stand on our own feet (Berdikari)116.  
(Sukarno, Presidential speech at the 20th Independence day commemoration,  
17 August 1965) 
 
Indonesia is the first member state of the UN to either have withdrawn membership 
or to have threatened to do so. Its decision brought huge political repercussions 
within the UN and raises a number of crucial questions of a legal, practical and 
academic nature – to what extent does a state actor have the right to withdraw from 
the UN, or more broadly, to deinstitutionalize itself from the international regime? 
What are the strategic effects of the action? (Livingstone 1965) 
 
                                                 
115 At the 20th Independence Day commemoration, on 17 August 1965. 
116 In this speech on 7 January 1965. 
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In this context, foreign aid was employed a tool for the positioning of Indonesia, as 
well as for reinforcing the boundaries of the state in the region of territorial disputes 
(Pollard 2009). Indonesia leveraged its strategic neural position and thereby can be 
said to have arguably ‘enjoyed’ the Cold War dynamic (Hill 2000). Indonesia 
received aid from both the Soviet Union and the US during the late 1950s, as 
attempts were made to exploit local fault lines within the archipelago through 
military aid (Friend 2003). At certain times, Sukarno arguably knew how to play 
his cards as aid recipient, realizing that his nation has a potential to find leverage, 
as  
 
Indonesia’s geographic position along the strategic Straits of Melaka and the 
South China Sea, its status as the most populous Muslim country in the world, and 
its possession of extensive oil reserves made it an important prize pursued by both 
Western and Soviet strategists. Under its flamboyant independence leader 
Sukarno, Indonesia went through numerous policy shifts as it attempted to position 
itself vis-à-vis both blocs.  
(Van Dijk et al., 2008: 437, Emphasis added) 
 
After the conflict with the West on the issue of Malaysia, Indonesia finally broke 
its aid relations with the West in the mid-1960s due to the geopolitical contingency. 
Sukarno’s message to the then American Ambassador Howard P. Jones, “go to hell 
with your aid” 117  and his confident speech that Indonesia would not collapse 
without foreign aid, emblematize Indonesia’s acrimonious goodbye to Western 
donors. 
  
                                                 
117 Chicago Tribune, 26 March 1964, 
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1964/03/26/page/12/article/sukarno-says-u-s-can-go-to-hell-
with-aid 
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7.1.2.3. Suharto’s New Order and Continued Tension with the West (1967-
1998) 
 
The break of aid relations with the West did not last for very long. After the disorder 
and violence in 1965 and 1966, the new President Suharto came into office and 
pushed for the complete opposite direction of Sukarno’s diplomacy (Vickers 2005; 
Friend 2003). Suharto was a leader in the army, the military branch with close ties 
to the West, compared to the relations of the navy and air force (Van Dijk et al. 
2008). The overarching goal of the ‘Orde Baru (New Order)’ was again to ally 
Indonesia with the West rather than with the Soviet Union, and to develop amicable 
relations with its Western donors (Vickers 2005; Hadiz 2006). In addition, 
Indonesia returned to the UN in September 1966, by sending the message it “has 
decided to resume full co-operation with the United Nations and to resume 
participation in its activities.”118 Interestingly, it was not required to reapply for 
membership although Indonesia had not been included in the General Assembly 
and not been treated as a member state during its ‘absence’. Instead, the Chairman 
of General Assembly stated that “[i]t would therefore appear that the Government 
of Indonesia considers that its recent absence from the organization was based not 
upon a withdrawal from the United Nations but upon a cessation of co-operation.” 
(Blum 1967; American Society of International Law 1966).  
 
Indonesia’s changing Cold War affiliations in international relations were pivotal 
in re-organizing the dynamics for aid coordination. Importantly, the shift led, in 
1967, to the establishment of the first dedicated mechanism for coordinating donors, 
the Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) (Friend 2003). This brought 
together all of Indonesia’s non-communist creditors, and was chaired by a former 
colonial power, namely the Netherlands. They made arrangements to reschedule 
Indonesia’s debt repayments to lenders. Indonesia began to receive significant 
                                                 
118 Telegram dated 19 September 1966 from the Ambassador of Indonesia to the United States of 
America Addressed to the Secretary General. See UN Doc S/7498 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/7498 
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amounts of foreign aid from the West, with a group of officials trained in the West 
“The Berkeley Mafia”119 (Ransom 1970).  
 
The Suharto administration continued to ‘reformasi (reform)’ align economic 
policy with the World Bank and IMF in the 1970s and adopted so-called reform 
measures 120  to attract foreign direct investment with strict domestic state-led 
controls (Hill, 2000, O'Rourke 2002). In 1969, Indonesia’s joining the anti-
Communist world of capitalism was symbolized by several head of state visits, 
including one by then US President Richard Nixon (Pollard 2009). Suharto drove a 
large scale deregulation of financial sector and privatization in the 1980s. The 
government received a large amount loan from the World Bank without any 
conditionality attached in 1980s. However, Indonesia’s total debt rose sharply to 
almost US$80 billion between 1988 and 1992 (Chowdhury & Sugema 2005). 
Indonesian nationalists became concerned that their country was becoming 
vulnerable to outside pressure from foreign donors (Ricklefs 2001; Pollard 2009).  
 
In 1992, the 25-year long existing donor coordination body chaired by Netherlands, 
IGGI, was dissolved. Tension then increased between Indonesia and donors 
unexpectedly, when international criticism grew over the Santa Cruz incident121  in 
East Timor on 12 November in 1991. Although the Netherlands and Indonesia had 
historically been involved in several frictions, the triggering event of fierce dispute 
was the return of the former Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation, Johannes 
Jan Pronk122 (1973-1977 and 1989-1998) to the Ministry as well as the then chair 
of the IGGI.  
 
                                                 
119 “The Berkeley Mafia refers to a group of five U.S educated Indonesian economists who studied 
and earned PhD at the University of California, Berkeley. They were appointed in the beginning of 
the Suharto’s 'New Order'. They brought Indonesia back to strategic cooperation with the US and 
led liberal approach in development policy in Indonesia. For more information, see Ransom (1970) 
“The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre”, Ramparts, Vol. 9, No. 4, October 1970, pp. 
26-28, 40-49. PDF available at 
http://la.utexas.edu/users/hcleaver/357L/357LRansomBerkeleyMafiaTable.pdf 
120 Based on Parliamentary Decree (Tap MPRS No.XXIII/MPRS/1966).  
121 Also known as the Dili massacre, which has arguably been considered as the East Timorese 
genocide during the Indonesian ‘occupation’ of East Timor.  
122 Picture in the figure below 
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The two personalities of Suharto and Pronk, as well as their “history of bad blood 
between two men”, also played an important role in these historical developments 
(Gillies, 1996: p.186). Dutch Minister Pronk proposed an international ‘human 
rights’ investigation on the Santa Cruz incident. Suharto’s perceived the 
Netherlands had “exaggerated eagerness to resort to the use of development 
assistance as a tool of intimidation”.123 From the perspective of the Indonesian 
government, Pronk, born in 1940, was considered as the post-World War II 
generation who does not feel the guilt from “the heap of ashes of an exceedingly 
painful historical past resulting from centuries of inhuman colonial subjugation as 
well as from barbarous atrocities carried out by colonial forces during the war of 
independence”124. Suharto, who then was already in his 6th presidential term in 
1992, has been particularly sensitive in coping with critiques towards the New 
Order Regime and his dictatorship. Thus, when Suharto heard that Pronk visited 
Dili in East Timor, and met with leaders of anti-Suharto movements in several 
cities, the relationship between the two reached it to the worst point. This 
idiosyncratic contingency seemed significant as Suharto decided to dissolve the 
IGGI in early 1992.  
 
The official letter signed by Indonesia's Coordinating Minister of Economy, Radius 
Prawiro, requested the Dutch to completely terminate all development assistance to 
Indonesia, and also to refrain from convening another IGGI meeting. The letter 
eloquently conveys obvious anger in a polite manner. One of the interviewees, 
senior government officers in Ministry of National Development Planning 
(hereafter, Bappenas)125 proudly still calls the letter “what a beautiful letter!”126 
 
However, relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands have recently 
deteriorated sharply as a consequence of the reckless use of development 
assistance (by the Netherlands) as an instrument of intimidation. Such reckless 
use of development assistance as a tool of threatening Indonesia has resulted in a 
rapid deterioration of relations between our two nations (…)  
 
                                                 
123 The letter from the government of Republic of Indonesia to the Government of Netherlands, on 
24 March 1992. The copy of the original official letter sent to the Prime Minister of the Netherlands 
was obtained from the field work, on 24 March 1992. 
124 Same letter 
125 Abbreviation of Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional  
126 Same letter 
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Therefore, since this exaggerated eagerness to resort to the use of development 
assistance as an instrument of intimidation seems to continue unabated, the only 
remaining option to prevent further erosion of relations between our two nations 
is to terminate completely all development assistance from the Netherlands to 
Indonesia (…) 
 
Accordingly, this letter formally conveys the wish of the Government of Indonesia 
to have the Government of the Netherlands terminate the disbursements of all on-
going development assistance in the form of loans as well as grants from the 
Netherlands to Indonesia immediately, at the latest one month after the date of 
receiving this letter. 
(Letter from the Government of Republic of Indonesia to the Government of 
Netherlands, 24 March 1992) 
  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the alliance with Indonesia became less 
important as a strategic priority for Western countries. Thus, it may not be easy for 
a recipient state to manage the aftermath of this crisis with the help of major donors, 
as well as to simultaneously develop a new post-Cold War relationship with donors. 
Indonesia’s strategic action and its assertive aid policy to donors, however, arguably 
worked quite well. Suharto administration was able to immediately replace the 
IGGI with the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI).  
 
Domestically, the nationalistic action against the former colonial power and 
political rhetoric of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘independence’ gained enormous support 
from the public. Indonesia has also successfully lobbied other donors to replace the 
IGGI by the CGI, chaired by the World Bank (Anwar 1995). The Netherlands, in 
spite of its chairmanship, only contributed less than 2% of IGGI’s total 
commitment. Indonesia smartly approached other main donors – such as the World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), and Japan – who had contributed to 80-
85% of IGGI’s annual commitment.127  Furthermore, it was finally successful to 
attract new donors including South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Denmark, Kuwait Fund 
for Arab Economic Development, and the Nordic Investment Bank. While the IGGI 
only had 17 donors as members, the CGI has 29 members, including the new donors 
mentioned above.  
                                                 
127 ‘Selamat Tinggal IGGI, Selamat Datang CGI (Goodbye IGGI, Welcome CGI)’ in Kompas, 26 
June 2015, p. 66. Also available online 
http://print.kompas.com/baca/polhuk/politik/2015/06/26/Selamat-Tinggal-IGGI%2c-Selamat-
Datang-CGI 
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‘Suharto’s timing was impeccable (Gillies 1996). He may have made up his mind 
to liquidate the Dutch Program as early as in December 1991, but in order to score 
points, he waited until March 1992 before going public.’ It was when Indonesia had 
taken over the chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement, which was set to meet 
in Jakarta in May 1992, where he would also address the trend of tying political 
strings to aid. Nevertheless, Suharto had carefully calculated the economic 
consequences of his political decision.  
 
On the same day of the appeal to bring the IGGI to an end, Indonesia was able to 
officially request the World Bank, a much bigger donor, to host and chair the new 
donor coordination body, CGI. A letter was sent to World Bank President, signed 
on 24 March 1992 by Indonesia’s Finance Minister, J.B. Sumarlin on behalf of the 
Indonesian government128. It was perceived that Indonesia “would be well served 
by adopting the predominant international model for aid coordination” and by doing 
so would secure the benefits “of a neutral, informed, multilateral chair to oversee 
the coordination of assistance to Indonesia from all sources”. Indonesia further 
expanded its aid relationship with other major donors such as the World Bank, 
ADB, Japan and Australia in the 1990s.  
 
So far, I have illustrated the historical context of aid in Indonesia and its domestic 
policy change. Figure 7-2, in the next page, present a summary of the milestone of 
foreign aid to Indonesia (1942-1998). This section also identifies the dynamic 
relationship between major donors and Indonesia. As previously discussed, aid is 
not apolitical. It is never as linear nor simple as a donor country just giving 
resources to a recipient country; rather it is the complex mechanism with diverse 
stakeholders, heterogeneous practices, and conflicting but intertwined values. This 
section confirms the centrality of this complexity as well as the historical and geo-
political nature of aid. Although it may be a story of the past, the Indonesia’s vision 
discussed in this section – ‘Pancasila’, ‘non-align movement’, and ‘independence’, 
‘ownership’ has often been revisited by political leaders and the people of 
Indonesia. In addition, from the events throughout the dissolution of IGGI, there is 
growing recognition that human rights issues have become the concern for donor 
                                                 
128 The copy of the original official letter sent to the President of the World Bank, on 24 March 1992.  
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countries. After the fall of Suharto dictatorship and the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 
the new generation of Indonesian politics put much effort into being a respected 
member of the international community, and aligning its domestic policy to global 
common goals and norms. In the following sections, I will discuss how the history 
of aid in Indonesia and seemingly dormant logics shaped recent aid reforms and 
influenced the implementation of AIMS. 
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Figure 7-2. Milestones in Foreign Aid to Indonesia (1942-1998) 
(constructed by author) 
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7.2. Shifted Goals in Aid Management in the Yudhoyono Presidency (2004-
2014) 
 
The inauguration of Indonesia’s first directly elected president, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (SBY) as 6th President in 2004129 could be marked as a turning point in 
managing aid flow in two ways: 
 
1) Domestic reform, focusing on government’s better aid management with 
stronger ownership, and  
 
2) Internationally, expanding Indonesia’s role in the global field of aid.  
 
Indonesian development policy is greatly influenced by the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis that caused President Suharto to step down and terminate his dictatorship of 
32 years. The Crisis caused volatile inflation, 65% in the prices of the basic 
commodities, and the GDP growth rate to dramatically shrink by 13.6% (Hill 2000). 
Shortly after, during the presidencies of Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibi (B.J. Habibi) 
(1998-1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) and the first female President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), the country had moved from an autocracy to 
democracy. Media and academia enjoyed much greater freedom of speech; the 
number of political parties dramatically increased to more than forty, compared to 
three during the Suharto era.  
 
Under Suharto’s New Order era, foreign aid played a big role as ‘budget support’ 
to supplement the domestic economy by helping the government to maintain fiscal 
stimulation and the increasing budget for defence systems and infrastructure. 
Foreign aid was considered ‘development income’ and was used to create the 
illusion of ‘balanced budget’. During the Crisis, the amount of foreign aid increased 
                                                 
129 The first direct presidential election was held in 2004, based on the fourth amendment of the 1945 
Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945), under the spirit of political reform. Prior to that, the 
constitutional mandate for presidential election was carried out by the People's Consultative 
Assembly (MPR:Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat). 
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from 2% in 1997 to 4.5% of total GDP 130 as well as up to 28% of government 
revenue in 1999, which contributed to Indonesia’s being a highly-indebted country 
(Chowdhury & Sugema 2005). The IMF’s prescription for the Indonesian debt 
crises, which was agreed to by the government towards the end of the Suharto 
administration, was often criticized for its effectiveness and conflicting financial 
and political objectives (Nanda 2006). Indonesian scholars raised concerns about 
the government’s management of foreign aid and its adverse effects on the 
Indonesian economy during the Crisis (Chowdhury & Sugema 2005). Furthermore, 
recovery of the country’s image from the Crisis and its political turmoil followed 
became an emerging priority in SBY’s era (Fitriani 2015). The following sections 
will discuss the government’s efforts in finding a best way in managing aid as well 
as positioning Indonesia as a respected member in the international community.  
 
7.2.1. Domestic Ownership: Focusing on Aid Management and Regulation 
Change 
 
In 2004, SBY, the retired Lieutenant General as well as the former Mining and 
Energy Minister and Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs, won 
the majority vote of 60.62% defeating the incumbent President Megawati in the 
final round of Presidential elections, held on 20 September 2004131 . Although 
devastated Indonesia’s economy was dramatically recovered after the Crisis during 
SBY’s first term (2004-2009), foreign aid remains an important part of the 
government’s revenue. During the SBY’s tenure, aid dependency in Indonesia132 
                                                 
130 This does not include the IMF loan which went to the Bank of Indonesia (BI) as a 'supplementary 
funds'. If this is included in the statistics, the aid dependency meaning aid-GDP ratio will be around 
10%  (Chowdhury & Sugema 2005).  
131 SBY also served as the Coordinating Minister in Megawati’s cabinet (2001-2004). However, he 
established a new party, Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat) in 2001, and ran for the office. For 
details: http://www.demokrat.or.id/sejarah. With his perceived communication skills, his reputation 
grew as Minister. By positioning himself as an underdog against Megawati, he gained popularity 
very fast. Lesmana (2009) described how resentful the relationship between Megawati and SBY has 
been. This could be one of the reasons that the power transition in 2004 have gone far from smoothly 
with the absence of communications. Megawati didn’t even attend SBY inauguration in October 
2004.  
132 Net ODA received (% of GNI). Source: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS?locations=ID, accessed 7 July 2017.  
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was not high, but the total net aid flow to Indonesia was still higher compared to 
other developing countries133. Indonesia’s access to highly favourable loan terms 
was declining. Net ODA to Indonesia was USD 2.842 billion in 2005, but 
dramatically decreased and reached minus USD 381.8 million in 2014 (Source: 
OECDStat 2017). Since 2005, net ODA had averaged 0.4% of GNI (World Bank 
2011). As of 2015, the top five donors are Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA), World Bank, ADB, Australia and Germany. Against this backdrop, the 
SBY administration made efforts to improve governance and focus on building the 
capacity to effectively manage aid and decrease aid dependency. 
 
To achieve better aid management, his administration shifted the Indonesian 
government’s stance on foreign aid. The government viewed it as a means to 
supplement domestic finance, but as a catalyst for enhancing socio-economic 
development; improving institutional capacity; and promoting knowledge transfer 
by sharing best practices in development, as well as technical assistance and 
vocational training from development partners (Bappenas, 2011). The 
administration introduced two main measures that provided the impetus for 
implementing the principles, which I will discuss in detail in the following section. 
 
1. National Development Plan: the government established the five-year 
National Medium Term Development Plan (RPJMN: Rencana 
Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional) under the 20-year National 
Long Term Development Plan (RPJPN: Rencana Pembangunan Jangka 
Panjang Nasional). 
 
2. Aid management regulations: the government issued a particular 
regulation in aid management: Government Regulation No.2/2006 (PP 
No.2/2006) which was later amended in 2011 as PP No.10/2011.134 
 
                                                 
133 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?locations=ID, accessed 7 July 
2017. 
134 Under the Government Regulation, the implementing regulation - State Ministry of National 
Development Planning (Bappenas) Regulation (Permen PPN) No. Per. 005/M.PPN/06/2006 and 
Permen PPN No.4/2011 was also enacted respectively. 
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Figure 7-3. Milestones in Foreign Aid to Indonesia (1998-2016) 
(constructed by author) 
 
7.2.1.1. National Development Plan 
 
First, the principles for aid management are outlined in the national development 
planning. In fact, the idea of short and long-term planning for national development 
is the heritage of the Suharto administration135. Building on previous experience 
and the emerging focus on aid management, SBY enacted the Law No.25/2004 on 
the National Development Planning System. Under this Law, SBY established the 
20-year RPJPN (2005-2025), five-year RPJMN (2005-2009 and 2010-2014) and 
                                                 
135 Also see “Megawati sindir kepemimpinan: Ganti orang, ganti visi misi (Megawati quips on 
leadership: New leader, new vision and mission)”, accessed on 9 July 2017 from 
http://www.rappler.com/indonesia/118680-visi-gbhn-megawati-soekarnoputri 
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Annual Government Work Plans (RKP: Rencana Kerja Pemerintah) at each of the 
three levels of government administration–national, ministerial and provincial.   
 
 
 
Figure 7-4. Conceptual Development Planning Plan 
(Source: Bappenas, 2010) 
 
RPJPN (2005-2025): This is the 20-year long-term national plan that elaborates the 
vision and mission of the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia, set forth in 
the 1945 Constitution mandate, as discussed in the previous section. The RPJPN, 
thus, is meant to be neutral and can serve for two to four presidents, that is to say, 
four presidential terms. An initial draft was presented by Bappenas to the National 
Development Planning Stakeholder Forum (Musrenbang: Musyawarah 
Perencanaan Pembangunan), in 2004. Based on discussion at the Musrenbang, the 
Head of Bappenas confirmed the final version of RPJPN and submitted it to the 
President for approval. The RPJPN 2005-2025 was finally affirmed by Law 
No.17/2007136, after the President presented it to the House of Representatives.  
 
RPJMN: The 5-year plan is more influential on the development practice. RPJMN 
refers to the vision, mission, and direction set by the corresponding term of RPJPN. 
It also incorporates presidential priorities and international commitments, as 
                                                 
136  Source https://www.bappenas.go.id/files/pendanaan/regulasi/uu-07-2007.pdf, accessed 28 
August 2017. 
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described in Figure 7-4. The key components of the SBY’s RPJMN include national 
priorities including policy reform and better aid management, as well as 
macroeconomic framework and broad resource allocation. The preparation of 
RPJMN starts with research undertaken by Bappenas on “situational analyses of 
Indonesia’s development context”, followed by an “evaluation and unaccomplished 
targets from the previous term RPJMN, as well as all stakeholder input” (Datta et 
al. 2011). Bappenas then prepares the draft of RPJMN for submission to the 
president, and the Musrenbang. As RPJMN is to be approved by President no later 
than three months after the president’s inauguration, RPJMN 2004-2009 was 
affirmed by Presidential Regulation No.7/2005, which instituted a reduction in the 
amount of foreign loans as fiscal policy direction and called for improvement on 
the government loan financing and management program, to achieve the objective 
of macroeconomic stability strengthening.137 
 
7.2.1.2. Establishment of Government Regulations 
 
The second major effort of the government was the legislating of a series of 
regulations. The strong emphasis on the role of government in aid management and 
its reform continued the most significant change in aid governance at the national 
level under the SBY administration. To achieve this, the Government Regulation 
No.2/2006 on the Procedures for Receiving and Forwarding Foreign Loans / Grant 
(PP No. 2/2006) was issued under Law No.1/2004 on State Treasury. It was aimed 
at improving the domestic management of foreign aid and offers general guidance 
for policy makers to negotiate with bilateral and multilateral lenders (Bappenas 
2011).  
 
Under the Government Regulation No.2/2006, an implementing ministerial level 
regulation – the State Ministry of National Development Plan Regulation on the 
Planning, Proposing, and Assessment of Foreign Loans and Grants (Permen PPN 
No. Per. 005/M.PPN/06/2006) – was subsequently established, as a practical guide 
                                                 
137 Chapter 24 of the Presidential Regulation No.7/2005 on National Medium Term Development 
Plan (RPJMN) 2004-2009. 
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for helping decision makers in planning and proposing aid-funded 
programs/projects to donors, as well as in implementing aid activities.  
 
Other important regulations in aid management in SBY's era include:  
 
 Government Regulation No.54/2005 on Regional Government Loans to 
prohibit regional government to enter any agreement on foreign aid 
 Minister of Finance Decree Number 447/KMK.06/2005 to place strategy of 
debt management 
 Government Regulation No.39/2006 on Procedures to control and evaluate 
implementation of development activities 
 
In 2011, Government Regulation No.2/2006 was replaced by Government 
Regulation No.10/2011 with the aim of improving the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the process. The new regulation accommodated provisions on the authorities and 
responsibilities assigned to each institution involved in the management of foreign 
loans and grants; updated the concept of a maximum limit for foreign loans as a 
controlling tool in managing an optimum debt portfolio and financing needs; 
introduced the concept of selecting financing source flexibility; outlined a foreign 
loans usage plan; and established a trust fund as a means of accepting grants. The 
new regulation also further clarified the policy on forwarding foreign loans to 
finance local government budgeting plans, both as loans and grants.  
 
The new regulation specifically highlighted the procedure for accepting grants, both 
from domestic and foreign sources. There was the need for the grant-accepting 
mechanism to be simplified and made easier, to avoid disincentives for donors. 
Therefore, the new regulation set up two alternatives for grants, i.e. planned grants 
and direct grants. Planned grants must follow a certain planning process, while 
direct grants could skip the planning stages although they must still be registered 
and follow the administration mechanism. The two alternatives were expected to 
bridge the interests of both donors and the government, and to accommodate grants 
with a simplified procedure along with improved accountability to all stakeholders. 
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The establishment of these regulations serves as reference for the government in 
conducting dialogue and negotiation with diverse bilateral and multilateral donor 
agencies. Dialogue and negotiation are also underway in order to sort out the donor-
funded activities encountering obstacles that need to be handled with extra care by 
the reallocation and even cancellation of residual, partial or total funds given. These 
processes are as indicated below 138 
 
 
 
Figure 7-5. Foreign Aid Project Planning Flow Chart139 
(Source: Government Regulation (PP) No. 10/2011 & Minister of National 
Development Planning Regulation No.4/2011) 
 
As illustrated in Figure 7-5 above, during the planning stages, line 
ministries/agencies propose activities to be financed with foreign grants/loans based 
on the RPJMN, taking into account the Foreign Loans Usage Plan (RPPLN: 
Rencana Penggunaan Pinjaman Luar Negeri) by fulfilling certain prerequisites. 
Bappenas then conducts an assessment of the proposed activities by considering the 
technical feasibility and the alignment with the RPJMN, to enlist them in the ‘Blue 
                                                 
138 Based on the Government Regulations No. 2/2006 and Government Regulations No. 10/2011. 
139 Note: this flow chart is based on the later issued regulation series of 2011, not the 2005. It does 
not have significant differences in terms of foreign aid project planning procedures.   
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Book’ or List of Medium Term Loans (DRPLN-JM: Daftar Rencana Pinjaman 
Luar Negeri – Jangka Menengah). The Blue Book enlists activity plans which 
would be funded by foreign loans for the medium term period. Subsequently, the 
proposing ministry/agency has to improve the readiness of the listed activities based 
on the readiness criteria. Those activities which have completed readiness 
assessment and have earned indication for foreign funding would then be included 
in the ‘Green Book’140 by Bappenas. The Green Book would be a reference for 
potential donors, to follow up during the project funding negotiation process, which 
may or may not end up in loan or grant agreements (Bappenas 2011).  
 
7.2.1.3. Key Actors in Aid Management and Coordination 
 
The Ministry of Finance (MoF) has the leading role with the mandate to sign all 
foreign loans and grants agreements based on the Law No.1/2004 on State Treasury. 
Bappenas, however, plays key roles in development planning, coordinating donor 
agencies and leading intra-governmental coordination, in particular, between MoF, 
State Secretariat (Setneg), and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). In coordination 
with Bappenas, MoF ensures aid effectiveness and avoids an adverse effect on the 
country. Other ministries, non-departmental agencies and regional governments are 
not authorized to enter any aid agreement or any cooperation which leads to an 
obligation to have loan projects (Bappenas 2011). 
 
Bappenas: Historically, since independence Bappenas has had a primary role in aid 
management, in particular, development planning and aid coordination. Bappenas 
is one of the largest ministries with a total of 40 directorates.141 Under the Deputy 
of Development Funding there are two directorates with responsibility for the 
specific functions of aid coordination with donors - Directorate for Bilateral Foreign 
Funding and Directorate for Multilateral Foreign Funding. It plays key roles in 
terms of aid coordination in bilateral and multilateral development cooperation by 
following the procedures of assessing the project proposals to be funded by foreign 
                                                 
140The official name is Daftar Rencana Prioritas Pinjaman Luar Negeri (DRPPLN) 
141  Source: https://www.bappenas.go.id/id/profil-bappenas/chart-struktur-organisasi/, accessed 30 
July 2017 
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loans and grants (1), drafting and issuing the Blue Book (2), conducting periodic 
meetings with potential donors (3), coordinating project implementation readiness 
(4), and issuing the Green Book (5). Bappenas is also actively involved throughout 
agreement negotiation process with the donors (6). Subsequently, after the 
disbursement of loans and grants, Bappenas serves the monitoring and evaluation 
function by receiving periodical reports on loan and grant usage submitted by the 
line ministries or agencies (7).142 
 
Ministry of Finance (MoF): As discussed previously, the Minister of Finance, or 
the appointed government official on behalf of the Minister of Finance, has the 
mandate to sign all foreign loans and grants agreements, according to Law 
(Undang-Undang) No.1/2004. The MoF is also involved during the series of 
discussions on the drafting of both the Blue Book and the Green Book. The 
proposals for loans and grants are then submitted by the Minister of Finance to the 
potential donors, by referring to the Green Book and government loan allocation 
limit. The MoF is responsible for the negotiation process with donors prior to the 
agreement signing, by also involving the Bappenas and other line ministries or 
agencies. In general, The Minister of Finance is responsible for receiving the loans 
and cash grants by designating the account, and for the administration of both loans 
and grants. In terms of loans, the MoF is responsible of allocating the loans payback 
in APBN (State Budget) and reporting for the payback realization. The Minister of 
Finance serves the monitoring and evaluation function by receiving periodic reports 
of loans and grants usage submitted by the line ministries or agencies, and is also 
responsible for timely publication of information regarding to loans and grants.  
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)143: In terms of conducting foreign relations 
and cooperation, MoFA would of course plays an important role in the coordination 
process to incorporate all the potential in order to create a synergy, and even as an 
initiator to seek for new breakthroughs. MoFA provides the necessary data and 
                                                 
142 See also Figure 7-5. Foreign Aid Project Planning Flow Chart (p.40) 
143  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BukuPanduanUmum Tata Cara 
HubungandanKerjasamaLuarNegeriolehPemerintah Daerah (General Handbook of Procedures for 
Relations and Cooperation Abroad by Local Governments), (Jakarta: Ministry of Foreign Affair, 
2012) p.8  
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information related to the foreign relations and cooperation. Other roles would 
include mediating with foreign partners, promoting domestic potential abroad, and 
facilitating the foreign relations and cooperation activities itself. It also serves the 
role as protector and consultant, so that the cooperation could be effective.  
 
Ministry of State Secretariat (Setneg)144: Setneg is responsible for the coordination 
of technical cooperation between the government and development partners. 
Another key role is the administration of foreign service agreements and tours of 
duty including issuing visa and custom services.  
 
 
 
Figure 7-6. Aid Governance in Indonesia 
(Constructed by Author) 
  
                                                 
144  https://setneg.go.id/index.php?lang=en&option=com_content&task=view&id=1&Itemid=31, 
accessed 30 July 2017.  
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7.2.2. International Role: Aspiration to Be a Respected Player in Global 
Community 
 
7.2.2.1. ‘A Million Friends and Zero Enemies’ 
 
During the SBY’s administration (2004-2014), Indonesia became a lower-middle 
income country with a GDP of USD 3,475 per capita (2013), and a member of the 
G20, which represents the largest economies in the world. Building up on the 
economic achievements, SBY desired for Indonesia to have a more active role in 
international society. ‘A million friends and zero enemies’ 145  symbolizes his 
foreign policy that originates from a long-standing legacy of ‘non-alignment’, and 
well reflects his willingness to reflect ‘Pancasila’ and pay attention to the common 
values of international community such as democracy, peace, and humanitarianism. 
In his inaugural speech146, SBY also declared that he would be consistent with the 
efforts of international community for common goals: 
 
(…) Indonesia would be the voice of conscience to promote peace, to improve 
welfare, and to fight for justice. Indonesia would continue to grow as a democratic, 
open, modern, plural, and tolerant nation. 
(SBY’s Presidential inaugural speech, 10 October 2004) 
 
Speaking at the Meeting on Financing for Development in New York, September 
14, 2005 147 , SBY again welcomed its commitment to global norms of aid 
effectiveness, while recognizing and appreciating efforts made by international 
donors, particularly in the areas of ODA and debt reduction: 
 
We welcome commitment to enhance the quality of aid, which is based on a 
recognition of the needs of the recipient countries. 
(SBY’s Remarks at the Meeting on Financing for Development Forum,  
in New York, 14 September 2005) 
                                                 
145 In his inaugural speech for the second term in 2009. 
146SBY’s inaugural speech, 10 October 2004 retrieved from http://kepustakaan-
presiden.perpusnas.go.id/uploaded_files/pdf/speech/normal/susilo21.pdf, accessed 10 July 2017.  
147 SBY’s Remarks at the Meeting on Financing for Development Forum, in New York, 14 
September 2005, retrieved fromhttp://kepustakaan-
presiden.perpusnas.go.id/speech/?box=detail&id=54&from_box=list_245&hlm=1&search_tag=&
search_keyword=&activation_status=&presiden_id=6&presiden=sby, accessed 8 July 2017. 
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In accordance with SBY’s vision, the SBY government incorporated global issues, 
such as climate change, gender equality, disaster management, and human rights 
into this RPJMN, particularly, in Bab 8 (Section 8): Consolidating Foreign Politics 
and Enhancing International Cooperation.148 Accordingly, line Ministries develop 
their Strategic Plans (Rencana Strategis - Renstra) including of goals, vision, 
policies, and programs based on RPJMN which is broadly developed on the general 
long term 25-years national development goals, RPJPN (Bappenas 2011).  
 
7.2.2.2. South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) 
 
One of the notable efforts of the Indonesian government to achieve an international 
reputation during the SBY’s era was the active engagement in South-South and 
Triangular Cooperation (SSTC). SSTC is a term used by political leaders and 
academics to describe knowledge sharing and development cooperation between 
developing countries, commonly called ‘global South’ as briefly discussed in 
Section 2.3.1. There are two reasons for emergence of the SSTC in the field of 
international development. First, there was growing disappointment towards the 
mainstream development cooperation which has been driven by ‘global North’. 
Second, the ‘global South’ has become increasingly active participants in the global 
economy. The Working Group on Technical Cooperation among Developing 
Countries (TCDC) created by the UN General Assembly in 1972 may be the origin 
of SSTC. In 1978, the UN endorsed the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) for 
Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries 
in order to promote, coordinate and support SSTC globally and within the UN 
system. Since 1980s, Indonesia has engaged in SSTC program, however, the 
contribution was not very significant until mid-2000s.  
 
It was the SBY administration when Indonesia became actively engaged in SSTC, 
particularly, during SBY’s second term in office (2009-2014). The SBY 
government saw an opportunity to promote Indonesia’s position in the global field 
                                                 
148Available at https://www.bappenas.go.id/files/9814/2099/2543/RPJMN_2004-2009.pdf, 
accessed 10 July 2017. 
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of aid through SSTC. It established the National Coordination Team (NCT) of 
SSTC in 2010. The Indonesian effort to lead SSTC saw the country host the 
International South-South Cooperation High Level Meeting on Country-led 
Knowledge Hubs in Bali 2012. At the Meeting, Minister of Bappenas Armida 
Salsiah Alisjahbana declared:  
 
Indonesia is no longer a recipient country, but Indonesia is gradually becoming a 
donor country in those three areas - development; democracy, governance and 
peace-building; and economic management policies for both macro and micro 
finance."  
(Bappenas Minster Armida’ speech at the International  
South-South Cooperation High Level Meeting in Bali 2012, Translated)149150 
 
In 2010, Indonesia established a National Coordination Team (NCT) of South-
South and Triangular Cooperation (SSCT) to cope with Indonesia’s growing 
number of programs and activities. The NCT “coordinates programs from the line 
ministries, connects and formulates cooperation with development partners, and 
monitors the implementation of SSTC programs. It also serves as the national 
contact point of Indonesia’s SSTC151” Similar to aid management, the governance 
structure of the NCT comprises four ministries that work closely with local 
government, NGOs and the private sector shown in Figure 7-7. Under this The 
NCT’s technical team is responsible for three working groups, namely 1) Capturing 
demand, 2) Program and Funding, and 3) Monitoring and Evaluation, Publication, 
and Knowledge Management152.  
 
 Ministry of National Development Planning/Bappenas: Responsible for 
setting priorities for national development, funding and cooperation.  
                                                 
149
 Original quote is "Indonesia sekarang bukan lagi sekedar negara penerima bantuan dari negara 
donor, namun Indonesia secara bertahap menjadi negara donor pada tiga bidang [pembangunan; 
demokrasi, pemerintahan dan pembangunan perdamaian; dan kebijakan pengelolaan ekonomi baik 
makro maupun keuangan mikro." 
150
 'Menteri: Indonesia Jadi Pusat Pengetahuan Dunia (Minister: Indonesia Becomes the World's 
Hub of Knowledge)', Antaranews.com, 10 July 2012, retrieved on 17 May 2017 from 
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/320755/menteri-indonesia-jadi-pusat-pengetahuan-dunia 
151
 SSC Indonesia (Accessed 25 May 2017). “Indonesia South-South and Triangular Cooperation: 
National Coordination Team on South-South and Triangular Cooperation of Indonesia.” http://ssc-
indonesia.org/ksst/index88b6.html?page_id=1095, accessed 14 July 2017.  
152
 Ibid.  
247 
 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Responsible for diplomacy and foreign policy 
 Ministry of Finance: Responsible for resource allocation to Indonesia’s 
international development and cooperation budget.  
 Ministry of State Secretariat: Supports and facilitates foreign technical 
cooperation.  
 
 
Figure 7-7. Role and Functions of Ministries on SSTC in Indonesia 
(Source: Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) p.47) 
 
7.3. Indonesian Aid Information Management System (AIMS) 
 
The technological object of this study is the Indonesian Aid Information 
Management System (AIMS), the national level aid management system 
implemented in 2009, used and abandoned in 2012. The AIMS, however, was not 
Indonesia’s the first experience with an AIMS. The Recovery Aceh Nias Database 
(RAND) was implemented in 2005 after the 2004 Tsunami, with the purpose of 
managing humanitarian assistance. The experiences with RAND provided 
significant lessons to the Indonesian government, particularly, how the importance 
of ownership is in implementing such systems. 
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7.3.1. Previous Experience: The Recovery Aceh Nias Database (RAND) for 
Managing Humanitarian Aid 
 
On 26 December 2004, the magnitude 9.1 earthquake occurred in the Indian Ocean 
and the Tsunami struck Aceh Province, on the north-western coast of Sumatra, 
Indonesia. The region was severely devastated and suffered the worst impact with 
an estimated 108,000 deaths, while 127,700 people were reported missing and 
426,000 displaced by the catastrophe 153 . SBY subsequently set up the 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR: Badan Rehabilitasi dan 
Rekonstruksi) for Aceh-Nias, on April 16, 2005. SBY’s trusted technocrat Kuntoro 
Mangkusubroto, who later become the Head of the Presidential Delivery Unit for 
Development Monitoring and Oversight (Unit Kerja bidang Pengawasan dan 
Pengendalian Pembangunan: UKP4), was appointed to lead BRR and oversee the 
coordination of the post-Tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction program.  
 
The BRR received funding of approximately USD 655 million from Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund (MDTF) executed by the World Bank 154 . In this humanitarian 
emergency, the government established the authority, the BRR, with its special 
powers and limited mandate that was, arguably, politically less difficult, as 
explained by the then Head of BRR, Kuntoro:  
 
President gave me a special authority to do things. I asked the President extra (ad-
hoc) organization and part of the cabinet – my staffs were the highest rank in the 
ministries at bureaucracy level. I set up BRR, and this BRR is basically an 
organization that I can design by myself….  
 
(…) when it comes to visa extension for 8,000 volunteers, then I have to deal with 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. First it can be slow. At the same time they would not 
help me. So, I set up my own unit in Banda Aceh to deal with this. I even extended 
their visa in BRR. 
(Interview with the Head of BRR) 
                                                 
153
 According to US Geological Survey, ‘Indian Ocean Tsunami Remembered — Scientists reflect 
on the 2004 Indian Ocean that killed thousands’, accessed on 13 July 2017 from 
https://www.usgs.gov/news/indian-ocean-tsunami-remembered-scientists-reflect-2004-indian-
ocean-killed-thousands 
154
 ‘After Tsunami, An Aceh Surprise: Good Government’, Wall Street Journal, 2 November 2005, 
retrieved on 2September 2017 from http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113089754732385956 
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Nearly 500 aid agencies, including donor government agencies, international 
organizations, hospitals, and NGOs, flooded the area, providing funds and 
resources, whilst creating multi-layer logistical problems. This proliferation of 
actors and aid heterogeneity dramatically increased the complexity of managing 
aid, making it increasingly difficult to monitor ‘aid flow’ (Mavrotas 2005; 
Ngamassi et al. 2011). Realizing the need for aid coordination among the 
proliferation of players, the BRR started considering an AIMS that could facilitate 
information sharing and the tracking of humanitarian funds in the region. Due to 
time constraints, the BRR tried to implement a ready-made AIMS. In this process, 
mimetic isormorphism is apparent as Kuntoro illustrated:   
 
I have six hundreds NGOs. I have fifty five countries. I have eight thousand 
volunteers, and I have so much equipment coming from abroad. Now the question 
is: where should I allocate all these, right? Where's the database? I don't have a 
database. I cannot develop it myself. Why? Time is pressing. I need it next week. 
So I look around and I find one--the one that's used in Afghanistan by Synergy 
International. UNDP also recommended the system.  
(Interview with the Head of BRR) 
 
The government chose to implement an AIMS known as the Development 
Assistance Database (DAD), developed by Synergy International, an Washington 
DC-based IT service provider, with financial support from the UNDP. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, in the end, UNDP rolled out the DAD to four of the tsunami-affected 
countries – Thailand, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Indonesia. 155  They all utilized 
Synergy International’s DAD platform, and all have the same light-blue coloured 
layout.  
 
Compared to other tsunami-affected countries where a generic, ready-made DAD 
was implemented, the Indonesian RAND had experienced the shaping process of 
the AIMS, in particular by hiring local IT consultants to change the interface and 
add GIS-based mapping components. The system was arguably customized by the 
                                                 
155
 In addition, the Vietnam DAD was adapted to track regular ODA flows unlike the DADs of the 
tsunami countries. Although the Vietnam’s DAD was not implemented for managing humanitarian 
assistance, mimetic isomorphism on AIMS implementation can be seen in ASEAN region during 
this time.  
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BRR staff and local IT consultant with substantial system modification, and finally 
inaugurated in November 2005 and re-named RAND. The RAND enlisted and 
published the names of 621 institutions and individual donors with the total 
donation sum of US$3.8 billion. The Head expressed pride in the configuration 
process by his staffs.  The BRR staff considered RAND as a different Indonesian 
owned system, while realizing challenges in collaborating with foreign service 
providers. How the Indonesia’s first experience of AIMS, the RAND, influence the 
decision making of the second AIMS implementation will be further discussed in 
Section 8.1. To avoid confusion, I present a summary of two AIMS in Table 7-1.  
 
 Recovery Aceh Nias Database 
(RAND) 
Aid Information Management 
Systems (AIMS)  
Implementation November  2005 June 2010 
Main objective Humanitarian assistance ODA  
Current status Accessible but not being used Shutdown  
Provider Synergy International Systems Local IT consultants  
Funder MDTF: Flash Appeal, UNDP, 
WFP and ADB 
GTZ (German Development 
Agency)  
Gov agency Rehabilitation and 
Reconstruction Agency (BRR: 
Badan Rehabilitasi dan 
Rekonstruksi) (Ad Hoc) 
Bappenas (Ministry)  
 
Table 7-1. A Summary of the RAND and the AIMS in Indonesia 
 
7.3.2. Jakarta Commitment  
 
The Jakarta Commitment, initiated by Indonesia and signed by 22 development 
partners on 12 January 2009, represents a milestone in the development of the 
Indonesian AIMS, the technological object of my research. This section traces the 
rationale for implementing AIMS in SBY’s administration. There were two main 
reasons for the growing need in aid coordination and establishing the Jakarta 
Commitment.156 
                                                 
156
 Initial signatory countries as of January 12 2009 are 22 development partners which consists of 
# bilateral donors i.e. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, New Zealand, Netherland, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, UK, and the USA 
as well as # multilateral donors i.e. ADB, EC-EU, Global Fund, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IMF, UNDP, 
World Bank. Six more donors participated in the commitment later. 
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First, the increasing number of development partners and aid heterogeneity were 
the threats to aid management  (Mavrotas 2005). The Indonesia Country Report 
Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration 2011 listed 25 development partners.157 
In 2010, Bappenas reported that 73% of Indonesia’s total loans came from three 
major development partners, i.e. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 
World Bank and ADB (Bappenas 2011). Those three retained their position as 
Indonesia’s top three development partners during SBY’s presidency. 
 
However, new donors, particularly, non-OECD DAC emerging donors, NGOs and 
mega philanthropies greatly contributed to the proliferation of donors and the 
increased aid heterogeneity. In addition to loans from DAC countries, SBY’s 
administration developed cooperation with more than 15 non‐DAC countries, and 
in 2006 enjoyed a substantial increase from USD 3.41 million in 2000 to USD 50.09 
million in net ODA from non‐DAC countries (Bappenas 2011:24). 
 
The proliferation of donors and aid activity is perceived as an impediments to the 
coordination and effectiveness of aid (Winters 2012). In spite of the establishment 
of regulations in aid governance discussed in the previous section, compiling 
information from diverse aid agencies was extremely difficult. In principle, the 
Bappenas approves all aid activities by donor agencies and keeps a central registry, 
however, in reality, donors often bypass Bappenas (McCormick & Schmitz 2011). 
Thus, “its database is incomplete and out of date, forcing researchers to search for 
information in ministries or from the donor agencies” (McCormick & Schmitz, 
2011: p.4).  
 
Secondly, there was increasing need internally for better donor coordination. As 
discussed in Section 7.1.2.3, most aid was coordinated through the 
Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) chaired by the Netherlands from 
1967 to 1992 (Bappenas 2011). Immediately after the IGGI was disbanded in 1992, 
                                                 
157
 Consist of 17 bilateral donors i.e. Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and 
USA; and also 8 multilateral donors i.e. ADB, European Community – European Union (EC-EU), 
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI), Global Fund, Islamic Development Bank 
(IDB), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), World Bank, and the UN. 
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the donor coordination forum was replaced by the Consultative Group on Indonesia 
(CGI) chaired by the World Bank. In January 2007, SBY surprisingly announced 
that the 15-year-long CGI was going to be dissolved. The CGI was criticized by 
civil society, as well as Indonesian government insiders, for having donor-driven 
tendencies (Edi & Setianingtias 2007). Donors, however, did not have serious 
practical impact on their areas of work, because the coordination body, CGI, was 
described as “little more than ceremonial” and “waste of time” (Pollard, 2009: 
p.128). The absence of the CGI implied a shift of focus in aid coordination from 
multilateral to bilateral, which is arguably considered a more balanced relationship 
between a donor and the government, as well as more ‘independence’. In this sense, 
the dissolution of CGI was widely supported by the media and civil society 
organizations. However, this resulted in confusion within the government, as well 
as an additional coordination burden since the government had to deal with several 
bilateral agencies respectively. In Chapter 8, I will also discuss how the dissolution 
of the CGI and the Indonesia’s quick turnaround with the Jakarta Commitment and 
the implementation of AIMS can be interpreted as the Indonesia’s strategic step to 
respond to the collective pressure from development partners and find a legitimacy 
in the global field of aid.  
 
Against this backdrop, SBY began a new stage of collaboration with donor 
countries and international organizations in 2009. The Indonesian government took 
the leadership in establishing the Jakarta Commitment, the roadmap with a specific 
action plan to bring the Paris Declaration (PD) and the Accra Action Agenda (AAA) 
to the local government level. The commitment of the most important process of 
norm localization of aid effectiveness, which I will further discuss in Chapter 8 
(Acharya 2004). In summary, it was the response of Indonesia to the criticism of 
non-participatory behaviour in globally endorsed aid principles, as well as to 
internal challenges in aid management.  
 
One of the key activities was the implementation of AIMS. The rationale of AIMS 
was to help the government manage aid flows, and donors coordinate better for 
effective aid. The AIMS was created as a single window system for monitoring and 
evaluating ODA,  
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To support the review of progress in the Jakarta Commitment and progress 
towards associated targets, the government will establish an integrated Aid 
Information Management Systems.  
(Jakarta Commitment III-b) 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the expected role of the Indonesia’s AIMS is not 
different from other cases in other countries. The need for AIMS arose from the 
difficulty in maintaining information on detailed and consolidated loans and grants, 
as well as allocation planning and forecasting. In general, the reporting and 
management of loans and grants and the preparation of financial and management 
reports were produced by using Microsoft Excel. Even the communication between 
government institutions and development partners used an Excel spreadsheet. 
Nevertheless, the use of spreadsheets could only be functional at the beginning. 
When it became complex, it was certainly impossible to rely on the use of Excel. 
The expected managerial role of the web-based AIMS was collecting and tracing 
aid information as well as providing analytical tools such as chart, graphs and maps.  
 
Based on this discussion, the Chapter 8 will further discuss the process of norm 
localization of aid effectiveness in detail, and how the process justifies the 
Indonesia’s implementation of AIMS.     
 
7.3.3. AIMS Implementation 
 
In 2010, the Indonesian government implemented the AIMS and operationalized it 
within the Bappenas as a single-window system for the monitoring and evaluation 
of ODA. Primarily, the systems comprising database of aid commitments, 
expenditures and detail activities. As the Jakarta Commitment affirmed, the AIMS 
was intended to assist Indonesia, a recipient country, with the incorporation of aid 
flows into the national budget, and enhance overall alignment of aid with the 
government’s priorities in RPJMN. By using the centralized information system, it 
was also aimed at strengthening aid coordination among stakeholders and was 
expected that the government and donors would engage in a process of joint 
evaluation of Paris Declaration, most importantly, the Survey on Monitoring of the 
Paris Declaration (PD Survey). The AIMS implementation was grounded by the 
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Jakarta Commitment; however, the planning for the systems had already been 
discussed in Bappenas in 2008 during the preparation of the Jakarta Commitment. 
The AIMS was initially suggested listed as one of the new programs in the Green 
Book 2008 under the section ‘Strengthening Capacity to Improve Aid 
Effectiveness’ (BAPPENAS 2008),  which would again continue to be in the Green 
Book 2009 with the change regarding funding source from KfW to GTZ 
(BAPPENAS 2009).  
 
The chronology of the implementation of AIMS, based on information collected 
from documents and semi-structured interviews conducted with AIMS developers, 
officers from Bappenas, State Secretariat, MoFA, donors including UNDP and the 
GTZ is delineated below. As I analysed in Chapter 5, there is significant 
homogeneity in AIMS in terms of the planning and implementation processes. 
Although generalization is not possible since each stage is not one hundred percent 
mutually exclusive, the common process of AIMS implementation that can be 
deconstructed follows seven stages; 1) political process, 2) financial process, 3) 
design/development, 4) data input, 5) implementation, 6) usage and evaluation, and 
7) policy. The case of Indonesia’s AIMS generally followed the stages. 
 
Stage 1. Political Process   
 
1. On 12 January 2009, 22 development partners signed the Jakarta 
Commitment. The A4DES was established in April in 2009, and within the 
A4DES, the ‘Working Group for Monitoring and Evaluation (WG Monev)’ 
commenced conducting coordination meetings with line ministries and the 
development partners to support AIMS. The terms of reference (TOR) for 
AIMS had been developed by Bappenas during a series of interim meetings 
that followed the UNDP-led four-day workshop on ‘Effective Aid 
Management’ in October 2008. 
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2. SBY won the Presidential election on 8 July 2009 and resumed his second 
term of office as President on 20 October.158  In his inauguration speech, he 
highlighted his nation’s intention to honour international commitments:  
 
We will continue to be pioneer in the efforts to save the earth from climate 
change; in the World Economic Forum, especially through the G20 in 
striving for the Millennium Development Goals; in advancing 
multilateralism through international organizations, and in encouraging 
harmony among civilization.  
(SBY’s Presidential inauguration speech, 20 October 2009, translated) 
 
Stage 2: Financial Process  
 
3. Although the expected funding source for the AIMS implementation was 
documented as KfW (German Development Bank) in Green Book 2008 and 
GTZ (German Technical Cooperation Agency) in Green Book 2009, there 
was final negotiation and confirming process with GTZ. In addition, after 
the contact by the AIMS service provider, Synergy International, which 
developed the RAND, the government made a decision of having contract 
with local IT providers and finally confirmed receiving a grant from GTZ. 
The technology artefact was evident in the persistent negotiations with 
relevant social groups. In the final negotiation with GTZ and other potential 
funders, Bappenas strongly expressed their preference for hiring local IT 
consultants – a decision that may have been influenced by the previous 
experience with RAND. The AIMS Task Force Lead in Bappenas 
emphasizes:  
 
[During the tsunami reconstruction] we were not happy with Synergy 
International, in particular, due to communication problem. Of course, 
they continued approaching us. We need more ownership on the system.  
(Interview with the AIMS Task Force Lead) 
 
4. On 12 February, 2010, the first Coordination Meeting was held with 
members of the Task Force AIMS (members from Bappenas, MoF, Setneg, 
                                                 
158
 His landslide victory in his second election (SBY:60.8%, Megawati:26.79%,  Jusuf Kalla 
12.41%) arguably confirms his successful first term that enables SBY earning more public trust.  
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Bank Indonesia, and the Secretariat of A4DES) and GTZ. The purpose of 
the meeting was to formulate AIMS activities for the fiscal year of 2010. 
The official contract between Bappenas and GTZ entered into force on 22 
February in 2010. 
 
 
 
Figure 7-8. A4DES Organizational Structure 
(Source: Jakarta Commitment Annual Report 2009) 
 
5. In mid-February, the recruitment process was carried out to establish the 
AIMS IT team, appointed by GTZ. The IT team members were Kodrat 
Mahatama (Senior Analyst), Bayu Waseso (Software Analyst), and Yusuf 
Firdaus (Programmer). In due course, the team was assigned two activities 
focusing on building an online Survey Module and finalizing one of the 
Bappenas’ existing database (Dit. Renbang/ Directorate of Development 
Planning - Bappenas).159 
  
                                                 
159
 Jakarta Commitment Annual Report 2010 (p.120-126) 
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Stage 3. AIMS Design and Development  
 
6. The target deadline – 12 April 2010 was established for completion of the 
initial version of the AIMS Online Survey ‘Module’, often referred to as the 
‘AIMS Prototype version’ in documents and interviews. Weekly 
coordination meetings were held between the Task Force AIMS and the IT 
Team. Subsequently, coordination meetings with GTZ were held once every 
two weeks at the task-force level.  
 
7. The ‘Workshop and Training - Module Aid Information Management 
Systems (AIMS)’ was convened on 23 April 2010 in Jakarta and more than 
20 development partners attended. The AIMS IT team leader recalls:  
 
The AIMS prototype was showcased and tested by participants from 
donor countries. I finally realized this (developing and implementing 
AIMS) is a big project.  
(Interview with AIMS Developer) 
 
8. For another one and a half months, the AIMS prototype was further tested 
by donors including the World Bank, GTZ, and AusAid. The operating 
system (OS) was re-designed and configured by the AIMS IT Team. At the 
meeting organized by Director for Utilization of Development Funding in 
Bappenas on 2 June, the finalization of the OS of the AIMS ‘Beta version’ 
was discussed 160 . Later, on 25 June, AIMS ‘Production version’ was 
installed on the Bappenas server. 
 
Stage 4. Data Input & Stage 5. System Launch 
 
In the case of Indonesia, there is no clear-cut step between the ‘Data Input’ stage 
and ‘Implementation’ since modifications to AIMS and requests for donor 
participation in aid data provision occurred simultaneously. The official launch of 
AIMS was held on 29 June 2010. However, it was actually an event that 
demonstrated the readiness of AIMS for use by donors and data collection rather 
                                                 
160
 Bappenas Letter No. 202/Dt.8.5/05/2010 
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than for public users to find useful information on the system. The short-term target 
was ensuring that development partners and the Indonesian government 
participated and completed the PD Survey by 2011. However, one of the reasons 
for the early launch event might have been government’s willingness to meet the 
deadline. In spite of time constraints, the government set a tight deadline for the 
launch. We can find a clue from an interview with Bappenas:  
 
It was actually already delayed. Jakarta commitment was signed in early 2009. 
But we had the presidential election in October. So, it was all stopped during the 
election. We need to prove we are working so hard. The deadline for the Paris 
Declaration Survey was also approaching.   
 
During the months following the launch, system configuration and data provision 
occurred at the same time. As discussed in Chapter 5, this often happens in AIMS 
cases in other recipient countries as well.  
 
9. On 29 June, the AIMS was officially launched just a couple of days before 
the deadline of 1st July based on the GTZ contract161.  
 
10. The ‘Launching event of the Module for Online Survey on Monitoring of 
the Paris Declaration’ was held at Le Méridien Hotel in Jakarta. Aid 
information on the system was incomplete at this stage. Invitation letters 
were sent to development partners actively participating in using AIMS, as 
well as officials from ministries and government agencies, A4DES WG 
Monev, AIMS task-force staffs and the media. In-house training on the 
system use and data provision for each of the development partners was 
provided, and followed by visits to donor agency by the AIMS IT Team 
between June and August.   
 
11. On 16 July, a coordination meeting was held in Bappenas, involving 
members of the A4DEC WG Monev, AIMS task force, representatives of 
                                                 
161
 Contract with GTZ 
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the A4DES, as well as the AIMS IT Team, to discuss performance 
monitoring of the Online Survey Module.162 
 
12. On 22 July, Joint training on the Online Survey was convened at the GTZ 
office in Jakarta with representatives of several development partners. It was 
organized by Bappenas’ Director for Utilization of Development Funding163 
 
13. On August 2, the official request on the aid data was sent by Bappenas’ 
Director for Utilization of Development Funding, to all development 
partners, requesting to expedite the data filling process.164 During this time, 
UNDP played a key part in aid data collection and coordinating donors as a 
donor focal point. 
 
14. The offline version of the AIMS Module was finalized. MS Excel 
spreadsheet forms were distributed to all development partners in an effort 
to speed things up and deal with the donor’s browser incompatibility issues. 
 
15. On 23 August, the letter signed by Bappenas’ Deputy of Development 
Funding was sent to several development partners, as a reminder concerning 
incomplete data submission and a request to expedite the data filling process 
with the full version AIMS Module165. The same letter was also addressed 
to the following specific recipients with an additional note: 1) Counsellor 
Commercial and Trade Embassy of The People Republic of China - 
thanking for the support for the AIMS program and inviting participation in 
the AIMS online Survey. China was not actively participating in AIMS and 
there was also the issue of donor coordination in a broader environment, as 
China is not an OECD DAC donor; 2) Other development partners - 
thanking them for the timely completion of data submission, and wishing 
for the continuation of the AIMS online Survey 2011; 3) The Commercial 
                                                 
162
 Bappenas Letter No. 4389/Dt.8.5/07/2010  
163
 Bappenas Letter No. 4670/Dt.8.5/07/2010  
164
 Bappenas Letter No. 4926/Dt.8.5/08/2010 
165
 Bappenas Letter No. 5420/Dt.8.5/08/2010 
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Counsellor at Spanish Embassy and Austrian Embassy – reminder, because 
the two had not given any response on the AIMS module within the set 
deadline.    
 
16. From 29 to 30 September, the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) was held at 
the Grand Permata Hotel in Bandung. It was an intensive meeting to discuss 
the results of AIMS implementation as a test run for the pilot PD Survey. 
The meeting also discussed the draft Report of PD Survey from 2009 data.  
Invited participants included public officers from Bappenas, MoF, Central 
Bank (Bank Indonesia), and also representatives from the ADB, JICA, 
UNDP, A4DES, European Commission, USAID, GTZ, and members of the 
Evaluation Team for the PD Implementation in Indonesia.  
 
17. On 5 November, the Try-Out Event for the AIMS Module was held at 
Santika Hotel. Participants included the AIMS IT Team and several staffs 
from Bappenas and A4DES, to test the AIMS module. The trial run was also 
to prepare the AIMS module to serve as a tool for the Survey on Monitoring 
the Paris Declaration Phase 3, earmarked for 2011. A coordination meeting 
was later held on 10 November in Bappenas to discuss the progress of each 
of the indicators in the PD Survey. 
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Stage 6. Use and Evaluation 
 
18. On 29 November 2010, the National Launch for the implementation of the 
PD Survey Phase 3 was held. The event was similar to one in Siem Reap, 
Cambodia, where the PD Survey was launched for the Southeast Asian 
region. The Indonesian launch was held at Nikko Hotel, and all bilateral and 
multilateral development partners were invited. The event’s key-note 
speaker was the Vice Minister of Bappenas.  
 
19. On 1 December, a training session on the AIMS Online Survey Module was 
conducted at Aryaduta Hotel in Jakarta. Staff representing 12 development 
partners participated in the training, which was organized to test the AIMS 
module for the implementation of the PD Survey by development partners. 
 
20. Technical Meeting for the 2011 PD Survey was held in Jakarta. Afterwards, 
in February 2011, Bappenas issued the AIMS 2011 Online Survey on 
Monitoring the Paris Declaration User Guide Book166. This 41-page guide 
was intended to help users in the “donor community and the Government of 
Indonesia use the system, understand the outcome and support the process 
of data collection using the AIMS” (Bappenas 2011, p.6). Terms and 
definitions used in the guidebook exactly follow the official guidance of the 
2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration published by the OECD-
DAC. 
 
AIMS Publications: Bappenas published a series of important official 
documents on AIMS in 2011. First, as mentioned above, the AIMS User 
Guide was published online, and distributed to the aid communities in 
Jakarta. In June 2011, the Business Process and AIMS Technical References 
were published. 167  The Business Process is said to ‘present project 
information structure, stakeholders involved, and stakeholders role in the 
AIMS’. Although the first part of the document provides a general, and 
                                                 
166
 BappenasDocument Code: AIMS-OS-2011  
167
 Bappenas Document Code: AIMS-BPS   
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redundant explanation of AIMS, the second half is more useful in explaining 
the different stakeholder roles and detailing the data collection process. 
These two documents reflected previous feedback from stakeholders in 
terms of the role of each development partners and the government’s efforts 
to minimize confusion in terms of data collection and procedure. The 
publication of the AIMS Technical Reference Document followed in June. 
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The Bappenas AIMS User Guide v4.0 Document and AIMS Administrator 
Guide v2.0 Document were published at the end of September alongside the 
Final AIMS Handover report for Bappenas. In the User Guide, the extensive 
role of AIMS in the coming years as a national single-window aid 
management system is described, and the role of stakeholders is also 
explained. However, most of the technical information is redundant. 
 
21. On 1 April 2011, Indonesia submitted the Country Report with results of the 
2011 PD Survey by using AIMS. On 22 June, Bappenas received the first 
draft of Indonesia’s Country Chapter, produced by the OECD, based on the 
Country Report. In order to obtain feedback on the draft, Bappenas sent a 
letter to Development Partners - Re: The Monitoring Survey of Paris 
Declaration – Draft of Country Chapter.  
 
22. On 13 July, the Workshop for the review of the Indonesia Country Chapter 
on the PD Survey in Jakarta was organized by Bappenas with the 
participation of the development partners169, CSO, related working groups, 
members of the AIMS task force, data analysts, and A4DES.  
  
                                                 
168
 Bappenas Document Code: AIMS-TR 
169
 Bappenas official invitation letter (No.3832/Dt.8.5/07/2011) says – The Head of UNDP and 
Ambassadors’ of Austrailia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, UK, France, Germany, Japan, 
Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Swiss and US were finally invited.  
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Stage 7. Policy  
 
23. On 30 September 2011, the Final Handover Meeting between Bappenas and 
the AIMS stakeholders, including the AIMS IT Team, A4DES and GTZ 
was held.  
 
24. On 24 October, the Minister of Bappenas Armida Alisjahbana, issued 
Ministerial Regulation No. 4/2011 discussed in Section 6.2.1.2.170 It was a 
revision of Ministerial Regulation (PP) No.2/2006 reflected the use of 
AIMS.   
 
7.3.4. Functionality of AIMS 
 
Although the short-term objective of AIMS was a computerization of the Survey 
on Monitoring of the Paris Declaration Phase 2, with Phase 3 to be completed before 
the Busan HLF in 2011, the fundamental rationale and expected outcome of AIMS 
was presented as a national computerized system for long term aid management. 
Thus, AIMS was designed to provide an overview of loans and grants by geo-
mapping donors’ activities and produce a visual presentation and analysis of aid 
data. It was a web-based intended to allow all citizens and aid workers to access aid 
information and to provide greater transparency. The purpose of the AIMS is 
explained in the User Guide – Aid Information Management System (Republic of 
Indonesia Doc Code: AIMS-UG) as stated below:   
 
Visibility: Provide a way for all initiatives in Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) to be recorded in a unique central repository visible to all stakeholders, 
Government of Indonesia, Development Partners, Line Ministries and the public. 
 
Monitoring: Give a common platform to monitor aid effectiveness following the 
rules of the Paris Declaration by measuring the 12 indicators for Aid Effectiveness 
and verifying alignment and correctness among participants. 
 
Information Sharing: Fulfil the commitment established with the Jakarta 
Commitment and provide data and project-related information from Development 
Agencies and Line Ministries. 
                                                 
170 Bappenas Regulation No. 4/2011on Procedures for Planning, Proposal Submission, Assessment, 
Monitoring and Evaluation of Activities Funded by External Loans and Grants.  
264 
 
 
Publication: Provide reports on the Paris Declaration Indicators and continuous 
assessment of aid effectiveness. Provide an evidence-based system for monitoring 
ongoing project and planning of future project. Geographical and Sectoral 
mapping of ODA initiatives. 
(Republic of Indonesia, 2010,  
User Guide – Aid Information Management System) 
 
Indonesia, however, did not participate in the first PD Survey. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the OECD Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration (the PD Survey) 
assesses the aid effectiveness and the progress in PD indicators. In the very first PD 
Survey 2006 (results published in 2007), 34 recipient countries and 55 donors 
participated, but Indonesia did not. In the second follow up PD Survey 2008 (results 
published in November 2008), it assesses progress in 55 recipient countries 
including Indonesia. By adopting the Jakarta Commitment in 2009, Indonesia 
announced its full commitment to improving aid effectiveness and to implementing 
global aid governance, including the PD Survey.  
 
In June 2010, prior to the PD Survey launched in November 2010, the Indonesian 
government implemented AIMS for the online survey to monitor progress of the 
Paris Declaration indicators. As opposed to the previous 2008, Survey which was 
conducted manually by using paper a questionnaire and MS excel spreadsheet, 
development partners directly accessed AIMS with the given password and 
protected ID and entered aid data into the system. This intermediary survey, 
commonly known as AIMS 2009 Online Survey, but executed in 2010, was 
conducted by using aid data from 2009 and managed on the AIMS for the first time, 
in order to review the progress of PD indicators since 2007.  
 
The goal of using AIMS was two-fold, firstly in the short term, to enable the 
government and development partners to prepare for the next PD Survey and 
coordinate discussion on progress in the aid effectiveness agenda. Secondly, in the 
long-term, to examine the current portfolio of aid activities and its quality as well 
as enhance aid coordination among stakeholders. 
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Figure 7-9. Main Page of AIMS Website171 
 
AIMS provided an analytical tool for research and reporting. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, one of the reasons for collecting and integrating aid data on the common 
platform was the preparation of analysis that would influence decision making to 
promote aid coordination and enhance effectiveness of aid. Data presentation and 
the GIS based system was an important element in this respect. As shown in Figures 
below, AIMS provided charts, tables, and graphs based on diverse categorizations 
by location, development partners, RPJMN priorities, aid classifications – sector, 
type and modalities, as well as based on different indicators, including yearly 
disbursement amounts, development indicators and other socio-economic indices. 
Visualization tools based on GIS, as well as report publishing tools, are featured in 
the AIMS.  There are two ways to access and create charts. First, by using the 
‘AIMS Charts & Statistics” menu, users can select one of the pre-made chart from 
the list. Secondly, by using the ‘AIMS Chart Panelboard’, the user can create the 
charts needed for analysis by using ‘parameter combination’ and combining diverse 
indicators. 
 
                                                 
171
 The URL was http://aims.bappenas.go.id but it is not accessible. As discussed in Section 4.4.3, 
I gained the access to the AIMS and its database with a help from AIMS developers who downloaded 
the entire pages and data from the ftp server, and kept the systems.  
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Figure 7-10. Sample of AIMS View – Disbursement Amount per Location by 
Development Partner 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-11. Sample of AIMS View - Project Location Map Interface 
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7.4. Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have illustrated the case of Indonesia’s AIMS, the technological 
object of my case study and its historical and political context. Indonesia’s aid 
governance reform, in the mid-2000s during the SBY term, focused on ‘better 
management with stronger ownership’, which was inherited through the historical 
legacy of the notion of ‘independence’. Alongside domestic reform, the emerging 
norm of ‘aid effectiveness’ in the global field of aid influenced the implementation 
of AIMS with hopes that it would 1) enable Indonesia to manage aid effectively, 
and 2) allow development partners to easily share aid information as well as to 
enhance aid coordination among stakeholders. Although the progress that AIMS 
achieved in implementation and the completion of the PD Survey from 2009 to 
2011 looks significant, it did not fulfil one of the most important expected 
outcomes, namely sustainability as a national single-window aid management 
system. This sustainability failure cannot be fully understood from the perspective 
of micro-situational struggles such as gaps between ‘knowledge and organizational 
practice’ (Basu 2004), ‘design and reality’ gaps (Richard Heeks 2002a; Heeks 
2003; Masiero 2016a) or ‘interaction failure’ (Lyytinen & Hirschheim 1987). 
Thereby, using the macro perspective lens provides some helpful insights and 
pointers. As Indonesia became a leading actor in the global field of aid, in particular 
in South-South Cooperation as well as in regional development collaboration in 
ASEAN, the AIMS as a ‘donor-driven’ system became increasingly irrelevant with 
the rapidly changing environment. In order to address my research question, the 
following Chapter 8 will discuss the sustainability failure of the Indonesian AIMS, 
based on data collected from the fieldworks conducted. 
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Chapter 8.  AIMS in Indonesia as a Global-Level Event 
 
In the previous chapters, I discussed the existing literature on aid, development, and 
technology, and presented the conceptual framework and methodology of my 
research. I then introduced the empirical analysis in Chapter 6, which reviewed 
AIMS implementations in recipient countries, and investigated how do we 
understand the global diffusion of AIMS and its role in aid effectiveness? The 
institutional analysis highlighted the complexity of AIMS, as well as the need for 
in-depth study to understand why do aid information management systems fail? 
This question has been illustrated by the single case study of Indonesia in Chapter 
7. Building on the historical understanding of foreign aid in Indonesia, the narrative 
explaining AIMS implementation in Indonesia was presented.  
 
In this chapter, I integrate the framing of the analysis and discuss the findings that 
emerged from data analysis to answer the research questions. My questions, 
grounded on the theories discussed in the early chapters, have been further 
formulated and converted into three specific questions related to the case study 
presented in this chapter:  
 
 How has the global norm of aid effectiveness emerged, cascaded, and been 
internalized in Indonesia?  
 
 In this process, how has AIMS been resisted, implemented, used, disused 
and shut down by the state of Indonesia?  
 
 What roles have AIMS played in this process?  
 
The analytical focus is three-fold. First, I have identified the major lacuna of 
‘missing aid’ in ICTD research in Chapter 2 and 3. Therefore reflecting the 
importance of the political nature of aid, the analytical focus is on the global-level 
dynamics. Second, reflecting the lack of understanding on the role of the state in 
information systems failure in the existing ICTD research, specific attention is paid 
to the role of the state as an agency in this chapter. Third, from the socio-technical 
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perspective, I focus on the role of technology in the process of AIMS 
implementation and abandonment.  
 
This chapter presents the deconstruction of the process of AIMS in Indonesia by 
focusing on the role of state in its implementation and sustainability failure. This 
deconstruction can be split into the following five phases:    
 
 Phase 1: Norm emergence and cascade in the global field of aid (-2005)  
 Phase 2: Reluctance (2006-2008) 
 Phase 3: Norm localization and AIMS (2009-2011) 
 Phase 4: Disuse managerially but use symbolically (2012-2013)   
 Phase 5: Finding an alternative legitimacy (2013-)  
 
A summary of each stage is illustrated in Table 8-1.  
 
I argue that understanding the AIMS failure requires a shift in attention from the 
process of aid management within a country to a more comprehensive view that 
centres on the global level. Both the implementation and abandonment of AIMS 
can be justified by tracing the norms and power dynamics of global aid and by the 
ways in which Indonesia, not only as a norm taker but also as the state itself, 
strategically seeks legitimacy in the global field of aid. Furthermore, in the 
dynamics of global power relations, the role of technology is multifaceted – made 
up of a mixture of managerial and rationalizing, as well as symbolic and political 
roles. 
 
When we examine AIMS implementation, we should not ignore global aid 
governance structure and its institutionalization. As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD) marked a tipping point of norm 
diffusion, as well as a process of institutionalization through the establishment of a 
set of codes (like rules e.g. aid reporting and the PD Survey), and symbols, which 
constitute a paradigmatic scheme of rationalizing the implementation of AIMS. The 
emergence of AIMS as a ‘must-have tool’ for achieving aid effectiveness in the 
global field of aid, as well as their adoption in recipient countries, were driven by 
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powerful actors in the field, in particular by the OECD DAC donors and 
international organizations.   
 
In this institutionalized context, recipient countries, which are subject to isomorphic 
pressures, are generally expected to accept global norms and practise the codes in 
managing aid activities. As discussed in Section 6.2, the aid effectiveness norm was 
further localized by adopting AIMS (Acharya 2004). Reflecting this scenario, the 
state of Indonesia, in the context of the established aid field, becomes rather 
peculiar. Indonesia’s strategic actions of reluctance, compliance, and pursuit of an 
alternative legitimacy in the shifting global field of aid are worthy of investigation 
for further implications.  
 
In this Chapter, I will not repeat the explanations of norm emergence and cascade 
of aid effectiveness in the field of aid, which were analysed in Section 6.1.2 and 
6.1.3. Rather, building on the norm dynamics (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998), I will 
explain norm localization and subsidiarity in the case of Indonesia. I specifically 
focus on the role of the state, and investigate how AIMS was implemented, used, 
and abandoned by the state of Indonesia. Chapter 3 discussed the apparent absence 
of the nation state as being analysed analytically in institutional accounts of 
information systems (Clegg 2010). In order to address this analytical absence, this 
chapter will pay particular attention to the macro dynamics of global aid institution 
associated with the active role of the state in the global field of aid.  
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 1 2 3 4 5 
Phase Norm emergence and 
Cascade 
Reluctance Compliance 
‘Hello AIMS’ 
Disuse managerially  
but use symbolically 
Alternative legitimacy  
‘Good bye donor-driven 
AIMS’  
Time -2005 2005-2008 2008-20011 2012-2013 2013-  
Milestones 
(Global) 
Paris Declaration (05) Diffusion of AIMS 
PD Survey 1st (06) 
Accra Action Agenda 
(08); PD Survey 2nd (08), 
3rd (11)  
Busan Partnership 
Document, End of HLF 
(Dec, 11) 
Global Partnership for 
Effective Development 
(14) 
Milestone and 
contingency 
(Local)  
SBY’s inauguration 
(Oct, 04), Tsunami 
(Dec, 04) 
 
Government 
Regulation 2/2006 
(06) 
SBY’s second term (Oct, 
09) 
Host of South-South 
Cooperation (12) 
Co-chair of OGP (13)  
Co-chair of GPEDC (14) 
Institutional 
Change (Local)  
 CGI dissolution (07) Aid for Development 
Secretariat (09) 
A4DES dissolution (12)  NCT on SSTC  
Strategic 
Action  
Endorsement of PD (05) Negotiating,   
Keeping ‘ownership’ 
in aid governance  
Jakarta Commitment 
(Norm localization)  
Building new leadership 
on SSTC  
 
Finding an alternative 
legitimacy 
 
Norm 
Dynamics 
Norm Emergence, Norm 
Cascade 
Resistance  Norm Internalization 
Norm Localization  
 Norm Subsidiarity 
Role of 
technology 
  Managerial and symbolic Symbolic  Managerial  
Abbreviation – HLF: High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness; OGP: Open Government Partnership; GPEDC: Global Partnership for Economic 
Development Cooperation; A4DES: Aid for Development Effectiveness Secretariat; NCT-SSTC: National Coordination Team on South-South and 
Triangular Cooperation  
 
Table 8-1. Five Phases of Indonesia’s AIMS Life Cycle 
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8.1. Phase 1- Norm Emergence and Cascade: Indonesia’s Endorsement of 
the Paris Declaration (2000-2005) 
 
Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) framework provides a useful analytical device 
to investigate which transnational norms emerged and how they have gained 
momentum.  
 
Norm Emergence: I discussed details of norm emergence of aid effectiveness in 
Section 6.1.2. At the heart of the norm emergence phase, norm entrepreneurs 
played the most important role. Among them, the OECD DAC was highly 
instrumental in the convening of the First High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness (HLF) in Rome (2003). With the signing of the Rome Declaration 
on Harmonization by 28 aid recipient countries and more than 40 multilateral 
and bilateral development institutions, the aid effectiveness framework was 
formalized. (OECD 2003). Indonesia did not participate in the first HLF in Rome, 
but in the second HLF in Paris in 2005.  
 
Norm Cascades: As discussed in Chapter 6, the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (PD) signed in 2005 is the most influential milestone in the global 
field of aid, and became the tipping point of norms cascade, as well as 
subsequent global AIMS diffusion as a mechanism for achieving aid 
effectiveness.  
 
As discussed in Section 6.1, one of the most important dimensions of the PD is 
a shift toward joint responsibility for aid effectiveness. This shift, which 
seemingly represents a balance between donors and recipients, enabled norm 
entrepreneurs’ attempts to socialize other states – typically recipient countries - 
to become norm followers (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). In fact, in the PD, the 
word ‘mutual’ often appears, including in one of the five core principles referring 
to ‘mutual accountability’ (between donors and recipients): 
  
273 
A major priority for partner countries and donors is to enhance mutual 
accountability and transparency in the use of development resources.  
(Article 47, emphasis added)  
 
Developed in a spirit of mutual accountability, these Partnership 
Commitments are based on the lessons of experience. We recognize that 
commitments need to be interpreted in the light of the specific situation of each 
partner country.  
(Article 13, emphasis added)  
 
Work together to establish mutually agreed framework that provide reliable 
assessments of performance, transparency and accountability of country 
systems (Indicator 2).                                                                        (Article 19)  
 
Use mutually agreed standards and processes to carry out diagnostics, develop 
sustainable reforms and monitor implementation.  
(Article 28)  
 
Against this backdrop the number of participant recipient countries dramatically 
increased from 28 in Rome to 138 in Paris  (OECD 2003; OECD 2008c). The 
motivation for each state’s participation in the PD and implementation of AIMS, 
in which the aid effectiveness norm cascades through the rest of states, may vary. 
However, the combination of isomorphic pressures, the desire to achieve 
legitimacy, and “the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem, 
facilitated norm cascades” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). 
 
Indonesia’s response to the aid effectiveness norms and rules, as well as the 
adoption of AIMS, unfolded differently from the typically accepting attitude of 
other recipient countries.  Indonesia signed the PD in 2005 (Phase 1) but did not 
participate in the first round of the PD Survey in 2006 (Phase 2). A common 
underlying analytical focus of institutional theories is the role of the institutional 
context, which Meyer & Rowan (1977) refer to as rules, norms, and ideologies 
of the wider society, and institutional conformity and its processes. However, 
the practical response of states in the global field often varies. Thus, it is 
important to understand how Indonesia engaged when the aid effectiveness norm 
emerged and was institutionalized, and how this global norm and the 
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implementation of AIMS implementation were accepted by Indonesia 
differently than by other countries.   
 
Indonesia’s endorsement of the PD can be considered as evidence of its 
motivation for conformity, and the desire of its leader. As discussed in Section 
6.2, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) (2004-2014) pursued domestic 
stabilization with stronger state ownership in aid, as well as active engagement 
in international cooperation. It would be unjust to forget the contributions of the 
three Presidents during the crisis (1998-2004), which had brought successful 
democratic political transformation with the first direct Presidential election in 
2004.  
 
He was not the one in charge for renovating the damaged house, but he was 
the one responsible for opening the door of the new renovated house.  
(Interview with an Indonesian journalist)  
 
As ‘a door opener’ of Indonesia to the international community, SBY’s personal 
aspiration to make his country a respected member of the international 
community is well-presented in his inaugural speech on 20 October, 2004,  
 
As a responsible member of the international community, Indonesia would be 
the voice of conscience to promote peace, to improve welfare, and to fight for 
justice. Indonesia would continue to grow as a democratic, open, modern, 
plural, and tolerant nation.  
(SBY’s Presidential inaugural speech on 20 October, 2004)  
 
‘Restoring the country’s badly tarnished image’ by political instability, 
economic hardship and security threats in the last decade, became a key priority 
of his presidency (Fitriani, 2015:73). Signing the internationally agreed 
Declaration and supporting the norm symbolically was a simple but effective 
foreign policy motivation for SBY.  
 
According to Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm dynamics, at the end of norm 
cascade stage, norm internalization takes place in a given state. That is, at this 
stage, global norms acquire a taken-for-granted level of stability and are no 
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longer debatable in the field. Since the adoption of the PD in 2005, successive 
High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness in Accra (2008) and Busan (2011) 
contributed to norm internationalization in many countries.  
 
 
Figure 8-1. Norm Dynamics and the Response of the States (Explained in 
Figure 3-2)  
 
In the following sessions, I discuss how the seemingly well-defined global norm 
of aid effectiveness has been reinterpreted and negotiated by Indonesia, and how 
during this process the state sought to gain alternative legitimacy in the global 
field of aid. 
 
8.2. Phase 2: Reluctance (2005-2008) 
 
The PD marked a new process of institutionalization through the establishment 
of a set of rules, which rationalized the concept of aid effectiveness. This process 
prescribes a set of legitimate principles for governing aid activities (the Paris 
Principles discussed in Section 6.1.3), and establishes protocols agreed to by all 
signatories to coordinate aid efforts (PD Surveys). The PD particularly 
emphasizes that aid information is fundamental in the diagnostic review aimed 
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at improving aid coordination and decision-making for aid targeting (Paris 
Declaration Article 43).  
 
[T]o coordinate the international monitoring of the Indicators of Progress' and 
'to enable consistent aggregation of information across a range of countries to 
be summed up in a periodic report. (Article 11)  
 
In this sense, donors “commit to providing timely, transparent and 
comprehensive information on aid flows in order to enable partner authorities to 
present comprehensive budget reports to their legislatures and citizens” (Article 
48). In addition, donors are strongly encouraged to use an existing country 
information system (Article 17 and 18) (OECD 2008c). The OECD DAC 
Working Party held a series of meetings on sharing aid information including its 
eighth meeting ‘Role of Aid Information Management Systems in Implementing 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness at the Country Level’ in July 2006, 
and actively promoted the implementation of AIMS in developing countries.  
 
As analysed in Chapter 6.2, there was strong coercive pressure on participation 
in the PD Surveys and AIMS implementation was a ‘must have tool’ for 
conducting the Surveys. 34 recipient countries participated in the first PD Survey 
in 2006. The Surveys based on five PD principles and 12 indicators, are 
emerging institutional frameworks orchestrated and driven by powerful actors, 
particularly the OECD DAC countries and the MDAs. In this institutionalized 
context, recipient countries are generally expected to accept and practise these 
codes in their aid management. 
 
In this context, Indonesia’s response was rather peculiar. Indonesia became a 
signatory member state of the PD in 2005, but opted not to participate in the first 
round of the PD Survey in 2006. Given Indonesia’s participation in the PD in 
2005, how did the state justify its actions, particularly its decision to distance 
itself from the actual institutional work prescribed and expected by the 
international PD community?  
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The most important reason for Indonesia’s non-participatory behaviour in the 
first PD Survey is that not much opportunity was given to actively engage in the 
process of shaping the PD principles and the PD Survey in 2006. More 
concretely, three major reasons can be identified:   
 
Tsunami Recovery and Learning from Legacy Technology: The first important 
factor identified is the Indian Ocean Tsunami, which hit Indonesia in December 
2004. This incident had the Indonesian government focus heavily on the 
reconstruction process in Aceh in 2005 and 2006, as the former officer at the 
Coordinating Ministry recalls.  
 
We were too busy with Aceh in 2005. Other Tsunami-affected countries also 
didn’t do [the Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness]. But, we once discussed at the CGI meeting with development 
partners, and might have been able to do the survey. But, it was too much 
burden for us.  
(Interview with a government officer at the Coordinating Ministry) 
 
As discussed in 6.3.1, the Recovery Aceh Nias Database (RAND) systems was 
developed by Synergy International and implemented in the ad hoc agency, 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR), in 2005. It had been used for 
managing humanitarian assistance to the Aceh area. The evaluation of this AIMS 
has been largely varied and mixed with international praise and critiques.  
 
According to the BRR Book Series – ‘Book 1 Story: Feat of the Daunting 
Launch’ and the Synergy International webpage, it appears that the RAND has 
achieved international acclaim as a good practice of AIMS172173:  
 
The Alphabet Media 174  awarded the BRR ‘Best Practice of Information 
Management’ for its application of the Recovery Aceh -Nias Database 
                                                 
172
 BRR Book Series – Book 1 ‘Story – Feat of the Daunting Launch’(P.9) 
173
 It also seems this news was covered by Kompas, one of the major Indonesian local 
newspapers, on 29 October 2008. However, the original article was not found in Kompas website 
but appeared in a blog:  https://syukriy.wordpress.com/2008/10/29/futuregov-informasi-
pemerintah/ 
174
 Mumbai based IT business group. See http://www.alphabetmedia.in for more information.  
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(RANdatabase) at the FutureGov - IV event held at Hotel Grand Hyatt, Bali, 
in October 2008. The BRR had beat out 450 nominees from 15 countries to 
take the honour. The RAND was considered superior in terms of its goals, 
functionalities and productivity. The project management was deemed 
innovative, particularly because the online data fed into it fulfilled the 
transparency and accountability principles.  
(BRR Book Series, Book 1, 2009:9) 
 
However, the story on the system from the field sounds contradictory. The 
detailed observations on the RAND in the monitoring and evaluation reports on 
the tsunami reconstruction process published by the Brookings Institute are not 
very different from the typical managerial and technical challenges of ICT 
coordination in the specific context of humanitarian relief (Saab et al. 2012; 
Ngamassi et al. 2011; Bharosa et al. 2009). Masyrafah & Mckeon (2008:36) also 
discusses managerial challenges in their Brooking’s Working Paper:  
 
The level of detail required by the system was challenging for many agencies 
and, in order to satisfy the arduous monthly reporting requirements, the 
credibility of project data began to suffer. 
(Brookings Working Paper 6, 2008:36, Post-Tsunami Aid Effectiveness in 
Aceh, edited by Masyrafah & Mckeon) 
 
A ‘design-reality’ gap, comprising a lack of usability and information 
accessibility, and a lack of clear guidelines and user friendly interface are 
discussed by Agustina (2007: p.7) at the World Bank with focus on the 
functional roles of the RAND and its challenges:  
 
The RAN database is equipped with reporting tools based on the MS Access 
application, but is accessible only on the government intranet. The database 
does not have an online archive folder to conduct a time-series analysis. Users 
must save their own data for each time period to conduct a time-series analysis. 
At the request of BRR, the RAN data are classified into sectors following 
BRR’s organization structure. A methodology for cleaning and processing 
data, including funding-gap data, is still lacking. A clear link to a user manual 
and a definition of terms (glossary) are also not provided. 
(World Bank 2007:7, Tracking the Money: International Experience with 
Financial Information Systems and Databases for Reconstruction authored 
by Agustina) 
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Similarly, Bharosa et al. (2009:57) argue that a major issue at the micro-
individual level in the field is that “no emergency responder has enough time 
and cognitive resources to absorb and process all information that becomes 
available during an emergency”. Likewise, the World Bank report by Mckeon 
(2007) points out much of the staff’s time was spent on updating project 
information in the RAND and addressing the technical, methodological and 
micro-situational challenges. Mckeon (2007:27) observes: 
 
[T]wo years post-tsunami, the RAND was still unable to provide BRR with the 
required overview of financial commitments, allocations and expenditures 
from donors and NGOs, and there was a continued need for the Bank’s 
methodology to operate in order to provide the big picture overview required 
by most stakeholders. As BRR continued to require agencies to submit data to 
the RAND, there remains some duplication of effort for data providers as they 
provide data to both the World Bank, and to the RAND. 
(World Bank 2007:27, Using Data for Ex-Ante Preparedness for Disaster 
Management, authored by Mckeon)  
 
However, political challenges including tension between stakeholders, or 
institutional challenges like conflicting principles and ambiguous mandates, are 
rarely discussed. One commonly-shared reflection on the government side 
reflects these missing dimensions, positing that the government encountered 
many communication and coordination problems with the service provider, and 
accusing the foreign AIMS provider of its lack of accountability and continuous 
efforts in the system. There was the shaping process of the RAND, shaping to 
some degree at the BRR’s request based on a series of meetings with Synergy 
International. The staff at the BRR faced challenges when the initial ready-made 
DAD was implemented. This actually later become a major constraint on policy 
options and a source of reluctance to have a contract with a foreign AIMS 
provider. The Head of BRR recalls: 
 
We took the DAD and started from there. But it’s not working. The purpose is 
different. The DAD is designed for managing regular ODA. It’s ready-made 
system. But Synergy (International) was not very responsible for customizing 
it to fit into our situation. Lots of communication and coordination problems 
occurred. We hired local IT people. That's the way we took six months of it 
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with our own software engineers and technology. The root is the one from 
Afghanistan, but it’s ours.  
(Interview with the Head of BRR)  
 
Still, evaluating whether the humanitarian assistance and reconstruction program 
in Aceh and Nias was successful is not the purpose or focus of this section. More 
importantly, we can see clearly that assessments of the program as well as the 
use of AIMS, surprisingly, have been largely varied and mixed with honours and 
criticism from different stakeholders. As discussed in Chapter 3, ascribing 
success to a given policy or program is a social process and depends on the 
particular perspective of the relevant social group (Wilson & Howcroft 2002). 
While the World Bank, as one of the major donors in the reconstruction program, 
showcases the program as a “highly successful reconstruction efforts,” 175  a 
couple of media articles severely criticize the inefficiency and lack of 
transparency of the program176177. Likewise, on the matter of assessing ICT 
projects in recipient countries, a success-failure dichotomy is still dominantly 
present in reality between donor-recipient, and developer-user. Thus, an 
ascription of ICT success and failure in recipient countries must be considered 
as stakeholder-dependent, as well as a property of broader institutional processes 
rather than the specific functions, use, and managerial conditions of the 
technology at hand. In particular, the RAND, and government’s interpretation of 
their experience using it, later greatly shaped their reluctant behaviour to a 
foreign AIMS provider when they planned and implemented the AIMS in 2009.  
 
Lack of Participation in Shaping Process of Paris Declaration: Secondly, and 
more importantly, in the year 2004 when the aid effectiveness norms and 
framework were sufficiently communicated among stakeholders, Indonesia did 
not actively engage in the process of shaping the PD principles. It also did not 
participate in Rome in 2003 during the period of on-going political uncertainty. 
                                                 
175
Source: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/12/26/indonesia-reconstruction-
chapter-ends-eight-years-after-the-tsunami, accessed 7 July 2017. 
176
 Source: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/dec/25/where-did-indian-
ocean-tsunami-aid-money-go, accessed 7 July 2017.  
177
 Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/27/world/asia/27indo.html, accessed 7 July 2017.  
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Indonesian domestic politics was at that time engrossed in the first presidential 
election in its history. This led to lacking attention towards the global aid agenda 
within the government. Lukita Dinarsyah Tuwo, the then Vice Minister of 
Bappenas, says:  
 
[L]imited campaign on Paris Declaration principles in the country contributed 
for limited awareness among groups in the government and development 
partners of the importance of aid effectiveness. Having said that, the 2nd phase 
of Paris Declaration evaluation has alerted the government to take proactive 
actions toward aid effectiveness. More campaign on the implementation of PD 
principles is strongly recommended.  
(Government of Indonesia, 2011, Joint Evaluation of Paris Declaration 
Phase 2 Final Report, Foreword, pp. vii-viii, emphasis added)  
 
When the first PD Survey began, the then newly established government was 
still under the internal policy consolidation process. As discussed in Section 7.2, 
the government only established a new regulation — Government Regulation 
No.2/2006 on Managing Foreign Aid — in early 2006, after a series of inter-
governmental coordination meetings. The Bappenas officer who had 
responsibility for multi-national cooperation noted:  
 
We didn’t know what the Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey is exactly (…) 
We were not participating in meetings except the Paris forum. At the meeting, 
the Indonesian Ambassador to the OECD was present. As I recall, we didn’t 
have many discussions on this (PD) in Bappenas. I went to the meeting before 
the Accra Forum (in 2008) and suddenly realized that ‘Wow! This is a big 
thing.’   
(Interview with Bappenas officer, Explanation added)  
 
The fact the OECD Ambassador was sent to the Paris Meeting may be 
considered as an irrelevant or meaningless action in terms of aid policies, or 
rather diplomatic action by aid experts in the government. The ambassador did 
not have a role in development cooperation, except Bappenas’ participation.  
 
Evidently and as one of the largest recipient countries to historically benefit from 
foreign aid, the SBY symbolically signed the PD in acknowledgement of the 
importance of supporting the global norms for ‘aid effectiveness’. Indonesia, 
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however, did not submit to the new global aid governance by the 
institutionalizing of the codes of the PD – like the PD Surveys, or the OECD 
CRS aid reporting standard. The sudden realization about the importance of the 
PD Surveys only came later during the preparation meetings for the Third HLF 
in Ghana, where the Indonesian government strove to find its strategic position 
in complying with the global aid institutions, which by then were already 
organized.  
 
Taking Ownership in Domestic Aid Governance:  Instead of adopting the PD 
principles and joining the PD Survey, as discussed in Section 7.2.1.2, Indonesia 
established the Government Regulation No. 2/2006 on Managing Foreign Aid in 
an effort to institutionalize domestic aid governance. Furthermore, it was 
anticipated to enhance aid management as a means of fully taking ownership, 
without direct involvement in and accountability for the PD institutions. The 
norm internalization process did not occur in Indonesia at this phase. The PD did 
not have an actual effect on aid management domestically in this phase; rather, 
it was a more symbolic meaning contributing to the achievement of legitimacy 
in the global field of aid:  
 
Equally important, the Paris Declaration provides important principles and 
actions that the government could instantly uses to improve management of 
development activities, in particular toward aid effectiveness. From different 
angle of analysis, Paris Declaration might not have any effect on the way the 
government place efforts toward aid effectiveness until the Jakarta 
Commitment is signed. For example: Development of  Government Regulation 
No. 2/2006 on Managing Foreign Aid would be considered as a follow up of 
commitment state in the RPJMN in 2004, rather than effect of Paris 
Declaration. 
(Bappenas 2011:28) 
 
The new regulation was aligned with the five-year domestic plan (RPJMN) 
starting in 2004. The establishment of this Government Regulations can be 
considered a follow-up of the state’s commitment in the RPJMN in 2004, rather 
than an effect of PD. Similarly, the continuous efforts aimed at revising 
government information systems was a part of government effort in SBY’s 
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‘reformasi’ (reformation) and eradicating corruption with the establishment of 
the KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission) (Bappenas 2011). 
 
As briefly explained in Chapter 7.2.1, the foundation of the new Government 
Regulation on aid management in 2006 was set by Presidential Regulation No. 
7/2005, which is grounded on the RPJMN 2004-2009. Therefore, the concept of 
National Development Planning System (RPJMN and RPJPN) was actually set 
in Megawati’s term, but the content of RPJMN 2004-2009 was set by SBY. All 
of those regulations focus on government ownership in aid management.  
 
 
 
Figure 8-2. Domestic Aid Governance in SBY Administration  
(Constructed by author) 
 
As a senior Bappenas officer observed,   
 
We felt that the PP (government regulation) was sufficient to accommodate the 
needs of managing grants and loans at that time.  
(Interview with an officer at Bappenas, explanation added) 
 
Indeed, Indonesia was embedded in a situation where two sets of norms and 
codes were established: the norms enshrined in the Paris Declaration, and the 
domestic norms. These were created to help to understand the state’s challenges 
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with global aid governance reform and to justify its actions. Indonesia did not 
submit to the emerging global aid institution of the PD in 2006, by withholding 
participation in the first-round Survey. Instead, the SBY administration opted for 
the utilization of domestic institutions in the reform of aid governance. This can 
either be interpreted as an expression of full confidence over aid management, 
or as an eagerness to take full government ownership.  
 
In fact, the decision to utilize domestic institutional capacity-building to manage 
aid and the emphasis placed on ‘ownership’ resonated well the notion of 
‘independence’, which was a historically powerful discourse that generated 
political credit. Indonesia had been a fast-recovering economy since the Crisis 
in 1997, and was on-track to be recognized as a middle-income country, 
implying that ‘ownership’ of its development agenda was essential for SBY in 
establishing the legitimacy of aid reforms.  
 
The tension between ownership and donor influence, and conflicting 
interpretations on coordination between the government and donors, was 
dramatized by the dissolution of the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) in 
January 2007. As discussed in Section 7.3.2, the long-established donors’ group 
to help coordinate the flow of foreign aid to Indonesia, was dissolved by 
President SBY without any beforehand signal and came as a surprise to both 
donors and government officials. The sudden dissolution of the CGI remains 
somewhat secretive, as one of senior Bappenas officer recalls:  
 
It was indeed all of sudden. It was right after the meeting with the Head of the 
IMF (Managing Director Rodrigo de Rato). Even my minister heard the news 
on the way back to Bappenas from a meeting with SBY (at Presidential Palace 
Complex).  
(Interview with Bappenas officer, Explanation added)  
 
However, the government perceived this long-established donor coordination 
body as a venue of advantage for donors to increase their visibility and collude 
against the government, as well as to hinder ‘berdikari (standing its own feet)’. 
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A clue about the CGI dissolution can be found in the explanation from the Head 
of Bappenas:   
 
Since 2006, in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness of foreign funding 
utilization to support national development priorities, Bappenas has intensified 
bilateral meetings with creditors and donors. With such regards, the 
dissolution of [the] CGI forum is a strategic step to reduce the collective 
pressure from the donors. (…)  
(Bappenas, Press Release: Head of Bappenas' Explanation about the Post 
CGI Foreign Funding Utilization, 1 February 2007, Document Translated 
and emphasis added)178 
 
 
The tone of this press release is somewhat ‘defensive’. Perhaps it was the 
intention to refute the attacking comments that CGI dissolution had occurred 
impulsively without proper considerations. 
 
In order to reduce the burden of repayment of foreign loans by the government 
amounting to about 60 billion USD (as of September 2006), Bappenas also 
encourages bilateral talks with donors, as has been done with Germany and 
Italy, for the debt swap mechanism.  
(Ibid, emphasis added). 
 
Apart from a debate on the government’s action toward resisting global norms 
on aid coordination and the rules set by the global aid principles, the government 
took the chance of setting the country’s own development agenda with 
preparations being done in advance to the upcoming 2009 RPJMN. Arguably, 
this development highlights that Indonesia had already been capable of planning 
its own national development policy. However, the statement “implicitly 
confirmed the allegations addressed to the Government about Indonesia's 
development design having been the result of pressure from international 
financial institutions and bilateral donors all along" (Wahyu 2007).   
 
The absence of the CGI implied a shift in aid management and coordination from 
donor-driven multilateral platforms to bilateral proceedings. Arguably, this can 
                                                 
178 Source: https://www.bappenas.go.id/index.php/download_file/view/10894/3206/ 
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be considered a more balanced relationship between a donor and the 
government, taking more ownership and independence by having one-to-one 
negotiation with a donor. The government’s strategic action was widely 
welcomed by the domestic media and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). It 
was viewed as a symbolic event, marking Indonesia’s growing independence in 
aid management as a state actor which assumed full ownership of its own 
development agenda.  
 
In sum, one reason for Indonesia’s non-participatory behaviour in the PD Survey 
may be the contingency from the Indian Ocean Tsunami and subsequent 
recovery efforts in Aceh. However, this cannot constitute a complete 
explanation. What needs to be further understood is the government’s reluctance 
and ignorance caused by Indonesia’s lack of opportunities to shape the global 
agenda and protocols, eagerness to ownership in aid management, and 
conflicting principles of PD. SBY’s dissolution of the donor coordination body 
also reflects the historically evolved tension between donors and the 
government, which has exhibited a strong state identity of ownership and 
individuality since becoming independent in 1945.    
 
8.3. Phase 3: Compliance and AIMS (2009 - 2011) 
 
Emphasis on ownership in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA): The AAA 
adopted at the 3rd HLF in Accra, Ghana in 2008, concluded with a supplementary 
provision to the PD principles, highlighting the role of recipient countries in 
building domestic institutional capacity. Specifically, as seen from the excerpt 
below, the principle of ‘ownership’ is emphasized in the AAA:  
 
(…) stronger leadership (of recipient countries) on aid coordination and more 
use of country systems for aid delivery  
(OECD 2008c).  
 
The AAA was a result of a series of preparatory meetings and workshops, during 
which the agenda-setting and amendment of the PD principles for the 3rd HLF 
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were sufficiently communicated among stakeholders in the global field of aid. 
The implementation of the AAA was followed by full Indonesian endorsement 
in 2008. Unlike Rome and Paris, it was evident that Indonesia, as a recipient 
government, had increased its involvement in the process of shaping the AAA. 
Indonesia achieved this by finding common ground with the norm entrepreneurs 
of aid effectiveness, as well as with other emerging actors in the global field of 
aid, while attempting to secure the legitimacy to justify its preference for the 
domestic reform agenda. This emphasizes the discourse of ‘ownership’ in aid 
management. Through the series of meetings for the 3rd HLF in Accra, the 
macro-level negotiations to understand the positions, actions and intentions of 
both the Indonesian state and the global aid governance structure (led by key 
norm entrepreneurs of aid effectiveness), respectively, took place (Hayman 
2009; OECD 2008c). The efforts to reach an agreement on the AAA involved 
the modification of policies without undermining the essential principles of both 
parties.  
 
There was, however, rising concern and pressure from the international aid 
community concerning Indonesia’s non-participatory stance on the PD Survey 
and its low-score in the 2nd PD Survey.  
 
AIMS [was] born primarily due to the feedback and critic expressed after the 
2nd monitoring of Paris Declaration implementation in 2008 and progress of 
Indonesia towards achieving the roadmap set for 2011 by the OECD measured 
by the 12 indicators for aid effectiveness.  
(GTZ, Final Report on a TC-Measures: Capacity Control to Improve the 
Effectiveness of Development Cooperation, Schlussbericht zu einer TZ-
Maßnahmen: Kapazitätssteuerung zur Verbesserung der Wirksamkeit der 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, 2011,7)    
 
From Indonesia’s perspective, the increasing criticism heightened the risk of 
veering further away from the global aid effectiveness norm and the rules 
defined by the PD Survey, as SBY’s administration was trying to avoid being 
seen as submitting to international pressure. Indonesia expected the PD 
community to respect and accept its concerns about ‘ownership’. The emphasis 
on ‘ownership’ in the AAA provided the legitimacy for Indonesia to start 
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engaging in the second PD Survey in 2008 and to maintain relations with 
development partners under the AAA, including the implementation of an AIMS 
that had been recommended by both the PD and the AAA. 
 
Norm localization - Jakarta Commitment: With this backdrop of internalizing 
the process of aid effectiveness norms, norm localization is first evidenced in 
January 2009. The Indonesian government and its development partners signed 
a local declaration – the Jakarta Commitment – which commits all stakeholders 
to the implementation of aid effectiveness norms and rules underpinned by the 
PD and AAA. Once Indonesia made the decision to turn back to the global aid 
governance, Indonesia sought the leadership in the norm localization process. 
The government took the leadership in returning to the aid coordination table 
and commissioned the Jakarta Commitment, signed by 22 development partners, 
to bolster the implementation of the AAA principles at the national level. The 
Commitment defines all participating development partners’ policy direction 
towards better aid management, as well as enhanced donor coordination among 
stakeholders.  
 
The government took the initiative to frame the external norm of aid 
effectiveness and to partly reconstruct it so it would fit into the local context. In 
the preface, the Commitment particularly highlights Indonesia’s role in the 
global field of aid:  
 
Indonesia is a signatory to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and is 
committed to the aid effectiveness principles and commitments contained in 
the Declaration. Indonesia has been an active participant in the regional 
preparations for the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, by 
engaging with global mechanisms (including the OECD DAC), and through 
dialogue with other countries in the Asia region. The Government is committed 
to take forward the Accra Agenda for Action as well as the Monterrey 
Consensus and the subsequent of the 2008 Doha Declaration on Financing for 
Development. 
(Jakarta Commitment, 2009) 
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In Section I – ‘Strengthening Country Ownership over Development’, the 
document confirms the importance of aid effectiveness and the government’s 
capacity building in terms of aid management.  
 
The Government will establish a mechanism at country level to determine, and 
to review, how effectively the Government and development partners can and 
do contribute to capacity development. This mechanism will be transparent 
and evidence based, involving country level stakeholders, and covering the 
range of capacity development partners. The Government and development 
partners will make use of this mechanism to monitor, measure, and potentially 
correct the effectiveness of their support to capacity development. 
(Jakarta Commitment 2009, emphasis added) 
 
This emphasis on the emerging roles and government ownership was supported 
by domestic stakeholders, including the media and the Parliament, in spite of the 
competitions in the then upcoming Presidential election on 8 July 2009.   
 
All donors, both bilateral and multilateral institutions agreed on a commitment 
of independence and the authority to use foreign loans or grants. (…) Under 
such agreement, donor’s assistance policies must be in line with [Indonesia’s] 
national interests and priorities. The development and implementation is led 
by the Indonesian development program. Donors are to systematically reduce 
their tied assistance activities. (…) later on, all incoming aids must follow 
national scenarios, procedures, and requirements.  
(Tempo.co, 13 January 2009, Foreign Donors Can No Longer Dictate, 
‘Pendonor Asing Tak Bisa Mendikte’)179 
 
In order to provide support in the facilitation and coordination of activities to 
achieve the objectives of the Jakarta Commitment, the ad hoc governmental 
agency, the Aid for Development Effectiveness Secretariat (A4DES) was 
established.180 The Transitional Multi Donor Fund (TMDF) for A4DES was 
setup and managed by the UNDP (UNDP 2009): 
  
                                                 
179  Accessed on 22 August 2017. 
https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2009/01/13/056154992/pendonor-asing-tak-bisa-mendikte 
180  Bappenas Minister issued a Ministerial Regulation No. 33/M.PPN/HK/04/2009 on the 
Establishment of A4DES on 2 April 2009. 
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[T]o ensure that the government of Indonesia’s institutions have the capacity 
to take full ownership and to lead the aid coordination and aid management 
processes, the Aid for Development Effectiveness Secretariat (A4DES) is 
established.   
(UNDP 2009, Transitional Multi Donor Fund for A4DES, emphasis added) 
 
One of the key activities following the establishment of the Jakarta Commitment 
was the implementation of the AIMS. The AAA reaffirmed the need for AIMS 
in aid management and coordination to strengthen “the quality of policy design, 
implementation and assessment” (Article 23-a); to ensure that donors aligned 
their monitoring exercises with the recipient government and support the 
building of national statistical capacity and information systems, including those 
for managing aid’ (Article 23-c); and to conduct mutual assessment reviews 
(Monitoring Survey and DAC Peer Reviews) “based on country results 
reporting and information systems complemented with available donor data and 
credible independent evidence” (Article 24-b) (OECD 2008c). 
 
AIMS as a Symbol of the Government’s Efforts in Aid Effectiveness: The 
implementation of the AIMS was part of a series of efforts by the Indonesian 
government to localize the aid effectiveness norm. The government seems to 
have been a willing actor in the domestic internalization of the global norm and 
its adaptation to the local context, as it recognized the significance of ODA as a 
major funding source of Indonesia’s development activities, and more 
importantly, the importance of ownership in the aid mechanism.  
 
The AIMS was a demonstrative technological artefact of the norm localization 
of global aid principles It was designed according to the global aid principles 
(the PD and the AAA). By using AIMS, it was anticipated that implementation 
of the Paris Principles would be as follows:    
 
1. Ownership: providing a decision-making tool for the government to 
coordinate development activities in the respective country;  
2. Alignment: evaluating the alignment of donor-funded projects with the 
national strategies and priorities;  
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3. Harmonization: enhancing donor coordination by identifying the pattern 
of aid flows, gaps, duplication of activities, and priority areas, so as to 
enable effective distribution of aid funds; 
4. Managing for Results: tracing the results of development projects, in 
order to support decision making and evaluation;   
5. Mutual Accountability among recipient government and development 
partners.   
 
In addition, the AIMS was designed to electronically conduct the PD Survey in 
accordance with 12 PD indicators and the CRS aid reporting standards. In 2009, 
there was growing discussion on the validity of the CRS and on the formation of 
the emerging aid reporting standard, the IATI, which had been shaped by the 
interactions of powerful actors in the global field of aid181. However, there was 
no significant reluctance from the government or other domestic actors in 
accepting the rules given by the global aid institutions in the domestic arena. The 
AIMS used the international meta-data standards on aid reporting and 
classification of aid activities (CRS) for structuring and storing aid data, and the 
reporting functionalities of AIMS, which followed the PD indicators.  
 
The AIMS was set up as a single-window system for monitoring and evaluating 
ODA. As explained in detail in Section 7.3, the AIMS was implemented and 
managed by Bappenas. The AIMS was intended to assist the Indonesian 
government with the management of aid flow, and donors with improved 
coordination for effective aid. In particular, the system was used by development 
partners and the government of Indonesia for completing the Online Survey on 
Monitoring the PD in 2011.  
 
“To support the review of progress in the Jakarta Commitment and progress 
towards associated targets, the government will establish an integrated Aid 
Information Management System”    
(Jakarta Commitment III-b) 
                                                 
181  For the comparison of the OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting Systems (CRS) and the 
Internaitonal Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) standards, please see ‘ 
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The AIMS was designed according to the global aid principles (the PD and the 
AAA) as well as according to the Jakarta Commitment. In the establishment of 
AIMS, the convergence of two distinctive codes of sense-making, whose 
meanings become simultaneously inscribed into the design of technological 
systems, was identified. The design and use of AIMS, and its attendant, serve to 
justify the legitimacy of global aid governance at the local government level, 
while advocating for ‘stronger leadership’ by the recipient government in 
shaping AIMS.  
 
We therefore, would like to start with the Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), which is under government control. There are three parallel measures 
currently undertaken in A4DES to improve the accountability and transparency 
of aid in Indonesia. First is the establishment of dialogue with a wider 
stakeholders, second is the improvement of aid registration mechanism and 
regulation to administer aid into government budget and lastly the 
development of our ownAid Information Management System (AIMS) … as a 
single system for implementation and monitoring and evaluation of external 
assistance. 
(Dr. Dedi Masykur Riyadi, Bappenas, Indonesian Delegation at High Level 
Symposium on Accountable and Transparent Development Cooperation, in 
Vienna, 12-13 November 2009, emphasis added) 
 
Technical rationality does not govern the construction of teleological artefacts – 
contrastingly, what appears significant are the external forces originating from 
the global arena, according to the socio-technical point of view. These, as well 
as domestic politics both play a vital role in structuring technology in its shape 
and form. From the perspective of the SBY administration, the AIMS served to 
endorse the political campaign for ‘independence/ownership’ and ‘stronger 
international leadership’, while keeping the commitment to the PD process 
intact. The willingness to commit to global aid governance while emphasizing 
ownership, as well as, the symbolic role of AIMS to achieve both, is well 
presented below:  
 
This agenda is furthermore driven by the strategic role Indonesia can play in 
international forums as a major Middle Income Country ensuring the 
development paradigm while focusing on poverty eradication also addresses 
concerns and critical development issues of this large group of countries 
receiving ODA.                            (Ibid, emphasis added) 
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Furthermore, advertising its efforts in aid effectiveness and the AIMS 
implementation, Indonesia expanded its role in shaping the global aid agenda, 
and became a co-country chair on the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 
hosted by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in preparation for the 
HLF in Busan 2011. The Committee for Assessing Progress, co-chaired by 
Ikufumi Tomimoto (Japan) and Benny Kusumo (Bappenas), published the report 
on Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration 2011. Through its 
involvement, Indonesia gained a chance to not only show its efforts and 
commitments to the global aid governance, but to also show leadership in Busan 
in 2011.  
 
Although the Indonesian government was willing to lead both the process of the 
localization of aid effectiveness norms and the implementation of AIMS, it was 
not very active in shaping the technology artefact. As soon as Bappenas secured 
the disbursement of the funding by GIZ and took ownership in hiring local IT 
personnel, the level of engagement coming from the government in shaping 
AIMS did not increase. At least in part this reflects that the government was 
relatively more focused on funding, keeping its ownership in the process of 
AIMS implementation, and participating in the Survey to achieve legitimacy in 
the global field of aid, than the on actual shaping process of AIMS and its 
continuous development for managerial purposes. An AIMS developer recalls:  
 
Sometimes I was also not sure whether this [AIMS] is important for them 
[government] or not, because I thought that survey needed to be a success, and 
they used this AIMS as survey tools. The daily support and guidance from 
them was less than I expected. But later, when it was finished for the handing 
over and launched with the formal ceremony, then I just thought, ‘wow, so this 
is important for them’. (…) [Our] team all went there together. A lot of donors’ 
experts came to the event.  
(Interview with an AIMS developer) 
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8.4. Phase 4: Disuse but Use (2012-2013) 
 
As discussed, the Indonesian AIMS was designed as a web-based system with 
the goal of allowing all donor agency workers and citizens to access aid 
information, and to therein provide greater transparency and better coordination.  
 
(…) The goal is two-fold. Firstly, to examine the current portfolio of project 
and its quality in terms of long term Aid Effectiveness. Secondly, to enable the 
Government as well as development partners to discuss the Aid Effectiveness 
agenda and prepare for the next edition of the OECD survey. 
(AIMS Progress report prior to the OECD Survey 2011) 
 
The short-term objective of AIMS, however, was a computerization of the 
Survey on Monitoring of the PD Phase 3 prior to the Busan HLF in 2011. After 
completion of the Survey Phase 3, for which the government and donors used 
the AIMS, the transition to utilising the system as a long-term aid management 
platform was not very successful. The following discussion about this goal 
transformation is based on three sub-sections.  
 
Resistance to Change: The AIMS was intended to be transitioned and to be 
sustainably used as a national single window aid management system. However, 
there was challenge in converting the major role of the AIMS from conducting 
the PD Survey, to the role of a monitoring and evaluation system of ODA. The 
challenges may have been the result of social and material inertias of the past. 
The AIMS developer recalls:  
 
Before the end of the project, there is a point from Bappenas asking for M&E 
(monitoring and evaluation) function. But, [a representative of GTZ] said it 
must be a big thing which could not just be implemented into the software. We 
would have needed to discuss details before starting AIMS. But, Bappenas 
maybe thought that maybe some part in AIMS could reflect what we newly 
need for further purpose (…)  
 
There was a chance to develop AIMS further as an M&E system. For me as a 
developer, creating a system that can work for people’s need is interesting. So, 
we discussed with the GTZ but they thought it was not possible. It needed to 
be a new different project for M&E part. But, [a Bappenas officer] saw that it 
could be inserted here and there.  
(Interview with an AIMS developer) 
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Conflicting Interpretations: As discussed, the shaping process of technology is 
not purely technical, but rather social; the bigger challenge comes from social 
and institutional inertia. While the AIMS was actively used for the PD Survey, 
several challenges were identified. The use of AIMS had only confirmed the 
challenges, but also did not convince stakeholders that AIMS would successfully 
solve the identified problems. The internal report, titled ‘Progress report prior to 
the OECD Survey’ written by the AIMS Task Force Team, summarized five 
“lessons learned” from the preliminary online survey 2009 for aid effectiveness 
analysis as below:  
 
 Low level of data completion: Seven development partners out of 21 
participating in the survey are unable to fill the data due to various reasons. 
Some of the data is inaccurate because the figure is either incomplete or 
incorrect.  
 
 Difficulty in meeting deadlines: (…) donors were given two months to complete 
the data. However, some of them were unable to meet the deadline due to 
various reasons, including the difficulty of providing data at the project level.  
 
 Lack of accuracy and uneven understanding of the questionnaires: Some were 
unable to provide accurate figures for certain indicators. Lack of understanding 
and coordination also caused inaccuracy of data and incomplete scope of the 
survey.  
 
 Lack of resources among donors: Lack of resources is mentioned as a cause of 
their inability to meet deadlines. (…) but some [who are in charge of aid 
reporting] are from less relevant areas of work. Many of them work full-time in 
the exercise, while others only partially dedicate their time.  
 
 Donor fatigue: Some donors already have their own system of aid monitoring. 
Major donors such as the World Bank, ADB, JICA, and some other donors for 
example, have an existing system of aid monitoring - internal or external - 
which records information around their assistance in Indonesia at the project-
level. The online exercise means these donors have to dedicate additional 
resources to fill information required in AIMS  
(AIMS Task Force, 2011, 27-28). 
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The report primarily focuses on managerial challenges on donor’s reporting of 
aid data. However, more fundamental institutional problems can be derived from 
this too, such as contradictory pressures from the PD, conflicting interpretations 
on aid effectiveness norms, in particular on aid coordination and the donors’ 
reluctance to share information (Thornton & Ocasio 2005; Barnett 2005).   
 
As pointed out previously, the PD was sometimes criticized for the challenges 
experienced in the achievement of goals in practice (Sjösted 2013), its 
technocratic orientation, conflicting or misleading principles (Hayman 2009), as 
well as the lack of involvement of non-OECD DAC emerging donors and CSOs.  
 
Indeed, there were conflicting interpretations of the aid effectiveness norms 
between the government and donors. It might derive from the heterogeneity of 
beliefs and views specifically on aid coordination. There is certainly a strong 
epistemic community in the donor’s side that supports the notion of aid 
coordination as a rational choice mechanism to minimize transaction cost. Many 
of government officials I interviewed, however, appeared to be somewhat 
skeptical about the PD principles.  
 
There are always people who say that we need to have better coordination. 
Because (aid) projects are not collaborated. And we can work together better. 
I don’t ascribe that.  
(Interview with a Bappenas officer) 
 
Donors can bring different project and suggest a good way and bid for 
competition. We can choose the best one among them like shopping.  
(Interview with a Setneg officer) 
 
Interestingly, even officials in donor agencies, who seemingly appeared to be in 
agreement with the global aid principles, openly expressed hesitation their 
validity and on the effects of aid effectiveness norms in their interviews. One 
stated:  
 
Why do we have to have a coordination? Why not having a health project 
cluster and overlaps between donors in a region with higher infant mortality?  
(Interview with a Bappenas officer) 
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Ideally, the multilateral development funds and donor coordination body would 
provide a platform for healthy competition between donors and collaboration:  
 
One of the purposes of the multilateral trust fund is actually energizing 
competitions between donors to financially support the best proposal 
submitted by the government.  
(Interview with a Bappenas officer) 
 
However, Birdsall (2004:9) comes to mind who observed,  
 
The donors are neither competing nor collaborating. They are in effect 
colluding – something easy to do for suppliers in the absence of a competitive 
market. The proliferation of colluding donors (i.e. the tendency of donors to 
operate in many countries and in many sectors within countries) creates what 
is now called “fragmentation” at the recipient country level.  
(Birdsall, 2004:9) 
 
It is not a matter of how competition or coordination can enhance effectiveness 
of aid, but rather of who has institutional power and control in the aid 
mechanism. Different interpretations from stakeholders were identified 
including from the government, AIMS developers, and funders.  
 
Donor’s reluctance to information sharing: Donors were in general not very 
pro-active when it came to aid reporting to the AIMS. The politics of donor 
coordination has often been discussed (Chandy & Kharas 2011; Winters 2012). 
In addition, another reason explaining the reluctance to information sharing may 
have been the emerging trend toward the donors’ open aid platform, as discussed 
in Section 6.2.3, since the World Bank started the open data initiative and ‘open 
aid’ platform visualizing all of the Bank-financed activities for the first time in 
2011. In 2012, some donors started to establish their own information system of 
monitoring their worldwide aid activities, which also included the project-level 
information in Indonesia. For some donors, continuous use of the AIMS implied 
the need for donors to dedicate additional resources in order to input the 
information required by the AIMS. One of A4DES officers recalls:  
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Managerial logic was gone, and only a symbolic one remains: After the 
completion of the third PD Survey, the AIMS remained like a ‘zombie’ without 
any ‘fresh’ data. Nevertheless, the implementation of the AIMS and Indonesia’s 
experience with the use of the system in the Survey of the PA as a ‘symbol of 
the aid effectiveness effort’, played an important role in achieving legitimacy as 
well as good relations with the external environment in the global field of aid. In 
addition, utilising the AIMS, the Online Survey was conducted using 2009 data, 
and the analysis of the quantitative indicators demonstrated the notable 
improvement made by Indonesia in some indicators (Bappenas, 2011).  
 
With the AIMS as a ‘zombie’, Indonesia’s government officers created  
legitimacy in its disuse, and criticized the donors’ lack of commitment in 
providing comprehensive and timely aid information.  
 
For the 2009 exercise, donors were given two months to complete the data. 
However, some of them were unable to meet the deadline due to various 
reasons. One reason has been the difficulty of providing data at the project 
level. Unlike the previous survey where donors were requested to provide total 
figures for the Paris Declaration indicators, the online exercise using the AIMS 
module requires more detailed information at the project level.  
(Bappenas, 2011 Progress Report prior to the OECD Survey) 
 
Moreover, the lack of a clear timeline for the completion of the survey as well 
as newly introduced alternatives to fulfil the task such as the short and offline 
version of the Online Survey have caused the delay of the exercise. 
(Ibid, 2011) 
 
Despite clear messages from the government that the 2009 Survey is ultimately 
important for monitoring aid effectiveness in Indonesia, apparently some 
donors understood erroneously that the exercise was optional and that the ‘real’ 
survey would be conducted by the OECD in 2011 with data from 2010.  
(Bappenas 2011, Online Survey 2009 Preliminary Aid Effectiveness Analysis 
for the Paris Declaration Monitoring) 
 
It is crucially important that the donors reaffirm their commitment to 
participate in the 2010 Survey and fulfil their initial commitment agreed with 
the Jakarta Commitment of January 2009.  
(Ibid, 2011) 
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According to several donors, challenges arising from the lack of resources 
resulted in their inability to meet deadlines. Donor agencies typically assigned 
responsibility for the PD Survey and data provision into the AIMS to one or two 
persons. Many of them were from the monitoring and evaluation unit, but some 
were from divisions with little or no connection to the work of aid data reporting.  
 
(…) we didn’t have a fulltime employer in the exercise, like statistician or 
economist. We only partially dedicate our time for the exercise.  
(Interview with aid expert in KOICA)  
 
What is important is not ‘whose fault was bigger’, but that no stakeholder was 
actively making an effort to solve the commonly identified problems. Since the 
launch of the AIMS in Jakarta in June 2011 and the subsequent meetings for 
completing the third PD Survey, no meeting was initiated, or arranged by either 
donors or the government side. Rather, all stakeholders arguably agreed, 
passively, with the status ‘disuse’.  
 
This section has discussed three aspects of the contrasting short and long-term 
goals of AIMS. With the AIMS not being used significantly in 2012 and 2013, 
the government’s lack of capacity to manage the systems and further develop 
came at risk of criticism. In the next section it will be discussed how Indonesia 
as the strategic agency found alternative legitimacy in the global field of aid, 
through shutting down AIMS and norm subsidiarity.  
 
8.5. Phase 5: Moving Away from Donor Driven Systems and Norms 
Subsidiarity (2013 - Present)  
 
After the completion of the PD Survey in 2011, AIMS was obviously not 
successful in taking the next step to becoming a long-term ODA management 
system, as initially had been hoped. The results of the Survey were published in 
the Fourth HLF in Busan, Korea in December 2011 in which I also participated 
as one of the representatives of the World Bank.  
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The Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 and year of 2012 
marked a paradigmatic shift in the institutional logic of global aid governance 
(Mawdsley et al. 2014). The Busan Forum was the culmination of a year-long 
process of consultations and negotiations, involving not only major OECD DAC 
donor countries and international organizations, but also diverse stakeholders 
such as civil society organizations (CSOs), the private sector, and emerging 
powers (Kim & Lee 2013). This last HLF, characterized as the move towards 
‘inclusive development’, resulted in the conclusion of the Busan Partnership 
Document which highlighted two significant changes (4th High Level Forum on 
Aid Effectiveness 2011). The first is the shift in focus from ‘aid effectiveness’ 
to ‘development effectiveness’. In more detail,, traditional aid, ODA, is just one 
of many development initiatives, alongside trade, foreign direct investment, and 
technology transfer, in which convergence is needed to create synergy. Another 
shift was the growing emphasis on the role of the ‘emerging powers’ including 
CSOs, the private sector, and most importantly, emerging non-DAC donors. 
These new shared understandings become the logic of a new institutional 
arrangement – the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 
(GPEDC), officially launched in 2014 (GPEDC 2014).  
 
In this transformation from the global field of aid from the HLFs on Aid 
Effectiveness to the GPEDC, Indonesia sought to establish its position in the 
field and find alternative legitimacy. One of the domestic bases for this was the 
changing relationship between the government and its donors (Prizzon et al. 
2017). The aid landscape to Indonesia and the relationship between the 
government and its development partners, also shifted during this transition. For 
example, the volume of ODA fell when Indonesia graduated from the 
International Development Association (IDA) in 2009. Prizzon et al. (2017:24) 
argue that “Indonesia seems to have adopted the more pragmatic ‘management’ 
of the consequences of an ever-changing context.” After SBY was re-elected in 
October 2009, new government priorities and negotiations on foreign aid 
reflected Indonesia’s new middle-income country status.  
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As the Chair of ASEAN from 2011 to 2012, and the host of South-South 
Cooperation High Level Meeting on Country-Led Knowledge Hubs in Bali, on 
10 July 2012, the state saw an opportunity to promote Indonesia’s leading roles 
in the global field of aid. At the SSTC meeting in Bali, the Head of Bappenas, 
Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana boldly announced that: 
 
Indonesia is no longer a recipient country of aid from the donor countries, but 
we are gradually becoming a donor country in those three areas [of 
development, democracy, governance and peace-building; and economic 
management policies for both macro and micro finance.  
(Antaranews.com on 10 July 2012, Translated) 182 
 
Indonesia's advancing status to middle income country (MIC) and the G-20 
membership has helped it to play its role in various international forums to 
achieve national development targets. The SSTC is one of the means of 
empowering Indonesia's role as donor to developing countries. The SSC 
facilitates cooperation amongst developing nations to build collective 
independence which would strengthen developing countries’ position in 
international forums.  
(Interview with a Bappenas official) 
 
In fact, as discussed in Section 7.1, Indonesia’s leadership in the SSC can be 
traced back to the Bandung Conference in 1955 as the milestone of the 
establishment of Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) in 1961 and as the origin of 
the SSC, discussed in the previous section, The SSC is a continuation of the idea 
of development cooperation among developing countries that originated from 
the Bandung Conference in 1955.  
 
With this strategic turn, Indonesia continued to actively engage in taking a 
leadership role in international arena. In 2013, Indonesia also became the Co-
chair of the Open Government Partnership, a new initiative aimed at promoting 
the use of open data and enhancing ‘transparency’, ‘participation’ and 
‘collaboration’. This also greatly influenced the shaping of the emerging notion 
                                                 
182  'Menteri: Indonesia Jadi Pusat Pengetahuan Dunia [Minister: Indonesia Becomes the World's 
Hub of Knowledge]', Antaranews.com, 10 July 2012, retrieved on 17 May 2017 from 
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/320755/menteri-indonesia-jadi-pusat-pengetahuan-dunia 
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of ‘open development’ in the global field of aid (Linders 2013; Smith & Reilly 
2013).  
 
In this turn, the local institution which had localized global norm of aid 
effectiveness, the Aid for Development Effectiveness (A4DES) Secretariat, 
gradually lost its position in domestic aid governance as well as in donor 
coordination activities. One person who used to work for the Secretariat recalls:  
 
It was unfortunate. I was really sad when we realized that nobody cared what 
we do. We couldn’t get the funding either. Our champion (in Bappenas) had 
other things in mind, so it was like, too bad. Plus the GPEDC started getting 
really hectic, that’s basically the last six months of A4DDES was to support 
GPEDC. That was not our original mission at all. (…) It is funny that A4DES 
was dissolved in 2013. Because Jakarta Commitment was supposed to be 
active at least up until 2014. We were closed in December 2013. Like, literally 
a year before. We were confused. What was the purpose of A4DES then?  
(Interview with an aid expert at development agency,  
who formerly worked for the A4DES, Clarification added)   
 
From the perspective of A4DES, the expected organizational outcomes, aid 
effectiveness and coordination had not been achieved with incomplete missions. 
However, from the perspective of the government, the story ironically shows 
how the government strategically and adjustably shifted its focus in the global 
field of aid.  
 
In 2013, there were a lot of the steering committee meetings on the way to 
GPEDC. It was not an open- member meeting. Indonesia hosted, I think, the 
second meeting in Bali. It was chaired by Bappenas Minister Armida and other 
co-chairs, Justin Greenly from the UK and Ngozi Diwala form Nigeria. This 
was why exactly BAPPENAS was busy with GPEDC. Even staffs in A4DES 
and other ministries were mobilized to support the GPEDC.  
(Interview with an officer at Bappenas, Clarification added)  
 
Until the first GPEDC in Mexico City in 2014, Indonesia, together with the UK 
and Nigeria, played the role of Co-Chairs of GPEDC. As the A4DES staff 
recalls, the head of Bappenas, Armida Alisjahbana, was appointed as Co-Chair 
of a 15-member Steering Committee, and pushed forward the South-South 
Cooperation agenda as a main theme for GPEDC 2014. The new vision of 
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Indonesia was affirmed by high-level government officers across Ministries 
including the MoFA the Director for Technical Cooperation, Siti Nugraha 
Mauludiah, emphasized in a media interview in Jakarta, 5 June 2014:  
 
Indonesia at the moment is not only a recipient country, but we have also been 
able to become a donor country.183 
(Sindonews.com, 5 June 2014, Interview with Director Mauludiah,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, translated) 
 
 
Interestingly, Indonesia’s administration frankly admitted to political 
motivations in its efforts in providing aid in the SSTC. Director Mauludiah 
mentioned in an interview184:  
 
Although our donations (Indonesian South-South cooperation) are only limited 
to technical assistance, the benefits can be in political and economic terms. 
 
Political, of course, for the purposes of the candidacy in the UN, if we have the 
African Union [support], of course it's for a political purpose. Secondly, for 
the economic potential of a market or investment opportunities.185  
(Ibid, translated and modified for readability) 
 
Accordingly, Pujayanti (2015:1) argues that under the SBY administration, 
foreign policy focused on the implementation of soft power policy by offering 
assistance and performing its new role as donor to developing countries through 
SSTC. Indonesia’s active role in the SSTC was viewed by political leaders as a 
means of yielding political benefit or creating a positive image for the country.  
 
                                                 
183  'Tak Cuma Menerima, Indonesia Kini Jadi Negara Donor [Not Just Accepting, Indonesia is 
Now a Donor Country]', Sindonews.com, 5 June 2014, retrieved on 17 May 2017 from 
https://international.sindonews.com/read/870497/40/tak-cuma-menerima-indonesia-kini-jadi-
negara-donor-1401958925 
184 'Sebagai Negara Donor, Indonesia dapat Keuntungan Politik dan Ekonomi [As a Donor 
Country, Indonesia Earns Politics and Economic Gains]', Metrotvnews.com, 5 June 2014, 
retrieved on 17 May 2017 from http://news.metrotvnews.com/politik/4KZ7W8wN-sebagai-
negara-donor-indonesia-dapat-keuntungan-politik-dan-ekonomi 
185 Original quote: "Politis tentu saja, untuk keperluan pencalonan PBB, kalau kita pegang Afrika 
Union, tentu saja ini tujuan politis. Kedua, potensi ekonomi peluang pasar atau investasi." 
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As Indonesia became the leading actor in the reform of global aid institution 
since 2011, it particularly pushed its subsidiary norms of South-South 
cooperation. Indonesia’s AIMS, which had been acting as a symbol for 
Indonesia’s commitment to donor-driven norms of aid effectiveness, became 
increasingly irrelevant in the changing environment. The environment was 
characterized by new codification schemes to justify the legitimacy of aid 
governance, which stressed alignment with new codes such as ‘aid 
heterogeneity’, and ‘emerging powers’. The system was shut down in 2013 with 
parts of its databases moving to another division in Bappenas, which attempted 
to make use of remaining resources for internal aid management purposes, 
including the SSC.  
 
The current administration, led by President Joko Widodo (2014-present), built 
on the strides made during the SBY administration. The former Bappenas 
Minister, Andrinof Chaniago (2014-2015), re-affirmed the increasing relevance 
of the SSTC both in Indonesia’s foreign policy strategy and in overall global 
welfare (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). The notion of SSTC challenges a 
conventional imbalance of donor-recipient relationships. Indonesia continues to 
pursue norm subsidiarity, arguing the SSTC is a mutually beneficial solution that 
benefits donors as well as recipients (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015).  
 
There are opportunities to enhance and improve the bridges between North-
South and SSC. Triangular cooperation could serve to promote win-win-win 
solutions, in which all partners (traditional donors and developing countries) 
learn, contribute and share responsibilities. We define SSTC as an arrangement 
under which donor and international organizations support and complement 
specific South-South cooperation programs or projects by providing technical, 
financial, and material assistance.  
(Task Team on South-South Cooperation (2011), Unlocking the Potential of 
South-South Cooperation: Policy Recommendations from the Task Team on 
South-South Cooperation p.1) 
 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi, also emphasized the importance of 
the SSTC. She indicated that the sharing of knowledge and technology among 
countries served to strengthen their solidarity, and thereby provided a way to 
achieve the mandate articulated in the Constitution Preamble: 
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(…) to participate toward the establishment of a world order based on freedom, 
perpetual peace and social justice, therefore the independence of Indonesia 
shall be formulated into a constitution of the Republic of Indonesia which shall 
be built into a sovereign state (…)  
(The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Pembukaan Undang-
Undang Dasar) 
 
Indonesia renewed its commitment to the mandate on the 60th anniversary of the 
Bandung Conference, when it hosted the Asia-Africa Summit and the Exhibition 
of SSTC in Jakarta in 2015.  
 
The discussion of institutional change for aid management in government, 
particularly the need of a single agency, dealing with SSTC as an emerging 
donor, as well as domestic management of foreign aid to Indonesia, is a current 
issue. However, the idea has not been realized due to the complexity arising from 
the dynamics of institutional resistance including internal politics and varied 
ministerial responses, particularly by the ‘big 4’ – MoF, MoFA, Bappenas and 
Setneg as discussed in Section 7.2.1.3 in aid management, and internal politics 
(Jermier et al. 1994; Oliver 1991). Bappenas, which has been leading aid 
management and SSTC, is arguably active in becoming the national single 
agency, while other ministries seem reluctant to give into this institutional 
change, having turf protection, particularly between Bappenas and the Foreign 
Ministry regarding the SSTC.  
 
During the process in which the international community searched for new 
sources of legitimacy to justify the institutionalization of aid governance, the 
Indonesian state agency can be clearly seen as influencing the understandings of 
contingent situations while at the same time being shaped by the same 
international context in which it participates. In this process, the contingency 
that caused the shutdown of the AIMS comes from the shifting discourses of aid 
governance that call for the ICTD researcher’s critical engagement with the 
structures of global political economy. 
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8.6. Summary  
 
I have de-constructed and explained the process of AIMS implementation, its 
use, and shutdown in the case of Indonesia. So far I argue that understanding the 
failure of AIMS in Indonesia requires a shift in focus from the project’s local 
context to the recursive relationship between the global field of aid governance 
and the state agency. Tracing the structure-agency relationship between the 
macro global aid governance and Indonesia as a state characterized by the 
enduring, contesting, negotiating, and collaborative relationship between the 
state and the institutional structures of aid, effectively justifies both the 
implementation and abandonment of the information system. Despite the fact 
there had been substantial investment and coordinative efforts on the AIMS 
project, the eventual disuse and abandonment of AIMS is not attributable to 
anyone in particular. Rather, no stakeholder may be held justifiably responsible 
for adapting the system to the contingency caused by institutional changes in the 
global field of aid. Instead, all stakeholders were working together to define and 
implement a shifting consensus of aid governance characterized by the emerging 
powers and heterogeneous aid partners.  
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Chapter 9.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter presents the conclusion to the thesis with its final remarks by 
summarizing key findings and arguments that have emerged from the analyses 
presented in Chapter 5, 6, 7 and 8. It also discusses the implications of the thesis. 
It has been found that this study at hand seems to be one of the first 
comprehensive studies of information systems in the aid sector. I demonstrate 
that my findings from the review of AIMS and the interpretive case study can be 
extended to a broader scope of studies, while keeping in mind certain limitations. 
The findings and results have empirical transferability beyond the single case of 
Indonesia, to further contexts of emerging economies; they can be transferred 
outside the domain of AIMS specifically, but can also be applied to better 
understanding the sustainability failure of information systems.  
 
This chapter consists of five sections and starts with summary of key findings 
and main arguments of the thesis as a whole.  
 
The second section demonstrates the ‘empirical transferability’ of the findings 
of this thesis, and discusses how I aim to build on the insights and further develop 
them. The section extends the theory of technology through investigating the 
sustainability failure of information systems. It also discusses the implications 
drawn from the case study of Indonesia to a wider set of phenomena.  
 
The third section then outlines the contributions that relate to information 
systems research, development practice, and research methodology. Building on 
the discussion in the first and second section, I discuss the implications that have 
emerged throughout this study for the field of information systems, more 
specifically implications for ICTD. Policy-related contributions are made with 
respect to the implementation and use of AIMS. These are not only limited to 
Indonesia and emerging economies, but are also relevant more broadly to the 
field of information systems in developing countries. Beyond theoretical and 
practical contributions, also the methodological implications are discussed.  
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Having presented the implications, the fourth section discusses the limitations of 
this thesis, which are closely connected to the emerging avenues of research 
which are discussed in the final section.   
 
Reflecting on the limitations encountered during the course of this doctoral 
research, the fifth section elaborates the future research agenda.  
 
9.1 Key Findings and Central Arguments   
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of information systems (IS) 
in aid management and to make sense of the complexity behind their 
sustainability failure. The investigation aims to address the primary research 
questions posed in this thesis:  
 
 How can we understand the global diffusion of AIMS?   
 
 Why do AIMS fail to achieve sustainability in recipient countries?  
 
The study empirically shows that the use of information systems in aid 
management, commonly referred to as AIMS, has been globally diffused. The 
study identifies 80 cases in 71 recipient countries. Building on the historical 
analysis of AIMS diffusion in the last two decades, the study identifies that the 
norm of aid effectiveness - aligned with managerial economic rationalism – was 
a central force contributing to AIMS implementation around the globe. The 
Paris Declaration (PD) served as a tipping point, through which this norm 
emerged, diffused in the global field of aid, and was internalized in many 
recipient countries by implementing AIMS. This instrumental view on AIMS 
has been promoted by norm entrepreneurs such as powerful donors and MDAs.  
 
While aid effectiveness norms were a central force in AIMS implementation, the 
complex combination of isomorphic mechanisms contributed to the proliferation 
of AIMS, including coercive isomorphic pressure created by the OECD Survey 
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on Monitoring the PD; mimetic isomorphism in the transitional economy in late 
1990s as well as in the Tsunami-affected countries in mid-2000.   
 
Alongside emerging global aid institutions both the inscribed visions of AIMS, 
as well as their technological functionalities, have evolved over the past two 
decades from PC-based AIMS for good governance in transitional economies, 
to web-based AIMS for aid effectiveness, to open data-based ones for open 
development. Despite the global popularity, the study identifies that many AIMS 
have not achieved the outcomes that the conventional technical-rational view 
anticipates; in fact some even failed to reach sustainability.  
 
Building on this institutional understanding of the global diffusion of AIMS, the 
study investigates this very sustainability failure. The interpretive case study of 
Indonesia, where the AIMS was implemented in 2010, used, and then abandoned 
in 2013, demonstrates a complex process of sustainability failure of information 
systems, that involved multiple stakeholders at local and macro level, and their 
relationships within the broad global field of aid.  
 
By tracing the history of global aid institutions and the power dynamics of 
AIMS, this thesis identifies that unlike other recipient countries, Indonesia, as a 
state actor, while being influenced by global aid governance, has actively shaped 
its strategic position in the field of aid. The structure-agency relationship 
between the global aid institutions and Indonesia, as well as the strategic actions 
of the state (i.e., reluctance, compliance, and subsidiarity to status-quo norms) 
effectively justifies the implementation and abandonment of the AIMS. 
Therefore, understanding the sustainability failure of information systems in 
developing countries requires a shift in focus from the project’s local context to 
the macro-level dynamic in the global field of aid. In this dynamic, sufficient 
attention needs to be paid to the role of state, as oftentimes emerging economic 
powers play not only the role of norm-taker, but also act as institutional 
entrepreneurs in restructuring the global field.  
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The role of technology in this power dynamics of global aid relations is identified 
as multifaceted comprising a mixture of functional, managerial as well as 
political and symbolic dimensions. Thus, the thesis contributes to the 
understanding of technology as offering socially constructed meanings and 
reality. This extends the classical definition of sustainability failure in 
information systems. Although information systems are not being used and may 
not be serving their original managerial and functional roles, they maintain 
agency and play a symbolic role through their online presence. In addition, the 
study at hand argues that sustainability failure cannot simply be considered as a 
negative connotation, as conventional donor-driven/pre-defined evaluation 
mechanisms suggest. Rather, it may be the result of local agents (often states) 
finding alternative legitimacy in the global field. At the same time, this failure 
could cause left-over innovations domestically. 
 
9.2. Transferability from Study Findings  
 
The study first demonstrates empirically that the use of AIMS, or the information 
systems used in the management of aid, has been globally diffused. In addition, 
the study highlights the importance of global aid effectiveness norms in the 
promotion of AIMS adoption and implementation in recipient countries, and 
traces the emergence, diffusion, and internalisation of these norms. This thesis 
aims to understand why a donor-funded information system, AIMS, which was 
designed to institute the aid principles endorsed by a particular international 
norm of aid effectiveness, was implemented, used, and then abandoned. This is 
theoretically significant as it illustrates a specific case of ‘sustainability failure’ 
of information systems, which is closely related to the constant changes in 
relations, institutions, and understandings, in the complex global context of the 
field of aid. Furthermore, the multifaceted role of technology is examined with 
a discussion on the possible extension of the definition of ‘sustainability failure’ 
to also include the symbolic role of AIMS through an online presence, even 
though the original mandate might no longer be fulfilled. 
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Although an interpretive case study design seeks to understand a particular 
context, I hope to be able to provide empirical transferability (Miles & 
Huberman 1994) in order to reach applicable conclusions to broader domains. I 
also hope to contribute both theoretically and practically to the literature in the 
area of the use of IS in the context of aid.  
 
9.2.1. Symbolic Roles of Technology and IS Failure   
 
First, I seek to extend the definition of sustainability failure in information 
systems. Although information systems may not be in use, and may also not be 
serving in their original managerial and functional roles, they do maintain their 
agency and play a symbolic role through their online presence. In Chapter 6, I 
categorized 80 AIMS into the three categories: [A] relatively active and being 
used, [B] accessible but rarely being used, and [C] implemented once but then 
shut down. From Heeks’ (2002, 2003) view, AIMS in Category [B] (not in active 
use) and [C] (shut down) cannot be clearly differentiated, however, [B] and [C] 
do have different symbolic roles.  
 
Information systems may survive (i.e. keep their existence on-line) because they 
are useful as a management tool. However, even after the systems have proven 
to be neither functionally nor managerially useful for the achievement of the 
original outcomes (typically aid effectiveness and NPM principles), some of 
them maintain the existence without use (i.e., as information systems that are 
neither used nor updated, but are still on-line), still retaining much of their 
remaining symbolic meaning. When the systems reach this status, their symbolic 
role becomes more prominent. The symbolic roles of technological artefacts 
have been discussed (Winner 1999; Barley et al. 2011; Hirschheim & Newman 
1991). Information systems scholars often argue that technology has an 
inherently political dimension, which makes it possible for different stakeholders 
to derive different symbolic meanings of technology. High-technology 
innovations in general, like ICT, can be symbolised as a national vision, 
development, and hope for the future. It particularly makes technology a symbol 
which may serve as a central rhetoric in policy agenda settings and political 
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speech (Amir 2007). To some extent, this has theatrical feature of technologies 
like nuclear technology, clean energy or smart cities can symbolize make them 
an ideal driver for the transmission of sensational themes through the media 
(Acuto 2010; Amir 2007).  
 
In the Kenyan President’s speech celebrating the launch of the Kenya 
Government Open Data Web Portal186, an umbrella website of e-ProMIS, this 
notion of technology is well represented. President Mwai Kibaki emphasized the 
benefit of ICT several times and expressed his pride that Kenya led the ‘ICT 
innovation’ in public sector and aid management:  
 
The information and telecommunications sector has continued to open new 
opportunities in our country. Kenyans are using ICT in innovative ways that 
are attracting global attention (…) I urge Kenyans to increasingly embrace the 
use of ICT in all possible sectors of our national endeavor, in order for us to 
reap the full range of benefits it offers.  
(Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki’s Speech on 8th July, 2011  
at Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi) 
 
One government official who was leading AIMS project argues that a previous 
experience of AIMS and its maintenance often symbolize the government’s 
efforts on ICT innovations, as well as help them attract more funding from 
donors:    
 
We are always interested in new ICT. AIMS is a great achievement for us, as 
many people think (…) I heard more than 90% of the World Bank projects 
have ICT components to some extent. It’s a matter of funding as well. If you 
are project leader, you might want to have fancy ICT components to attract 
more funding.  
(A former leader of AIMS Task Force in a Sub-Saharan African country)  
 
The meanings arising from the symbolic roles of technology may have a positive 
and a negative connotation. If there are more positive symbolic meanings such 
as ‘hope’, ‘progress’, ‘high-tech’, ‘vision’, ‘efforts’, it would be harder to ‘kill’ 
the AIMS which is not managerially used, as once it is eliminated also its 
                                                 
186 Speech on 8th July, 2011 at Kenyatta International Conference Centre, Nairobi  
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meaning disappears. Similarly, if the meanings – typically monumental symbols 
of the implementer’s efforts in complying with the dominant global norms – are 
sufficiently important, the systems may acquire the stability of ‘zombie’ status. 
In this way, the systems are kept alive as AIMS in Category [B], otherwise they 
would shut down – or faded away by being abandoned passive-aggressively – 
by not receiving funding, technical assistance from funders nor putting efforts, 
staff. Thus, the possibility of ‘sustainability failure’ of information systems 
emerges –   which I define in Chapter 3 as:   
 
A permanent shutdown of IS, which were once implemented, used, but 
abandoned after a relatively short period (such as three years after the launch), 
without any transformation, considerable left-over innovation or thoughtful 
reflection, (e.g. evaluation study, report for future innovation) 
 
It may not be justifiable if one argues that all AIMS in Category [C] follow this 
logic. However, this conceptual distinction between [B] and [C] is helpful to 
understanding the multi-faceted role of technology depending on different 
stakeholders and the context in which the technology is embedded.  
 
 
Figure 9-1. Different Meanings of AIMS 
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 As discussed, it emerges in this study that the symbolic and political meaning 
of technology is one of the main reasons that influences sustainability failure, 
and helps maintain the on-line presence of AIMS without using it functionally 
as a management tool.   
 
These findings have implications for our general understanding of information 
systems failure in developing countries, as well as making sense of the power 
dynamics surround these systems. The symbolic nature of technology has 
received relatively little attention in ICTD and IS failure research. Technology 
itself can symbolize different things for different people (Eoyang 1983). By 
stating and showcasing AIMS, the government’s efforts on aid effectiveness 
norms such as transparency, coordination, efficiency may be demonstrated and 
communicated towards people as well as other stakeholders in the field of aid. 
As Hirschheim and Newman (1991:31) argue “the value of a symbolic approach 
lies in its ability to interpret seemingly irrational events as symbols which serve 
one or more actors’ rational functions.” That is to say, although technology may 
not be currently in active use, it is seen as a ‘great effort’ and ‘monument of the 
past’, as well as ‘hope’ or ‘vision’ for next step. More importantly, although the 
technology may no longer contribute to ‘transparency’ in the field of aid, it still 
serves as a powerful symbol of ‘transparency’.  
 
Yes, it is unfortunate. But, we learned a lot. We cannot survive without 
understanding ICT. We are not yet getting the full potential of it, but this is the 
way we have to go. Next time we will do better (…) because it is a very good 
system. Nobody wants to kill the system we have worked on. I still remember, 
when I looked [at the system on] my screen, I was so happy to have this kind 
of advance systems in my government. It’s not just technical tool. It’s for 
transparency. Okay, now we have a lot of problems, but if we improve our 
technical capacity and the government works harder, we will be able to make 
a good system again. These days, we talk about open data and big data. These 
kinds of new technological innovation will help us. There are still many ways.  
(A government official in charge of AIMS implementation  
in a Sub-Saharan Africa)  
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9.2.2. Emerging Economies and AIMS Failure 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, cross-national studies on e-government performance 
based on multivariable regression analysis often suggest that e-government is 
more likely to be successful in states, that are wealthy, urbanized, transparent, 
with higher ICT infrastructure, literacy, government efficiency and low-level 
corruption (Kim 2007; Relly & Sabharwal 2009; Rorissa & Demissie 2010; 
Ferro et al. 2011; Gil-Garcia & Martinez-Moyano 2007). In spite of the various 
confounding factors and a-contextual approach in a cross-national analysis, 
technical rational approach became an orthodoxy and are often used to justify 
NPM principles in e-government practice in developing countries.  
 
The findings from this thesis, however, suggest rather contradictory results. 
Empirical evidence indicates that the correlation between AIMS 
sustainability/success, and factors frequently used for e-government research, 
remains unclear in the case of IS in the aid sector. More importantly, most 
emerging economies fall into the case of ‘abandonment’ category as shown in 
[C]. The findings also show that it is more likely to find a great number of least 
developed countries (LDCs) in [A], the category in which AIMS in relatively 
active use by emerging economies. At the same time, it is more likely to find 
MICs in [C], rather than [B], groups in which AIMS are rarely used. 
 
In this study, the role of powerful donors and MDAs who served as norm 
entrepreneurs in the process has been discussed, particularly in relation to 
international aid principles such as the Paris Declaration, which served as a 
tipping point in the process of internalisation. The Indonesian case study 
emphasizes the need for a shift in focus from the local context to the macro-level 
dynamics at the global level of aid, as well as the role of the state as norm taker, 
as well as institutional entrepreneur. 
 
AIMS are more likely not sustainable in larger economies with higher 
government effectiveness. This includes emerging economies like Indonesia 
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(GDP: 9323 billion USD), India (GDP: 22,640 billion USD), South Africa, 
Thailand, Philippines, and Vietnam, based on the findings discussed in the 
previous chapters. This insight calls for particular attention to be paid to the role 
of the emerging states in the global field of aid, like the case of Indonesia, which 
has been actively and strategically engaged in the changing global field of aid, 
by localizing the dominant aid principles, and by promoting subsidiarity norms 
of South-South Co-operation. In this process in the context of an emerging 
economy, the implementation, use, and shutdown of AIMS may be justified as 
a strategic action of the state in a shifting consensus of global aid governance, 
which is characterized by the emerging power and by heterogeneous 
development partners.  
 
Understanding the role of state actors in the global context is the key to 
explaining particular cases of sustainability failure where the major sources of 
changes and contingency are to be found on the recursive relationship within the 
global field of aid. Much of the disuse of information systems needs to be 
explained by tracing the change in relations, ideologies, and institutional 
arrangements among the donors and MDAs, which are normally beyond the 
influence of the recipient country as a state actor. Within this macro dynamic, 
the role of states in the field of international aid has rarely been accounted for 
and theorised in the ICTD literature explaining IS failure. In this scenario, 
particular attention must be paid to the context of the emerging states, where 
there arguably exists relative power balance between the state and the powerful 
actors in the aid field.  
 
9.3. Research Contributions 
 
This section presents contributions relating to the domains of ICTD research, 
policy, and methodology. Building on the discussion in the previous section, I 
discuss implications in the field of information systems, more specifically ICTD. 
Practical and policy-related implications, as well as methodological implications 
are reviewed.   
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9.3.1. Implications in ICTD Research   
 
As positioned in the literature review, from an Information Systems perspective 
this study lies in the research domain of ICTD. In addition to the arguments 
presented so far, the thesis also makes contributions to the discussion within the 
academic field.  
 
The study argues that ICTD research, in particular studies on information 
systems failure in developing countries, can draw important insights from the 
focus on the macro-level dynamics of global aid. Contrary to the existing focus 
on the micro-situated struggle in the literature, this thesis contributes to the shift 
of attention from the process of aid management within a developing country, to 
the global level. Institutional changes in the global field of aid are crucial in 
enabling, constraining, and shaping ICTD initiatives in a given country. 
Addressing Clegg's (2010) criticism of the relative absence of power in 
institutional theory, the importance of the state is emphasized through this thesis. 
The intellectual resonance between the sociological institutionalism and the IR 
constructivist approach was discussed in the early chapters of the thesis.  
 
The thesis shows that ICTD research can benefit from theoretical perspectives 
from the IR field when it comes to understanding the global power dynamics in 
changing aid governance and the role of the states. Walsham's (2017:20) call for 
IS researchers to “adopt a transdisciplinary perspective, seeing their 
contribution as potentially important but respecting and engaging with the 
perspectives from other disciplinary fields” has been followed in this study. The 
transdisciplinary perspective helps us to avoid what Finnemore called 
‘disciplinary isolation’ (Finnemore 1996).   
 
9.3.2. Policy and Practical Implications   
 
King et al. (1994) emphasize that a study should be based on a strong motivation 
of the researcher, and that it should pose a question that is ‘important in the real 
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world’ (King et al. 1994:15). With the growing popularity of the use of 
information systems in recipient countries as well as aid agencies identified in 
Section 6.2.3, the practical implications of the study are vital, particularly in the 
applied social science discipline of Information Systems. Dunleavy (2003:23-
25) asserts that the best way to achieve a great fit between the question asked 
and the answer delivered in research is “to try and work out what you will be 
able to say, or hope to be able to say”. At the beginning of my PhD journey, my 
objective was to learn from cases of AIMS failure and to draw lessons on how 
we could learn from those cases, so as not to continually repeat the same results 
in the development field. As explained in the introduction chapter, this policy-
related thinking was the strong initial motivation for this study.  
 
What we can learn from ‘failure’ is that “it can reveal the process that would be 
hidden when systems are claimed to be successful” (Mitev 2000). The progress 
to the internationally agreed target set by ODA, the 0.7% of a donor’s growth 
national income (GNI), has been very slow, in particular since the 2007 financial 
crisis. Considering that there are still many sectors, towns, and marginalized 
people in desperate need of more help in the field of international development, 
the frequent failure of AIMS to achieve sustainability after heavy investment is 
a worrying outcome.  
 
One way this has been dealt with in this study, is by conceptualizing a 
mechanism for sustainability failure that can be empirically transferred to other 
cases. Based on this, policy and practical implications for developing and 
implementing AIMS are drawn from the discussion as follows:  
 
 There has been a lack of ownership by recipient governments during the 
shaping of technology in the stage of development, design and 
implementation of AIMS. Furthermore, there is very little evidence that 
technology is adaptively configured by diverse local users, particularly 
citizens as public users in the ‘use’ stage. The key elements and questions 
identified in the process of AIMS, summarized in Table 6-4, may be 
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helpful to engage more local, relevant social groups in the process, as 
well as to enable local government to enhance ownership.  
 
 Careful consideration of the political nature of aid and global aid 
governance cannot be ignored in ICT initiatives in developing countries. 
AIMS implementations and ICT initiatives would be required to shed 
light on the socio-political context and institutional challenges that have 
often been overlooked.  
 
 In order to enhance the sustainability of AIMS, a high level of ownership 
by local actors must be considered. Even in the donor-driven initiatives 
(in terms of norms, financial support, international aid standards that the 
system has to follow), the balance of power between the government and 
donors in a given recipient country is important to sustain the system, 
minimize conflict between stakeholders, and even to reduce transaction 
costs – as is also emphasized by rational choice theories.  
 
 In this process and going beyond the influence of the state actor, other 
relevant social groups such as CSOs, media, academia, and citizens are 
encouraged to engage in the development process and the broad 
governance structure of aid activities.  
 
In the past years, a number of AIMS have been implemented, particularly along 
with emerging open data initiatives, without careful consideration of the 
feasibility in the country, and mixed context of domestic and global aid 
governance. This study may help to provide guidelines for policymakers and 
practitioners by adding new dimensions to enhance the understanding of hidden 
problems and challenges of AIMS, contrasting the existing best practice type 
research published by MDAs, which focuses on data transparency and technical-
functional solutions.  
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9.3.3. Methodological Implications  
 
One concrete contribution can be formulated pertaining to the research approach 
on IS studies. The dominance of quantitative studies in IS research, which was 
identified in the early 1990s by Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) who point out 
that 150 of 155 research papers are based on the positivist approach with 
quantitative analysis only, is still valid. Chen and Hirschheim (2004) empirically 
show that 81% of 1131 studies in IS research are conducted under a positivist 
epistemology. Likewise, a similar trend was found in e-government research, as 
discussed in the literature review (Heeks & Bailur 2007; Yildiz 2007). Given the 
dominance of instrumental views and technical deterministic approaches in 
research on ICT implementation in the public sector (Heeks & Bailur 2007; 
Snead & Wright 2014), the combination of an explanatory account of 
information systems diffusion together with an interpretative single case study, 
provides in-depth empirical findings in this research arena. More importantly, 
the study’s findings, which reveal that among the 80 AIMS examined, 36 cases 
of AIMS have shut down, and 29 cases have experienced significant challenges, 
this insight may be revelatory in the field where ‘good practice’ studies are 
prevalent.  
 
In addition, researchers call for methodological rigour and diversity in research, 
particularly when it comes to ICT intervention in the public sector (Yildiz 2007; 
Heeks & Bailur 2007). Snead and Wright (2014) reveal that very few studies are 
conducted using multiple methodologies (9%), and only 47% are based on first 
data from in-depth studies within e-government research. My research seeks to 
provide a unique stance in this field and a methodological rigour based on an in-
depth interpretive case study with mixed methods. To the best of my knowledge, 
this thesis may be one of the first comprehensive studies of information systems 
in the aid sector. While much empirical research has been conducted on ICT 
adoption in the public sector in a single state, it seems that the adoption of IS in 
the context of aid still has not yet been addressed. The review study of AIMS by 
complete enumeration on all countries in the list of OECD recipients does not 
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exist. Future research can also be suggested and based on the empirical findings 
in this study.   
 
9.4. Limitations  
 
In this section, I draw attention to the limitations of my research relating to three 
concrete aspects: methodology, generalization, and scope of research.  
 
Methodological Limitations: As discussed in Section 4.3.4 and 4.4.5, the data 
collection and research methodology had some limitations. For the study of 
AIMS review (Chapter 5 and 6), the detailed data collection was limited to the 
period of post-new millennium. The analysis of the first generation – PC-based 
AIMS – was supported by limited data. Also, I mainly relied on data collection 
using search engines, and I recognize that the use of search engines often 
encounter limitations as discussed in Section 4.3.4 (Lucas D. Introna, Helen 
Nissenbaum 2000). More nuanced data on each case, including semi-structured 
interviews, will help to develop an agenda for further research.  
 
In addition to the common methodological limitations of interpretive case 
studies, including issues of generalization and double hermeneutics, my single 
case study on Indonesia’s AIMS had a couple of notable methodological 
limitations. First, the case study was started in 2015, only after the shutdown of 
the AIMS. There would have been much room for development if a longitudinal 
approach had been possible. Although it may be inevitable to involve double 
hermeneutics in case of an interpretive study conducted over a longer period of 
time, an in-depth longitudinal study covering the whole process of information 
systems including planning, implementation, use, and shutdown would provide 
for a richer description. Another challenge was the nature of a 'failure study'. 
While I note that research findings on the process of failure may well have 
reached saturation, interviewing some key former officials who were involved 
in AIMS but were reluctant to be interviewed was not easy, and this limited the 
data collection process.  
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Scope of Research: One of the limitations concerns the unit of analysis used. 
Although the nation-state has been a central unit of analysis in international 
relations and international political sociology, this state-centrism has been 
rigorously challenged by scholarly efforts theorizing the diverse dimensions of 
globalization. Particularly in the digital era, the role of non-state entities such as 
private firms, global IT companies, CSOs is becoming much more prominent  
(Sassen 2004).  
 
I recognize that the conception of the state as an unproblematic totality would be 
subject to criticism, and my analysis places great emphasis on the state of 
Indonesia. I thereby take a relatively lesser close look at complex dynamics 
between diverse stakeholders at different levels, like government, 
municipalities, CSOs, media and so on in the domestic arena.  
 
Generalization: A comparative study that can go beyond a single case design, 
specifically a qualitative comparative study (QCA) on a number of AIMS cases, 
which can benefit from the empirical findings of AIMS implementation in 
Chapter 5 and 6, may help against further generalization. This will be further 
discussed together with potential key research questions in the following 
Section.  
 
9.5. Suggestions for Further Research 
 
On approaching the submission of a PhD thesis, I indeed realize that the 
completion of my doctoral research is only the starting point of my exploration 
of the research arena, nurtured by many intellectual lessons as well as the trials 
and errors that I have gone through as a doctoral student. The 18th-century 
English chemist, Joseph Priestley made a wonderful metaphor:  
 
Every discovery brings to our view many things of which we had no intimation 
before (…). The greater is the circle of light, the greater is the boundary of the 
darkness by which it is confined 
(Priestley 1790).  
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Indeed, as knowledge grows, so does ignorance. However, I believe that this 
journey will be an indispensable foundation for a long-term research agenda for 
which I plan to collaborate with scholars in relevant fields and learn from them. 
Thus, I present below major areas of future research opportunities closely linked 
to the findings and limitations that I discussed in Section 9.2.3.  
 
Open databased AIMS: As discussed in Chapter 6, recipient governments have 
also promoted open data initiatives by implementing AIMS to better process 
comprehensive data in timely manner. Although open data has become 
increasingly popular, there is still confusion around the impact of open data in 
aid management and development process. The following questions remain 
unanswered: To what extent does open data contribute to solving not only 
technological challenges but also institutional challenges given the political 
nature of aid? How can the logic of open aid data be theoretically linked to the 
research stream of ICTD? These questions require a better understanding of the 
missing theoretical links between open data, information sharing and how they 
improve coordination in the aid sector.  
 
Demand side of AIMS: AIMS should be seen as a socio-technical system of 
which the varying political and economic interests of diverse relevant social 
groups exist within the supply-demand chain. The current implementation of 
AIMS heavily focuses on aid data transparency; however, it is not clear how the 
data produced can enhance development outcomes beyond increased 
transparency. Further research would be required to shed light on the demand 
side of AIMS. ICTD researchers often point out that ICT initiatives cannot work 
properly if end users are not able to use the services. However, several issues are 
not yet clear: how do stakeholders use aid data? and are AIMS developed and 
implemented with the goal of supplying data that meet the demands of users? 
We need to have a better understanding on the demand side of AIMS.  
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Inclusive aid process: Increased transparency does not necessarily lead to better 
accountability in aid service. There has been a lack of evidence of citizens’ 
experience in AIMS. Future studies may question which group can be 
empowered in the diffusion and use of AIMS, and whose voice can be reflected 
to make the aid process more inclusive, and in particular, how to engage citizens 
in the development process. Additional research needs to address the linkage 
between transparency, participation and accountability; whether such ICT 
intervention only works for certain demographics, and if so, what changes 
should be made to the intervention. Walsham (2017) describes a major challenge 
for ICTD researchers as trying “to create a better world where people from less 
advantaged backgrounds can be enabled to enhance their capabilities and 
increase their participation in matters which affect their lives.” Further research 
needs to investigate how AIMS empower citizens to engage more in aid 
activities, and close the accountability gaps in aid mechanisms.  
 
Sector/region-specific study: This study was conducted at the national level 
information sharing and aid management. Given that there is growing attention 
to the decentralization of governance and the role of local authorities in aid 
management, it would also be useful to deepen the study to include what 
opportunities and challenges exist at regional or municipal levels in using 
information systems in sub-national level aid management; and what conflicting 
mandates and policy exist between levels. Likewise, it would be feasible to 
explore a particular sector, such as, aid management in education, public health, 
or ICT and investigate whether there are different practices or outcomes in the 
use and sustainability of AIMS.   
 
Based on the analysis of 80 AIMS cases in Chapter 5 and 6, diverse research 
methodologies on various topics may be suggested.  
 
Comparative Studies in different contexts may be suggested. As discussed in 
Section 5.1, seven countries implemented AIMS on two occasions: Bolivia, 
Burundi, Georgia, Indonesia, Kyrgyz Republic, Philippines, and Tajikistan. In 
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some cases, this may have occurred because the political, cultural, technological 
context is no longer relevant. In other cases, possible dissatisfaction may be 
reflected in the switch of providers (Bolivia, Burundi, Kyrgyz, Georgia, and 
Indonesia). Of course, none explicitly blame service providers, but some 
disappointments are reflected in the switch of provider (Burundi, Kyrgyz, 
Georgia, and Indonesia). In addition, it would also be interesting to compare the 
use and sustainability of AIMS between the case of humanitarian aid, fragile 
states, and the managing of regular ODA.  
 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA): QCA (Berg-schlosser et al. 2008) 
might be feasible for extending the findings of this thesis. It may be possible to 
select cases in countries with similar socio-economic status, in the same 
geographical category such as Sub-Saharan Africa; in a regional collaboration 
such ASEAN; or with the same economic status. Studies may investigate to what 
extent institutional differences between countries contribute to the sustainability 
of AIMS. Also, it may be feasible to study how global norms and AIMS are 
diffused, and how they conflict with regional, local norms in this process, and 
what role technology plays therein. 
 
A cross-national analysis: Findings on the 80 cases of AIMS may also be a 
useful source for a cross-national analysis with limited opportunities. With an 
extension of empirical puzzles discussed in Section 6.3.2, one interesting 
hypothesis to test might be the claim that AIMS in countries with higher GDP, 
IT infrastructure, internet access, and e-government index are less likely to be 
successful in AIMS; while least developed countries (LDCs) with lower socio-
economic indicators, and IT infrastructures are more likely to be successful in 
donor-driven AIMS, due to a potential power imbalance between donors and the 
government. This contradicts the conventional wisdom of success factors from 
e-government research based on multivariate analysis.  
 
In addition, further research may investigate which isomorphic mechanism 
occurs prominently in what circumstances by testing the following hypotheses: 
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i) in terms of coercive pressure, countries with high level of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) or aid dependency would be more likely to adopt donor-driven 
AIMS, ii) when adoption of new IS practice is based on coercive mechanism, 
decoupling is more likely; When adoption of new IS practice is based on 
normative mechanism, decoupling is less likely.  
 
In this concluding chapter, I summarize key findings and arguments, and suggest 
the further research agenda. Despite the fact that there has been substantial 
investment and coordinative efforts on AIMS, many AIMS have not been 
sustainable. Through the case of Indonesia, I argue that the eventual disuse and 
abandonment of AIMS cannot be simply understood as the failure of the 
recipient government. It is also difficult to accuse and hold stakeholders in 
Indonesia justifiably accountable for the sustainability failure of AIMS caused 
by institutional changes in the global field of aid. Rather, the implementation, 
use, and shutdown of AIMS may be justified as a strategic action of the state in 
a shifting consensus of global aid governance, which is characterized by the 
emerging power and by heterogeneous development partners. In this process, the 
symbolic and political role of technology becomes more prominent.  
 
It is, however, still not desirable to witness the prevalent disuse and sustainability 
failure of AIMS after heavy investments, considering that there are a billions of 
people who desperately need further development assistance. Looking back on 
my personal motivation for pursuing the Ph.D., particularly on the topic of 
information systems failure in the aid sector, I indeed hope we find a way to not 
repeat the déjà vu – of donor-driven agendas, excitement over new technologies, 
explosive initial attention, huge investments, quick diffusion with universal 
ideas, fade away, and failure with no reflection.  
 
This also highlights the importance of in-depth research on the context. Through 
this thesis, I argue for the importance of understanding of technology beyond its 
technical and functional aspect, namely as providing socially constructed 
meanings in a particular domestic context and global setting, in which the 
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political nature of aid cannot be ignored. As discussed in Chapter 2, development 
is value-laden. Walsham (2017) emphasized that ICTD researchers “should not 
see ourselves as the ‘experts’ bringing top-down solutions to ‘beneficiaries.’ 
Rather, we should see ourselves as co-contributors with everyone else, since all 
people all over the world have views about ‘development’ in their particular 
context.” Further research and policy needs to highlight the role of local actors 
and their ownership, as well as the context in which the ICTD initiatives are 
embedded, including not only the local but also the global-level. 
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Appendix 1: Jargon of the Aid Sector  
 
This appendix section defines and explains the most common terms used throughout 
this upgrade proposal.  
 
In OECD’s Glossary of Aid-flow Terms (2001), donor is defined as, “any entity 
including sovereign governments, intergovernmental institutions, non-profit entities, 
and private for-profit organizations that contributes funds” to a developing or low-
income country. The term aid recipient refers to any entity that receives resources, 
including governmental, quasi-governmental, non-governmental, or private institutions 
(OECD, 2001). It is commonly used to refer to a country that receives financial 
resources and technical assistance for relief or development purposes. 
 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is “the specialized committee of the OECD 
that serves as a forum for discussions on aid and development among the main Western 
aid donors” (OECD, 2001:3). As of 2014, it comprises 28 countries including Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and United States, and European Union. DAC was established in 
1961, and has led aid effectiveness agenda. DAC members agree to submit to a regular 
Peer Review of their development co-operation, undertaken by the DAC, and to serve 
as an examiner in reviewing other donor’s air activities. DAC doesn’t include donors 
from rising economy such as BRICs and MINTs.  
 
Creditor Reporting System (CRS) was established in 1967 to collect detailed 
information about individual aid loans and later grants to complement the recording of 
aggregate flows. Since 1973, it has covered the project level of activities of most of the 
OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members well as those of 
multilateral development banks and some UN agencies, and is expanding to include 
non-DAC emerging donors. The objective of the CRS database is to provide a set of 
readily available basic data that enables analysis on where aid goes, what purposes it 
serves and what policies it aims to implement, on a comparable basis for all DAC 
members.  
 
International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) was launched in 2008 at the third 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF) in Accra. It was designed, in part, to 
support donors to meet their political commitments on transparency, as laid out in the 
Accra Agenda for Action. At the fourth HLF in Busan, 2011, development actors 
committed to “implement a common open standard for electronic publication of timely, 
comprehensive and forward-looking information on resources provided through 
development cooperation,” that takes into account the statistical reporting of the OECD-
DAC and work of IATI (Source: IATI website). The IATI standard is a framework 
suggested by the IATI for publishing information on development cooperation activities 
in a timely, comprehensive and forward-looking manner with more indicators and 
qualitative information (http://iatistandard.org). It is still in the shaping process.  
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The Paris Principle on the Aid Effectiveness (2005) has been the most authoritative 
practical framework for stakeholders since its endorsement by hundreds of ministers, 
heads of donor agencies and aid-recipient countries.  
 
Ownership is emphasized as primarily referring to recipient country governments’ 
abilities to  “exercise  leadership  over  their  development  policies  and strategies  and  
coordinate development  actions” (OECD, 2008). Ownership also emphasizes the use 
of the government-administered aid management system by donors. The AIMS is fully 
endorsed under this principle, and development partners are asked to commit to use the 
aid-recipient country’s aid information management system to ensure effective 
communication and information sharing with the government.  
 
Alignment refers to the provision of aid by donors in ways that respond to partner 
countries’ development priorities, supporting and using partner countries’ own systems 
and institutions (OECD, 2010). According to OECD’s Aid Effectiveness Monitoring 
Report (2008), for aid to be most effective, it needs to respond to the recipient countries’ 
priorities and be provided in a way that uses and strengthens the partner countries’ own 
institutions and systems. Within this principle, there is a specific emphasis on the use of 
the countries’ systems, such as AIMS in order to understand the government priorities 
and avoid duplication of projects in the country. 
 
Aid harmonization is about bringing donors together to streamline the way they provide 
aid. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) recognized that the multitude of 
donor approaches to preparing, providing, and managing development co-operation, 
could result in unnecessary duplication of efforts and a greater burden on aid managers 
who deal with a multitude of policies and procedures. This principle encourages donors 
and aid-recipient countries to implement common arrangements and procedures, 
simplifying the way in which aid is provided. It also encourages them to work together 
to enhance complementarity in development cooperation by implementing a more 
effective division of labour at the country level. Harmonization is closely related to 
ownership and alignment as well. When partner countries implement their commitments 
to strengthen their systems, the easiest way for donors to harmonize is often to use the 
country’s own systems.  
 
Mutual accountability between donor and recipient countries is emphasized in the 
Principle. Further, the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) reiterates the importance of the 
mutual accountability principle, emphasizing greater transparency and accountability 
in the use of all development resources. This principle urges the development partners 
and the aid-recipient country to remain transparent to each other and the citizens. It 
requires each donor to report to each other on their aid spending and continuously 
communicate about the aid-funded projects (OECD, 2008). 
 
Managing for results is a general principle of management that involves using 
information about results to systematically improve decision making and strengthen 
performance. Developing countries are expected to develop cost-effective, results-
oriented reporting and smart aid information management systems, while donors 
commit to using any such arrangements and refraining from requiring separate reporting 
(OECD, 2010). Managing for results is an objective in its own right– citizens are fully 
entitled to know how aid resources are being used. It is also a way of establishing 
powerful motivations that help improve the effectiveness of all aid resources in 
achieving results. 
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Appendix 3. Data Sources (A Review of AIMS)  
 
*Website Screenshot: Screenshots acquired from Category [A] and [B]. In addition, some AIMS in [C] are accessed from web.archive.org, 
as evidence that the AIMS were once existed. 
*Donor Agency Reports: Refers to the ones published by donor (mostly UNDP, OECD, World Bank, and limited number of bilateral 
agencies). 
No. Country Year AIMS Name Provider 
Status 
Funder 
Data Sources 
A B C 
URL 
N/A 
Web 
Screen-
shot 
Analytics 
/ User 
Manual 
Gov Doc 
AIMS 
Provider 
Doc 
Donor 
Agency 
Reports 
Media 
Articles 
Other 
Sources 
1 Afghanistan 2002 National Budget and 
Aid Management 
Systems 
Synergy  
 

  
MDTF (UNDP, Japan)     
 

2 Armenia 1990s DAD: Donor 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
  
 UNDP 
    

 

3 Bangladesh 2014 AIMS: Aid 
Information 
Management System 
Techno Vista 
   
MDTF (Australian Aid, 
Denmark, DANIDA, 
DFID, Government of 
Bangladesh and UNDP) 
    
  
4 Bolivia (1) 2007 PGA: Plataforma de 
Gestión de la Ayuda 
DG 
  
 N/A 
   

   
5 Bolivia (2) 2012 MIP: Mapa de la 
Inversión Pública en 
Bolivia 
Local IT 
 

  
N/A 
 

 
 
 
6 Botswana 2005 BODAMIS: Botswana 
Development 
Assistance 
Management 
Information System 
Equinoccio 
  

 
The European 
Commission 

 
    
7 Burkina Faso 2008 PGA: Plateforme de 
Gestion de l'Aide 
DG 
 

  
UNDP 
 
  
 

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Funder 
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A B C 
URL 
N/A 
Web 
Screen-
shot 
Analytics 
/ User 
Manual 
Gov Doc 
AIMS 
Provider 
Doc 
Donor 
Agency 
Reports 
Media 
Articles 
Other 
Sources 
8 Burundi (1) 2008 AMP: Aid 
Management Platform 
DG 
  

 
MDTF: Swiss Agency 
for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC) / 
Development Gateway 
Foundation (DGF),  
Deutsche 
Gesellschaftfur 
Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 
  
 
 

9 Burundi (2) 2012 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
  

 
N/A 
 

 

 

10 Cambodia 2005 Cambodia ODA 
Database 
Local IT 
   
N/A   
 

 

11 Cameroon 2010 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
 

  
MDTF 
    
 

12 Central 
African Rep. 
2008 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
  

 
UNDP 

 
  
 

13 Chad 2014 PGA: Plateforme de 
Gestion de l'Aide 
DG 
 

  
MDTF (including 
UNDP) 

 
  
  
14 Comoros 2013 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy     UNDP, EU, and Islamic 
Development Bank 
       
15 Congo 
Democratic 
Rep. 
2008 AIMP: Aid and 
Investment 
Management Platform 
DG     
N/A 
      
16 Cotê d'Ivoire 2014 PGA: Plateforme de 
Gestion de l'Aide 
DG     
MDTF 
       
17 Ethiopia 2005 AMP: Aid 
Management Platform 
DG     
MDTF 
      
18 Gambia 2015 AMP: Aid 
Management Platform 
DG     
MDTF 
       
19 Georgia (1) 1990s DAD: Donor 
Assistance Database 
Synergy    
UNDP 
      
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Manual 
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Reports 
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Articles 
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Sources 
20 Georgia (2) 2015 e-Aid Information 
Management System 
(eAIMS) 
FAS     
N/A 
       
21 Guatemala 2009 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy     
UNDP 
       
22 Guinea 
Bissau 
2011 PGA: Plataforma de 
Gestão da Ajuda 
DG     
N/A 
       
23 Haiti 2012 MGAE: Module de 
Gestion de l’Aide 
Externe 
DG     
N/A 
      
24 Honduras 2013 PGC: Plataforma de 
Gestión de la 
Cooperación 
DG     UNDP, CIDA (Canadian 
International 
Development Agency), 
and the EU 
       
25 India 2007 CDSS: Coordination & 
Decision Support 
System 
Synergy     
UNDP 
      
26 Indonesia (1) 2005 Recovery Aceh - Nias 
(RAN) Database 
Synergy     
MDTF 
      
27 Indonesia (2) 2009 AIMS: Aid 
Information 
Management System 
Local IT     GTZ (Gesellschaft für 
Technische 
Zusammenarbeit) 
      
28 Iraq 2011 IDMS: Iraq 
Development 
Management System 
Synergy     MDTF (UNDP, USAID, 
the European 
Commission, the U.N. 
Office for Project 
Services, and the 
government of Spain) 
      
29 Jordan (1) 2010 JAIMS: Jordan Aid 
Information 
Management System 
Local IT     
European Union & 
United Nations 
      
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shot 
Analytics 
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Manual 
Gov Doc 
AIMS 
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Reports 
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Articles 
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Sources 
30 Jordan (2) 2015 JORISS: Jordan 
Response Information 
System for the Syria 
Crisis 
Local IT     
EU, UN 
      
31 Kazakhstan 1990s DAD: Donor 
Assistance Database 
Synergy    
UNDP 
      
32 Kenya 2010 Electronic Project 
Monitoring 
Information System (e-
ProMIS ) 
Synergy     
MDTF (UNDP/ 
Government) 
       
33 Kosovo 2010 AMP: Aid 
Management Platform 
DG     MDTF(European 
Commission Liaison 
Office (ECLO)/the 
United States Agency 
for International 
Development) 
(USAID) 
       
34 Kyrgyz 
Republic (1) 
1990s DAD: Donor 
Assistance Database 
Synergy     
UNDP 
      
35 Kyrgyz 
Republic (2) 
2012 AMP: Aid 
Management Platform 
DG     Government of 
Switzerland 
       
36 Laos 2011 AMP: Aid 
Management Platform 
DG     MDTF ( UNDP, The 
World Bank, and 
OECD) 
       
37 Lebanon 2006 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy     
UNDP 
       
38 Lesotho 2013 PSID: Public Sector 
Investment Database 
Synergy     
UNDP 
      
39 Liberia 2007 AMP: Aid 
Management Platform 
DG     
N/A 
      
40 Macedonia 2010 CDAD: Central Donor 
Assistance Database 
Synergy     
UNDP 
       
41 Madagascar 2009 AMP: Aid 
Management Platform 
DG     
MDTF 
       
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Funder 
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A B C 
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N/A 
Web 
Screen-
shot 
Analytics 
/ User 
Manual 
Gov Doc 
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Reports 
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Articles 
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Sources 
42 Malawi 2008 AMP: Aid 
Management Platform 
DG     
UNDP 
      
43 Maldives 2005 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy     
UNDP 
       
44 Mauritania 2011 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy     
UNDP 
       
45 Moldova 2014 AMP: Aid 
Management Platform 
DG     
MDTF 
      
46 Montenegro 2007 AMP: Aid 
Management Platform 
DG     
N/A 
      
47 Mozambique 2006 ODA to Mozambique 
Database (ODAmoz) 
DG     
MDTF 
      
48 Myanmar 2015 Mohinga Catalpa Int'l     European Union       
49 Nepal 2010 AMP: Aid 
Management Platform 
DG     MDTF (UNDP, DFID, 
DFAT (Australia), and 
USAID) 
       
50 Nicaragua 2008 ODA to Nicaragua 
Database (ODAnic) 
DG     Department for 
International 
Development (DFID) 
      
51 Niger 2009 PGA: Plateforme de 
Gestion de l'Aide 
DG     African Development 
Bank Group, UNDP, 
USAID 
       
52 Nigeria 2010 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy     
MDTF 
       
53 Pakistan 2006 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy     
MDTF 
      
54 Palestine 2010 DARP: Development 
Assistance and Reform 
Platform 
Local IT     
N/A 
       
55 Papua New 
Guinea 
2008 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy     
MDTF 
       
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No. Country Year AIMS Name Provider 
Status 
Funder 
Data Sources 
A B C 
URL 
N/A 
Web 
Screen-
shot 
Analytics 
/ User 
Manual 
Gov Doc 
AIMS 
Provider 
Doc 
Donor 
Agency 
Reports 
Media 
Articles 
Other 
Sources 
56 Philippines 
(1) 
2014 Electronic Monitoring 
Platform 
Accountability and 
Transparency Hub for 
Yolanda (eMPATHY) 
Synergy     
UNDP 
       
57 Philippines 
(2) 
2013 Foreign Aid 
Transparency Hub 
(FaiTH) 
Local IT 
    N/A 
       
58 Russia 1996 DAD: Donor 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
   UNDP 
      
59 Rwanda 2006 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
    
MDTF (Including 
UNDP) 
      
60 Senegal 2009 PGFE: Plateforme de 
Gestion des 
Financements 
Extérieurs 
DG 
    MDTF 
       
61 Sierra Leone 2008 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
    UNDP 
       
62 Solomon 
Island 
2011 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
    UNDP 
       
63 Somalia 2011 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
   UNDP 
       
64 Somaliland 2010 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
    UNDP 
      
65 South Africa 2004 DCIS: Development 
Co-operation 
Information System 
Local IT 
    
MDTF (European 
Union, United Nations 
Development 
Programme and the UN 
Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC)) 
      
66 South Sudan 2010 AMP: Aid 
Management Platform 
DG 
    UNDP 
      
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No. Country Year AIMS Name Provider 
Status 
Funder 
Data Sources 
A B C 
URL 
N/A 
Web 
Screen-
shot 
Analytics 
/ User 
Manual 
Gov Doc 
AIMS 
Provider 
Doc 
Donor 
Agency 
Reports 
Media 
Articles 
Other 
Sources 
67 Sri Lanka 2005 INDIS: Integrated 
National Development 
Information System 
Synergy 
    UNDP 
      
68 Tajikistan (1) 1990s DAD: Donor 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
   UNDP 
      
69 Tajikistan (2) 2012 AIMS: Aid 
Information 
Management System 
Synergy 
    
Technical support from 
UNDP; funded by 
Department for 
International 
Development (DFID) 
      
70 Tanzania 2008 AMP: Aid 
Management Platform 
DG 
    MDTF 
      
71 Thailand 2005 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
    UNDP 
      
72 Timor-Leste 2012 Aid Transparency 
Portal 
DG 
    
MDTF (The 
Government of Japan, 
Australia and the Asian 
Development Bank) 
       
73 Togo 2011 PGA: Plateforme de 
Gestion de l'Aide 
DG 
    
European Union & 
UNDP 
      
74 Turkmenista
n 
1990s DAD: Donor 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
   UNDP 
      
75 Uganda 2013 AMP: Aid 
Management Platform 
DG 
    MDTF 
      
76 Ukraine (1) 1990s DAD: Donor 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
   UNDP 
      
77 Ukraine (2) 2012 Open Aid Ukraine Synergy     N/A        
78 Vietnam 2005 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
    UNDP 
      
79 Yemen 2012 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
    
MDTF (UNDP, USAID, 
DFID, Italy) 
       
80 Zambia 2008 DAD: Development 
Assistance Database 
Synergy 
       UNDP 
      
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Appendix 4. List of Selected Documents for Analysis  
 
Laws & Regulations (Indonesia)  
 
Pancasila [the official, foundational philosophical theory of the Indonesian state]  
Preamble of the Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 
[Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia] 
Perubahan Keempat Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 
[Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia], based 
on Sidang Paripurna MPR-RI, on Direct Presidential Election. 
Undang-Undang [Law] No. 1/2004 on State Treasury. 
Undang-Undang [Law] No. 25/2004 on the National Development Planning 
System. 
Undang-Undang [Law] No. 17/2007 on RPJPN 2005-2025.  
Ketetapan MPRS No. XXIII/MPRS/1966 [Parliamentary Decree] on the Renewal 
of the Policy on Economic, Finance and Development Platforms. 
Peraturan Pemerintah [Government Regulation] No. 54/2005 on Regional 
Government Loans. 
Peraturan Pemerintah [Government Regulation] No. 2/2006 on the Procedures for 
Receiving and Forwarding Foreign Loans / Grant. 
Peraturan Pemerintah [Government Regulation] No. 39/2006 on Procedures to 
Control and Evaluate Implementation of Development Activities. 
Peraturan Pemerintah [Government Regulation] No. 10/2011 on the Procedures for 
Receiving and Forwarding Foreign Loans / Grant. 
Peraturan Presiden [Presidential Regulation] No. 7/2005 on RPJMN 2004-2009. 
Peraturan Menteri Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional [State Ministry of National 
Development Planning (Bappenas) Regulation]  
No. Per. 005/M.PPN/06/2006 on Foreign Grant and Loan Funded Program 
Planning, Drafting, Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Mechanism. 
Peraturan Menteri Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional [State Ministry of National 
Development Planning (Bappenas) Regulation]  
No. 33/M.PPN/HK/04/2009 on the Establishment of A4DES. 
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Peraturan Menteri Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional [State Ministry of National 
Development Planning (Bappenas) Regulation] No. 4/2011 on Foreign 
Grant and Loan Funded Program Planning, Drafting, Assessment, 
Monitoring, and Evaluation Mechanism. 
Keputusan Menteri Keuangan [Minister of Finance Decree] No. 447/KMK.06/2005 
on Government Debt Management Strategy. 
 
Speech (Presidential and Ministerial) 
 
Arita Hachiro, ‘The International Situation and Japan's Position’, Japan’s Foreign 
Minister Radio Speech, 29 June 1940. 
Armida Salsiah Alisjahbana, Ministerial Address on International South-South 
Cooperation High Level Meeting on Country-led Knowledge Hubs, in Bali, 
10 July 2012. 
Mohammad Hatta, ‘Mendayung di Antara Dua Karang [Rowing between Two 
Rocks]’ Speech Made before the Central Indonesian Committee (KNIP), 2 
September 1948 
Sukarno, ‘Tahun Vivere Pericoloso [Year of Living Dangerously]’, President 
Speech Commemorating the 19 Years of Independence, in Jakarta, 17 
August 1964. 
Sukarno, President Speech on Withdrawal from UN Membership. 7 January 1965.  
Sukarno, ‘Raihlah Bintang-Bintang di Langit: Tahun Berdikari [Reach for the Stars 
in the Sky: Year of Berdikari]’, President Speech Commemorating the 20 
Years of Independence, in Jakarta, 17 August 1965. 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Inaugural Speech for Presidency, in Jakarta, 10 
October 2004. 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Remarks at the Meeting on Financing for 
Development Forum, in New York, 14 September 2005. 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President Speech Commemorating the 64 Years of 
Independence, in Jakarta, 14 August 2009. 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Inaugural Speech for the Second Term of Presidency, 
in Jakarta, 20 October 2009. 
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Declarations & International Agreements (by year) 
 
Kalijati Agreement (between Dutch and Japan), signed on 8 March 1942  
Dutch – Indonesian Round Table Agreement, signed on 2 November 1949  
Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference, in Bandung, 24 April 1955. 
Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) for Promoting and Implementing Technical 
Cooperation among Developing Countries, 12 September 1978. 
Rome Declaration on Harmonization, at the First High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness, February 2003.   
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, at the Second High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness, February 2005.  
Accra Agenda for Action, at the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 
2008.  
Jakarta Commitment, 12 January 2009.  
Busan Partnership Documents, at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid  
Effectiveness December 2011.  
The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, July 2012.  
 
Reports and Government Publications  
 
AIMS Task Force, 2011, Progress Report Prior to the OECD Survey. 
Badan Pusat Statistik (Statistics Indonesia), Berita Resmi Statistik, No. 05/01/Th. 
XIX, 4 January 2016. 
Bappenas, 2008, Green Book 2008. 
Bappenas, 2009, Green Book 2009. 
Bappenas, 2011, AIMS 2011 Online Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration 
User Guide Book. 
Bappenas, 2011, Business Process.  
Bappenas, 2011, AIMS Technical References. 
Bappenas, 2011, AIMS User Guide v4.0.  
Bappenas, 2011, AIMS Administrator Guide v2.0. 
Bappenas, 2011, Final AIMS Handover Report to Bappenas. 
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Bappenas Letter No. 202/Dt.8.5/05/2010. 
Bappenas Letter No. 4389/Dt.8.5/07/2010.  
Bappenas Letter No. 4670/Dt.8.5/07/2010.  
Bappenas Letter No. 4926/Dt.8.5/08/2010. 
Bappenas Letter No. 5420/Dt.8.5/08/2010. 
Bappenas Letter No. 3832/Dt.8.5/07/2011. 
Bappenas, Press Release: Head of Bappenas' Explanation about the Post CGI 
Foreign Funding Utilization, 1 February 2007 
Dedi Masykur Riyadi, Bappenas, Indonesian Delegation at High Level Symposium 
on Accountable and Transparent Development Cooperation, in Vienna, 12-
13 November 2009. 
Government of Indonesia, 2011, Country Report on Monitoring the Paris 
Declaration. 
Government of Indonesia, 2011, Joint Evaluation of the Paris Declaration Phase 
2: Final Report. 
Letter from the Government of Republic of Indonesia to the Government of 
Netherlands, dated 24 March 1992. 
Letter from the Government of Republic of Indonesia to the President of the World 
Bank, dated 24 March 1992. 
Jakarta Commitment Annual Report 2009. 
Jakarta Commitment Annual Report 2010. 
Task Team on South-South Cooperation, 2011, Unlocking the Potential of South-
South Cooperation: Policy Recommendations from the Task Team on 
South-South Cooperation. 
UN, 2015. World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. 
UN Doc S/7498, 19 September 1966 (Telegram dated 19 September 1966 from the 
Ambassador of Indonesia to the USA addressed to the Secretary General). 
US Geological Survey, ‘Indian Ocean Tsunami Remembered — Scientists reflect 
on the 2004 Indian Ocean that killed thousands’. 
OECD, 2007, OECD Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration 2006. 
OECD, 2008, OECD Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration 2008. 
OECD, 2011, Better Aid, Aid Effectiveness 2011.  
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GTZ, 2011, Schlussbericht zu einer TZ-Maßnahmen: Kapazitätssteuerung zur 
Verbesserung der Wirksamkeit der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit [Final Report on 
a TC-Measures: Capacity Control to Improve the Effectiveness of Development 
Cooperation]. 
 
News Articles (by year)  
 
Chicago Tribune, Edition 26 March 1964, page 12. 
TEMPO, Edition 37/03, Published on 17 November 1973, Cover Story: Jan Pronk, 
Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation – IGGI Sebagai Cukong (IGGI 
as Broker).  
TEMPO, Edition 30/04, Published on 28 September 1974, Cover Story: Adam 
Malik – Indonesia’s Foreign Minister - Selamat Sore IGGI! (Good 
Afternoon IGGI!).  
TEMPO, Edition 05/22, Published on 4 April 1992, Cover Story: IGGI Bubar: 
Wawancara Khusus dengan J.P. Pronk (IGGI Disbanded: Special Interview 
with J.P. Pronk).  
TEMPO ‘Pendonor Asing Tak Bisa Mendikte [Foreign Donors Can No Longer 
Dictate]’ in Tempo.co, 13 January 2009 
Sindonews, 'Tak Cuma Menerima, Indonesia Kini Jadi Negara Donor [Not Just 
Accepting, Indonesia is Now a Donor Country]', June 2014 
Metrotvnews, 'Sebagai Negara Donor, Indonesia dapat Keuntungan Politik dan 
Ekonomi [As a Donor Country, Indonesia Earns Politics and Economic 
Gains]', 5 June 2014. 
Kompas, ‘Selamat Tinggal IGGI, Selamat Datang CGI [Goodbye IGGI, Welcome 
CGI]’, 26 June 2015, p. 66. 
Rappler, ‘Megawati sindir kepemimpinan: Ganti orang, ganti visi misi [Megawati 
quips on leadership: New leader, new vision and mission]’, 11 January 
2016. 
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Appendix 5.  Consent Form for Interviews 
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Appendix 6.  Example Topic Guide for Semi-structured Interviews 
 
The topic guide below is one of guides that I used for interviews conducted during 
my field visits. It was used particularly in my second visit to Indonesia from 
December 2015 to February 2016.  
 
Stage Topic Points 
0. Prior to 
Setting 
Interview  
 Provide an overview of the research and consent form via email  
 Clearly explain interviewees’ rights and requirements as a research part
icipant 
 Email participants a reminder of the time and date of the interview 
 Informal conversation at café or other comfortable venue, if available  
1. Introductio
n  
(5mins)  
 Greet and  Introductions 
 Notify that interview will be recorded, and receive interviewees’ agree
ment   
 Official interview begins  
 Express gratitude for interviewee’s participation   
 Remind the participant of the purpose and nature of the study, explaini
ng details where necessary 
 Confirm interviewee’s rights, anonymity and requirements 
 Explain the confidentiality arrangements. 
 Introduce interview procedure and expected duration (1 hour or more)  
 Ask whether there are any questions, or areas needing clarification, pri
or to the interview?  
2. Warm-up 
(5mins)  
 Ask initial questions on participants’ affiliation, position and areas of re
sponsibility 
1) Before the main questions, could you tell me your title and role, and 
how you came to join the organization?  
2) How long have you worked in the position?  
3) What are thy typical activities that come with your role, your 
common everyday tasks?  
3. Main Part 
of 
Interview  
(45mins)  
- Points during interview  
- Be aware of reflexivity 
- Keep check/manage time  (moving to next question quickly, skipping
 some questions, or asking more questions, as required)  
 Start with the first broader question:  
- I would like to know your thoughts on the impact of the aid informat
ion management system (AIMS) or ICT intervention on aid effectiven
ess 
If interviewee asks for clarification, respond (Roles in AIMS)  
- Could you describe your role in using/managing/developing/policy-
making in AIMS?  
- Could you describe the involvement of your team with ICT interventi
ons for governance? 
- How useful is AIMS to you in ICT-enabled aid management related w
ork? Explain further. 
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- What you have learned from it so far? 
 Main Questions  
1) Overview of ICT use in aid management - From the time when there 
were no computers to today (documents would be helpful). 
a) Institutional changes over time e.g. creation of BAPPENAS, AIMS, E-Go
vernment    Directorate etc.  
      b) The idea of ICT in aid management  
 What do you understand by AIMS? How does the Government appe
ar to understand it?  
 Whose idea matters? The Indonesian Government? Donors? Citizens
? Private sector? International pressure? 
 What do you think about the donor-driven agendas, norms (transpar
ency, aid effectiveness, the Paris Declaration)?  
      c) Policy 
 Describe the policy development process – guiding principles, values
, and participants etc.  
 How was the policy translated into action plans/programmes? 
       d) Processes  
 What action programmes for aid management exist?  
 What do you think of how they are funded? Co-ordination among do
nors? 
 How important is foreign/donor funding? 
 How are they operationalized as projects?  
e) Players  
 Important individuals, groups and their goals and how pursued 
 Who are/have been some key players at national level? 
 Who were influential in driving the AIMS/Open Aid agenda – the pub
lic sector, donors, private sector, NGOs, individuals (Champions)? Ho
w good is/was the cooperation. 
 What did they do that is of significance?  
 What of opposition? Was it open or covert? 
 How much do conflicts between private and public interests affect y
our e- government projects? 
f) Evaluation (points of success/failure)  
 How do you feel about the implementation? Did it work well?  
 What do you think, could be improved in practice?  
 What points were successful and unsuccessful?  
 Finally, the shutdown. What are the reasons?  
 How do you compare the RAND (legacy technology) vs AIMS, and the
 current IS? 
 Overall, what do you think are the main challenges in developing an 
effective AIMS in Indonesia? 
 With specific reference to the government agency/donor agency lev
el, what difficulties do you encounter (or perceive) in the collection a
nd use of aid information? 
 Was there a feedback mechanism to help aid workers understand ho
w their aid data was being used? 
 Is there a functional system for the monitoring and evaluation of aid
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? What role can the AIMS play in this, you think?  
 In your opinion, what is the approximate rate of failure/success for I
CT-enabled projects in general? (Success being the ability to achieve 
stated goals) 
 Why do you think projects succeed or fail in the Ministry? Give exam
ples of successful (and failed) ICT projects. 
 
2) AIMS in your agency (Ministry, local government, donor agency) 
a) Tell me about the use of AIMS, e-government in a broader conte
xt  
b) Technology issues  
i) What systems exist, and at what stages of completion, usage?  
ii) What computer types and systems have been used in govern
ment over the years? 
Iii) How well do public servants adapt to new technologies? Expl
ain. 
c) People  
i) Culture, beliefs and attitudes, and their effect on ICT use and A
IMS take off.  
ii) How compatible are the actual work culture and practices wit
h rational assumptions about decision processes in computer ba
sed systems? E.g. Indonesian time. 
iii) Indonesians are from diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds
. How easy is it to pull them together for the common interest? 
d) Personal experiences in working in ICT/E-Government/AIMS rela
ted work: Significant moments, events, personal motivation, diffi
cult decisions and changes encountered. 
 
4. Cool-off 
(5mins)  
 Ask any remaining questions 
 Clarify if there is any vagueness or tension. 
 Let participant know that interview is finished, ‘I switched off the recor
der.’  
 Be aware of ‘hand on the door’ phenomenon, and try to deal with it.  
1) I think I have asked all main questions that I would like to ask. Is the
re anything more you would like to share?  
 
5. Closure 
(2mins)  
 Express thanks 
 
6. Follow Up   Transcribe all interviews into electronic form (MS word) from recording
s.  
 Save interview transcript in a safe manner.  
 Reflect field notes (notes taken while I conducted interviews). 
 Send follow up email to participants. 
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Appendix 7.  List of Interviews 
No Date Organization (current/former) Position  Type of data collection Code 
      
Pilot Interview 
 01/03/2015 World Bank Operation Officer  IOi0 
 12/04/2015 SETNEG Former AIMS manager from SETNEG side Interview (Skype) GV1 
August 2015 
 10/08/2015 Donor agency First Secretary Interview (in person) Dk1 
 12/08/2015 Donor agency Resident Representative Interview (in person) Dk2 
 13/08/2015 SETNEG Head of Sub Division  Interview (in person) GV3 
 13/08/2015 SETNEG Deputy Director Interview (in person) GV1 
 14/08/2015 BAPPENAS Deputy Director of SSTC Interview (in person) GV2 
 14/08/2015 BAPPENAS Staff  Interview (in person) GV4 
 14/08/2015 UNESCO Head of the Education Unit Interview (in person) DO4 
 16/08/2015 World Bank Senior Counsel Interview (in person) IOi2 
 18/08/2015 UNDP Technical Specialist - REDD+ Environment Unit Interview (in person) IO1 
 18/08/2015 UNDP Communication Specialist Interview (in person) IOi1 
 20/08/2015 University of Indonesia Professor  Interview (in person) AC2 
 26/08/2015 World Bank Senior Governance Specialist Interview (in person) IO2 
 26/08/2015 Donor agency ODA Specialist in Governance Interview (in person) DO5 
 26/08/2015 Donor agency Senior Advisor Interview (in person) Dk4 
      
December 2015 – February 2016 
 07/01/2016 SETNEG Head of Sub Division Interview (in person) GV3 
 08/01/2016 UNDP  Senior Counsel Interview (in person) IOi2 
 09/01/2016 Donor agency Staff in charge of AIMS  Interview (in person) DA1 
 11/01/2016 Embassy in East Timor Country Representative, First Secretary Interview (in person) DF1 
 12/01/2016 CSOs Researcher Interview (in person) CS5 
 12/01/2016 BAPPENAS Intern Interview (in person) GV10 
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No Date Organization (current/former) Position  Type of data collection Code 
 12/01/2016 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Analyst, Bilateral Foreign Funding Interview (in person) GV5 
 12/01/2016 IS Provider Developer Interview (in person) IT2 
 13/01/2016 UNDP Senior Counsel Interview (in person) IOi2 
 15/01/2016 BAPPENAS Directorate of Bilateral Foreign Funding Interview (in person) GV11 
 15/01/2016 BAPPENAS Director of International Development Cooperation Interview (in person) GV14 
 15/01/2016 BAPPENAS Deputy-Director Interview (in person) GV12 
 15/01/2016 BAPPENAS Deputy Director of SSTC Interview (in person) GV2 
 18/01/2016 Donor agency Vice Representative  Interview (in person) Dk5 
 19/01/2016 University of Indonesia  Professor Interview (in person) AC4 
 19/01/2016 Ministry of Finance  Deputy Director of Development Management  Interview (in person) GV6 
 21/01/2016 USAID Communication Officer  Interview (in person) DO3 
 21/01/2016 UNDP Program Assistant Interview (in person) IOi1 
 21/01/2016 CSOs Analyst Interview (in person) CS6 
 22/01/2016 Donor agency E-Gov specialist Interview (in person) Dk9 
 22/01/2016 Donor agency Lawyer Interview (in person) N/A 
 25/01/2016 Donor agency Country Director/Chief Representative Interview (in person) Dk7 
 26/01/2016 Open Data Labs Research Manager Interview (in person) CS2 
 26/01/2016 Open Data Labs Data Scientist Interview (in person) CS4 
 27/01/2016 Kantor Staf Presiden  Open Data Lea Interview (in person) GV8 
 27/01/2016 Kantor Staf Presiden Open Data Developer  Interview (in person) GV9 
 27/01/2016 SETNEG Head of Sub Division Interview (in person) GV1 
 28/01/2016 Bilateral Economic Cooperation Bureau Representative  Interview (in person) Dk8 
 28/01/2016 Research institute  Senior Researcher Interview (in person) Dk9 
 07/02/2016 A4DES Former A4DES Staff  Interview (Skype) DOi2 
      
June – August 2016 
 22/06/2016 IS Provider AIMS developer  Interview (in person) IT1 
 22/06/2016 Bandung Institute of Technology  Professor Interview (in person) AC3 
 22/07/2016 Freelancer AIMS developer  Interview (in person) IT1 
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No Date Organization (current/former) Position  Type of data collection Code 
 28/07/2016 Bilateral Economic Cooperation Bureau Representative  Interview (in person) Dk8 
 28/07/2016 Donor research institute  Senior Researcher Interview (in person) Dk9 
 02/08/2016 Donor agency  ODA Specialist Interview (in person) Dk4 
 03/08/2016 Aid for Development Effectiveness 
Secretariat (A4DES) 
AIMS Task force Interview (in person) IT3 
 05/08/2016 IS Providers, Donor agency AIMS developer, Donor data specialist, AIMS Task force Focus group FO1 
 12/08/2016 BAPPENAS Communication Officer Interview (in person) GV15 
 12/08/2016 BAPPENAS, SETNEG AIMS Task force  Focus group  FO2 
 15/08/2016 A4DES Former A4DES IT Manager Interview (in person) IT2 
 15/08/2016 Unit Kerja Presiden bidang Pengawasan 
dan Pengendalian Pembangunan (UKP4) 
Former Minister, Head of BRR, Head of UKP4 Interview (in person) GV16 
 15/08/2016 UKP4 Researcher Interview (in person) GV19 
 16/08/2016 Knowledge Sector Initiative (KSI)  Interview (in person) DOi9 
 17/08/2016 IS Provider Manager, Global Practice Interview (Skype) IT4 
 18/08/2016 A4DES Former A4DES Program Manager Interview (in person) DOi2 
 30/08/2016 AIMS Provider Manager Interview (Skype) IT5 
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Appendix 8.  Selected Snow-Balling 
 
 
  
377 
Appendix 9.  Publications Related to Thesis  
 
Some of the preliminary findings and analysis from my doctoral study were presented 
as conference proceedings earlier. All empirical data were collected and analysed by 
myself; papers were developed and written during my doctoral study in Information 
Systems and Innovation Group, Department of Management, London School of 
Economics and Political Science from 2013 to 2017.  
 
Conference Proceedings  
 
 Park, KR. (2017). An Analysis of Aid Information Management Systems in 
Developing Countries: Explaining the last two decades. In: Proceedings of the 50th 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Hawaii, pp.2580-2589. 
https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/handle/10125/41468  
An earlier version was presented in the Doctoral Colloquium of the Annual 
Conference on Digital Government Research, Shanghai in 2016.  
     
 Park, KR. and Li, B. (2017). Systems Failure for Good Reasons? – Understanding aid 
information management systems failure with Indonesia as the state actor in the 
changing global field of aid. In: Proceedings of the Information and Communication 
Technology for Development (ICT4D) 2017, Yogyakarta, pp 321-332.  
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-59111-7_27  
 
Related Works  
 
 Park, KR. (2016). Institutional Isomorphism and Organized Hypocrisy in Aid 
Information Management Systems: the Case of Indonesia. Extended abstract accepted 
and presented at the Annual Conference of Development Studies Association, Oxford.  
 
 Park, KR. (2016) Social Shaping of Aid Information Management Systems in 
Indonesia, Note accepted at ICTD 2016, Michigan.   
 
 Park, KR. (2015). Does Open Data Enhance Aid Coordination among Stakeholders? 
Paper accepted and presented at the 1st Open Data Research Symposium, Ottawa. 
 
 Wittemyer, R., Bailur, S., Anand, N., Park, KR., and Gigler, S. (2014). New Routes 
to Governance: A Review of Cases in Participation, Transparency, and 
Accountability. In: Closing the Feedback Loop: Can Technology Bridge the 
Accountability Gap? World Bank, Washington, DC.  
 
 
 
